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Preface
James McElvenny
University of Edinburgh
Notions of “form” have a long history in Western thought on language. When
linguistics emerged as an institutionalized discipline in the early decades of the
nineteenth century, its practitioners could look back on amultitude of senses and
uses of “form”, embedded in a variety of conceptual schemes. Even though many
nineteenth-century linguists sought to emphasize the novelty of their work and
imagined a radical breakwith the “pre-scientific” past (seeMorpurgoDavies 1998:
chap. 1), both their everyday practice and their theoretical views were permeated
by an intellectual inheritance stretching back over centuries, in which “form”
occupied a central place.
On a practical level, “form” has long been employed in a general sense to
refer to the perceptible outer appearances of linguistic expressions, especially
in connection with the inflectional variants of words. On a deeper theoretical
level, there has often been an effort to find underlying motivations for these
appearances and so conceive of “form” in senses loaded with metaphysical and
epistemological significance. This was the path taken by such movements as the
medieval Scholastics and the Enlightenment-era General Grammarians (see Law
2003: chaps. 8 and 11), whose successors in the ninetenth century – despite of-
ten disavowing their predecessors – were similarly engaged in a search for the
cognitive, biological or aesthetic bases of linguistic form.
A particularly prominent figure in nineteenth-century discussions of form in
language was Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835), whose writings served as the
point of departure for many later scholars. For Humboldt and his followers, there
is a sense in which all language is form and nothing else, in that language is the
representation we make of the world which, in Kantian fashion, we shape ac-
cording to our perceptive faculties. “The essence of language”, writes Humboldt
(1905 [1820]: 17), “consists in pouring the material of the phenomenal world into
James McElvenny. 2019. Preface. In James McElvenny (ed.), Form
and formalism in linguistics, iii–viii. Berlin: Language Science Press.
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the form of thoughts.” (Das Wesen der Sprache besteht darin, die Materie der Er-
scheinungswelt in die Form der Gedanken zu giessen.) A commonplace among the
Humboldtians was to claim that each language has its own characteristic form of
representation discernible in the form of its expressions. The task of the linguist
is to capture these forms and analyse them for what they reveal about the mental,
cultural and physical life of language speakers (see Morpurgo Davies 1998: chap.
5; Trabant 1986; McElvenny 2016).
The centrality of form to linguistic scholarship continued into the structural-
ist era. The Cours de linguistique générale of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913)
famously contains the assertion that “language is a form and not a substance” (la
langue est une forme et non une substance) (Saussure 1922 [1916]: 169). Following
on from the earlier Humboldtian position, a fundamental tenet of structuralism
is to conceive of languages as self-contained structures imposed on the material
substrate of the world. In describing phonological, grammatical and semantic ap-
paratuses of languages, the structuralist is engaged in an investigation of linguis-
tic form (for a classical structuralist account couched in these terms, see Lyons
1968: 54–70).
In the generativist era, Noam Chomsky’s (b. 1928) efforts to construct an intel-
lectual genealogy for his work involved an attempted appropriation of Humbold-
tian “form”, which rekindled awareness of these ideas in mainstream linguistics.
In his Cartesian linguistics, Chomsky (2009 [1966]: 69–77) sought to assimilate
Humboldtian form to his own innovation of generative rules as the underlying
system that allows for the creative use of finite means to produce an infinite array
of expressions.
The fecundity of “form” is visible not only in its polysemy, but also in the
family of derivatives it has brought into the world, including such terms as “for-
mal”, “formalized” and “formalist/formalism”. Like their parent, these terms defy
concise definition, although when applied as labels to directions in linguistic
research they generally imply concentration on internal systematicity to the ex-
clusion of external explanatory factors alongside an inclination to abstraction
and axiomatization – two tendencies that may in fact manifest independently
of one another (cf. Newmeyer 1998). As is explored in several contributions to
this volume, formalism as a research mindset is at home in many fields – such
as logic, mathematics, aesthetics and literary studies – and represents an area of
rich historical cross-pollination between linguistics and other disciplines.
In a separate but related sense, “formalism” as a count noun refers to the de-
vices employed in the representation and analysis of phenomena. Various for-
malisms in this sense, along with the theoretical views to which they are tied,
are also examined in the following chapters.
iv
1 Preface
In composing this volume, we have come together as historians of science and
philosophers of language and linguistics to take a critical look at notions of form
and their derivatives, and the role they have played in the study of language over
the past two centuries. We investigate how these notions have been understood
and used, and what this reveals about the way of thinking, temperament and
daily practice of linguists.
The first contribution to our volume is Judith Kaplan’s examination in Chapter
1 of the role of visual formalisms in representing genealogical relationships be-
tween languages. Engaging with some of the latest literature on material culture
in the history of science, Kaplan explores how visual diagrams and metaphors
helped in grasping relationships between languages in comparative-historical
grammar, from the nineteenth century up to the present day. She finds that the
tensions between the dominant models of language relationship – “tree” versus
“wave” models – were typically conceived in a visual mode, whether this was ex-
plicitly represented in a diagram or initially described only as a visual metaphor.
She observes shifting commitments to the realism of representations and mutual
influences between linguists and those working in neighbouring sciences.
In Chapter 2, James McElvenny compares competing nineteenth-century ac-
counts of “alternating sounds” – a cover term for the apparent unstable phono-
logical variation found in “exotic” languages – for the different attitudes towards
linguistic form that they reveal. The traditional view took alternating sounds to
be a feature of “primitive” languages, which were assumed to have not attained
the levels of formal arbitrariness characteristic of European languages. Franz
Boas (1858–1942) famously refuted this view by insisting that all languages have
fully developed phonologies and ascribed alternating sounds to perceptual error
on the part of outside observers. Georg von der Gabelentz (1840–1893), on the
other hand, embraced the phenomenon and wielded it against Neogrammarian
doctrine, the leading formal theory of his day. Both Boas’ and Gabelentz’ posi-
tions can claim a measure of theoretical sophistication and at the same time con-
tain obvious faults. McElvenny places these positions in their historical context
and considerswhy Boas’ viewwas sowell received in linguistics while Gabelentz’
was not.
Chapter 3 turns to the links between linguistic, psychological and, above all,
aesthetic theory in the work of Edward Sapir (1884–1939). In this chapter, Jean-
Michel Fortis provides a detailed exposition of Sapir’s writings on form in lan-
guage, concentrating in particular on Sapir’s notion of “form-feeling” and follow-
ing the trail – in some places explicitly marked by Sapir himself and in others
reconstructed by Fortis through terminological and conceptual detective work
v
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– to identify his sources of inspiration. Fortis places Sapir in a finely interlaced
intellectual network spanning across contemporary Gestalt psychology and Ger-
man art theory, with a heritage extending at least as far back as the Romantic
period around the turn of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century.
The focus on Sapir continues in Chapter 4, where Els Elffers critically com-
pares Sapir’s philosophy of science to that of Jerry Fodor (1935–2017) and exam-
ines the implications of their views for the treatment of linguistic form. Look-
ing at Sapir’s arguments against the “superorganic” in language scholarship and
Fodor’s proposal for “token physicalism”, she finds striking similarities between
the two, despite their very different intellectual contexts: Sapir was responding
to ideas in anthropology emerging from debates about the nature of the Geis-
teswissenschaften in contrast to the Naturwissenschaften, whereas Fodor was re-
sponding to logical positivism. Both scholars, however, concerned themselves
with how best to demarcate the individual sciences, with the specific example
of linguistics in mind, and settled on the principle of demarcating the sciences
not according to their subject matter but the way in which that subject matter is
conceived.
In Chapter 5, Bart Karstens undertakes a re-examination of the genesis of lin-
guistic structuralism and its early interactionwith Russian Formalism, a school of
literary analysis from the early twentieth century. Karstens engages in a detailed
investigation of the scholarly network around Roman Jakobson (1896–1982) and
his role as a vector for the transmission of Russian Formalism first to the Prague
School of structuralism in the 1920s and then later to the United States. While for-
malist doctrine was often heavily criticized by the early structuralists, Karstens
shows that various formalist views informed elements of early structuralism.
A similar story of “resistant embrace” is told in Chapter 6, where John Joseph
reconsiders the place of structuralism in French linguistics of the mid-twentieth
century, before the onset of the “post-structuralist” period. Focusing on such fig-
ures as Émile Benveniste (1902–1976), Henri Meschonnic (1932–2000), Aurélien
Sauvageot (1897–1988) and their closest contemporaries, Joseph demonstrates
that each of these figures has a complex relationship to structuralism: at times
criticizing the apparent premises of the approach while employing recognizably
structuralist forms of analysis, or publicly avowing structuralism while straying
away from its principles in their own work.
In Chapter 7, Ryan Nefdt surveys some of the radical changes in theory that
generative linguistics has undergone in its short history and derives from them
positive lessons for the philosophy of science. Amid the turbulence and insta-
bility that has characterized generative theory, he identifies one constant: the
vi
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formal structures in language that generative linguists describe. With the dura-
bility of this constant in mind, he advocates for a position of structural realism in
the philosophy of linguistics. Such a position, he argues, would allow linguists
to escape pessimistic meta-induction – that is, the notion that we must neces-
sarily expect our theories to one day be refuted and superseded – and allows
them to step away from the ontology of natural languages, thereby securing the
epistemological basis of the formal approach to language.
The gaze of the last two chapters in our volume is largely directed towards cur-
rent questions in the philosophy of linguistics, specifically the role of normativity
and authority in language description. After first tracing the origins of genera-
tive grammar in formalist approaches to logic, Geoffrey Pullum, in Chapter 8,
develops a new perspective on the classical distinction between prescriptivism
and descriptivism. He contends that the value of a grammatical description lies
in the precise, formalized account it provides of a particular set of linguistic prac-
tices, which can guide those who may wish to participate in those practices. In
serving as a guide, every grammar has normative force, but is not necessarily
prescriptive: the grammar-reader may follow its advice but is not compelled to
do so.
In Chapter 9, Nick Riemer identifies the ideologies of language he sees em-
bodied in the “unique form hypothesis”, the assumption that every linguistic
expression can be reduced to a single, universally agreed underlying represen-
tation. While linguists might seek to distance themselves from this hypothesis
and its implications, it is, argues Riemer, a recurring motif in linguistics, espe-
cially prominent in the teaching of the discipline. Its effects in education are
particularly pernicious, since teachers, due to the exigencies of pedagogy, can
usually offer no justification for the unique forms they present to their students
other than arbitrary authority, a practice that reinforces unreflective submission
to authority of all kinds, both at university and in life. Acknowledging that most
linguists would shudder at such consequences, Riemer pleads for greater open-
mindedness among linguists towards critique of the discipline’s foundations.
Although dealing with a broad range of topics from diverse perspectives and
in different styles, this volume is the product of concerted collective effort. Each
of us came to this project with existing ideas about form and formalism in linguis-
tics. These ideas we set out in draft chapters, which we discussed in person at a
meeting in Edinburgh in August 2018. After our meeting, we revised the chapters
to reflect the insights gained through our discussion. It is these revised chapters,
shaped and harmonized by our dialogue, that are contained in this volume.
vii
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Chapter 1
Visual formalisms in
comparative-historical linguistics
Judith Kaplan
University of Pennsylvania
This paper examines visual formalisms in comparative-historical linguistics from
the perspective of the history of science. It shows that visual aids representing
key understandings of language relationship have followed on pre-existing visual
metaphors. Using this observation to pry open canonical metaphors of language
relationship, it traces the ways in which these “visualizations” have both consoli-
dated existing research programs and opened up new lines of inquiry for students
and recent advocates of phylogenetic methods.
1 Introduction
From the interiority of brain atlases to the distant topography of Mars, from the
intimate realm of nano-images to the global modelling of climate data, a recent
swell in computerized visualization techniques is transforming the face of scien-
tific research, pedagogy, and generalist publications. Commenting on this trend
in 2014, Lorraine Daston judged computer simulations to be “the greatest revo-
lution in scientific empiricism since the canonization of observation and exper-
iment in the late seventeenth century” (Daston 2014: 321). These developments,
moreover, have had a profound impact on scholarship in Science and Technol-
ogy Studies: many have hailed the growing sophistication of digital visual culture
as an opportunity to re-think classical theories of scientific representation. Cru-
cially, their efforts have emphasized the materiality of scientific representation
in a turn away from questions of truth-as-correspondence and social infrastruc-
ture. For this new generation, the “material enactments” of scientific images are
to be taken just as seriously as the embodied practices and community norms
Judith Kaplan. 2019. Visual formalisms in comparative-historical linguistics.
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surrounding them, and a good deal more seriously than any quest to faithfully
represent the natural world (Coopmans et al. 2014: 3; see also Kusukawa 2016).
How might these conversations relate to the formalisms of comparative-his-
torical linguistics?1 Like economics, chemistry, and molecular biology, to name a
few arenas, diachronic linguistics has embraced and disseminated a raft of colour-
ful and complex data visualizations since the early 2000s (see, e.g., Gray et al.
2009). Thoughtful critics have entertained the possibility that a belated turn to
phylogenetic modelling (an iterative statistical approach to genealogical classi-
fication thought to have revolutionized biological systematics during the 1970s)
has made “tree thinking” viable again (Lopez et al. 2013). But wemay equally well
use the opportunity occasioned by this surge in tree thinking to reflect on the
status of visual culture and epistemology in the language sciences more gener-
ally. Looking at canonical visual topoi for understanding language relationship
over roughly the last 150 years, my chapter attempts to do just that.
Two points emerge from this line of questioning. First, it shows that well-
known diagrams of language relationship derive from pre-existing verbal de-
scriptions: words came first and were subsequently elaborated by pictures.2 This
chronology illuminates George Lakoff’s distinction between “conceptual” and
“image” metaphors in complicated ways (Lakoff 1987), where “metaphor” itself is
defined basically as a way of “understanding and experiencing one kind of thing
[…] in terms of another” (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 455). First, it shows that concep-
tual metaphors – understood to be systematic, quotidian, and extendable – and
image metaphors – more limited in scope, hewn from conventional mental im-
ages, and characterized by “one-shotmapping” – often interact and define one an-
other. This helps to explain the layering of arboreal and genealogical metaphors
of language relationship, for instance, in comparative-historical linguistics. This
double representation shows an inclination to capture the relatively abstract (the
genealogical) with the relatively concrete (the arboreal). Furthermore, it helps
us to understand that the fundamental metaphor here for conceptualizing rela-
tionship is language is a living thing. But even beyond this framework, the
example suggests that image metaphors can become progressively conventional
over time, to the point where they are systematic, quotidian, and extendable over
a wide range of phenomena. This point takes on extra significance in the context
1See James McElvenny’s preface to this volume. This chapter takes formalisms to be those “de-
vices employed in the representation and analysis of phenomena” (p. iv), as he elaborates.
2This point generalizes to the history of biology. Here, Peter Simon Pallas (1741–1811) is credited
with originating the tree of life (see his Elenchus Zoophytorum, 1766), though the visual was
at that point purely descriptive, not diagrammatic. The diagrammatic rendering of Pallas’ idea
came some 63 years later (Eichwald 1829).
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of science, where the extension of conventional mental images has contributed
to the development and communication of theories about the way the world ac-
tually works (see Boyd 1979: 357).
In these respects, historical linguistics looks very much like molecular biology.
Natasha Myers, tackling the latter tradition, traces the mechanical interventions
of structural biology and bio-engineering back to the circulation of machinic
metaphors for life during the 1870s (Myers 2015, “Introduction”). They provided
Thomas Henry Huxley, analogizing between the “protoplasmic theory of life”
and the “‘horology’ of a clock”, with a bridge from the “visible tangible and ma-
nipulable world” of everyday life to an “invisible, intractable world of biological
molecules” (Huxley 1880; Myers 2014: 157). Myers ultimately presents the idea
of the “molecular machine” as a powerful “material-semiotic actor” capable of
directing practitioners – initiates, especially — to travel certain lines of experi-
mental inquiry (Haraway 1991; Myers 2014: 165–168).
The development and persistence of foundational metaphors for vertical (lan-
guage is a living thing, entailing a genealogical concept of relationship) and
horizontal (language is a physical thing, entailing a proximity theory of re-
lationship) transfer in linguistics exhibit characteristics that are like the ones
Meyers describes. They are hybrid in nature (both verbal and visual) and they
feature prominently in texts that have served the consolidation of disciplinary
knowledge. Attending to these similarities points up the enduring significance
of texts, alongside material culture, in the history of science.
To focus on trees alone — rumoured to be the “most universally widespread of
all great cultural symbols” (Pietsch 2012: 1) – might sustain conclusions on the
specific conceptual ramifications of “biosystematic iconography” (see, e.g., Pul-
gram 1953: 69) and illuminate large scale patterns of change over time – from real-
ism to anti-realism, and lately back again. Indeed, numerous studies of these phe-
nomena already exist (see, e.g., Southworth 1964; Hoenigswald & Wiener 1987).
Instead, by drawing together trees and their alternatives in what follows, I hope
to show how such representations highlight certain notions of relationship while
removing others from view.
This, then, is the second point of the paper: visual metaphors and visual aids
of language relationship matter a great deal because they constrain objects and
programmes of research. I aim to establish this point by showing how difficult
it has been for linguists to visualize vertical and historical relationships at the
same time. While the advent of algorithms like NeighborNet in 2003 purported
to give researchers the tools needed to see variation within hierarchy – forests
and trees – there is a much longer history of failed attempts to capture both
3
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kinds of relationship in a single visualization (Bryant & Moulton 2004). Select
examples of this tension are woven throughout my discussion of canonical types
in what follows.
These points are developed over the next five sections. In §2, I consider classi-
ficatory diagrams lacking figural elaboration, in other words, lists and tables (on
diagrams, see Bigg 2016). My hope is that this starting point will de-naturalize
the turn to tree thinking in the second half of the nineteenth century. §3 then
introduces the dominant visualizations for understanding historical relationship
– trees and waves – manifest in works that have gone on to have canonical status
in pedagogy and historiography. Complementing previous studies of these texts,
this part of the paper emphasizes the relationship betweenwords and images and
highlights conceptual problems that were encountered during the 1870s in bring-
ing trees and waves meaningfully together. Next, in §4, I look at the uptake of
these visualizations in twentieth-century textbooks. How were they introduced,
drawn, and qualified? What attempts, if any, were made to see “the wave pro-
cess and the splitting process” simultaneously? §5 entertains the possibility that
computational models offered a new bifocal lens on these processes of linguis-
tic differentiation. The conclusion, in §6, offers a few ideas about the benefits of
integrating the historiography of science and linguistics when it comes to specif-
ically visual formalizations.
2 From tables to trees
MultiTree is a “digital library of language relationships” that was launched in
2006, funded by the United States National Science Foundation in 2012, and
hosted by Linguist List as recently as 2018 (http://new.multitree.org). The stated
aim of the project is to facilitate research in historical linguistics, “represent-
ing the most complete collection of language relationship hypotheses in a user-
friendly, visually-appealing, and interactive format”. As with many such projects,
it is a resource with ambitions vis-à-vis expert, interdisciplinary, and public audi-
ences alike. While the visualizations presented on the site may be young (among
other innovations, users can “climb” branches to view trees from individual nodes
in rectangular and radial layouts), the data is often rather old. A search on “Ma-
yan”, for instance, retrieves a potentially interactive visualization of a classifica-
tory note composed by the Swiss-American ethnologist Albert Samuel Gatschet
in the mid-1890s, shown in Figure 1. The entry is quite simple: it pictures Mayan
as a root node linked to six sub-groups (Huastec, Maya proper, Tzental, Mam,
Quiché, and Pokom).
4
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What is curious about this presentation is how unmotivated it makes the tree
actually seem. Whereas science studies scholars have directed painstaking atten-
tion to the implications of rooted (versus unrooted) trees, top-to-bottom (versus
left-to-right) orientation, branching patterns, and the like, the manipulability of
MultiTree undercuts all authorial intentionality on such fronts. Moreover, the
original publication of Gatschet’s account of the “Maya Linguistic Family” holds
nary a tree – a hierarchical outline format using Roman and Arabic numerals suf-
ficed just as well for his classificatory purposes (Gatschet & Campbell 1973: 250–
251). As Pietsch and others have noted, early arboreal representations merely
translated tables into trees, perhaps explaining some authors’ preference for their
growth from the left-hand margin of a printed page (Wells 1987: 51; Pietsch 2012:
7–10; Archibald 2014: 57).3
Why bother layering the biosystematic metaphor on top of the familial (see
Wells 1987: 49 on “mixed metaphors”, 53–54 on biological imports)? When it
comes to MultiTree, this choice not only fosters comparability across the data-
base, it also reflects architects’ stated commitments to aesthetics, access, and
“fun”. In other words, the visual is second nature to those already familiar with
the techniques of comparison and sub-grouping, and it recruits potential new-
comers to those particular methodological approaches.
This brief example is meant to suggest that tree thinking did not have a nec-
essary or inevitable trajectory in comparative-historical linguistics. Trees were
not the only means available for the organization of information on ancestor-
descendant relations.4 Rather, they have served additional rhetorical purposes,
taken up in the next section.
3This is to say nothing of the local influence from stemmatics in linguistics, dating back to the
sixteenth century, where trees typically drop down in a branching pattern from an original
manuscript positioned at the top of the page (see e.g. Maher 1966; Hoenigswald 1975; Cameron
1987). Setting questions of priority aside, Müller (1913 [1891]: vol. I, 537) encourages reflection
on the visual culture of linguistics in the late nineteenth-century, as his Lectures on the Science
of Language includes both genealogical trees and tables. In this example, the table gives Müller
more space for textual elaboration – allowing him to differentiate, for instance, between “liv-
ing” and “dead” languages, and to layer vertical groupings, reflecting geography, on top of
horizontal brackets, reflecting genetic affiliation.
4The case in biology on this point is somewhat different. In the case of Lamarck’s diagrams, for
example, the shift from tables (e.g. 1778) to trees (e.g. 1809) coincided with a definite concep-
tual shift (re. species mutability). The recognition of variation and change over time did not
correspond with the visual in linguistics (Archibald 2014: chap. 3).
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Figure 1: Gatschet (1895), according to Gatschet & Campbell (1973).This
is the radial view with descendants expanded. Available at: http://new.
multitree.org/trees/id/21186
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3 Canonical visual metaphors
1853 was a pivotal year with regard to the visualization of language relationship
— two of the earliest known language family trees were published that year.5 The
first, posthumously attributed to the Czech poet and translator Frantiek Ladislav
Čelakovský (1799—1852), depicted the historical differentiation of the Slavic lan-
guage family (Čelakovský 1853: 3; Priestly 1975). But Čelakovský’s contribution
has been overshadowed by the trees of August Schleicher (1821—1868). His first
such visualization depicted the Indo-Germanic family with thick branches and
weighty arboreal realism (see Maher 1966; Hoenigswald 1975; Koerner 1987). Sig-
nificantly, Geisler and List suggest that this diagram was a formalization, after
the fact, of Schleicher’s first published reflections on the comparative history of
languages some five years earlier (Schleicher 1848). Identifying relationship with
descent, and pinning that conception on the tree, they assert, Schleicher’s “new
theory of vertical language relations [was] directly reflected in the tree model”
that has since become so familiar (Geisler & List 2013: 114).
What more did Schleicher invest in his “schema” than a procedure for classi-
fication by two-way splits? Historians have emphasized notions of parsimony,
regularity (Geisler & List 2013: 117, 114–115), organicism (Wells 1987: 56), and pro-
grammatic ambition (Koerner 1975: 755). More concretely, Schleicher told readers
directly that branch length served as an indicator of “duration” and that the dis-
tance between branches was meant to indicate “degrees of relationship”, left oth-
erwise undefined (Schleicher 1853: 8). Going further, Schleicher emphasized the
importance of his trees for training newcomers to the field, and their projected
departure from older philological traditions:
In the present work an attempt is made to set forth the inferred Indo-
European original language side by side with all extant derived languages.
Besides the advantages offered by such a plan, in setting immediately before
the eyes of the student the final results of the investigation in a more concrete
form, and thereby rendering easier his insight into the nature of a particular
Indo-European language, there is, I think, another advantage of no less im-
portance, namely that it shows the baselessness of the assumption that the
non-Indian Indo-European languages were derived from Old-Indian (San-
skrit), an assumption which has not yet entirely disappeared. (Schleicher
1967 [1871]: 94; my emphasis)
5In fact, the “Arbre Généologique” by Felix Gallet (ca. 1807) is often cited as the first tree of
language relationship (Hellström 2012: 242).This chronology roughly alignswith the biological
context, where the first known tree diagram of relationship was published by Augustin Augier
in 1801.
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My emphasis on the first “advantage” described in this passage, the pedagog-
ical advantage, presents the tree diagram as tool for summing up and dissemi-
nating research findings to those just entering the field — for Schleicher it was
decidedly not a means to new linguistic knowledge. References to the “eyes” and
“insight” of the student recall Daston’s (2008) depiction of the “all-at-once-ness”
of disciplined perception, seen here to be very much in the making through the
association between pedagogy and disciplinary differentiation. That said, phy-
logeny does not appear to be a primary goal, in and of itself. Rather, it is cele-
brated as a means to better understand a “particular” language under investiga-
tion. Schleicher’s philosophy of science did not necessarily demand knowledge
of a general sort (Nyhart 2012). His visual epistemology appears to have involved
a kind of inward tendency, from sight to insight, both in the cultivation of the
student and the discipline.
By the early 1870s, the outlines of the Indo-European family had been drawn,
giving comparativists considerable cause for celebration. Nevertheless, excep-
tions persisted. As a young professor of German and Slavic at the University
of Bonn, Johannes Schmidt (1843—1901), a student of Schleicher’s, tackled these
difficulties head-on. In a 31-page monograph on The Relationships of the Indo-
Germanic Languages [Die Verwandtschaftsverhältnisse der indogermanischen Spra-
chen], he demonstrated that unique resemblances can be identified between any
two Indo-European branches, and that these tend to increase with geographic
proximity. In light of this observation, he argued that linguistic changes spread
horizontally like waves on a pool of geographically distributed speech, rather
than vertically, through a process of strict cleavage and differentiation. With
each change propagated individually, he projected an image of successive waves
moving out and interacting from a variety of centres – a network of linguistic
features differentiated through space.
Though Schmidt did not give readers a diagram of his Wellentheorie in 1872,
he did picture it in words.6 With the following passage, Schmidt invited readers
to join him in an image metaphor:
If we want now to represent the relationships of the Indo-Germanic lan-
guages in a picture that illustrates the origin of their diversity, then we
must completely abandon the idea of a family tree. I would like to put a
6The critique of Schleicher’s tree thinking through alternative visual metaphors came even ear-
lier in Hugo Schuchardt’s 1870 lecture “On the Classification of the Romance Dialects”, where
he speaks of killing the tree by binding together numerous branches and twigs with “horizontal
lines” (Schuchardt 1928 [1870]: 11).
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picture of a wave in its place, which diffuses concentrically with the dis-
tance from the mid-point in ever weaker rings. It does not matter that our
language area makes no circle, rather a circle-sector at best, with the most
primitive language at one end, not the centre […]. There were not initially
any boundaries between languages within this domain, two arbitrarily dis-
tant dialects, A and X, were connected to each other by continuous vari-
eties, B, C, D, etc. […]. (Schmidt 1872: 27–28; my emphasis)7
With references to “pictures”, geometry, and dialect labels, this passage reads
as though it were captioning a printed diagram, though Schmidt did not provide
one at first to accompany the text. Indeed, he went on to challenge the visual alto-
gether – asserting the priority of linguistic data over any such formalization. As
far as he was concerned, “[p]ictures have only marginal value in science, and if
the one chosen here is displeasing to someone, he can replace it at will with some-
thing better without changing the results of the foregoing analysis” (Schmidt
1872: 28).8
Perhaps this attitude partly explains why his first attempt to provide a visual
aid, as reproduced in Figure 2, lagged some three years behind his introduction of
the image metaphor. Perhaps this reluctance derived from problems inherent to
the visualization of horizontal relationship. Geisler & List (2013: 116–117) suggest
as much through their side-by-side presentation of several “fruitless” attempts to
draw an alternative to Schleicher’s trees – from overlapping circles (Hirt 1905),
to the spokes of a wheel (Meillet 1908), to early networks (Bonfante 1931), and
alternating boundaries (Bloomfield 1933). I turn now to the challenging case of
another visual metaphor that attempted to capture vertical and horizontal rela-
tionship simultaneously.
Johann Heinrich Hübschmann (1848–1908) heeded Schmidt’s call to data-driv-
en analysis in his comparative work on Armenian. Like Schmidt, Hübschmann
7“Wollen wir nun die verwantschaftsverhältnisse der indogermanischen sprachen in einem
bilde darstellen, welches die entstehung irer verschidenheiten veranschaulicht, so müssen wir
die idee des stammbaumes gänzlich aufgeben. Ich möchte an seine stelle das bild der welle
setzen, welche sich in concentrischen mit der entfernung vom mittelpunkte immer schwächer
werdenden ringen ausbreitet. Dass unser sprachgebiet keinen kreis bildet, sondern höchstens
einen kreissector, dass die ursprünglichste sprache nicht im mittelpunkte, sondern an dem
einen ende des gebietes ligt, tut nichts zur sache […]. Sprachgrenzen innerhalb dises gebietes
gab es ursprünglich nicht, zwei von einander beliebig weit entfernte dialekte des selben A und
X waren durch continuierliche varietäten B, C, D, u. s. w. mit einander vermittelt.”
8“Bilder haben in der wissenschaft nur ser geringen wert, und missfallen jemand die hier gewäl-
ten, so mag er sie nach belieben durch treffendere ersetzen, an dem ergebnisse der vorstehen-
den untersuchung wird dadurch nichts geändert.”
9
Judith Kaplan
Figure 2: Schmidt (1875: 199). The text goes on to tell readers that the
radia between lettered points should be read as isogloss lines, carving
out dialects like pieces of a pie.
studied with Schleicher at the University of Jena, though he later completed his
degree under the Iranian philologist Martin Haug (1827—1876) at the University
of Munich. Having defended a dissertation on Avestan and Old Persian philology
in 1872, he turned in the next three years to an investigation of the relationship
between Iranian and Armenian in pursuit of his Habilitation at the University
of Leipzig. Initially, Hübschmann was only interested in Armenian insofar as it
contributed to an understanding of the internal phylogeny of the Iranian family
of languages. In line with the general consensus of the day, Hübschmann had,
up to this point, taken a high degree of shared vocabulary as evidence of the fact
that Armenian was part of Iranian (Schmitt 1976).
His postdoctoral studies culminated in the 1967 [1875] paper “On the Position
of Armenian in the Circle of the Indo-Germanic Languages” [“Ueber die Stel-
lung des Armenischen im Kreise der indogermanischen Sprachen”]. Here Hüb-
schmann sorted out non-native parts of the lexicon and analysed the remaining
10
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“native” words, which allowed him to identify strata in the historical develop-
ment of the language. His findings compelled his colleagues to recognize Arme-
nian as an independent branch of the Indo-European family — not a sub-group
of Iranian after all.
In the 1967 [1875] essay, Hübschmann demonstrated an extensive political his-
tory of contact and exchange between native Armenian-speaking and Iranian-
speaking groups, suggesting that the similarities traditionally invoked in support
of the “prevailing” view of common descent were in fact derived from the sector
of borrowed, not inherited, vocabulary. Working back and forth between ety-
mological and phonological evidence, Hübschmann next established provisional
sound laws unique to Armenian, which undermined long-standing confidence
in what were thought to be cognates between the languages in question. From
the lexicon, Hübschmann then moved to grammatical considerations – the in-
flectional morphology of Iranian and Armenian, which exhibited many surface
similarities. He attributed these to processes of analogical change – a psycholog-
ical process of association tending to regularize words with similar meanings or
inflectional paradigms, a mechanism of convergence.
Adding further phonological evidence to the balance against family relation-
ship in this case, Hübschmann came to a fairly radical position, one that priori-
tized horizontal over vertical relationship:
Through the last part of our investigation, such a tight bond haswithout ques-
tion been constructed between Armenian and European that it would be eas-
ier to tear Armenian from Aryan than from European. Among the European
languages it stands closest to Balto-Slavic […]. In this situation, friends of the
family tree […] will certainly be inclined to separate Armenian completely
from Aryan and make it a purely European language. Against this view I
might first refer to the fact that Armenian does not take part completely in
the split of a and r […].
If further research makes this conclusion definitive, then the impossibility of
setting up a family tree of the Indo-European languages would be strikingly
demonstrated. For Armenian would be the connecting ring of both parts in
the chain of the Aryan-Balto-Slavic languages, not a branch between two
branches. And then too the family tree, which Johannes Schmidt’s vigorous
might has overturned, would remain lying forever […].
But if Armenian is to be the connecting member between Iranian and Balto-
Slavic, between Aryan and European, then in my opinion it must have played
the role of an intermediary at a time when they were still very similar to
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one another, when the historical period had not yet drawn the present sharp
boundary between them, but when they were still related to one another as
dialects. (Hübschmann 1967 [1875]: 183)
Like all the examples encountered thus far, Hübschmann appealed first to a
visual metaphor in this passage rather than a visual aid. Further, his discussion
highlights inherent difficulties in drawing vertical and horizontal relationship
together. To see Armenian as a link in the chain between Aryan and European,
it was necessary to focus in on “a time when they were still very similar”. If trees
lacked, fundamentally, a feeling for spatially distributed variation, waves were
completely without a sense of timing.
Though this painstaking work secured Hübschmann’s reputation as the “fa-
ther” of modern Armenian linguistics – a doubly genealogical claim – previous
accounts have not had much to say about the degree to which his positivism
paradoxically threatened to topple his faith in the comparative method. In a pa-
per “On the pronunciation and transcription of Old Armenian”, published the
following year, Hübschmann pushed Schmidt’s visual metaphor still further:
[I]t seems that languages can have similar sound systems without being re-
lated to one another, that the sound system of a language can be conditioned
by outside influences, i.e. local influences, leading one to infer the congru-
encies between the sound systems of two languages less from their origin
as from their local gathering. This statement seems to me for the determi-
nation of the genealogy of languages to be important and in linguistics to
reward further success than heretofore was the case […] if Iranian languages
on the border of India show Indic sound similarities, must one therefore be-
lieve that they stand nearer to the Indic than the other Iranian languages?
(Hübschmann 1876: 73)9
Evidently, the dictates of historical fidelity required taking vertical and hor-
izontal relationship into consideration. But this proved remarkably difficult to
capture visually. Hübschmann’s best practice was to toggle back and forth be-
tween the two.
9“Aus alledem ergiebt sich, dass Sprachen das gleiche Lautsystem haben können, ohnemiteinan-
der verwandt zu sein, dass das Lautsystem einer Sprache von äusseren, d. h. localen Einflüssen
bedingt sein kann, und man aus der Gleichheit des Lautsystems zweier Sprachen weniger auf
ihre Verwandtschaft als auf ihr locales Beisammensein zu schliessen hat. Dieser Satz scheint
mir für die Beurtheilung der Verwandtschaftsverhältnisse der Sprachen wichtig zu sein und
in der Linguistik mehr Beachtung zu verdienen als es bisher der Fall war. […] wenn iranische
Sprachen an der Grenze Indiens indische Lauteigenthümlichkeiten […] zeigen, hat man darum
zu glauben, dass sie dem Indischen näher als die andern iranischen Sprachen stehen?”
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4 Metaphors and visual aids in twentieth-century
textbooks
The canonical topoi just considered enjoyed a hearty afterlife in the Disziplin-
geschichte of the late nineteenth century, and its review in textbooks thereafter.
This section looks at the deployment of visual aids in that genre, building on
previous studies of print and pedagogy in the history of chemistry, physics, and
biology (Bertomeu-Sánchez et al. 2002; Kuhn 1962; Hopwood 2015). This liter-
ature has shown how scientific textbooks specialized from the late eighteenth
century on, emphasizing their “use in formal teaching and their pedagogical and
scientific authority”; their significance for disciplinary self-fashioning; and their
“major role” in the making of interactional expertise, that is “the worldviews of
citizens, what they know, what they do, what they are” (Simon 2016: 475, 479;
Johns 1998: 406–408).10
Leonard Bloomfield’s Languagemet all of these criteria: it served as a provoca-
tive introduction to descriptive linguistics in 1933, asserting a new programwhile
disciplining perception (Bloomfield & Hoijer 1965: v-vi). Comparative-historical
material, notably, bookends the text: it appears first as a kind of “preface his-
tory”, recounting progress towards the modern “scientific” study of language
and, in the second half of the book, aligning with Bloomfield’s priorities and
programmatic vision. Far from a straightforward reproduction of earlier works,
the presentation of historical research in the later part was designed for Amer-
ican students – those just beginning linguistics “who often d[o] not have the
background in Indo-European languages” necessary to “understand texts that
present methodology very largely in terms of concrete problems drawn from the
older Indo-European languages” (Bloomfield & Hoijer 1965: vi). Put differently,
the update shifted from exemplars to models, in line with what could reasonably
be assumed of a new generation of students.
What, then, was textually self-evident, and what did Bloomfield think needed
elaboration through the use of visual aids? By far the most common diagram
in Language is the table, followed by maps (eight), and only then abstract visu-
alizations of the sort laid out in the previous section. Interestingly, Bloomfield
10Josep Simon (2016) contends that “textbook” had come to mean a book conceived for instruc-
tional purposes within formal education by themiddle of the nineteenth century, picking up on
the earlier convention of designating canonical works, excerpted with spaces for students’ in-
terlineal notes, as texts.Thus, he implies a direct connection between the history of note-taking
practices and the development of formal, printed textbooks. This contextualizes John Joseph’s
(2017) compelling discussion of the ambiguous relationship between pictures and words in
Saussure’s Cours de linguistique généale within a broader history of science and education.
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identifies visual metaphors and visual aids in teasing out the implications of the
former. Students read:
The comparative method assumes that each branch or language bears inde-
pendent witness to the forms of the parent language, and that identities or
correspondences among the related languages reveal features of the parent
speech. This is the same thing as assuming, firstly, that the parent commu-
nity was completely uniform as to language, and secondly, that this parent
community split suddenly and sharply into two or more daughter commu-
nities, which lost all contact with each other. Often enough, the compar-
ative method assumes successive splittings of this sort in the history of
a language […]. The comparative method thus shows us the ancestry of
languages in the form of a family tree, with successive branchings […].
(Bloomfield 1933: 311)
This passage rehearses standard criticisms of the tree model — namely, ances-
tral uniformity and clean two-way splits — showing it to have heuristic power
despite being unrealistic. Thus, it signals an advance over nineteenth-century
understanding. “The earlier students of Indo-European did not realize that the
family-tree diagram was merely a statement of their method; they accepted the
uniform parent languages and their sudden and clear-cut splitting as historical re-
alities” (Bloomfield 1933: 311). In this way, Bloomfield subordinated Schleicher’s
visual aid to a method of inference. Translating this into Lakoff’s terminology,
he moved an “image metaphor” towards the “conceptual” register.
This shift was reflected in the highly idealized visual that accompanied the
text, shown in Figure 3. The lengths and distances between branches are not
particularly measured, and the labels refer to groupings and periods rather than
specific language entities. Bloomfield was an anti-realist tree thinker, to be sure:
the diagrams above depict relations but not relatives.
In the text, Bloomfield persistently refers tree thinking to “older scholars”, set-
ting off his positive variationist approach. To complement a series of examples
highlighting exceptions to the assumption of clean two-way splits, he adapted a
visual aid from the Germanist and linguistic palaeontologist Otto Schrader (1855–
1919), shown in Figure 4.
The citation to Schradermay at first seem surprising, given that the authors dif-
fer in their selection of “special resemblances”, hence, group assignments (Bloom-
field 1933: 317). However, both authors allow that the groups could be drawn dif-
ferently depending on the forms taken into consideration. Bloomfield explained
his image in Figure 5 – containing elements of uniformity and variation – in
14
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Figure 3: Bloomfield (1933: 312)
Figure 4: Schrader (1890: 65)
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Figure 5: Bloomfield (1933: 316)
terms of Schmidt’s “wave-hypothesis”, which he endorsed. “Indeed”, he wrote
favourably, it is “the picture presented by the local dialects in the areas we can
observe” (Bloomfield 1933: 317). Charles Hockett (1916–2000), writing in a more
richly visual idiom some twenty-five years later, would refer a reprint of the
same image to overlaid notions of vertical and horizontal relationship (cf. Hüb-
schmann 1967 [1875]).
Bloomfield’s influence can be seen throughout the pages of Hockett’s textbook,
A Course in Modern Linguistics (1959 [1958]). Hockett introduced his subject in
rigorous terms: “Linguistic research can accomplish nothing unless it is strictly
inductive” (Hockett 1959 [1958]: 7). Such primacy of “actual usage, as determined
by observation” was born out in the sequence of chapters, which proceed from
the smallest units of synchronic observation – defined through examples and pre-
sented with rules for exacting description – to the more complex, with chapters
on language diachrony and other unobservables saved for the end. Indeed, he did
not even mention the distinction between synchronic and diachronic linguistics
in the book until Chapter 36.
There are clues to Hockett’s visual epistemology throughout the text, with
bearing on the way he called upon diagrams of language relationship. First, the
text shows a remarkable tolerance for the kind of idealization any visualization of
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language relationship would require. Elaborating on the “design of a language”
through its five subsystems, he allowed, for instance, that no description “can
claim more than a kind of by-and-large accuracy” (Hockett 1959 [1958]: 139). He
similarly flagged the underdetermined and heuristic nature of grammatical de-
scription in connection with immediate constituents a few pages later. The fol-
lowing passage is perhaps unexpected behaviourist fare:
[…] grammatical analysis is still, to a surprising extent, an art: the best and
clearest descriptions of languages are achieved not by investigators who
follow some rigid set of rules, but by those who through some accident
of life-history have developed a flair for it […]. Consequently, the reader
will find in these sections many an example which the writer has handled
in one way, but which might also be handled in some other way […]. In-
deed, the reader should be alert for possible instances where conciseness of
statement has unintentionally concealed uncertainty. (Hockett 1959 [1958]:
147)
Reflections like these contextualize his use of visual metaphors (e.g., the per-
sistent reference to phonemic “shape”) and visual aids in the text (Hockett 1959
[1958]: 130–132). With respect to the latter, Hockett’s use of two-dimensional
abstract representations involved explicit pedagogical aims. For example, in the
notes to his chapter on “Canonical Forms and Economy”, Hockett taught stu-
dents how to see the three diagrams in Figure 6, which were most often used
to represent complex morphological systems — the “maze”, “freightyard”, and
“rollercoaster” (Hockett 1959 [1958]: 290–292; Harris 1951; Hoenigswald 1950).
Hockett told readers that the example providedwas derived from the inflection
of gendered Spanish adjectives, a pattern “too simple to need diagrammatic dis-
play”, thus a “good one with which to demonstrate the diagramming techniques”.
The words accompanying these images train students in the techniques of visual
analysis – navigating the maze, for example, one proceeds “from left to right,
never crossing any lines”; once in the freightyard, there is “no turning back”; and
while riding the rollercoaster, “one can turn downwherever there is a curved top,
but not an angle”. Thus, Hockett formalized morphological rules, rendered them
exhaustive, and made them intelligible for beginners.The penultimate paragraph
on the matter provides lessons in critical visual analysis. Here Hockett pointed
out that vertical alignment in the first two diagrams can be “read” as indicating “a
single positional class”, whereas the “rollercoaster has the advantage of listing all
the inflectional affixes along the bottom for ease of checking against inadvertent
duplications”.The discussion concludes with an exercise that recruits students to
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Figure 6: Hockett (1959 [1958]: 291)
the practice of diagrammatic visualization, suggesting that this was not merely
a means of summing up, but rather an active part of research practice.
Howwas this visual epistemology brought to bear on questions of language re-
lationship? Hockett defined relationship in terms of common origin: divergence
being the key factor, not time. Accordingly, he made a sharp distinction between
linguistic and biological phylogeny – “languages do not ‘reproduce’ either sexu-
ally or asexually”, instead, they “simply continue” (Hockett 1959 [1958]: 369; Hock-
ett’s emphasis). For this reason, familial metaphors to do with parenthood and
ancestry appeared “shaky” in his estimation. “At a given point in time,” he con-
cluded,
a set of related languages is merely what would be a set of dialects of a
single language except that the links between the dialects have become
very tenuous or have been broken […]. The mere fact of relationship thus
becomes of secondary importance. More important is the degree of rela-
tionship. (Hockett 1959 [1958]: 369; Hockett’s emphasis)
The first tree diagrams to appear in the text serve methodological rather than
representational ends. Grouping together Proto-Germanic and its descendants
without concern for sub-grouping, two sets of arrows in Figure 7 instead illus-
trate the logic of traditional and inverted reconstruction.
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Figure 7: Hockett (1959 [1958]: 514)
A more realistic tree diagram, reproduced in Figure 8, appears a few pages
later, qualified, with tips on interpretation.
Of this canonical image, Hockett wrote:
The vertical dimension represents time, increasing as one goes from bot-
tom to top. G[othic] has been placed earlier than the other four languages
because our records of it date from an earlier century. Read literally, the
diagram would suggest that, after Proto-Germanic, first the speakers of
what was to become G split off from the rest […], that somewhat later the
speakers of what was to become O[ld] I[celandic] moved away from the
rest, and that, finally, the remaining group split three ways — the splits,
in each case, being more or less sudden. Now such literal interpretation is
not contrary to what sometimes happens in history. But it is dangerous to
assume that this is always what happened, because there are other ways
in which divergence can come about. (Hockett 1959 [1958]: 519–521)
This passage begins with extremely rudimentary visual directives, a reminder
of the pedagogical aim of the work. It also says something — through reference
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Figure 8: Hockett (1959 [1958]: 519)
to “our records” – about the research labour that goes into “cooking” the data
summarized by the family tree. From there, readers are directed through a “lit-
eral” reading of the tree. The important point here is that insights on historical
process are being extracted from a given pattern of historical relationship.While a
bracketed table might capture a similar classification of language relationship, it
would be harder to read in such a richly narrative way. This is because it would
lack the “entailments” of the underlying image and conceptual metaphors we
have been tracing. Ultimately, Hockett concluded, the tree was a possible, but
unrealistic way of representing relationship. “It is imperative for us to remember
that our reconstruction wears a disguise of greater preciseness than can validly
be ascribed to it, but to throw it out for this reason would be folly” (Hockett 1959
[1958]: 523). He proposed the alternative illustrated in Figure 9 instead.
The diagram in Figure 9, in effect, zooms in on the base of the previous tree,
looking at it through a series of cross-sectional slices like a flip-book. A succes-
sion of slices was Hockett’s best effort to visualize relationship simultaneously
in space and time. It culminated in the recapitulation of Bloomfield’s diagram
of dialect geography, formulated here in the context of a methodological argu-
ment rather than a list of discrepant data. This reflects another step away from
exemplary towards formal instruction.
In his overview of scientific textbooks, Josep Simon calls for a transdisciplinary
exploration of the genre, beyond a traditional emphasis on disciplines and dis-
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Figure 9: Hockett (1959 [1958]: 520)
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cipline-formation in connection with this site of “normal science” (Simon 2016:
475). In partial fulfilment of that call, the final example in this section pivots from
general introductions to a textbook devoted specifically to the sub-discipline in
question, Theodora Bynon’s Historical Linguistics (1977). Significantly, Bynon in-
troduces the twentieth-century organization of linguistic knowledge with an ex-
tended image metaphor:
The representation of the evolution of a language as consisting in a suc-
cession of discrete states is no more a true reflection of the situation than
is the representation of a circle by a number of straight lines connecting
successive points around its circumference. For, however large a number
of such points are taken the resulting figure will never be a genuine circle
and, in the same way, however many language sates are considered over
a given period their succession will never provide a true picture of the un-
broken continuity of a language in time. It is thus due to the limitations of
our methodology that we are faced with the rather absurd situation that
language evolution, although observable retrospectively in its results, ap-
pears to totally elude observation as a process while it is actually taking
place. (Bynon 1977: 2; Bynon’s emphasis)
So much for any attempt to comprehend, let alone visualize or represent, his-
torical products and processes realistically. Accepting this fate, Bynon accord-
ingly opts for a “two-fold strategy”. First, she presents models of linguistic de-
velopment from the neogrammarians to the transformational-generative school.
“We must study [the] results [of language change] as abstracted from the gram-
matical descriptions of successive language states and […] of related languages”
(Bynon 1977: 6). Second, she turns to the “question of the connection between
language change and social and geographical space” (Bynon 1977: 6). Rather than
worry about the historical fidelity of either approach to the study of relationship
and differentiation, this text holds them apart schematically, as shown in Fig-
ure 10.
According to this overall scheme, questions of the linear development of lan-
guage through time – and, with them, trees – are isolated from those pertaining
to internal variation and contact. Trees appear in her narrative as a bridge from
the consideration of change within individual languages to changes between
them. For Bynon, trees are not primary, they do the work of summing up the
“rules” of differentiation – a sign of her times. That said, she emphasizes their vi-
sual interpretation more than either Bloomfield or Hockett. Describing a down-
ward branching tree linking English, German, the Greek dialects, Persian and
22
1 Visual formalisms in comparative-historical linguistics
Figure 10: Bynon (1977: 173)
Sanskrit back to Proto Indo-European through a series of innovations, students
read:
In the tree diagram the horizontal dimension […] represents “space” in a
much idealized form – not in an absolute geographical sense but rather
in terms of contact or absence of contact between speech communities –
whereas the vertical dimension represents time. The branches of the tree
then represent channels of transmission, that is the paths along which in-
novations have been transmitted, and whenever a branch divides into two
or more this implies the splitting up of a speech community indicated by
the fact that subsequent innovations are no longer shared. (Bynon 1977: 66)
Clearly, Bynon embraced anti-realistic tree thinking, though here she invests
more words in training students to see this model than her structuralist predeces-
sors. Notably, she resists the urge to conclude her discussion with an all-inclusive
diagram of the Indo-European family, opting for a two-page chart instead, shown
in Figure 11.
This diagram, she concludes, has the advantage of not overstating putative re-
lationships, designed, as it was, to bring “together loosely according to branches
and periods the main languages of the Indo-European family for which actual
material survives.” As for the tree model, Bynon states, it should be reserved for
“the display of rules relating successive systems” (Bynon 1977: 70). At roughly
the same time as phylogenetic modelling was taking off in biology, Bynon was
relinquishing the analogy between languages and biosystematics entirely.
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Figure 11: Bynon (1977: 68). This is half of the chart, which stretches
over two pages.
24
1 Visual formalisms in comparative-historical linguistics
5 From anti-realism to realism in the digital era
At a 1973 conference on the topic of “Lexicostatistics in Genetic Linguistics”, con-
vened in Montreal, Paul Black presented a paper on the adaption of Multidimen-
sional Scaling (mds) to historical linguistics, which built on a prior collaboration
with Isidore Dyen and Joseph Kruskal of Bell Labs. His workwas an early attempt
to model hybrid transfer computationally using data collected by others. Black
endorsed the controversial use of statistics in comparative-historical linguistics,
stating by way of introduction that metrical analysis of linguistic distance “per-
mits amultidimensional recognition of relations” (Black 1973: 43–92).Thus, Black
adapted canonical metaphors of language relationship – forged on the basis of
Indo-European data in a two-dimensional environment – to a new geographic
and conceptual space.
Carried over from the world of marketing, psychology, and political science,
Black described mds as a way to see continuous variation (“cline structure”)
within a hierarchy of discrete classes (the evolutionary tree). The objective was
hybrid in nature:
While a “family tree” diagram or some other representation of a hierarchi-
cal subgrouping is an obviously appropriate way of describing the tempo-
ral hierarchy of linguistic splits through which a group of languages may
have evolved from a common ancestral protolanguage, multidimensional
scaling can be used to investigate and describe the spatial variation which
originates in the wave-like spread of linguistic innovations within a single
language, and which may also persist within the evolutionary tree to an
extent sufficient to hamper the correct inference of this tree. (Black 1973:
43)
According to Black’s discussion, themethodwas new in that it began by testing
– rather than assuming or imposing – the fit between tree classifications, wave
models, and the actual language data (in this case, pertaining to Bikol, Lower
Niger dialects, Konsoid, and Salish) theyweremeant to represent. From there, dis-
tances between each of the entities under consideration (dialects or languages)
were scaled so as to approximate “actual physical distances”. Looking at Bikol
dialects, for example, one might figure percentages of lexicostatistical retention,
subtract each from one hundred percent, and map each percentage point of dif-
ference as a distance of one tenth of an inch. A common retention of 79%, as in
the case of Sorsogon and Masbate, for instance, might yield a one-dimensional
distance of 2.1 inches according to this method. Black continued,
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Oas might then be added to the picture by placing it 3.1 inches (corre-
sponding to 69%) from Sorsogon and 4.2 inches (corresponding to 58%)
from Masbate; these relationships would then be well represented in two-
dimensional space as a triangle. (Black 1973: 52)
This was reasonably straightforward. But, as Black pointed out, the procedure
becomes increasingly unwieldy as more dimensions are added to the mix, such
that the representation “might prove to be difficult to visualize and interpret”
should dimensionality not be “restricted to some very small number” (Black 1973:
53). With these words, Black was confronting the difficulty of reconciling lan-
guage data with formalized relationships, fidelity with the “all-at-onceness” of
disciplined perception. Even if mds was escaping the constraints of the printed
page as a research tool, Black was still bound to two dimensions when it came to
the communication of research findings. In order to flatten a full set of distance
measures into a two-dimensional representation with some degree of intelligibil-
ity, it was necessary to adjust the original percentages in a rationalized way that
might be traced back to the original data. Electronic computers were thought to
have the power needed to pull this off. Using the kyst program,11 Black specified
the range of possible dimensions, a rule for scaling, and the lexicostatistc data,
ultimately yielding images like those in Figure 12.
Figure 12: Black (1973)
11kyst, pronounced “kissed”, was one of several mds programs available in the 1970s. The name
derives from those of its architects: Kruskal, Young, Shepard, and Torgerson (see Kruskal et al.
1973).
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On the left-hand side of Figure 12, we have the distances (inverse percentage
agreements) between twelve dialects scaled down to two dimensions from a po-
tential total of eleven. The stress index given (.069) is a measure of how far these
adjusted values differ from the original data fed into the program.The right-hand
side shows these values projected into geographic space, with arrows indicating
differences between scaled values and places where the dialects were actually
observed.
This last point highlights the extent to which representational validity was of
concern to those working with mds. The iterative nature of this method – tinker-
ing with dimensions and scaling to preserve fidelity to the data – foregrounded
the issue of realism in a way that pre-computational diagramming did not. If ear-
lier examples primarily served rhetorical, didactic, or programmatic functions,
mds thus can be seen to align with the advent of a new period of experimental
visualization in comparative-historical linguistics.
In this respect, mds looks like a forerunner of the use of phylogenetic networks
in linguistics (Stevens 2013). Russell Gray, for instance, a self-described “evolu-
tionist” and the newly appointed director of the Max Planck Institute for the
Science of Human History in Jena, has zealously promoted the use of such prob-
abilistic modelling techniques in linguistics, linking their powers of discovery to
new scientific frontiers (e.g., http://www.mpi.nl/events/nijmegen-lectures-2014/
lecture-videos, accessed 2 August 2018). Cheerfully labelling this work lexomics,
Gray has sought to model and test tacit assumptions about comparative-histori-
cal methods, in addition to reconstructing family trees.
One of the programs commonly used in such work is SplitsTree, a tool for
producing visualizations of phylogenetic networks (Greenhill et al. 2010), as in
Figure 13. The idea, according to architects Daniel Huson (a specialist in bioin-
formatics at Tübingen University) and David Bryant (a mathematician from the
University of Auckland) is to “use split networks, which are not trees, to repre-
sent phylogenetic signals that, for the most part, originate from trees” (Huson
& Bryant 2006: 254–267). Through an iterative modelling process, this program
prioritizes fidelity to the givens – acknowledging the realistic complexity of his-
torical relationship while revealing the presence of latent trees to “plain sight”.
6 Conclusion
This paper has surveyed visual metaphors and visual aids of language relation-
ship and divergence from the mid-nineteenth century to the early 2000s. It has
shown that, until recently, visual metaphors took priority over visual aids. In
27
Judith Kaplan
Figure 13: Greenhill et al. (2010: 2445)
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some cases – Schmidt’s most notably –we have seen the very utility of visual aids
called fundamentally into question. The complicated overlay of mental images
and concepts in this history suggests that there may be movement between these
categories of metaphoric expression, accounting for both disciplinary consolida-
tion and the open-endedness of linguistic practices. This emphasis on metaphor
provides an interesting counterpoint to the recent material turn in Science and
Technology Studies scholarship on practices of scientific representation. High-
lighting the difficulties linguists have encountered in their efforts to comprehend
the “all-at-once-ness” of language relationship in both time and space, I have
suggested that canonical visualizations (whether presented in words or pictures)
matter a great deal in pedagogy and practice. Phylogenetic modelling has offered
new hope to those in pursuit of a “natural classification” insofar as it offers this
kind of dual vision.
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Chapter 2
Alternating sounds and the formal
franchise in phonology
James McElvenny
University of Edinburgh
Amatter of some controversy in the intersecting worlds of late nineteenth-century
linguistics and anthropology was the nature of “alternating sounds”. This phe-
nomenon is the apparent tendency, long assumed to be characteristic of “primitive”
languages, to freely vary the pronunciation of words, without any discernible sys-
tem. Franz Boas (1858–1942), rebutting received opinion in the American anthro-
pological establishment, denied the existence of this phenomenon, arguing that it
was an artefact of observation. Georg von der Gabelentz (1840–1893), on the other
hand, embraced the phenomenon and fashioned it into a critique of the compara-
tive method as it was practised in Germany.
Both Boas and Gabelentz – and indeed also their opponents – were well versed
in the Humboldtian tradition of language scholarship, in particular as developed
and transmitted by H. Steinthal (1823–1899). Although the late nineteenth-century
debates surrounding alternating sounds were informed by a number of sources,
this chapter argues that Steinthal’s writings served as a key point of reference and
offered several motifs that were taken up by his scholarly successors. In addition,
and most crucially, the chapter demonstrates that the positions at which the partic-
ipants in these debates arrived were determined not so much by any simple tech-
nical disagreements but by underlying philosophical differences and sociological
factors. This episode in the joint history of linguistics and anthropology is telling
for what it reveals about the dominant mindset and temperament of these disci-
plines in relation to the formal analysis of the world’s languages.
James McElvenny. 2019. Alternating sounds and the formal franchise in
phonology. In James McElvenny (ed.), Form and formalism in linguistics, 35–
58. Berlin: Language Science Press. DOI:10.5281/zenodo.2654351
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1 Introduction
Phonology is in many ways the promised land of formal conceptions of language.
The apparent orderly transmutation of sounds over time stimulated the mechan-
ical minds of historical-comparative linguists, ultimately inspiring the Neogram-
marians to their postulation of exceptionless sound laws. The vanguard of lin-
guistic formalism in subsequent generations continued to look to sound patterns
– although now chiefly in their synchronic aspect – as the pristine embodiment
of the self-contained systems they sought. In this way, the classical American
structuralist grammar sets out from the firm ground of phonology and ascends
to increasingly less regular linguistic levels.
But a question that remained controversial into the last decades of the nine-
teenth century was just how far the formal franchise in phonology should be
extended. Do the sound systems of all languages of the world meet the standards
of arbitrariness and regularity identified in the Indo-European languages? An
apparent phenomenon prevalent in the “primitive” languages of the Americas,
Africa and the South Seas suggested limits to law-governed language. European
scholars and adventurers who tried to learn and transcribe the words of these lan-
guages were frequently frustrated by the way in which native informants would
seemingly change the pronunciation of the same word from utterance to utter-
ance. From the perspective of present-day phonological theory, this phenomenon
would be considered variously a manifestation of free variation, allophonic vari-
ation and difficulty perceiving articulations markedly foreign to the recorder’s
own phonological system. Nineteenth-century scholars, by contrast, conceptu-
alized this phenomenon in a number of different, competing ways. These differ-
ences in conceptualization led to terminological instability, but a common cover
term, also adopted here, was “alternating sounds”.
This chapter explores some responses from prominent language scholars in the
mid- to late nineteenth century to the phenomenon of alternating sounds, and
looks at what these responses reveal about the underlying philosophical commit-
ments and sociological structure of the intersecting fields of anthropology and
linguistics in this era. The investigation spans the intellectual worlds of America
and Germanywhich, although closely intertwined, were organized around differ-
ent disciplinary structures.The figures featured here whowere active in America
described themselves as anthropologists, for whom linguistic research was one
of the “four fields” of American anthropology.1 The corresponding German dis-
1The essays contained in Kuklick (2008) provide an excellent comparative overview of the his-
tory of anthropology in America and Europe, including their disciplinary structures.
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cussion, on the other hand, took place largely within the discipline of linguistics,
in which the study of “exotic” languages was a niche pursuit.The exception is the
work of H. Steinthal (1823–1899), who is put forward in this chapter as an inspi-
ration to – and therefore link between – both the German and American worlds.
His Völkerpsychologie, developed with his collaborator M. Lazarus (1824–1903),
strove to offer an all-encompassing scientific account of human culture, history
and society.2
The starting point for this chapter, in §2, is the 1889 paper “On alternating
sounds” by Franz Boas (1858–1942), a milestone marking the way to modern ex-
planations of alternating sounds and modern views on the equality of all lan-
guages. Here Boas rebutted the received position of the American anthropolog-
ical establishment, represented in particular by such luminaries as Daniel Gar-
rison Brinton (1837–1899) and John Wesley Powell (1834–1902), which held that
the alternating sounds observed in American languages were a manifestation of
their alleged primitiveness. Boas argued, by contrast, that the alternating sounds
were an illusion caused by the conflicts of incommensurable phonological sys-
tems in informant and ethnographer.
From a present-day perspective, this episode may seem like a simple case of
science triumphing over naivety and prejudice. But arguments presented on both
sides of the American debate could claim some degree of theoretical sophistica-
tion. Indeed, Brinton and Boas shared a key source of theoretical inspiration in
the work of Steinthal, whose views were in turn anchored in the linguistic writ-
ings of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835). While phonological issues occupy
at most a peripheral place in Steinthal’s work, aspects of his linguistic and psy-
chological theory would seem to have informed the later debate. §3 offers an
account of the nuanced views advanced by Steinthal and their possible links to
later arguments.
Despite its now canonical status, the American debate was not the only recon-
sideration of principles of phonological regularity around the turn of the nine-
teenth to the twentieth century. In Germany, Georg von der Gabelentz (1840–
1893), also drawing on the Humboldtian tradition as transmitted by Steinthal,
affirmed the existence of alternating sounds, in a turn that could be seen as pre-
figuring key features of later phonemic theory. Like Boas, Gabelentz fashioned
his treatment of alternating sounds into a critique of the linguistic establishment.
But unlike Boas, Gabelentz’ goal was not to extend the formal franchise to all lan-
guages, but rather to redefine it and thereby challenge the comparative method
2For a detailed account of Völkerpsychologie from its beginnings with Steinthal and Lazarus to
its later developments and ultimate fate, see Klautke (2013).
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as it was practised at the time. §4 looks at Gabelentz’ proposals for alternative
methods in historical-comparative linguistics and their rather unfavourable re-
ception.
Finally, §5 brings the American and German debates together to discuss what
they reveal about the dominant mindset and temperament in the intersecting
fields of linguistics and anthropology in relation to questions of the nature and
correct treatment of linguistic form.
2 Alternating sounds in America
Boas’ (1889) “On alternating sounds” occupies a prominent place in the standard
disciplinary narrative of linguistic anthropology as a text that helped to establish
the scientific foundations of the field. According to this story, Boas overcame con-
temporary evolutionary prejudice by demonstrating that an alleged characteris-
tic of “primitive” languages was in fact nothing more than an artefact introduced
by insufficiently trained observers.3 Alternating sounds, in various guises, were a
recurring motif in the description of exotic languages throughout the nineteenth
century, but the two key figures against whom Boas developed his position were
Brinton and Powell, the leading anthropologists of the previous generation.4
In the year before Boas’ seminal article appeared, Brinton reaffirmed several
tropes about “primitive” languages in an 1888 address to the American Philo-
sophical Society, “The Language of Palæolithic Man”, which in an 1890 volume
of his collected papers became “The earliest form of human speech, as revealed by
American tongues” (Brinton 1890 [1888]). As the titles suggest, Brinton sought in-
sights into the nature of the earliest stages of human language evolution through
an examination of the supposedly characteristic features of American languages.
While much of Brinton’s paper focuses on the lexical and grammatical properties
of these languages, it begins with a discussion of their phonological features.
Primitive speech, in Brinton’s assessment, has not yet attained the levels of
arbitrariness and fixedness that characterize the more developed languages: in
European languages individual sounds carry no sense, words have fixed sound
3“Evolutionary prejudice” was the term later used by Boas’ student Edward Sapir (1884–1939)
to describe the assumption that the world’s languages can be categorized according to their
putative level of grammatical development (see Sapir 1921: 130–132).
4On the relationship between Boas, Brinton and Powell in the context of late nineteenth-century
American anthropology, see Darnell (1988) and Darnell (1998). See also Laplantine’s (2018) pref-
ace to her translation of Boas’ (1911) Handbook of American Indian Languages for a succinct
summary of his life and work in context.
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forms, and the articulated word alone is enough to convey its meaning. Amer-
ican languages, by contrast, frequently attach meaning to individual phonetic
segments (Brinton 1890 [1888]: 394), word meaning is often modified by such de-
vices as “[t]one, accent, stress, vocal inflection, quantity and pause” (Brinton 1890
[1888]: 399) that are not reducible to graphic writing, and sounds in words can
vary freely: “In spite of the significance attached to the phonetic elements, they
are, in many American languages, singularly vague and fluctuating” (Brinton
1890 [1888]: 397). His concluding observation is that “[t]he laws of the conversion
of sounds of the one organ into those of another have not yet been discovered;
but the above examples, which are by no means isolated ones, serve to admon-
ish us that the phonetic elements of primitive speech probably had no fixedness”
(Brinton 1890 [1888]: 398–399).
Under the name of “synthetic sounds”, this same phenomenon of apparent
fluctuating phonology in American languages found a place in Powell’s (1880
[1877]) Introduction to the Study of Indian Languages. Given Powell’s influential
position as director of the Bureau of American Ethnology, which was founded on
his initiative in 1879, the Introduction achieved widespread use in the recording
of American languages, not only in projects officially sponsored by the Bureau,
but also in the efforts of other researchers and amateurs, including Boas and his
students (see Darnell 1998: 50–51).
Powell was very conscious of the difficulties associated with capturing the
phonology of American languages. His commitment to scientific rigour led him
to commission the noted Sanskrit scholar and general linguist William Dwight
Whitney (1827–1894) to devise a standardized alphabet for recording American
languages. Despite Powell’s efforts to encourage its use, the alphabet was gen-
erally considered inadequate and impractical by many of those who worked for
the Bureau. Whitney himself felt no great attachment to the alphabet, regarding
its design and implementation not as a theoretical task but merely a matter of
expedience (see Darnell 1998: 50–51). For Powell, however, the alphabet was a
foundational element of language description: his Introduction opens with a so-
phisticated discussion of articulatory phonetics and the principles of accurate
transcription, which observes a number of phonological peculiarities of Ameri-
can languages still recognized today, such as ejective consonants (“interrupted
sounds”) (Powell 1880 [1877]: 1–16).
“Synthetic sounds” appear in this discussion as another characteristic of Amer-
ican phonologies. Powell (1880 [1877]: 12) speaks of the “indefinite character of
some of the sounds of a[n American Indian] language”, although this is not due
to the chaotic variation imagined by Brinton but rather because the sounds are
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“made by the organs of speech in positions and with movement comprehending
in part at least the positions and movement used in making the several sounds to
which they seem to be allied”. That is, Powell believes these “synthetic” sounds
are insufficiently “differentiated” – they are produced by articulating several sim-
ple sounds at once.Through historical sound change, such synthetic sounds have
been simplified and disappeared from the European languages, but this is a pro-
cess yet to take place in the American languages. In their present undifferentiated
state, these sounds “will be heard by the student now as one, now as another
sound, even from the same speaker.” There is, however, a trace of humility in
Powell’s approach to the American languages, an admission that science may
not yet have fully grasped the principles underlying this phenomenon: “When
the phonology of our Indian tongues is thoroughly understood, much light will
be thrown upon the whole science of phonology […]” (Powell 1880 [1877]: 13).
In response to views of the kind put forward by Brinton and Powell, Boas
argued that such sounds are not a peculiarity of primitive languages at all, but
rather the result of perceptual error on the part of the language researcher. All
languages, European andAmerican alike, make use of a fixed and finite repertoire
of the total range of sounds that can be produced by the human articulatory or-
gans. When an observer encounters a sound in a foreign language that is not
present in their native repertoire, they will “apperceive” it as a similar sound
that is in their repertoire. A term with a long history and a diverse range of uses,
“apperceive” became in the early nineteenth century part of the technical appa-
ratus of Johann Friedrich Herbart’s (1776–1841) associational psychology, from
where it was taken up into the Völkerpsychologie of Steinthal and Lazarus, and
later into the Bewusstseinspsychologie of Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920).5 Boas’ in-
vocation of “apperception” is too fleeting and off-hand to align him with any
specific school of psychology at the time, but his usage attests to a familiarity
with contemporary psychological jargon and a desire to dress his own work in
the latest technical garb.
According to Boas, the mapping from foreign to native sound that results
through the process of apperception may vary from occasion to occasion, cre-
ating the illusion of alternating sounds. The presence of this perceptual filter on
the part of the observer is demonstrated by the fact that “the nationality even
of well-trained observers may be readily recognized” in the transcriptions they
make of foreign sounds (Boas 1889: 51). Boas sums up his argument with the
following words:
5For a recent survey of approaches to what can retrospectively be called “psycholinguistics” in
this period, including the work of Lazarus, Steinthal and Wundt, see Levelt (2013).
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I think, from this evidence, it is clear that all such misspellings are due to
a wrong apperception, which is due to the phonetic system of our native
language. For this reason I maintain that there is no such phenomenon as
synthetic or alternating sounds, and that their occurrence is in no way a
sign of primitiveness of the speech in which they are said to occur; that
alternating sounds are in reality alternating apperceptions of one and the
same sound. A thorough study of all alleged alternating sounds or syn-
thetic sounds will show that their existence may be explained by alternat-
ing apperceptions. (Boas 1889: 52)
Boas was no doubt correct to impugn the perception of his colleagues in many
cases where they accused American languages of phonetic fluctuation. But it
must be acknowledged that the potential for cross-linguistic phonological inter-
ference was already well recognized in the literature of the time. Powell (1880
[1877]: 2) noted this difficulty in his own guide to transcription:
[T]here are probably sounds in each [Indian language of North America]
which do not appear in the English or any other civilized tongue; […] and
further, […] there are perhaps sounds in each of such a character, or made
with such uncertainty that the ear primarily trained to distinguish English
speech is unable to clearly determine what these sounds are, even after
many years of effort. (Powell 1880 [1877]: 2)
As is shown in the following sections, this awareness of cross-linguistic in-
terference is clear in many other contemporary and antecedent sources, where
it co-existed with a range of different attitudes towards alternating sounds. A
scholar’s stance in relation to these questions was therefore shaped to a very
large degree by beliefs and commitments beyond the immediate language data.
A key motivation for Boas was of course to subvert the then current discourse
of primitive languages and language evolution. But this was not his only aim, and
indeed this subversion was at least in part beholden to other goals. Although he
enjoyed mostly respectful and collegial relations with both Brinton and Powell,
Boas was always engaged in a project to proclaim his superior scientific exper-
tise and secure institutional support for his coterie of students and adherents.
The chief and most valid source of data in Boasian anthropology were the de-
scriptions made and texts recorded by the scientifically trained observer in a
fieldwork situation. By contrast, Brinton, the doyen of the previous generation,
relied mainly on the critical philological analysis of written documents that had
been collected and compiled by others (see Darnell 1988: 21–24). By diminishing
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existing written documentation, Boas’ critique undermined the legitimacy of the
mode of research employed by Brinton and boosted his own fieldwork-oriented
approach.
Even among confirmed fieldworkers, Boas’ critique helped to assert the exclu-
sive expertise of his own school. In later years, Boas developed a reputation for
his domineering role in the world of Americanist anthropology, freely blocking
thework of researcherswho did notmeet his frequently quite arbitrary standards
(see Darnell 1998). Pointing out the technical inadequacies of his predecessors,
as in the case of alternating sounds, served this end well. In his 1911 Handbook
of American Indian Languages, which was explicitly intended to supersede Pow-
ell’s (1880 [1877]) Introduction, Boas’ doctrine of the conditioned apperception of
foreign sounds is incorporated as part of the propaedeutic guide to the correct
recording of American languages, as a simple and uncontroversial methodologi-
cal principle (see Boas 1911: 16–18).
That assertions of expertise are a decisive factor in Boas’ campaign is demon-
strated by his enduring commitment to the possibility of objective observation
in language documentation. While previous transcribers of American languages
may have been afflicted with a phonological filter, the goal of the Boasian anthro-
pologist must be to eliminate this interference altogether. Even after the impor-
tation and elaboration of phonemic theory in America, Boas maintained a prefer-
ence for fine-grained phonetic transcription. It was not enough for the observer
to simply enter the foreign phonological system; they had to step outside phonol-
ogy and record the given phonetic datum as accurately as possible.6 Boas’ zeal
extended to correcting written texts from one of his native speaker informants,
which were essentially phonemic in nature, to include as much phonetic detail
as possible (see Anderson 1985: 204–208). Even the phonemic testimony of the
native speaker did not pass Boasian muster.7
6Another perspective from which Boas’ position should perhaps be explored is that of contem-
porary debates on the “personal equation” in recording data, which were prominent across the
natural sciences (see Schaffer 1988) and also played a role in attitudes to fieldwork in anthro-
pology (see Kuklick 2011). I thank Judith Kaplan for drawing my attention to these debates.
7A further piece of circumstantial evidence is perhaps Boas’ work on a revised standard alphabet
for American languages. After Powell’s death in 1902, Boas was asked byWilliam John McGee
(1853–1912), Powell’s successor at the Bureau of American Ethnology, to form a committee
to update the Bureau’s alphabet. The resulting system, published 1916, clearly contains many
compromises between various conflicting constraints, but the overall Boasian impulse towards
greater phonetic detail and specialist exclusivity is quite apparent (see Darnell 1998: 195–197).
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3 Steinthal and the Humboldtian tradition
The American debate on alternating sounds was shaped by a number of influ-
ences: the three figures mentioned in the previous section – Brinton, Powell and
Boas – all had broad backgrounds spanning the natural sciences and humanities
that informed their attitudes and approaches (see Darnell 1998). But a central
point of reference – in particular for Brinton and Boas –was theHumboldtian tra-
dition of linguistic scholarship as it was interpreted and propagated by Steinthal.
Boas had met Steinthal personally in Berlin and freely acknowledged Steinthal’s
influence on his linguistic research. Brinton was the leading Humboldt scholar
in America and frequently cited Steinthal (see Bunzl 1996: 63–69; Trautmann-
Waller 2006: 289–292). Although the questions of phonology and language docu-
mentation that lay at the heart of the American debate on alternating sounds are
addressed only at the periphery of Steinthal’s work, we see in his texts several
threads unpicked and woven into the later accounts.
Steinthal’s great achievement in linguistics was to construct a monolithic the-
oretical edifice dealing with issues ranging from themental processes underlying
individual language use to language evolution and typology, and to attempt an
empirical demonstration of these principles through detailed investigations into
the languages of the world. Through his collaboration with Lazarus from the
1850s onwards, Steinthal’s linguistics became a central component of the broader
project of Völkerpsychologie.8
Following Humboldt, Steinthal imagined an “idea of language” (Sprachidee),
an ideal form towards which linguistic expression strives. The evolution of lan-
guage passes through three stages on the way to the full realization of this ideal;
these stages are recapitulated in child language acquisition and can be discerned
in the contours of “primitive” languages (cf. Bumann 1965: 81–93). The first stage
consists in self-awareness, the psychological attainment that distinguishes hu-
mans from animals. Unlike animals, humans can represent, share and understand
their “intuitions” (Anschauungen), which they “apperceive” (appercieren) in their
consciousness. Here Steinthal invokes the core notion of “apperception” from
Herbartian associational psychology; this is the same term that Boas would later
use in generic form (see §2 above).
At the first stage language is made up of nothingmore than “reflex sounds” (Re-
flexlaute), which merely represent and communicate intuitions in an unanalysed
8Trautmann-Waller (2006) is a comprehensive intellectual biography of Steinthal, which exam-
ines his linguistic work and Völkerpsychologie in depth. For studies of Steinthal’s linguistics,
see Bumann (1965) and Ringmacher (1996).
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way. These sounds are brought forth through unreflected action and are solely
mimetic in character. The further development of language occurs as speakers
become increasingly aware of the thoughts they entertain in consciousness and
begin to analyse them. At the second stage, language progresses beyond reflex
sounds to a proper conscious analysis of thoughts. It is at this point that sen-
tence structure develops, with a distinction between subject and predicate and
individual words that can be abstracted from the sentence as a whole:
It is therefore already at the point where language first appears in its
true quality, where it achieves its full intellectual character, that it breaks
through onomatopoeia. Andwords in their true conception develop onlywith
the development of the sentence form; that is, simultaneously with the opposi-
tion of subject and predicate, which soon establishes itself as the difference
in the naming of things and expressions for circumstances and changes.
The logical character of words seems to be decisively hostile to their ono-
matopoeic origin. (Steinthal 1881 [1871]: 424–425)9
At the third stage of evolution, language continues its ascent from its mimetic
origins: the etymological bond between words and their meanings fades from
consciousness and the connection between them becomes truly arbitrary.
For Steinthal, the crucial moment in language evolution is the second stage,
as this is the point at which “inner linguistic form” (innere Sprachform) emerges
(Steinthal 1881 [1871]: 425–426). “Inner linguistic form” is a term that first ap-
pears in Humboldt’s (1998 [1836]) introduction to his work on the Kawi lan-
guage of Java. The term is therefore generally associated with Humboldt, even
though, as Borsche (1989) definitively demonstrated, its elaboration into a theo-
retical construct is the later work of Steinthal. In Steinthal’s hands, inner form
became a wide-ranging concept covering all aspects of the immanent structure
of languages. Like “apperception”, “inner form” grew in the second half of the
nineteenth century into a favourite but rather indefinite term in linguistic and
philosophical scholarship. Despite the explosion of senses attached to the term
in this period, its ultimate origin in Humboldt’s essay and its deep association
9Original: “Also gerade schon da, wo die Sprache zuerst in ihrer wahren Eigentümlichkeit
auftritt, wo sie ihren vollen intellektuellen Charakter gewinnt, durchbricht sie die Ono-
matopoie; und das Wort in seinem wahren Begriff entsteht erst mit der Satzform, also zugleich
mit dem Gegensatze von Subjekt und Prädikat, der sich bald zu dem Unterschiede der Benen-
nung von Dingen und der Ausdrücke für Zustände und Veränderungen festsetzt. Der logis-
che Charakter des Wortes scheint dem onomatopoetischen Ursprunge desselben entschieden
feindlich zu sein.” Italics in this quotation renders Sperrung in the original.
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with Steinthal’s work remained foremost in the minds of those who employed it.
Both Brinton and Boas keenly spoke this idiom and acknowledged the tradition
with which it was aligned: Brinton constantly advocated for attention to the in-
ner form of languages and Boas (1911: 81) set capturing the unique inner form of
each language as the goal of the language sketches in his Handbook (cf. Darnell
1988: 98–105).
Steinthal’s typological efforts were aimed at assessing how far towards the
“idea of language” the inner form had progressed in different languages and at
identifying the grammatical means – such as morphological or syntactic struc-
tures – in which it manifests itself. His 1860 Charakteristik der hauptsächlichsten
Typen des Sprachbaues provided a survey and classification of the world’s lan-
guages, in which the primary division is between those language with properly
developed inner form (Formsprachen) and those without (formlose Sprachen).This
work was followed by his 1867 Mande-Neger-Sprachen, which subjected several
Mande languages of Africa – Mandingo, Bambara, Soso and Vai – to a detailed
examination that revealed alleged developmental deficiencies in all aspects of
their inner forms. This examination is based on a philological analysis of exist-
ing written sources, similar to the preferred research practice of Brinton. The
analysis proceeds from both a “phonetic” (phonetisch) perspective, which looks
at the grammatical apparatus of the languages, and a “psychological” (psycholo-
gisch) perspective, which investigates how expressions are formed.10
In his “phonetic” examination of theMande languages, Steinthal found no way
to distinguish individual words from the sentences in which they appear: there
are allegedly no phonological processes observed to operate only at the word
level distinct from the sentence as a whole. In their grammars, the languages
supposedly rely on mechanisms that are not truly arbitrary, such as the “interjec-
tional” process of reduplication, used for a variety of purposes in the languages.
The grammatical affixes and particles that can be identified in the languages all
seem to have transparent etymologies that link them to “material” words, which
keep them bound to their mimetic origins.
From the “psychological” perspective, the Mande languages did not fare any
better. Steinthal’s assessment of how various meanings are rendered using the
lexical and grammatical means available in the languages reveals that the Herbar-
tian processes of “isolation” (Isolirung) and “condensation” (Verdichtung) of “rep-
resentations” (Vorstellungen) in the minds of speakers are not carried out prop-
erly. The inevitable conclusion for Steinthal (1867: 255) is that the speakers of
10For a discussion of the historical background to this dual-perspective approach to language
description, see McElvenny (2017: 2–6).
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Mande languages have not completely raised their “intuitions” to the level of
“representations”: “in the consciousness of the Mande negro the concrete intu-
ition with its material relations is still dominant, and its conversion into repre-
sentations is not carried out completely”.11
Up to this point, Brinton’s account of the “primitive” phonological features
of American languages accords well with Steinthal’s story of language evolu-
tion. The alleged lack of arbitrariness and fixedness Brinton identified in the
sounds of American languages are features that could be expected of languages
at Steinthal’s first stage of evolution. Steinthal in fact considered the possibility
that a lack of arbitrariness in the earliest languages could lead to greater variabil-
ity, since the sounds produced by reflex are bound to the mental moment and
subject to all of its modifications:
We may think that language, as long as it is still the immediate creation of
the excited soul, shares in the fluctuations and inequalities of these exci-
tations. So just as the representation, even though its content is the same,
is not always the same in its psychological behaviour – e.g. not always
as lively and energetic to the same degree, vivid, strongly concentrated –
the word, as the reflex of this representation, is not always the same. The
energy of thinking expresses itself most immediately in intonation, then
also in the sharpness of articulation, i.e. the clearness and definiteness of
the sound. And both together most certainly influence the quality or even
the content of the sound, the way in which it is articulated. (Steinthal 1867:
3–4)12
But such questions remained hypothetical for Steinthal. According to Steinthal
(1867: 3–4), the “uncivilized peoples” (culturlose Völker) living today are not the
Natur-Völker of the earlier stages of human evolution. He accepted a greater de-
gree of variation in the sounds of the languages of “uncivilized peoples” because
11Original: “im Bewußtsein des Mande-Negers ist die concrete Anschauung mit ihren ma-
teriellen Verhältnissen noch vorwiegend, und ihre Umsetzung in Vorstellungen ist unvoll-
ständig vollzogen.”
12Original: “Wir dürfen uns denken, daß die Sprache, so lange sie noch die unmittelbare Schöp-
fung der erregten Seele ist, auch an den Schwankungen und Ungleichheiten dieser Erregun-
gen Theil hat. Wie also die, obschon ihrem Inhalte nach gleiche und selbe, Vorstellung doch
in ihrem psychologischen Verhalten nicht immer gleich ist, z. B. nicht immer gleich lebendig
und energisch, gleich anschaulich, gleich kräftig concentrirt: so lautet auch das Wort, als der
Reflex dieser Vorstellung, nicht immer gleich. Die Energie des Denkens drückt sich am unmit-
telbarsten in der Weise der Betonung aus, dann auch in der Schärfe der Articulation, d. h. der
Klarheit und Bestimmtheit des Lautes; und beides zusammen beeinflußt sicherlich dieQualität
oder den Inhalt selbst des Lautes, die Weise seiner Articulation.”
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these languages lacked the stabilizing and standardizing influence of an orthog-
raphy, but even before the invention of writing, human language will “have es-
tablished itself in the consciousness” and “its word forms [will] have crystalized
in definite shape” ([…] hat sich die Sprache im Bewußtsein gefestigt, sind ihre Wort-
formen in bestimmter Gestalt krystallisirt; Steinthal 1867: 4–5).
In Steinthal’s estimation, the Mande languages find themselves in this situa-
tion: they stand uneasily on the threshold to the second stage of evolution, but
their apparent phonetic inconstancy in comparison with European languages is
not due to enduringmimetic reflexes but simply anarchy arising from the absence
of a regulating instance. Steinthal (1867: 257–266) discounts the fact that the Vai
do indeed possess a native writing system, since it is an imitation of European
scripts fashionedwithout proper understanding of those scripts’ underlying prin-
ciples.The result is a massive syllabary – of over 200 characters – lacking system
and internal order, which is chiefly used by distinguished members of the com-
munity to write books containing “tales from the life of their authors, sayings,
observations and fables – without any unity” (Steinthal 1867: 260).13 While the
Vai may have a script, they do not have an orthography: they simply transcribe
whatever pronunciation occurs to them as they write (Steinthal 1867: 264–266),
and this can vary even within the same text.14
The perceptual problems to which Boas (1889) attributed alternating sounds in
American languages were acknowledged by Steinthal in the case of the Mande
languages. Steinthal (1867) critiqued the transcriptions found in all of his sources,
commenting, among other observations, that the influence of the transcriber’s
native phonology and writing habits had to be taken into consideration. On his
English sources, he remarked:
Since we frequently have to rely on English works, the influence of the En-
glish ear and English orthography must be taken into account. However,
although this influence may be responsible for some things, it is hardly re-
sponsible for everything.The same sources offer at times, both consciously
and unconsciously, double forms, e.g. bombong and bambang, “hard” […].
13Original: “Der Inhalt dieser Bücher besteht in der Erzählung von Ereignissen aus dem Leben
ihrer Verfasser, in Sittensprüchen, Betrachtungen und Fabeln – ohne alle Einheit.”
14Steinthal (1852) presented an account of the development of writing from ideographic systems
to alphabets. Like his language typology, this represented an evolutionary scheme in which
language users became progressively more aware of the structure of their languages. The Vai
syllabary has reached the upper echelons of a pure phonetic script – i.e. a script without ideo-
graphic elements – but has not reached the highest point of a full alphabetic script (Steinthal
1867: 262–264). The place of the Vai script in this hierarchy does not bear directly on the ques-
tion of its consistency.
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The most frequent alternation is perhaps that between i and e. (Steinthal
1867: 9)15
While phonology as such was never among Steinthal’s core concerns, in his
empirically oriented researches he was inevitably confronted with the practical
difficulties that arise in reducing to writing the sounds of exotic languages with
no native orthographic tradition. The dangers he identified in written materi-
als produced by European observers were precisely those that Boas would later
turn into the fatal failures of perception on the part of his predecessors. On the
other hand, the corroboration Brinton provided for existing accounts of phonetic
fluctuation in American languages could in principle be licensed by Steinthal’s
scheme of language evolution, although Steinthal explicitly denied that any lan-
guage spoken today would still find itself at this most elementary stage. Steinthal
accepted greater degrees of variation in the languages of “uncivilized peoples”,
but only because they lacked a standard imposed by authority.
4 Phonetic latitude and sound laws
Around the same time that Boas launched his attack against alternating sounds
– but independently of the American debate – Georg von der Gabelentz mar-
shalled related phonetic phenomena to mount a critique of the linguistic estab-
lishment in Germany. His opponents were the Neogrammarians, whose work
was built upon an insistence on the exceptionless nature of sound change, and
Gabelentz embraced the prospect of relative regularity in languages as a means
to undermining this fundamental Neogrammarian tenet. As in the American con-
text, a key theoretical reference in Germany – in particular for Gabelentz – was
the work of Steinthal.
In his magnum opus, Die Sprachwissenschaft, Gabelentz (2016 [1891]: 341–384)
undertakes an extensive investigation into contemporary linguistic typology that
is essentially organized around the principles espoused by Steinthal.16 Gabelentz
rejected the strong distinction between “formal” and “material” elements in lan-
guage hypothesized by Steinthal and used by him to demonstrate the alleged infe-
15Original: “Da wir mehrfach auf englische Arbeiten angewiesen sind, so darf hierbei der Ein-
fluß des englischen Ohrs und der englischen Orthographie nicht unberücksichtigt bleiben. In-
dessen, er mag manches verschulden, schwerlich alles. DieselbenQuellen stellen zuweilen un-
bewußt und bewußt doppelte Formen auf; z. B. bombong und bambang, hart […]. Am meisten
vielleicht wechseln i und e mit einander.”
16Gabelentz (1889) had already presented key parts of this section of his book in an address to
the Saxon Academy of Sciences. An English translation can be found in McElvenny (2019).
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rior mental development of speakers of the Mande and other languages. Instead,
argued Gabelentz (2016 [1891]: 380–384), linguistic form is the product of an aes-
thetic drive to achieve subjective self-expression.17 In his view, all shaping of
linguistic expression, regardless of how transparently its origin shows through,
is formal in nature (see McElvenny 2016). Gabelentz (2016 [1891]: 406–408) ac-
cepted, however, that in the most primitive stages linguistic forms would have
been created spontaneously and freely, and only over time become constrained
and fixed through force of collective habit.
Given the dominance of historical-comparative grammar in the disciplinary
linguistics of his day, Gabelentz dedicates an entire “book”, or primary section,
of his Sprachwissenschaft to this approach to language study. He finds that the
principle of gradual fixing of the linguistic system applies also on the phonetic
plane, and uses this principle both to critique the supposed exceptionless na-
ture of sound change as promulgated by the Neogrammarians and as a means to
explain how sound change can occur at all. “Fluctuating articulations” (schwank-
ende Articulationen), according to Gabelentz (2016 [1891]: 196), are a very real part
of languages, and indeed they are the force driving sound change in the first place.
If, as the Neogrammarians argued, sound change proceeded according to invio-
lable rules then everyone would always speak the same way. For sound change
to occur, one speaker has to innovate a new pronunciation and then it has to
spread to the rest of the speaker community. Gabelentz (2016 [1891]: 196–197) is
very clear that he means not only variation in pronunciation between speakers,
but also variation in the same speaker over the course of their lives and even
from utterance to utterance.
The way in which Gabelentz describes the range of variation that each lan-
guage allows in fact seems to evince an inchoate concept of the phoneme as an
ideal sound which may have multiple realizations:
But languages, even the smallest dialects, distinguish only a certain num-
ber of sounds, which are related to individual phonetic phenomena like
species to individuals, like circles to points; a language draws the bound-
aries more broadly or narrowly, but it always tolerates a certain degree of
latitude. (Gabelentz 2016 [1891]: 35).18
17Jean-Michel Fortis, in Chapter 3 of this volume, examines similar aesthetic ideas in the work
of Edward Sapir, and their possible connection to Gabelentz’ work.
18Original: “Die Sprache aber, und wäre es die kleinste Mundart, unterscheidet nur eine bes-
timmteAnzahl von Lauten, die sich zu den lautlichen Einzelerscheinungen verhaltenwieArten
zu Individuen, wie Kreise zu Punkten; sie zieht die Grenzen weiter oder enger, immer aber
duldet sie einen gewissen Spielraum.”
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The “degree of latitude” allowed may vary from language to language, accord-
ing to Gabelentz (2016 [1891]: 197–198), and this greater or lesser latitude provides
the theoretical basis for countenancing the possibility of alternating sounds of a
more extreme kind outside the familiar European languages.
A similar recognition of variation within limits is also a feature of Boas’ (1911)
account of alternating sounds in the officially codified version of the Handbook.
Here Boas admits variations in the realization of sounds in languages, but cru-
cially he denies that the range or latitude of variation can vary from language
to language: the American languages admit neither more nor less variation in
their sounds than any other languages, and certainly no more than European
languages. Taking the example of a sound in Pawnee, Boas (1911: 17) insists:
Thus the Pawnee language contains a sound which may be heard more or
less distinctly sometimes as an l, sometimes an r, sometimes as n, and again
as d, which, however, without any doubt, is throughout the same sound,
although modified to a certain extent by its position in the word and by
surrounding sounds. […]This peculiar sound is, of course, entirely foreign
to our phonetic system; but its variations are not greater than those of the
English r in various combinations, as in broth, mother, where. (Boas 1911:
17)
Gabelentz’ theoretically grounded belief in varying degrees of latitude in pro-
nunciation leads him, in contrast to Boas, to accept and repeat several well-
known cases of alternating sounds from the corners of theworld: Gabelentz (2016
[1891]: 202–204) offers examples from Samoan, Malay languages, Australian lan-
guages and of course various American languages. Gabelentz is willing to trust
the data on alternating sounds delivered by scholars in the field, insisting that
they are fully qualified observers who through extended immersion in the for-
eign language have had the opportunity to overcome the interference of their
native phonology. Indeed, it is because they have become so accustomed to the
phonological systems of the languages they record that they have developed the
feeling for the languages that allows them to perceive the subtle alternating ar-
ticulations:
We could raise the following objection: most of our informants were not
schooled in the scientific observation of sounds; they judge the foreign
sounds according to their native language, and intermediate grades be-
tween these sounds seem at one moment to tend to one side and in another
moment to another side. We may retort that at least some of these men
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have lived long enough among the aborigines that their ear has become
as accustomed to the foreign language as it was previously to their native
language. It is to this, or rather to their multilingual schooling, that they
owe precisely this fine ability to hear that allows them to perceive those
uncertain, fluctuating articulations. (Gabelentz 2016 [1891]: 204–205)19
In an inversion of the assignment of expertise effected by Boas, Gabelentz
endorses the data and uses them to undermine the theoretical edifice of the
Neogrammarians. Rather than refining sound laws to explain away exceptions,
Gabelentz (2016 [1891]: 198) advocated statistical surveys that would embrace all
variants observed, the deviants as well as the well-behaved regular forms. Gabe-
lentz’ model for this endeavour was perhaps the statistical analyses undertaken
by William Dwight Whitney (1827–1894) of variant forms throughout the his-
tory of Sanskrit and in modern English dialects (Whitney 1874; Whitney 1896
[1875-1878]; cf. Silverstein 1971: vix-xx, xxii-xxiii).20 Wilhelm Wundt similarly
suggested that a statistical approach to the study of sound change may prove
more fruitful than the absolutism of the Neogrammarians (see Formigari 2018).
Gabelentz’ first steps towards applying a statistical method were taken in an
1893 address to the Berlin Academy of Sciences in which he tried to prove a
genealogical relationship between the Basque and Berber languages.21 As Gabe-
lentz (1893: 593–594) himself noted, the hypothesis that the Basques of southern
Europe, whose language could not be aligned with any known family, were in
some way related to the “Hamites” of North Africa was not a novel idea. That no
linguistic proof of this relationship had yet been given, he contended, was due
to the inflexibility of the comparative method as it was practised at the time. The
comparative method needed to be ramified to accommodate the radical mutabil-
ity of linguistic form that had been discovered in regions beyond the familiar
Indo-European context, as in Indo-Chinese and Melanesian sources:
19Original: “Folgenden Einwand könnte man erheben: Die meisten Gewährsmänner waren nicht
zu wissenschaftlicher Lautbeobachtung geschult; sie beurtheilten die fremden Laute nach de-
nen ihrer Muttersprache, und Zwischenstufen zwischen diesen schienen ihnen bald nach der
einen, bald nach der anderen Seite zu neigen. Darauf ist zu entgegnen, dass mindestens ein
Theil jener Männer lange genug unter den Eingeborenen gelebt, um ihr Ohr an die fremde
Sprache so zu gewöhnen, wie es vordem an die Muttersprache gewöhnt gewesen. Dieser, oder
richtiger ihrer mehrsprachigen Schulung, verdankten sie eben das feinere Gehör, das sie jene
unsicheren, schwankenden Articulationen empfinden liess.”
20Gabelentz (1894b) also later proposed using a statistical approach for the typological study of
languages. McElvenny (2018) offers an English translation of this text.
21For a comprehensive account of this episode, including Gabelentz’ initial address, the subse-
quent book-length publication (Gabelentz 1894a), and the reaction of Gabelentz’ colleagues,
see Hurch & Purgay (2019).
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The belief in the constancy of the outer and inner linguistic form is among
the achievements to which our science clings most tenaciously, and the
facts that could shake this belief are for their part newly acquired and
poorly known, since they are in the territory of Indo-Chinese and Melane-
sian. (Gabelentz 1893: 594)22
Looking across Basque dialects, Gabelentz (1893) postulated extremely irreg-
ular sound correspondences between apparently cognate words, leading him to
the conclusion that “they offer a picture of phonetic wildness which, as far as I
know, must be one of a kind in the world of languages” (sie geben ein Bild laut-
licher Verwilderung, das meines Wissens in der Sprachenwelt kaum Seinesgleichen
hat; Gabelentz 1893: 596). He found a similar situation in the Berber languages.
On this basis, Gabelentz (1893: 604) assumed the existence of a “prehistoric period
of themost uncertain articulation” (vorgeschichtlichen Periode der unsichersten Ar-
ticulation) in these languages, “where the phonetic images appeared before the
soul only in vague outlines, as if they were drawn with a mop or paint-roller”
(wo die Lautbilder der Seele nur in vagen Umrissen vorgeschwebt haben, als wären
sie mit dem Wischer gezeichnet oder mit dem Vertreiberpinsel gemalt). To bring
order into this chaos, Gabelentz employed his statistical method, tabulating the
frequencies of putative correspondences across the Basque dialects, the Berber
languages and between these two groups.
The extraordinarily large latitude in pronunciation of the kind attributed to
Basque and Berber is, Gabelentz (1893: 606) argued, characteristic of languages
“at a lower level of culture” (auf niederer Culturstufe). At this cultural level, ar-
ticulated forms are only rejected when they cannot be understood. This lack of
constraint on variation leaves linguistic forms subject to the temperamental and
corporeal contingencies of the moment, as in Steinthal’s conception of the first
stage of language evolution. Distant analogues of such cases can even be ob-
served in Indo-European languages, claimed Gabelentz, offering the example of
an uneducated Saxon from Germany (the same example with a more moderate
moral occurs also in Gabelentz 2016 [1891]: 398):
In this way a strange thing can happen, that a very indefinite sound image
appears before the soul, and yet the mouth produces a very clearly articu-
22Original: “Der Glaube an die Beständigkeit der äusseren und inneren Sprachform gehört zu
den Errungschaften, an denen unsere Wissenschaft am zähesten festhält, und die Thatsachen,
die ihn erschüttern könnten, sind ihrerseits neuer Erwerb und wenig bekannt, da sie auf indo-
chinesischem und melanesischem Gebiete liegen.”
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lated sound, although not always the same one, but rather at one moment
this one and then at another that one, depending on chance and mood. […]
I can offer an example of an at least distant analogue of this from our own
languages.The Saxon, who does not distinguish between d and t, between i
and ü, e and ö, ei and eu, äu, can in the heat of the moment pronounce the d
as t and – when he is talking about deep, dark, terrible things – turn all i, e
and ei into ü, ö, eu in a kind of onomatopoeia. (Gabelentz 1893: 606–607)23
Needless to say, Gabelentz’ attempted reform of the comparative method did
not gain a foothold. The exceptionless dismissal of Gabelentz’ approach may not,
however, have been so much due to his underlying premises as to his cavalier
treatment of his sources. Even among thosewho could be expected to sympathize
with Gabelentz’ proposal, the criticism was widespread that he had not properly
curated or analysed the Basque and Berber data, which led him to obvious errors
in presentation and interpretation (cf. Hurch & Purgay 2019). Brinton (1894), for
one, in his brief review of the 1894a expanded book version of Gabelentz’ Basque
and Berber studies, did not criticize Gabelentz’ underlying views on variation,
but did note that he had not properly distinguished between cognates and loan
words in his analyses.
Hugo Schuchardt (1842–1927) – one of the most prominent contemporary op-
ponents of the Neogrammarians, as he acknowledged himself (see, e.g., Spitzer
1928 [1922]) – was similarly unimpressed by Gabelentz’ methodological laxness,
despite being sympathetic to the motivating idea of the radical mutability of lin-
guistic forms. In a review of Gabelentz (1894a), he questioned the wisdom of tak-
ing such an adventurous course in comparing these languages when the more
conventional and uncontroversial methods had yet to be tried properly:
The Kabyle and Tuareg words that the author [Gabelentz] compares to the
Basque words differ from these greatly for the most part. He does indeed
attempt to explain this on the basis of muddled and washed out phonetic
confusion. However, even if I do not dispute this possibility in general, it
23Original: “So kann das Seltsame geschehen, dass der Seele ein sehr unbestimmtes Lautbild
vorschwebt, und doch der Mund ein sehr scharfes hervorbringt, aber nicht immer dasselbe,
sondern bald dieses bald jenes, je nach Zufall und Stimmung. […] Aus unserem Sprachkreise
wüsste ich wenigstens entfernt Analoges anzuführen. Dem Obersachsen, der zwischen d und
t, zwischen i und ü, e und ö, ei und eu, äu nicht unterscheidet, kann es geschehen, dass er
im Affecte jedes d wie t ausspricht, und dass er, wo es sich um tiefe, dunkele, grausige Dinge
handelt, alle i, e und ei lautmalend in ü, ö, eu verwandelt.”
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still seems to me that we should for the time being – that is, as long as
further and more careful examinations of Basque phonetic history are not
available – not seek refuge in this “last resort”. (Schuchardt 1893: 334)24
Gabelentz’ freewheeling approach, commented Schuchardt (1893: 334), offers
no credible way to navigate language history. It could just as easily be used to link
Basque to the languages of the Caucasus or the Ural as to those of North Africa.
Although there were linguists dissatisfied with the rigid system-building of the
Neogrammarians and prepared to face the messiness of the raw data, Gabelentz’
scheme did not present a viable alternative for them.
5 Conclusion
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the phenomenon of alternating
sounds was instrumentalized in different ways by scholars hoping to advance
their various academic and disciplinary agendas. In America, Boas denied the
reality of the phenomenon as part of a project to assert the scientific superiority
of the anthropological school he was busily building up. In Germany, Gabelentz
moved in the opposite direction, embracing the phenomenon as a means to un-
dermine the hegemony of Neogrammarian linguistics.The positions of both Boas
and Gabelentz – and indeed also their rivals – were informed in no small way
by the mid-nineteenth-century writings of Steinthal, who developed a unified
theory of the psychological basis and evolution of language with a strongly em-
pirical accent.
Although both Boas and Gabelentz indulge in exaggeration and caricature in
their critiques, and exhibit obvious faults in elaborating their own positions, their
views have had very different fates in the received histories of linguistics and
anthropology. External factors no doubt play a role here: Boas achieved institu-
tional dominance and is feted as the founding father of modern American an-
thropology, while Gabelentz died early and disappeared into relative historical
obscurity.
The different fates of their views on alternating sounds are perhaps also indica-
tive of the temperament of linguistics and anthropology as disciplines. Despite
24Original: “Die kabylischen und tuaregischenWörter, die der Verf. zu baskischenWörtern stellt,
weichen von diesen zum grossenTheil sehr stark ab. Zwar sucht er das aus einer verworrenen
und verwaschenen Lautirung zu erklären: aber wenn ich auch im Allgemeinen die Möglichkeit
einer solchen nicht bestreite, so dünkt mich doch, wir sollten vorderhand, d. h. so lange nicht
mehr und sorgfältigere Untersuchungen über die baskische Lautgeschichte vorhanden sind,
hier nicht zu dieser ‘ultima ratio’ unsere Zuflucht nehmen.”
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his apparent hostility to later conceptions of the phoneme, Boas’ attack on the no-
tion of alternating sounds is celebrated for expanding the formal franchise, mak-
ing all languages equal subjects under the laws of linguistics. Gabelentz’ efforts
to problematize the comparative method, by contrast, could find no supporters:
his dismembering of current historical linguistics offered no practical alternative.
Boas is more welcome than Gabelentz in fields that place a premium on techni-
cal progress, conceived positivistically as the ability to capture and catalogue
phenomena within a universalizing system. This case study offers informative
parallels to the “resistant embrace” of structuralism in France that John Joseph
(Chapter 6, this volume) sketches and the “unique form hypothesis” that Nick
Riemer (Chapter 9, this volume) imputes to present-day linguistics.
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Chapter 3
On Sapir’s notion of form/pattern and
its aesthetic background
Jean-Michel Fortis
cnrs, Université Paris Diderot
“I find that what I most care for
is beauty of form, whether in
substance or, perhaps even more
keenly, in spirit. A perfect style,
a well-balanced system of philos-
ophy, a perfect bit of music, the
beauty of mathematical relations —
these are some of the things that,
in the sphere of the immaterial,
have most deeply stirred me.”
Sapir, letter to Lowie, 29 Septem-
ber 1916 (cited in Silverstein 1986:
79)
On Sapir’s view, units of cultural behaviour (such as linguistic units) can only be
identified through the relations they maintain to other elements of the same kind.
This set of interrelations is what Sapir calls a “pattern”, or refers to simply as “form”.
The chapter begins by examining Sapir’s notion of pattern in his analysis of phono-
logical systems. It is shown that, to a certain extent, Sapir conflated the notion of
pattern with that of Gestalt, yet his own conception was idiosyncratic insofar as
it placed much emphasis on the purely formal potency of patterns, understood as
aesthetic configurations existing for form’s sake and independent from functional
motivations.
The second part of the chapter is devoted to Sapir’s description of how patterns are
formed and grasped. Complex interrelations are not laid bare in ordinary conscious
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thinking; they can only be accessed through an intuition that Sapir characterizes
as a “form-feeling”. Form-feeling, as Sapir himself tells us, takes its origin from art
theory. It is argued that the source of this notion is to be found in German-speaking
art theory, specifically the notion of Formgefühl. In the course of the discussion, the
hypothesis is set forth that Sapir’s “form drive”, which underlies the elaboration of
patterns for form’s sake, might also have its source in German thought, notably in
Humboldt and Schiller.
1 Introduction1
The vast range of scholarly interests which Sapir nurtured during his life far
exceeds what would fall under our current conception of linguistic matters. In
particular, psychology, especially Gestaltist, psychoanalysis, as especially repre-
sented by Carl Jung (1875–1961), music and aesthetics were to him concerns of
prime importance. As we shall see, his interests are reflected in the general con-
ceptions he entertained about culture and language, and more precisely about
linguistic form, or, in terms also used in his writings, linguistic pattern or con-
figuration.
In what follows, it will be shown that the aesthetic leitmotiv running through
many of Sapir’s writings is essential to understandwhat is idiosyncratic in his no-
tion of form or pattern.The aesthetic viewpoint, as will be argued, is fundamental
for understanding how Sapir conceived of an individual’s relation to cultural and
linguistic patterns; it also helps us see in what ways Sapir’s ideas about the con-
stitution of patterns and their diachrony deviated from anything we are familiar
with. Further, the theoretical connections of Sapirian form with Gestaltist ideas
and psychoanalysis might be best appreciated by, again, following the aesthetic
thread.
What about the historical roots or inspirations of Sapir? Their very hetero-
geneity and the fact that they were not always disclosed by him appear to have
produced a gap, or an indecision, in Sapirian studies. Were we to suggest proba-
ble influences beyond the well-attested ones, this gap could be at least partially
filled and our comprehension of Sapir deepened. Any attempt in this direction
is certainly worthwhile and we will do our best to offer proposals on this his-
torical context throughout the discussion and particularly in the last part of this
chapter.
1Parts of this chapter have already appeared as a post of the multi-author blog History and
Philosophy of the Language Sciences (Fortis 2014) and in an extended French version (Fortis
2015).
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2 An example of pattern: the phonological system
Sapir’s conception of a phonological system is a good entry point for his notion of
pattern. As early as Language (1921), phonemes are said to be “points” of an “un-
derlying phonetic pattern”. A potential simplifying misconception should first be
dispelled: we may be tempted to read into Sapir’s analysis of a phonological pat-
tern the idea that phonemes are merely identified by their distinctive features, in
effect, then, by the contrastive relations they hold to other phonemes of the lan-
guage. Sapir’s conception is more complex. In a phonological pattern, the relative
distance of elements is also determined by the degree to which they share com-
mon contexts of occurrence and partake of the same functional/semantic role.
See, for example, the fact that a Nootka speaker conflates /p’/ and /’m/ into a sin-
gle phonological structure /C’/ (Sapir 1951 [1933]: 55–57). There can be no other
reason, as Sapir explains, than the fact that the occurrences of /p’/ and /’m/ are
sufficiently similar to warrant the assimilation of their phonological structure.
This assimilation, in other words, manifests the fact that the occurrences of /p’/
exert an attraction on /’m/ which results in a levelling out of their phonological
structure. The relative proximity of elements in the system is also determined
by functional and semantic factors. For instance, in English /f/ contrasts with
/v/, as /p/ contrasts with /b/, but /f/ is closer to /v/ than /p/ to /b/ for the reason
that /f/ and /v/ belong to common paradigms, such as wife/wives. In turn, /f/ and
/v/ form with /θ/-/δ/ and /s/-/z/ what we may call a subsystem or subpattern,
in view of parallel voicing contrasts like sheath/sheathe andmouse/mouses (Sapir
1951 [1933]: 48). The very existence of idiosyncratic patterns, and the fact that the
relational feelings of speakers have an effect on phonetic change, do not make it
permissible “to look for universally valid sound changes under like articulatory
conditions” (Sapir 1951 [1933]: 48). This is not to reject the search for regularities,
nor is it in contradiction of the neogrammarian assumption of the inviolability
of sound laws, rather it is an implicit restriction of their validity to a family of
languages. In fact, Sapir occasionally points out the perpetuation of patterns or
subpatterns within a language or genetically related languages.
On several points, it should be noted, Sapir’s view is in line with Hermann
Paul (1846–1921) in his Prinzipien (1880–1920): linguistic elements form dynamic
groups which absorb or repulse elements that are, respectively, similar or dissim-
ilar in their form, function and semantics. The series wife/wives = sheath/sheathe
=mouse/mouses would constitute, in Paul’s parlance, a stoffliche Proportionengle-
ichung, a “material equation” (Paul 1920 [1880]: 86). In the German context, such
views on representations acting as groups can be traced back to Johann Friedrich
61
Jean-Michel Fortis
Herbart (1776–1841), whose psychology of the unconscious appears to have fur-
nished theoretical tools to many thinkers, not only to Paul. By contrast with
Paul, however, Sapir isolates phonemes from morphemes, an abstraction which
Paul might have found implausible from a psychological point of view. In addi-
tion, Sapir’s aesthetic conception of patterns strongly colours his interpretation
of Herbartian groups, as we shall see later.
Again in conformity with Paul and much of the linguistic literature of the
time, for Sapir the organization of groups is unconscious. Latent factors can be
brought to light in a variety of ways: through the conflation of phonemic struc-
tures, as in the Nootka example; through the filling in of phonemes which reflect
co-occurrences latent in the speaker’s knowledge (Sapir 1951 [1933]: 52–53); or
through what Herbartian psychology and Boas (1858–1942) had described as ap-
perceptive phenomena, for example, in English speakers, the illusory addition
of a weak consonant in syllables ending with a short vowel (Sapir 1951 [1933]:
58–59).2 More generally, unconscious patterning gives rise to what we would
characterize as “categorial perception”; that is, the perception of forms that is
consonant with their position in a pattern and abstracts away from physical fea-
tures. Such perception, as Sapir (1951 [1933]: 46) points out, is a general trait of
human cognition; indeed, the distinction between physical features and their po-
sition in a cultural or linguistic pattern, and the psychological primacy of the
latter, is a point repeatedly emphasized in Sapir’s texts. Lastly, and this brings us
back to aesthetics, in Sapir’s (1951 [1925]) “Sound patterns in language”, the ability
to access and use this sytem of positions, in other words speech, is characterized
as an “art”. This rather surprising characterization, undeveloped and allusive as
it is in the text, will hopefully be made more understandable when Sapir’s notion
of form (or pattern) and the aesthetic motif are more closely examined.
3 Patterns as Gestalten
Most remarkable is the very salient fact that Sapir does not speak of a network of
groups but of patterns of elements. This shift of emphasis only underlines the ac-
tion of unconscious patterns on forms surfacing as conscious elements, for only
elements are conscious, not groups. Speaking of “pattern” or, at times, of “con-
2“A new sensation is apperceived by means of similar sensations that form part of our knowl-
edge” (Boas 1889: 50). Apperception is one of those notions which belong to the stock-in-trade
of Herbartian psychology. The concept of apperception was presumably passed on to Boas
through Steinthal. Its application to the issue of “alternating sounds” in Native American lan-
guages is discussed by McElvenny in Chapter 2 of this volume.
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figuration” also reveals the connection Sapir established between unconscious
organization and configurations designated as Gestalten in the psychology of
the same name.
We do not know for certain when Sapir became acquainted with Gestalt psy-
chology. Several testimonies (including a letter by Sapir himself) have revealed
Sapir’s admiration for Kurt Koffka (1886–1941) and more specifically his book
The Growth of the Mind (1924), which he appears to have read in 1924.3 We know
the book lay at hand’s reach in the family house, and that it was recommended
reading for Sapir’s seminars on the impact of culture on personality and on the
psychology of culture at Yale (years 1933–34 and 1935–36; Sapir 1999 [1933]: 677).
It is also a matter of historical record that Sapir met Koffka personally in a sym-
posium on the unconscious in 1927.
There is certainly a kinship between the Gestaltist rejection of elementist psy-
chological accounts and its holistic view of perception and behaviour and, on
the other hand, Sapir’s idea that all units of culturally determined behaviour are
pyschologically active only as “points in a pattern”, not as bundles of physical
features. The “psychological reality of phonemes” (the title of Sapir’s famous pa-
per) has its match in the Gestaltist affirmation that “sensations” do not have
phenomenal reality. The contexts of the two theories were vastly different, but
this common point shoud be highlighted.4
Perhaps most congenial to Sapir was Koffka’s definition of a configuration (Ge-
stalt) which, although it occurred in the context of a discussion of figure/ground
organization, was of the widest generality. A configuration (or Gestalt),5 said
Koffka (1924: 146), was definable as a “co-existence of phenomena, in which each
member possesses its peculiarity only by virtue of, and in connection with, all
the others”. In a similar vein, Sapir explained that a linguistic sound
is not only characterized by a distinctive and slightly variable articulation
and a corresponding acoustic image, but also — and this is crucial — by
3Sapir’s positive judgment of the book is conveyed with particular elation in a letter to Benedict
(cited in Sapir 2002 [1928-1937]: 121). David Sapir’s testimony is cited in Cowan et al. (1986:
478). These testimonies alone suffice to show that Murray (1981), who denies any influence
of Gestaltist ideas on Sapir, has seriously misjudged the influence of Gestalttheorie on Sapir’s
thinking.
4Sapir’s view was also an argument in favour of a minimalist position in the debate on the
phonetic notation most suited to Amerindian languages: should one complexify or simplify it?
See Darnell (1990: 285).
5Mead had lent Koffka’s book to Sapir in its English version, where “configuration” translates
Gestalt/Struktur (Darnell 1990: 185). Koffka explains that the translation as “structure” was
not retained for fear that in an American context it might be interpreted in connection with
structural psychology (i.e. theWundtian-style analysis of mental states promoted by Titchener
in the United States).
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a psychological aloofness from all the other members of the system. […]
A sound that is not unconsciously felt as “placed” with reference to other
sounds is no more a true element of speech than a lifting of the foot is a
dance step unless it can be “placed” with reference to other movements
that help to define the “dance”. (Sapir 1951 [1925]: 35; Sapir’s emphasis)
Sapir’s allusion to an organized sequence of actions (dancing), in this passage
and elsewhere (Sapir 2002 [1928-1937]: 104–105), might point to the fact that pat-
terned behaviour was appreciated as a major step towards an enlargement of the
notion of configuration. This enlargement was especially noticeable in the way
Koffka described Köhler’s experiments with apes: learning how to solve a task
is, says Koffka, the establishment of a new configuration in which an element
of the field – for example, a stick – comes to find a role in an action sequence
with a beginning and an end; that is, a configuration which has the property of
closure (a term significantly reused by Sapir in The Psychology of Culture, 2002
[1928-1937]: 104). Further, the apprehension of something as a tool is configura-
tional insofar as a chimpanzee, when putting together a thicker and a thinner
stick, is sensitive to their relative length, not to their absolute size; in another
situation, the thinner stick may thus play the role of the thicker one.
The vicarious character of units of behaviour and their identification through
the configuration of which they partake is precisely the point being made in
the initial example of Sapir’s (1951 [1925]) “Sound patterns of language”: the ex-
piration wh that blows a candle gets entirely reconfigured when it becomes a
linguistic gesture.
An essential property of formal patterns is their transposability. By “transpos-
able” is meant here the capacity for a system of relations to remain unaltered un-
der a change in physical implementation. Language furnishes several instances
of transposability. Thus, the formal patterning of language is said to underlie the
possibility of “linguistic transfers”; that is, the possibility of resorting to various
(de)coding techniques, such as writing, lip-reading or gestural systems; or again,
the system of initial consonants in English is a historical transfer from the Indo-
European one (Sapir 1921: 200). The latter kind of transposition, which involves
a phonological system, will be further elaborated through an artificial example
in “Sound patterns of language”.
Now, transposability, in Gestalt thought, furnished evidence for the existence
of qualities not reducible to sums of sensations. Indeed, from the very beginning
of Gestalt psychology, in the seminal work of Christian von Ehrenfels (1859–
1932), transposability was played upon as a favourite theme: “proof of the exis-
tence of Gestalt qualities”, said Ehrenfels (1988 [1890]: 90), “is provided, at least
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in the sphere of visual and aural presentations, by the similarity-relations […]
which obtain between melodies and figures having different tonal or positional
foundations”. Note that the transposability of melodies as “systems of relations”
was cited as a universal of human musical cultures by Carl Stumpf (1848–1936)
in Die Anfänge der Musik (1911), a book Sapir reviewed at an early stage of his ca-
reer. Gestaltist ideas thus came to Sapir at least in part through the mediation of
aesthetic theory, and much earlier than 1924. There remains, however, a point on
which Sapir is at variance with the Gestaltists: whereas a Gestalt quality is phe-
nomenally more directly accessible than its elements, the structure of a pattern is,
for Sapir, unconscious. However, its units are grasped in a way which, because it
does not lay its structure bare, Sapir most often describes as a “feeling”. We shall
now turn our attention to this feeling for form.
4 The form-feeling
Inmany places, Sapir refers to the grasping of patterns of all kinds, be they phono-
logical, morphological and syntactic, or behavioural and social, as a “feeling” or,
less frequently, as an “intuition” of the same order. This view, as far as I know,
makes its first appearance in Language (1921), where it is applied to linguistic
patterning. For example, we read that “both the phonetic and conceptual struc-
tures show the instinctive feeling of language for form” (Sapir 1921: 56) or that
every language has a definite feeling for its inner phonetic system and “also a
definite feeling for patterning on the level of grammatical formation” (Sapir 1921:
61). The notion of a feeling for form/pattern recurs in different guises which we
may assume to carry the same meaning: “relational feeling”, “form intuition”,
“feeling for form/relations/patterning/classification into forms”, “to feel a pat-
tern/form” etc. These expressions are used in various contexts: quite generally,
as above, to refer to the phonological/morphosyntactic apparatus of a language,
as in discussing the unconscious direction imparted to thinking by the forms a
language has laid down (Sapir 1951 [1924]: 153); more specifically, while speaking
of vocalic alternations in English (goose-geese, sing-sang-sung; Sapir 1921: 60–61),
active constructions (Sapir 1921: 84–85, 111), of which the speaker is said to feel
the SVO structure, possessive pronouns, the animate/inanimate distinction (Sapir
1921: 156), case-marking on the English interrogative pronoun (Sapir 1921: 159),
the semantic relation between boy and man (Sapir 1951 [1929]: 61), the mean-
ing of est-ce que in French and of verbal stems in Athabaskan languages (Sapir
1991 [1923]: 147), causative forms (Sapir 1951 [1924]: 154), which are an uncon-
scious, unreflective mode of the mental representation of the concept of causa-
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tion; French reflexive verbs (Sapir 1951 [1931]: 116), which, to French speakers,
induce a “formal feeling”, a sense of belonging together, although from an ex-
ternal perspective semantic homogeneity is hard to find. Of all these texts, the
notion of “form-feeling” is probably most frequently referred to in “Sound pat-
terns” (1951 [1925]).
A passage from “The unconscious patterning of behavior in society” (1951
[1927](b)) provides a good illustration of the issues intertwined with the notion
of form-feeling.
To most of us who speak English the tangible expression of the plural idea
in the noun seems to be a self-evident necessity. Careful observation of
English usage, however, leads to the conviction that this self-evident ne-
cessity of expression is more of an illusion than a reality. If the plural were
to be understood functionally alone, we should find it difficult to explain
whywe use plural formswith numerals and otherwords that in themselves
imply plurality. “Five man” or “several house” would be just as adequate as
“five men” or “several houses.” Clearly, what has happened is that English,
like all of the other Indo-European languages, has developed a feeling for
the classification of all expressions which have a nominal form into singu-
lars and plurals. So much is this the case that in the early period of the his-
tory of our linguistic family even the adjective, which is nominal in form,
is unusable except in conjunction with the category of number. (Sapir 1951
[1927](b): 550; my emphasis)
The example brings home the point that a structural feature is, as it were, “ex-
ercised” in actual speech in a way that is not of the order of conscious knowl-
edge. Such a feature gives form to experience and may perpetuate itself by the
sheer force of the unconscious pattern which imposes itself on the speaker. Their
thoughts being channelled in these formal grooves, speakers may resist the elim-
ination of what, in the eyes of cool reason, would appear to be non-functional or
a superfluous luxury.
Note too that the form-feeling has implications for the way diachrony should
be conceived. In the passage just cited, and in other places, Sapir seems to be
engaged in an implicit dialogue with Otto Jespersen (1860–1943), who had fa-
mously argued that languages evolve toward greater economy and analyticity
(1894, 1965 [1924]; see e.g. 1965 [1924]: 207ff for the example of plurality). Against
Jespersen, yet not in complete disagreement with him, Sapir apparently claims
that languages may not evolve toward the complete elimination of superfluities
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and toward absolute or near absolute analyticity, for speakers’ unconscious at-
tachment to formal patterns carries with it an inertia which resists this evolution.
We shall return to the issue of diachrony shortly.
A clue to the understanding of Sapir’s “form-feeling” may be found in the
following excerpt, which clearly points to the aesthetic source of the notion:
Probably most linguists are convinced that the language-learning process,
particularly the acquisition of a feeling for the formal set of the language,
is very largely unconscious and involves mechanisms that are quite dis-
tinct in character from either sensation or reflection. There is doubtless
something deeper about our feeling for form than even the majority of
art theorists have divined, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that, as
psychological analysis becomes more refined, one of the greatest values of
linguistic study will be in the unexpected light it may throw on the psy-
chology of intuition, this “intuition” being perhaps nothing more nor less
than the “feeling” for relations. (Sapir 1951 [1924]: 156; my emphasis)
There are two possible ways of interpreting the reference to aesthetics: our
feeling for linguistic form can be conceptualized in analogy with its counterpart
in aesthetic theory; or both feelings reflect a common ability, the intuitive grasp
of complex patterns. From what we have said so far, from the way Sapir con-
flates phonological intuition with art (Sapir 1951 [1925]: 34), or seems to equate
Gestalten with aesthetic forms (Sapir 2002 [1928-1937]: 145–150), we may gather
that aesthetic intuition was for him a general ability exceeding the bounds of the
perception of artistic forms as such (see too, in this respect, the epigraph to this
chapter). Such an interpretation would allow us to draw a parallel between this
formal linguistic play which is supposed to reflect an innate striving for formal
elaboration and, on the other hand, the Boasian idea that artistic creation begins
with the purely formal, unrepresentative exercising of technical skills (Boas 1927
[1922]). In the realm of aesthetic thought, Sapir would have as counterparts those
theorists granting pride of place to ornamentation, decorative arts; that is, to for-
malist considerations. In the same way, linguistic change becomes comparable
to stylistic change, at that time an all-important question of aesthetic theory. It
is now time to see the relation of linguistic change to the aesthetic perspective.
5 Diachrony
We may wonder if Sapir’s concepts of pattern and form-feeling have important
consequences for his descriptive linguistic work.They certainly do in phonology.
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It is suggested here that his view of diachronic processes might furnish another
illustration and demonstrate again the relevance of the aesthetic perspective.
In Language, diachronic change is described as a “drift”, a notion which Sapir
(1921: 155) defines as follows: “The drift of a language is constituted by the uncon-
scious selection on the part of its speakers of those individual variations that are
cumulative in some special direction”.6 This view of change can be made more
palpable through an illustration, Sapir’s account of the progressive disappear-
ance of whom in favour of who. According to Sapir, four causes have contributed
to the decline of whom. They are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Sapir’s causes for the decline of whom
Cause Phenomenon Consequence
1 The forms marking the
non-subject (“objective forms”)
are me/him/her/us/them/whom.
In this group whom is isolated.
The functional class of whom
comprises which/what/that but
these are not inflected.
The isolation of whom causes its
weakening.
2 Interrogative words like
where/when/how, are invariable,
except who/whom
The isolation of whom causes its
weakening.
3 Objective forms are strongly
associated with the post-verbal
position (cf. he told him, it’s me),
while interrogative ones are
strongly associated with
pre-verbal positions.
whom belongs to two groups
whose members are associated
with distinct positions. Who is
not associated with distinct
positions and is thereby
favoured over whom.
4 whom is followed by a slight
hesitation in Whom did you see?
whom is often “clumsy”, from a
rhythmical point of view, which
weakens it.
6On the meanings of “drift”, and its reception after Sapir, see Malkiel (1981). Malkiel suggests
that drift may have its source in the continental drift (Verschiebung in German) of Wegener.
The idea seems outlandish to me. Hermann Paul, like other authors, speaks of drift (also Ver-
schiebung) when dealing with those slight variations which cause constant linguistic change.
The definition of “drift” just cited would be perfectly in line with Paul.
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Points 1 to 3 in Table 1 are faithful to Hermann Paul’s style of explanation:
elements which formally or functionally deviate from a group (Isolierung) are
weakened, except if they are very frequent. However, Sapir’s description has its
own peculiarities. The frequency factor has disappeared and Sapir has his own
way of accounting for the cause of isolation. For example, on the isolation of
whom in situation 1, he suggests that “there is something unesthetic about the
word. It suggests a form pattern which is not filled out by its fellows” (Sapir 1921:
158). He is a little more affirmative in case 2, when he adds: “it is safe to infer
that there is a rather strong feeling in English that the interrogative pronoun
or adverb, typically an emphatic element in the sentence, should be invariable”
(Sapir 1921: 159; my emphasis). Apparently, a purely “mechanical” account of the
formation and dissolution of groups of the kind advocated by Paul is not deemed
sufficient.The form-feeling, with its aesthetic connotation, had to come into play.
As hinted at above, the aesthetic perspective on language made it possible to
envisage a comparison of linguistic change and stylistic change. The similitude
is explicitly endorsed inThe Psychology of Culture:
Practically all aesthetic patterns run through such a gamut: a rise from
humble beginnings, an authoritative pinnacle, a prestige hangover — then
down! The progress of an aesthetic cycle, then, means that there is aes-
thetic developmentwithin an aesthetic idea. […] Even language forms have
something like a cyclical development. Although the language’s develop-
ment is continuous, it is possible to define a certain set of linguistic forms
— or point to a certain stage of development of a form — as classical. The
classical stage would have a perfectly consistent and tightly-wrought use
of forms. Now people participating in an aesthetic cycle are not conscious
of it. (Sapir 2002 [1928-1937]: 132–133)7
Sapir then goes to explain that English has embarked on an evolution toward
analyticity but, unlike Chinese, has not yet completed the cycle.
As already noted, the formal efficacy of entrenched patterns explains Sapir’s
qualifications on Jespersen’s idea of a progress toward analytic forms.8 English,
says Sapir, still mixes up concrete and relational concepts in some limited do-
mains, hence is not fully analytic. For example, the animate/inanimate distinc-
tion correlates with distinctive markings, since I /me and the possessive ’s are
7It is difficult to find any originality in this cyclical view of history. Winckelmann is famous for
having defended it in aesthetics.
8McElvenny (2013, 2017b) shows how Jespersen’s views relate to the debate on the form of
international languages.
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associated with forms denoting animate entities. Through this convergence, for-
mal configurations reinforce each other, with the consequence that “however the
language strives for a more and more analytic form, it is by no means manifest-
ing a drift toward the expression of ‘pure’ relational concepts in the Indo-Chinese
manner” (Sapir 1921: 168). In other words, if we apply to this case the same reason-
ing as for whom, linguistic change is at least partly determined by an aesthetic
feeling responding to the (dis)harmony of groups.This view leads to the rejection
of purely “mechanical” (Paul) and teleological (Jespersen) accounts.
6 Form, function and formal play
The potency of a pattern is not determined by the function it might fulfil; we
have seen that formal patterns have their own efficacy. Reciprocally, function
may counteract a well-established pattern. An example of such a counteraction
in the non-linguistic realm is given in “Anthropology and sociology” (Sapir 1951
[1927][a]). In many Indian tribes, Sapir observes, there is an entrenched social
pattern according to which prestigious positions are a matter of inheritable priv-
ilege. This pattern may even extend to positions which should require special in-
dividual capacities, and thus may be transferred to domains in which it is clearly
non-functional. However, some tribes resist this transfer, because “the psychic
peculiarity which leads certain men and women (‘medicine-men’ and ‘medicine-
women’) to become shamans is so individual that shamanism shows nearly every-
where a marked tendency to resist grooving in the social patterns of the tribe”. In
the present case, functionality (the exigencies of the craft) supersedes a dominant
social pattern (the prevalence of inheritable privilege).9 However, it is not clear
that any such counteraction of function can be observed in the linguistic realm.
Given what Sapir says about the greater insulation of language from conscious
rationalization, it would be coherent to think that a counteraction of function is
9Sapir’s notion of cultural/social pattern is in line with Boasian relativism, and its opposition
to cross-cultural descriptive schemes appealing to race, evolution or environmental factors.
Within diffusionist Boasian anthropology, some emphasized that a proper understanding of the
diffusion and assimilation of cultural traits involved moving to the pattern level: substantively
identical cultural traits are functionally different if placed within different patterns (Wissler
1917). A radical view holds that substantive traits are of little importance for characterizing
some cultural patterns. Totemism, for example, is not to be defined by a substantive trait nor
analysed as having originated from any particular trait (be it a guardian spirit, exogamy, taboo,
the use of totemic names etc.). Rather, it is a classificatory social pattern, whose origin matters
little; what matters is the totemic pattern spreading over a group (Goldenweiser 1912). The
analogy with the purely structural Sapirian view of a phonological pattern is obvious.
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perhaps only found in non-linguistic domains: language “forms a far more com-
pact and inherently unified conceptual and formal complex than the totality of
culture. This is due primarily to the fact that its function is far more limited in
nature, to some extent also to the fact that the disturbing force of rationalization
that constantly shapes and distorts culture anew is largely absent in language”
(Sapir 1951 [1916]: 432–433).
This “largely” unilateral autonomization of form in the field of language would
seem to imply that the aesthetic form-feeling plays a greater role in linguistic
matters than in any other field. The action of this form-feeling would also be
more coercive. In several texts, Sapir connects the potency of patterns with their
being unconscious, saying for example that “we act all the more securely for
our unawareness of the patterns that control us” (Sapir 1951 [1927][a]: 549).10
In this respect, language has a special status since, explains Sapir (1951 [1912]:
100), “linguistic features are necessarily less capable of rising into consciousness
of speakers than traits of culture”. Though less radical, such an affirmation is in
agreement with Boas’ (1911: 67) claim that linguistic classifications, of all ethno-
logical phenomena, are unique in being inaccessible to consciousness. For Sapir,
the access point is obviously the form-feeling.
The relative independence of form and function also manifests itself in a pro-
cess wemay call the “semantic disinvestment” of form. By this term is meant that
the “full” content of linguistic forms may not be activated in all of their occur-
rences, insofar as forms may be simply conventionally applied to ends to which
they are not suited. An example from Psychology of Culture may illustrate this
point (the square brackets indicate places where the reconstructed “manuscript”
has been patched by significant additions from the editors):
Consider, for example, verbs that are not entirely active [in their meaning
but are treated as active in the linguistic structure:] in English the subject “I”
is logically implied to be the active will in “I sleep” as well as “I run”. [A sen-
tence like] “I am hungry” might, [in terms of its content, be logically] better
expressed with “hunger” as the active doer, as in [the German]mich hungert
[or even the French] j’ai faim. In some languages, however, such as Sioux, a
rigid distinction is made between truly active and static verbs. […] [It seems,
then, that] when we get a pattern of behavior, we follow that [pattern] in
spite of [being led, sometimes, into] illogical ideas or a feeling of inadequacy.
We become used to it.We are comfortable in a groove of behavior. [Indeed], it
10This conception, as noted by Joseph (2002), gives the linguist an important role in weakening
the grip of linguistic patterns.
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seems that no matter what [the] psychological origin may be, or complex of
psychological origins, or a particular type of patterned conduct, the pattern
itself will linger on by sheer inertia. […] Patterns of activity are continually
getting away from their original psychological incitation. (Sapir 2002 [1928-
1937]: 109–110)
In other words, the SV pattern is disinvested of its full significance when it
gets applied to cases in which S is not an active doer and the verb is static (cf.
also Sapir 1921: 14–15). In English, the generalization of this pattern conforms
to the general observation that “all languages evince a curious instinct for the
development of one or more particular grammatical processes at the expense
of others, tending always to lose sight of any explicit functional value that the
process may have had in the first instance, delighting, it would seem, in the sheer
play of its means of expression” (Sapir 1921: 60). The description of this formal
play is couched in terms that can hardly fail to evoke artistic activity. This step
is taken most explicitly in “The unconscious patterning of behavior in society”.
In this text, the conception of language as an aesthetic product serves to capture
two features of linguistic activity: the disconnection between form and function,
yet the fact that the formal consistency of language seems to act as a surrogate
of this functional demotivation:
Purely functional explanations of language, if valid, would lead us to expect
either a far greater uniformity in linguistic expression than we actually find,
or should lead us to discover strict relations of a functional nature between a
particular form of language and the culture of the people using it. Neither of
these expectations is fulfilled by the facts. [… T]he forms of speech developed
in the different parts of the world are at once free and necessary, in the sense
in which all artistic productions are free and necessary. Linguistic forms as
we find them bear only the loosest relation to the cultural needs of a given
society, but they have the very tightest consistency as aesthetic products.
(Sapir 1951 [1927][b]: 550)11
An important aspect of the Sapirian version of the so-called Sapir-Whorf hy-
pothesis may well reside in this aesthetic view, besides, of course, those facets it
owes to other motivations, well described in Joseph (2002), and which relate in
particular to the publication of Ogden and Richard’s Meaning of Meaning (1923).
11This interplay between freedom and necessity invites a comparison with what Sapir says of the
rules of etiquette: etiquette “combines a strong moral necessity and tyranny and a felt element
of choice” (Sapir 2002 [1928-1937]: 236).
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In view of this aesthetic dialectic between the free and the necessary, Allen (1986:
462) is quite justified in stating that, for Sapir, the linguistic coercion of thought
and the compliance of behaviour with cultural patterns “is not the grip of a mas-
ter (culture) upon a slave (the individual) but is, instead, more closely analogous
to the felt need of the member of an orchestra to play his instrument in accor-
dance with a musical score”.
The fact that formsmay be disinvested of their semantic/psychological content
finds its counterpart in Sapir’s typology of symbols. In the entry “Symbolism”,
which was written for the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Sapir (1951 [1934])
calls “referential symbolism” the kind of symbolism that has been divested of
affective content, in contrast to those symbols that act as substitutes for emo-
tionally charged behaviour, which are said to belong to the second main type,
that of “condensation symbolism”.12 During the evolution of mankind, one sym-
bolism has developed from the other:
It is likely that most referential symbolisms go back to unconsciously evolved
symbolisms saturated with emotional quality, which gradually took on a
purely referential character as the linked emotion dropped out of the be-
havior in question. Thus shaking the fist at an imaginary enemy becomes
a dissociated and finally a referential symbol for anger, when no enemy, real
or imaginary, is actually intended. (Sapir 1951 [1934]: 565)
From a psychoanalytical point of view, this was a very neutral and agnostic
way of describing the evolution of symbolism, without, for instance, the concept
of repression.Quite significant in this respect is the non-affective factor adduced
by Sapir to explain the development of referential symbolism, namely “the in-
creased complexity and homogeneity of symbolic material”; that is, the evolu-
tion to more richly patterned symbols. This can be brought in relation to Sapir’s
examples of pattern extensions, and their “getting away from their original psy-
chological incitation” (cf. the quotation above).
12The manifestly Freudian “condensation”, a rendering of Verdichtung, only underlines the im-
portance of affect in the way Sapir conceived of this symbolism, whose immediate emotional
significance puts it at the origin of symbolization in mankind. There is a certain kinship be-
tween Sapir and some views defended by Ernest Jones (1879–1958) in his psychoanalytical
essay on symbolism (Jones 1916), in particular a duality of symbolisms correlated with the
unconscious/conscious distinction.
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7 The form drive
Form for form’s sake is the aesthetic motto for explaining the routinization of
linguistic processes, against “mechanical” accounts which narrowly concentrate
on low-level processes:
It is usual to say that isolated linguistic responses are learned early in life
and that, as these harden into fixed habits, formally analogous responses
are made, when the need arises, in a purely mechanical manner, specific
precedents pointing the way to new responses. We are sometimes told
that these analogous responses are largely the result of reflection on the
utility of the earlier ones, directly learned from the social environment.
Such methods of approach see nothing in the problem of linguistic form
beyondwhat is involved in the more andmore accurate control of a certain
set of muscles towards a desired end, say the hammering of a nail. I can
only believe that explanations of this type are seriously incomplete and
that they fail to do justice to a certain innate striving for formal elaboration
and expression and to an unconscious patterning of sets of related elements
of experience. (Sapir 1951 [1924]: 156)
The contrast between the hammering of a nail and speaking is reminiscent of
that between blowing a candle and uttering the linguistic sound wh; it is, says
Sapir (1951 [1925]: 34), what separates mere practical behaviour from art.
In the above passage, the mention of an “innate striving for formal elaboration
and expression” echoes other declarations, such as the following one, in which
the aesthetic leitmotiv reappears: “the projection in social behavior of an innate
sense of form is an intuitive process and is merely a special phase of that men-
tal functioning that finds its clearest voice in mathematics and its most nearly
pure aesthetic embodiment in plastic and musical design” (Sapir 1951 [1927][a]:
344). Sapir’s appeal to a sort of instinctual “form-craving” of the human mind
and to an innate sense of form (e.g. Sapir 1951 [1924], Sapir 1951 [1927](a); see
Handler 1986: 445) is not without antecedents. His form-drive is reminiscent of
the Schillerian Formtrieb, which Friedrich von Schiller (1759–1805) characterized
as a drive to a free expression of personality and toward insulating a permanent
self from ever-changing worldly conditions (Schiller 1795, letters 12 to 16). The
wedding of this “form-drive” to the flow of sensations is accomplished through
an aesthetic impulse, the “play-drive” (Spieltrieb). Even if Schiller’s Formtriebwas
not on Sapir’s mind when he wrote Language, Jung’s (1921) Psychological Types,
a book and a theory Sapir was very fond of, may have reminded him of it. For
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Jung, however, the Spieltrieb was not interpreted as an essentially aesthetic at-
titude, nor as a systematization of formal patterns, but rather the conciliation
of abstract thinking and sensation, of ego-centred vs object-centred orientation,
and the source of symbolic creativity.
Sapir is not the only linguist of the time to speak of a form-drive. As McEl-
venny (2016) observes, Georg von der Gabelentz (1840–1893), in a passage of his
Sprachwissenschaft (2016 [1891]), speaks of a drive towards the creation of forms
(Formungstrieb) which would acccount for the formal lavishness (Formengeprän-
ge) of languages, whose profusion goes beyond functional needs. This Formungs-
trieb accounts for people’s delight in formal play, says Gabelentz, who describes
this human urge with Schiller’s word Spieltrieb; that is, the play-drive which
grounds the aesthetic attitude (Gabelentz 2016 [1891]: 381; no explicit reference
to Schiller is made). The play-drive implies that the “little surplus of effort that
I made on my work over and above bare utility was already a piece of love, and
gave the dead material a breath of the personal for all time.” Indeed, continues
Gabelentz (2016 [1891]: 344), “precisely the same thing happened with language”
(trans. McElvenny 2016: 35).
In an addition to the second edition of Gabelentz’ text, and in the context of
the present discussion, Gabelentz’ nephew, Albrecht Graf von der Schulenburg,
refers back toWilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835) (see alsoMcElvenny 2017a). Es-
pecially praised are speakers of languages which systematize this formal play by
resorting to obligatory inflections, that is, speakers of Indo-European languages;
in them, says Schulenburg, one finds a specific sense of form (Formensinn, a word
also found in texts on art) and an outstanding “aesthetic” gift (Gabelentz 2016
[1891]: 394). While the value judgement might not have been to Gabelentz’ taste,
I believe the reference to Humboldt puts us on the right track.
Although the term Formungstrieb, so it seems, is not used by Humboldt (Jür-
gen Trabant, p. c.), what we do find in Humboldt is the idea of a formative power
which is especially active in some phases of language evolution, a power that
Humboldt calls Bildungstrieb. The term can be found in two contexts: in texts
about language, and in instances where the discussion revolves around biolog-
ical questions (respectively Humboldt 1907 [1830-35], vol. vii: 95, 168, cf. Eng.
trans. in Humboldt 1988 [1830–1835], p. 88, “constructive urge”, and p. 150, “for-
mative urge”; Humboldt 1903 [1794], vol. I: 328). The latter contexts point to the
biological source of the Bildungstrieb, a concept borrowed from Humboldt’s for-
mer teacher at Göttingen, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752–1840). For Blu-
menbach (1781), the Bildungstrieb is a force creating and perpetuating organic
forms (Jürgen Trabant, p. c.). In the linguistic domain, the stage at which lan-
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guage forms, as it were, “outgrow” the mind seem to be evaluated negatively (cf.
Über die Verschiedenheit, Eng. trans. §20, in Humboldt 1988 [1830–1835]), which
of course separates him from Sapir.
In short, linguistic structures are produced by an instinct which governs the
creation of aesthetic objects through its formal play. I believe that by setting
Sapir’s aesthetic form-drive in the very German genealogy sketched above I am
not going far beyond the bounds of decent speculation. This brief digression on
the sources of the form-drive is not all the German lead has to offer, as we shall
now see.
8 On the source of the form-feeling: Croce?
Wehave shown that the form-feeling has its origin in aesthetic theory. Aesthetics
is a continent unto itself, and the potential sources are many. Let us first go back
to what Sapir himself said about his influence(s). The crucial passage is repeated
here:
Probably most linguists are convinced that the language-learning process,
particularly the acquisition of a feeling for the formal set of the language,
is very largely unconscious and involves mechanisms that are quite dis-
tinct in character from either sensation or reflection. There is doubtless
something deeper about our feeling for form than even the majority of
art theorists have divined, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that, as
psychological analysis becomes more refined, one of the greatest values of
linguistic study will be in the unexpected light it may throw on the psy-
chology of intuition, this “intuition” being perhaps nothing more nor less
than the “feeling” for relations. (Sapir 1951 [1924]: 156; my emphasis)
In this passage, “intuition” is equated with “feeling for form”. On the other
hand, we have explicit statements by Sapir in Language in which he acknowl-
edges his debt to Benedetto Croce (1866–1952); further, in one instance, Sapir
(1921: 224) says he borrows the term “intuition” from Croce, who in his Aesthet-
ics uses “intuition” in contrast to “logical knowledge”. Altogether, this may be
conducive to an adventurous syllogism: Sapir owes his notion of intuitive knowl-
edge to Croce, intuitive knowledge = form-feeling, ergo Sapir’s form-feeling is a
version of Croce’s intuition, or at least related to it. This conclusion is endorsed
by Modjeska (1968: 347), who claims that in Croce Sapir “found a confirmation,
if not the source of his own thoughts on formal pattern”. Hymes (1969) agrees
with Modjeska, while Hall (1969) begs to differ.
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That Sapir borrowed “intuition” from Croce is acknowledged by Sapir him-
self, as we just saw. Whether the notion of form-feeling can be conflated with
Croce’s “intuition” is another matter. Croce’s definitions of intuition, however
hazy, show that intuition is for him a faculty essentially dedicated to the ap-
prehension of individual objects. Further, Croce wields his notion of intuition
against an intellectualist view of cognition and implicitly against Kant’s concept
of intuition; at any rate, his discussion shows he completely misses the Kantian
doctrine of forms of intuition and categories, which certainly should detract from
its interest for an informed reader.13
In the Aesthetic, there is no particular emphasis on the grasp of unconscious
patterns. On the contrary, genius, as superlative intuition, is essentially con-
scious, and in the chapter on language (chap. 18), Croce makes clear that parts
of speech, which might be taken here as building blocks of linguistic pattern-
ing, are dubious abstractions floating above linguistic intuition. Intuition is also,
however, a faculty that is inherently expressive, insofar as its operation is fully
realized (intuiting a geographical area is being able to draw it, says Croce); this
aspect, at least, is consonant with the dynamic character of the Sapirian uncon-
scious (see Allen 1986).
Given the philosophical context in which Croce introduces his notion of intu-
ition, what was its relevance for Sapir? In Language, occurrences of “intuition”
that may be considered to come close to Croce’s notion appear in the section
devoted to literary criticism; that is, when discussing the idiosyncrasy of writers.
In this section, the irreducibly individual character of an artist’s “intuition” is
said to have its origin in personal experience, within “thought relations” which,
says Sapir (1921: 239), “have no specific linguistic vesture”. If this were not clear
enough, shortly after this passage, a distinction is drawn between this personal
intuition and the “innate, specialized art of language”, an art that would seem to
be exercised by the form-feeling.
When Sapir uses “intuition” in a sense that would appear to be more relevant
to his own understanding of the term, he does not go back to Croce but to Jung.
In this respect, the way he handles Jung’s functional types of mental activity
(thinking, feeling, sensation, intuition) is revealing. Of all these types, intuition
is singled out. Intuition, he says, is not on a par with the rest of the functional
types; it is rather a mode of apprehension which cuts across the other functional
13Against Kant, Croce says for instance that we have “intuitions without space and time”: “Noi
abbiamo intuizioni senza spazio e senza tempo: una tinta di cielo e una tinta di sentimento,
un ‘ahi !’ di dolore e uno slancio di volontà oggettivati nella coscienza, sono intuizioni che
possediamo, e dove nulla è formato nello spazio e nel tempo” (Croce 1908 [1902]: 6–7). Here,
intuition is used in reference to Kant’s Anschauung (which adds to the confusion, if anything).
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types. Intuition is really an awareness of relations provided by a quick rate of
apprehension, and the intuitive mind might be described as “an historical mind,
aware of all the relations that are locked up in the given configuration” (Sapir
2002 [1928-1937]: 167).Thus, in the realm of abstract thinking, the quick glance of
intuition is a privilege of the great mathematician, who sees the answer before it
is proven (Sapir 2002 [1928-1937]: 167). In the realm of sensationist apprehension,
intuition is the process which lies behind the ability of a cook to project the result
of combining flavours (Sapir 2002 [1928-1937]: 168). Being thus generalized to all
sorts of fields, Jungian intuition is redescribed by Sapir in a way that makes it
come very close to the form-feeling.
The aesthetic aspect, however, is not essential in Jung’s conception, except
when the discussion leads him to find objections to it; for example, when he
scrutinizes Schiller’s Spieltrieb. On the other hand, in the preface to Language
(1921: iii), a short eulogy praises Croce for being “one of the very few who have
gained an understanding of the fundamental significance of language”, and ap-
parently expanding on what this significance consists in, Sapir goes on to say
that Croce “has pointed out its [i.e. language’s] close relation to the problem of
art” and that he is “deeply indebted to him for this insight.”
A glance at what Croce has to say about language, both simplistic and vague,
suggests that Sapir, beyond this fundamental insight, could find little of value for
his own concerns. First, the notion of “form-feeling” does not figure in the the-
oretical apparatus of Croce. Second, Sapir had reservations about Croce. Thus,
in notes he jotted down on Croce he criticizes him for conceding too much to
an individual’s expressive capacity and not enough to formal conventions (Han-
dler 1986). As a matter of fact, this is a recurring objection. It is for example lev-
elled against Jung and Lévy-Bruhl: we should not transfer to individuals qualities
which come from their complying with cultural patterns.
From this excursus on Croce, we may conclude, in agreement with Handler
(1986: 441), that Sapir’s analyses of linguistic patterning owe little to Croce, and
we should take him at his word when he says that his debt to Croce is one fun-
damental insight, the connection of language to aesthetics. Further, even if Sapir
borrowed “intuition” from Croce, his use of the term is his own and may at least
as much reflect the influence of Jung.
9 Form-feeling and Formgefühl: Vischer and Wölfflin
We are left without an answer to the question of Sapir’s sources in aesthetics. I
suggest that “form-feeling” is in fact a translation of the German Formgefühl, a
78
3 On Sapir’s notion of form/pattern and its aesthetic background
term commonly used by art theorists of the time. Note also that the plural in the
quote above (“the majority of art theorists”) points to a notion that is not the
prerogative of a single author, and this is indeed the case for the Formgefühl. A
few words need to be said about the historical background to this notion.
Formgefühl has various meanings. In the Ästhetik, the magnum opus of the
“ponderous Hegelian” (Croce’s words) FriedrichTheodor Vischer (1807–1887), the
term is used abundantly without, however, being thematized as such. Its signi-
fication is essentially that of aesthetic sensibility, and it is most often used in
connection with a people and a period. It may also characterize one of the op-
posed principles into which Vischer resolves styles, namely the painterly and
the plastic (Vischer is one of the sources for the analyses of styles into opposing
pairs; cf. for example the Principles of Wölfflin).
Since the psychological aspect of the Formgefühl is our first concern here, we
should mention that early occurrences of the term in psychological literature can
be found in the writings of the great mandarin of the field in Germany, Wilhelm
Wundt (1832–1920). Wundt (1908–1911 [1874]) appears to employ Formgefühl in
contradistinction to, on the one hand, sensations of (dis)harmony between ele-
mentary impressions and, on the other hand, “intellectual” contents associated
with the perception of forms, including, for example, the functionality of body
parts in representations of the human figure (cf. the 1902 edition, chap. 16, part
2). The Formgefühl is thus associated with the perception of organization and
order.14 In this “structural” meaning, its genealogy can be traced back to some
of Herbart’s followers, namely, to Nahlowsky (1812–1885) and his notions of “el-
ementary feelings” and “group-feelings” (Nahlowsky 1862; Romand 2018), and
to Waitz (1821–1864) and his observations on the aesthetic effect of Form and
Gestalten (Waitz 1849; Romand 2015, Romand In press).
The notion of Formgefühl seems to gain a larger audience with the advent of an
empathy-centred, psychological aesthetics. An important landmark in this tradi-
tion, which goes back to the Romantic era, is the work of Robert Vischer (1847–
1933), son of Friedrich Vischer.15 In a short treatise (his dissertation) entitled On
The Optic Feeling of Form (Über das Optische Formgefühl, 1873), Vischer explains
that contemplating and forming images always implies an active involvement
of the body or a projection of bodily feelings and affects onto the object (a pro-
jection he calls Nachfühlung/Einfühlung, “concurring-feeling”, as it were, and
14My thanks to David Romand for having called to my attention Wundt’s Grundzüge and the
Herbartians. According to Romand, the Wundtian concept was the one taken over by Lipps
and Dessoir (Romand In press).
15For an English introduction to Robert Vischer, see Barasch (1998).
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“empathy”). Thus, a rock facing a subject may appear to defy or challenge her, a
road which widens awakens a triumphant feeling etc. This is not yet art, but its
prelude: the artist’s task consists in imbuing such projected feelings with a more
general and spiritual meaning. In sum, the Formgefühl is for Vischer a projection
of a feeling into a form.
Heinrich Wölfflin (1864–1945), in his first study Wölfflin (1886), pursues Vis-
cher’s line of thought, and applies it more specifically to the description of factors
which condition the affective effect produced by an architectural style. In Renais-
sance und Barock (1888), Wölfflin explains that the features which define a style
reflect a way of projecting inner feelings and corporeal habits, characteristic of a
period, into forms.The tapering of Gothic forms, for example, reflects a muscular
tension and an effort of the will that one does not find in the serene and vigorous
equanimity of Renaissance constructions. Further, the Formgefühl offers a psy-
chological definition of style which cuts across arts and thus unites architecture
with painting, sculpture and decorative arts (e.g. clothing). This relative homo-
geneity of style is manifested in recurrent formal patterns (e.g. the pointed elon-
gated shape of Gothic art), of which the Formgefühl is therefore both an intuition
and a source.16 Moreover, Wölfflin lays great importance on the idea that artistic
forms cannot be determined by cultural-historical factors nor by functionality or
technical necessity. And although the notion of Formgefühl is still framed in an
empathy-based theory (or Wölfflin’s own version of empathy, the Lebensgefühl),
the Formgefühl itself circumscribes a relatively autonomous formal plane.
On the whole,Wölfflin’s formalist style of analysis, which reflects an emphasis
on non-representative art (such as architecture), resonates with the great interest
of the time in ornamental design and decorative art, exemplified in particular by
Alois Riegl (1858–1905; see e.g. Riegl 1893) and Gottfried Semper (1803–1879).The
latter, for example, placed much emphasis on the role of decorative arts, small
artefacts, costume, furniture and architecture (i.e. all objects close to the body;
Semper 1884).17 Such an emphasis could hardly be lost on anthropologists who
often had to deal with everyday objects. Indeed, Boas does not seem far from
Semper when he states that “so far as our knowledge of the works of art of prim-
itive people extends the feeling for form is inextricably bound up with technical
experience. Nature does not seem to present formal ideals, — that is fixed types
that are imitated, — except when a natural object is used in daily life; when it is
handled, perhaps modified, by technical processes” (Boas 1927 [1922]: 11).
16See, for example, Wölfflin (1888: chap. 3); the English translation has somewhat distorted the
text, Formgefühl being variously rendered as “formal sensibility”, “formal response” and, worse,
“conception of form”.
17On the relation of Wölfflin to Semper and Riegl, see Payne (2012).
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In this way, the formalist perspective in aesthetic theory may be considered as
a counterpart to Sapir’s view on the potential autonomization of linguistic form.
10 Form-feeling and Formgefühl: Lipps and Dessoir
Perhaps most relevant for our concerns are the discussions of Theodor Lipps
(1851–1914) and Max Dessoir (1867–1947), in view of their insistence on the struc-
tural features of form, and therefore their possibly greater proximity to Sapir’s
understanding of the form-feeling.
In hisAesthetics of Space (Raumästhetik), Lipps (1897) draws a parallel between,
on the one hand, this form of unconscious and rule-driven knowledge, intuited
by feeling, which we exercise when engaged in “mechanical activities” (such as
riding a bicycle) and, on the other hand, the feeling which rules our speech pro-
ductions, the “language-feeling” or Sprachgefühl (a term in common parlance
at the time; cf. Tchougounnikov In press). Further, Lipps (1897: chap. 8) states
that this “language-feeling” is akin to the “form-feeling” which is built from our
bodily experience and our acquaintance with the world of physical objects, and
which results in the grasp of general geometrical patterns.These various feelings,
though rule-driven, do not rest on an exact memory of past events, since each
new case which presents itself is different from the preceding ones; they con-
stitute a sui generis kind of knowledge, unconscious and “amazingly sure”, says
Lipps.
In an introduction to his conception of psychological aesthetics, Lipps (1907)
explains that the Formgefühl is a feeling assigning a value to the way in which
parts are articulated into a whole; that is, to the structure of a pattern. The rules
which govern this part-whole organization fall under two main principles: those
related to the identification of global organization (e.g. rhythm), and those re-
lated to the hierarchical structure of the whole. For instance, in the Greek temple,
because of the regular disposition of columns, the principle of rhythmic organiza-
tion prevails, while in the Gothic cathedral the hierarchical principle is dominant.
The beautiful is defined as a vital affirmation of the Ego (Lebensbejahung), an af-
firmation which results from a positive empathy, which Lipps attempts to define
in not too nebulous terms. Finally, Lipps characterizes art as a formal language
(Formensprache), and this formal language he identifies with a play with forms
endowed with a functional role (e.g. a capital stylized into a vegetal form).
Close to some positions advocated by Lipps, Dessoir (1906) defines the Form-
gefühl as that feeling which arises from the structural features of proportion,
harmony and rhythm, as well as from the quantitative and intensive aspects of
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forms. The Formgefühl itself is carefully distinguished from feelings associated
with pure sensations and the content of aesthetic objects; it is therefore a feeling
which revels in the organization of formal elements. Much of the discussion cen-
tres on rhythm and music and, in fact, the term Formgefühl surfaces from time
to time, in addition to Dessoir’s text, in discussions about the “new music” (Neue
Musik), such as those of Schönberg and Webern (see e.g. Webern 1912). Given
Sapir’s intense interest for music and the similarity he perceived between mu-
sic and language (Darnell 1990: 156), these discussions may have been a possible
source too.
11 Conclusion
In a Sapirian spirit we may say that Sapir has assembled into a unique configu-
ration ideas which he had found consonant with his own perspective. That lin-
guistic structures are unconscious was almost a commonplace in the linguistics
of the time. However, Sapir’s notion of pattern has, to the best of my knowl-
edge, no equivalent. On the one hand, patterns are formed out of groups which
are formally and functionally/semantically defined, as in Paul’s theory; on the
other hand, the combinatorial potential of units, be they phonemes, morphemes
or words, helps define unconscious groups, an aspect which brings him closer
to Bloomfield. In contrast to Paul, the form-feeling is a window on unconscious
structures; its intuitive grasp of linguistically relevant units attests to the psycho-
logical reality of forms which abstract away from physical features. The form-
feeling warrants, perhaps makes possible, the linguist’s labour.
Unconscious patterns were obviously connected in Sapir’s mind with the no-
tion of Gestalt, and the way Koffka conceived of Gestalten may have enticed him
to generalize the notion of pattern-Gestalt to any culturally significant activity;
that is, beyond linguistic behaviour. As to the unconscious structuring of lin-
guistic units, this was not apprehended by Sapir in the “mechanical” fashion of
Paul, but as the result of the creative facet of the form-feeling, or form-drive.
The form-drive and the form-feeling operate in accordance with entrenched pat-
terns, which may have lost their functional motivation. The conventionality or
routinization of patterns invites a parallel with what aesthetics knows as style,
and we have seen that for Sapir the creation and perception of linguistic pattern
is fundamentally of the same order as the artistic attitude. This insight he said he
owed to Croce, but, as we have shown, it can be doubted that Croce’s influence
went far beyond this very general idea.
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If the form-feeling is an allusion to the German Formgefühl, as was suggested
above, it seems legitimate to examine more closely this notion as it circulated
in aesthetics, and ask what, among its various aspects in different authors, had
seemed to answer to Sapir’s concerns. In this respect, Lipps’ theory seems to be
especially relevant: like the Sapirian form-feeling, Lipps’ aesthetic form-feeling
is an unconscious form of knowledge which cannot be reduced to a kind of con-
ceptual knowledge, yet it is rule-driven. Further, it is explicitly compared with
that feeling for language which regulates speech production. Given his fame,
Wölfflin may have come to Sapir’s attention and may have suggested to him a
parallel between language and style. Moreover, Wölfflin’s formalist perspective
and in the same respect that of Lipps and Dessoir was also potentially congenial
to the Sapirian view of “form for form’s sake”. In addition, we may speculate
that the problem of stylistic change, of major importance for Wölfflin, could sug-
gest a comparison with the question of linguistic change. Finally, the interplay,
in art productions, between functionality, stylization and convention, between
emotion-laden and detached formal play may have reinforced the Sapirian view
of language as an aesthetic form.
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Chapter 4
Linguistics as a “special science”: A
comparison of Sapir and Fodor
Els Elffers
Independently of each other, the linguist-anthropologist Edward Sapir (1884–1939)
and the philosopher of mind Jerry Fodor (1935–2017) developed a similar typol-
ogy of scientific disciplines. “Basic” (Fodor) or “conceptual” (Sapir) sciences (e.g.
physics) are distinguished from “special” (Fodor) or “historical” (Sapir) sciences
(e.g. linguistics). Ontologically, the latter sciences are reducible to the former, but
they keep their autonomy as intellectual enterprises, because their “natural kinds”
are unlike those of the basic sciences. Fodor labelled this view “token physicalism”.
Although Sapir’s and Fodor’s ideas were presented in very different periods of intel-
lectual history (in 1917 and 1974) and in very different intellectual contexts (roughly:
Geisteswissenschaften and logical positivism), the similarity between them is strik-
ing. When compared in detail, some substantial differences can also be observed,
which are mainly related to contextual differences. When applied to linguistics,
Sapir’s and Fodor’s views offer a perspective of autonomy, albeit in different ways:
for Fodor, but not for Sapir, linguistics is a subfield of psychology.
1 Introduction
In 1974, Jerry Fodor (1935–2017) introduced “token physicalism”, a non-reductive
variety of physicalism, which applies to “special sciences”.1 According to Fodor,
special sciences, such as economics, psychology and linguistics cannot be en-
tirely reduced to physics, which is a “basic science”. Such a reduction would im-
ply that special sciences actually disappear as autonomous sciences.
According to Fodor, special sciences retain their autonomy, because reduc-
tion is possible only with respect to the events they describe (“tokens”), not with
1Token physicalism belongs to a larger class of non-reductive types of physicalism. Superve-
nience physicalism and emergentism are other members. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) is gen-
erally regarded as an early representative of non-reductive physicalism.
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respect to properties or natural kinds (“types”). For example, economic events
such as monetary exchanges are, ultimately, physical events, but, from a physi-
cal point of view, very heterogeneous ones. There is no single physical natural
kind corresponding to the economic natural kind “monetary exchange”, because
such exchanges may involve “strings of wampum, […] dollar bills, […or] signing
one’s name to a check” (Fodor 1974: 103). Physics, according to Fodor the only
“basic science”, develops taxonomies of physical phenomena in terms of physical
properties. Special sciences develop their own taxonomies of, ultimately, phys-
ical phenomena as well, but in other terms, not belonging to the vocabulary of
physics.
In this chapter, I will compare Fodor’s token physicalism with ideas of Ed-
ward Sapir (1889–1939), presented in an article published in 1917. I will argue
that Sapir’s ideas are highly similar to Fodor’s. Despite differences, Sapir’s “con-
ceptual sciences” and “historical sciences” resemble Fodor’s basic and special sci-
ences to such a degree that, in this respect, Sapir can be regarded as Fodor’s
predecessor.
Historians, including historians of linguistics, apply the concept “predecessor-
ship” in different and partially unfounded ways. In §2, I will briefly discuss this
problem and present my own view of predecessorship, including its implications
for the concept “predecessorship of token physicalism”.
In the sections that follow, I will argue that this concept applies to Sapir. §3 will
discuss Sapir’s distinction of conceptual and historical sciences in detail. In §4,
Fodor’s token physicalism is further analysed. Together, these sections present
a picture of similar theories, developed in different periods, intellectual contexts,
and with different motivations. §5–§7 present a systematic comparison of both
theories. In §8–§10, both theories will be discussed in a broader context, both
chronologically and intellectually.
The views of both Sapir and Fodor were presented without any special focus
on linguistics. In linguistic circles, their views are not well known. In §12, I will
explore the linguistic implications of Sapir’s and Fodor’s varieties of token phys-
icalism.
2 Pitfalls of predecessorship
“Predecessorship” belongs, together with some other concepts (e.g. “influence”
or “source”), to the more dangerous instruments of the historian’s toolbox. They
are applied in multifarious and sometimes confusing ways. Present-day dangers
of “predecessorship” can be partially attributed to the belated influences of older
approaches to intellectual historiography:
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1. The exegetical “history of ideas” approach, with its focus on isolated and
quasi-immutable “ideas” or “themes”, and their march through history.
2. The historicist approach (in one of many meanings of this term)2 of inter-
preting chronological sequences of events in causal, teleological or devel-
opmental terms.
Unwarranted claims of predecessorship are corollaries of (1) and (2).3 I mention
an example of both, to be found in historiography of linguistics:
Ad 1. In Antal (1984), the entire history of linguistics is interpreted in terms of
an alternation of two themes: “psychologism” and “objectivism”. Hermann
Paul (1846–1921) is thus presented as a “psychologistic” predecessor of
Noam Chomsky (b. 1928). The term “psychologism” applied to approaches
as far apart as those of Paul and Chomsky, is, however, almost meaningless,
and so is the predecessorship conclusion based upon it.
Ad 2. In Chomsky’s (2009 [1966]) well-known Cartesian Linguistics, the seven-
teenth-century Port-Royal Grammar is presented as a – still imperfect –
predecessor of twentieth-century generative grammar.This claim has been
amply criticized as being based upon an incorrect and biased interpretation
of seventeenth-century grammar, and as a specimen of presentism, Whig
history and ancestor hunt. All these defects are rooted in the historicist
idea of chronology as a series of developmental steps towards the present.
Although pitfalls (1) and (2) are well known today, the danger of unwarranted
claims of predecessorship still exist. It is natural for historians to compare phe-
nomena over time. Discovering similarities easily creates “the temptation to dis-
cern and extract pervasive themes or patterns running through and manifested
in the succession of events and activities” (Robins 1997 [1967]: 7–8). Moreover,
historicism (conceived in the above manner) is still influential in the way it per-
meates our common historical vocabulary, which “presents history as a ‘stream’
2Themeaning of “historicism” applied here is related to the meaning of other “-ism” terms such
as “psychologism” or “scientism”; these terms claim to reveal “where” the essence of things
has to be looked for. This meaning of “historicism” has to be distinguished from, e.g., Popper’s
use of the term (cf. Elffers 1991: 43).
3Cf. Elffers (1991: chaps. 2 & 3) for a more thorough and comprehensive discussion of these
influences in present-day intellectual historiography, and for more details of the alternative
approach, briefly indicated on p. 92 of this chapter as reconstruction of earlier scientific ideas
“as problem solutions within the context of the contemporary intellectual state-of-the-art”.
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which proceeds irresistibly […]. Metaphors talking of ‘progress’ […] constitute
examples: ‘avant-garde’ art, advanced technique […], locutions like ‘keeping pace
with’ […] or ‘being in advance of’ one’s time as well as clock-metaphors, such
as ‘turning back’ or ‘stopping’ the clock […]” (van der Dussen 1986: 131, transl.
E. E.)4
If the above pitfalls are avoided, the establishment of predecessorship relations
in intellectual history may become a more complicated task, but it continues to
be interesting and rewarding; indeed, even more so, because we are now disre-
garding superficial historical similarities as well as irrelevant later developments.
Instead, we are thoroughly analysing and comparing the actual contents of sci-
entific ideas, which are carefully reconstructed as problem-solutions within the
context of the contemporary intellectual state of the art.
Following this approach, I assume that a predecessor of token physicalismwas
similar to Fodor with respect to the questions that Fodor answered by postulating
token physicalism, and to the answers themselves.
Questions – predecessors of token physicalism are involved in:
a. Ontological questions concerning basic categories of entities.
b. Epistemological questions about the basic categories of separate disciplines.
Answers: Predecessors of token physicalism present theories which take into
account questions (a) and (b) and assume that for one or more “basic” disciplines,
the categories of (a)-answers and (b)-answers are identical. For other, “special”,
disciplines, the categories of (a)-answers and (b)-answers are non-identical.5
Predecessorship thus conceived is typically unconstrained by terminology. Ter-
minological identity may conceal fundamental differences in content, and vice
versa. Consequently, predecessors of token physicalism may apply quite differ-
ent terms from those used in the above preliminary assumption.The only require-
ment is that the content of their statements can be interpreted in terms of this
assumption.This also applies to Fodor himself: Fodor (1974) does not use the term
4“…waarbij de geschiedenis wordt voorgesteld als een ‘stroom’, die onweerstaanbaar […] voort-
gaat. Metaforen waarin over een ‘vooruitgang’ wordt gesproken […] zijn hier voorbeelden van:
‘avant-garde’ kunst, geavanceerde techniek […] het spreken van een ‘meegaan’ met de tijd […]
of zijn tijd ‘vooruit’ zijn, evenals klok-metaforen, zoals de klok ‘terugdraaien’ of ‘stilzetten’
[…]”
5Against this background, I regard Seuren’s (2016: 827–832) claim that a scholar much earlier
than Sapir, Hyppolyte Taine (1828–1893), anticipated Fodor’s token physicalism as unconvinc-
ing. Seuren presents quotations to support his view, but none of them suggests a distinction
comparable to the distinction between (a) and (b).
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“ontological” at all, and he sometimes gives the term “epistemological” a rather
specific meaning.6 But the content of his statements meets the requirement of
being interpretable in the above terms, as I hope to show below.
3 Sapir: against a “superorganic”
Sapir’s 1917 article is titled “Do we need a ‘Superorganic’?” It is a reaction to the
anthropologist Alfred Kroeber’s (1876–1960) article “The Superorganic” (Kroeber
1917). Both articles were published in subsequent issues of American Anthropolo-
gist, an anthropological journal that is still quite prominent in the field.7
Both Kroeber and Sapir were students of Franz Boas (1858–1942), the “founding
father” of American anthropology. Kroeber, who became an influential American
anthropologist, argues in his 1917 article against the reduction of anthropology
to biology. He states that human cultural behaviour, unlike animal behaviour,
cannot be explained through an appeal to inheritance plus Darwinian adapta-
tion, nor to personal psychology. The forces of culture, a superorganic and au-
tonomously developing entity, are the main determinants. For anthropology, this
superorganic is the actual object of research.8
When Sapir wrote his critical article, he was working as director of the An-
thropological Division of the Geological Survey of Canada in Ottawa. This was a
very productive period in his career. Anthropological linguistics, which included
the investigation and description of American Indian languages never studied by
academics before, was his main area of research. He exchanged correspondence
with Kroeber over a period of many years.
In “Do we need a ‘Superorganic’?”, Sapir begins by welcoming Kroeber’s “salu-
tary antidote” to the trend of applying methods used by the exact sciences to the
study of culture. But he also feels that Kroeber “has allowed himself to go fur-
ther than he is warranted in going” on “two points of considerable theoretical
importance” (Sapir 1917: 441). Although only the second point directly concerns
our subject, I will also briefly discuss the first one, because there is, according to
Sapir, a connection between them.
6“Epistemological” as used in Fodor (1974: 113) refers to the “context of discovery”. This deviates
from the usual reference, which is primarily to the “context of justification”.
7Sapir’s article appeared in the section “Discussion and correspondence”. Another comment on
Kroeber’s article by A. A. Goldenweiser (1917) was included in the same section.
8Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) coined the term “super-organic” to focus on social organization,
in the first chapter of his 1898 Principles of Sociology, entitled “Super-organic Evolution”.
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Thefirst point concerns Kroeber’s denial of any influence by individuals on the
course of cultural history. Sapir admits that the influence of individuals is mostly
highly exaggerated by historians. He fully recognizes that individual thought
and action are very much moulded by cultural traditions, and that the cultural
influence of most individuals is nil. If it is not nil, broader cultural conditions are
necessary to trigger this influence. But this does not obviate the influence of at
least some individuals – such as Napoleon, Jesus, Shakespeare or Beethoven –
on cultural history, according to Sapir. A total social determinism goes too far.
The second point concerns the nature of social phenomena. Kroeber claims
that they are built out of organic phenomena but are not reducible to organic
phenomena, just as organic phenomena are built out of inorganic phenomena
but are not reducible to them. A superorganic social “force” is assumed, which is
manifested in social history.
Sapir regards the above analogy as false. The types of irreducibility are en-
tirely dissimilar. Sapir’s ontology is trialistic. He assumes three basic types of
entities: inorganic, organic and psychic. Social phenomena are not a fourth type,
as Kroeber feels they are, but “merely a certain philosophically arbitrary but hu-
manly immensely significant selection out of the total mass of phenomena ideally
resolvable into inorganic, organic and psychic processes” (Sapir 1917: 444, ital-
ics Sapir). Social phenomena are, therefore, not at all conceptually irresolvable
but experientially irresolvable. Conceptual irresolvability is what separates inor-
ganic, organic and psychic phenomena; these are, in Sapir’s terms “true concep-
tual incommensurables” (Sapir 1917: 445). Experiential irresolvability is entirely
different: it refers to classes of directly experienced phenomena, demarcated not
in terms of ontology, but in terms of values that determine their selection. These
classes are studied in historical sciences. Conceptually demarcated classes are
studied in conceptual sciences.
Sapir illustrates his distinction between types of science using the example of
geology:
Few sciences are so clearly defined as regards scope as geology. It would or-
dinarily be classed as a natural science. Aside from paleontology, which we
may eliminate, it does entirely without the concepts of the social, psychic
or organic. It is, then, a well-defined science of purely inorganic subject
matter. As such, it is conceptually resolvable, if we carry our reductions
far enough, into the more fundamental sciences of physics and chemistry.
But no amount of conceptual synthesis of the phenomena we call chemical
or physical would, in the absence of previous experience, enable us to con-
struct a science of geology. The science depends for its raison d’être on a
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series of unique experiences, directly sensed or inferred, clustering about
an entity, the earth, which from the conceptual standpoint of physics is
as absurdly accidental or irrelevant as a tribe of Indians or John Smith’s
breakfast. The basis of the science is, then, grounded in the unique rele-
vance of particular events. To be precise, geology looks in two directions.
In so far as it occupies itself with abstract masses and forces, it is a concep-
tual science, for which specific instances as such are irrelevant. In so far
as it deals with particular features of the earth’s surface, say a particular
mountain chain, and aims to reconstruct the probable history of such fea-
tures, it is not a conceptual science at all. In methodology, strange as this
may seem at first blush, it is actually nearer, in this respect, to the historical
sciences. It is, in fact, a species of history, only the history moves entirely
in the inorganic sphere. In practice, it is, of course, a mixed type of science,
now primarily conceptual, now primarily descriptive of a selective chunk
of reality. (Sapir 1917: 445)9
As examples of “chunks of reality” studied by historical sciences, Sapir also
mentions, next to the earth, “France, the French language, the French Republic,
the romantic movement in literature, Victor Hugo, the Iroquois Indians, some
specific Iroquois clan, all Iroquois clans, all American Indian clans, all clans of
primitive peoples.” Sapir (1917: 446) stresses that none of these terms has any
relevance in a purely conceptual world, whether organic, inorganic or psychic.
These examples are not selected arbitrarily. Sapir wants to show (i) that histor-
ical sciences apply to “history” in a much wider sense than the word ordinarily
indicates, (ii) that historical sciences not only study directly experienced entities,
but also more abstract entities.
Sapir elaborates on (ii) in order to explain two further differences between
types of science: “such concepts as a clan, a language, a priesthood” might sug-
gest a similarity with “the ideal concepts of natural science”, which also “lack
individual connotation” and appear in generalized laws. Logically, both sets of
concepts are involved in similar operations such as observation, classification, in-
ference, generalization etc. “Philosophically”, however, the concepts are distinct,
because, in actual fact, the social concepts are not “ideal” at all; they are “conve-
nient summaries of a strictly limited range of phenomena, each element of which
has real value”:
9In this quotation, physics and chemistry are both mentioned as fundamental sciences of the
inorganic. In 1917, reducibility of chemistry to physics was not at all as generally accepted as
it is today (cf. Hettema 2012: 13, 17–18).
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Relatively to the concept “clan” a particular clan of a specific Indian tribe
has undeniably value as a historical entity. Relatively to the concept “crys-
tal” a particular ruby in the jeweler’s shop has no relevance except by way
of illustration. It has no intrinsic scientific value. Were all crystals exis-
tent at this moment suddenly disintegrated, the science of crystallography
would still be valid, provided the physical and chemical forces that make
possible the growth of another crop of crystals remain in the world. Were
all clans now existent annihilated, it is highly debatable, to say the least,
whether the science of sociology, in so far as it occupied itself with clans,
would have prognostic value. (Sapir 1917: 446–447)
A corollary of this difference is the different status of laws in both types of sci-
ence. A sociological law is a generalization, an abbreviation for a finite number of
phenomena. Exceptions occur, and the laws become “more and more blurred in
outline with the multiplication of instances”, whereas this multiplication makes
natural laws “more and more rigid” (Sapir 1917: 447). Natural laws cover an indef-
initely large number of phenomena and have to be exceptionless: an exception
necessitates a new formulation of the law.
Sapir concludes his article by connecting his two criticisms of Kroeber: if the
nature of historical phenomena had been sufficiently clear to him, he would have
felt no need to invoke a “superorganic” force as a unique explanans in history,
and to deny individual force.
4 Fodor: against reductive physicalism
Fodor’s article is titled “Special sciences (or: the disunity of science as a working
hypothesis)”. It was published in 1974 in Synthèse, a well-known philosophical
journal that is still published. It takes as its starting point the “typical thesis of
positivistic philosophy of science […] that all true theories in the special sciences
should reduce to physical theories in the long run” (Fodor 1974: 97). This thesis,
and its foundation in amaterialist ontology, were the cornerstones of the Unity of
Science movement, to which Fodor’s title alludes. This movement was narrowly
related to logical positivism during the first decades of the twentieth century.
Since those days, questions about the unity of science and about reductivism
have never disappeared from the philosophical agenda.
When Fodor wrote “Special sciences”, he was a professor in the departments
of philosophy and psychology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Phi-
losophy of mind and language was his central subject of research. He had already
96
4 Linguistics as a “special science”: A comparison of Sapir and Fodor
published widely on many themes related to this area. In 1975, his seminal book
The language of thought would appear. In “Special sciences”, psychology is by far
the science that receives the most attention.
Fodor addresses a problem that results from the positivistic assumption that
the subject matter of a special (i.e. non-physical) science, such as psychology, is
part of the subject matter of physics. A generally accepted inference from this
assumption is that psychological theories must reduce to physical theories. This
causes methodological problems for psychology; the discipline should actually
disappear as a separate science. Fodor (1974: 98) wants to “avoid the trouble by
challenging the inference”.
Assuming that sciences are about events, Fodor claims, in agreement with the
physicalists, that “all events that the sciences talk about are physical events […]”
(Fodor 1974: 100). He calls this doctrine “token physicalism”. But he rejects the
stronger reductionist doctrine of “type physicalism”, which claims that, in addi-
tion, every property mentioned in the laws of any science is a physical property.
Token physicalism claims that, for example, every psychological event is identi-
cal to a neurological event, but not every psychological property is identical to a
neurological property.
The reasonwhy type physicalism is too strong a thesis is that interesting gener-
alizations in special sciences are often about events whose physical descriptions
have nothing in common. Moreover, the question “whether the physical descrip-
tions have anything in common is, in an obvious sense, entirely irrelevant to
the truth of the generalizations, or to their interestingness, or to their degree of
confirmation, or, indeed, to any of their epistemologically important properties
[…]” (Fodor 1974: 103). As an example of such a generalization, Fodor refers to
Graham’s Law, an economic law about monetary exchanges. In the above intro-
duction, this example was already mentioned to illustrate the wildly different
physical events which correspond to the concept of “monetary exchange” (trans-
actions with bills, cheques etc.). These events do not correspond to a natural kind
in physics. Similarly, although psychological events correspond to neurological
events, “there are no firm data for any but the grossest correspondence between
types of psychological states and types of neurological states, and it is entirely
possible that the nervous system of higher organisms characteristically achieves
a given psychological end by a wide variety of neurological states” (Fodor 1974:
105).10
10Fodor refers to the physiological psychologist Karl Lashley as a defender of this claim. He
also acknowledges that there is much “psychology and brain” research throughout the world,
which is based upon the assumption that psychological types correspond to neurological types
(Fodor 1974: 105).
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Fodor further supports his token physicalistic view by arguing that his view
explains (i) that laws of special sciences have exceptions, (ii) why there are special
sciences at all.
Ad i. Given the assumption that, in a special science law, physical counterparts
of the antecedent as well as the consequent consist of heterogeneous dis-
junctions, the counterpart “law” cannot be a genuine physical law.11 Ex-
ceptions occur when the physical counterpart of an instantiation of the
antecedent of a special science law has no lawlike connection with one
of the disjunctive physical counterparts of the consequent. According to
Fodor, this is a common situation in a special science such as psychol-
ogy: there are always exceptions to psychological generalizations which
are “uninteresting from the point of view of psychological theory” (Fodor
1974: 111).
Ad ii. According to reductionists, special sciences exist for practical, “epistemo-
logical” (cf. footnote 6) reasons. If neurons were not so small and brains
were on the outside of the head, wewould do neurology instead of psychol-
ogy. Fodor does not agree: even if brains were on the outside, we would
not know what to look for, lacking “the appropriate theoretical apparatus
for the psychological taxonomy of neurological events”. Moreover, he as-
sumes that such a corresponding taxonomy does not necessarily exist, that
“quite different neurological structures can subserve identical psychologi-
cal functions […] In that case the existence of psychology depends not on
the fact that neurons are so sadly small, but rather on the fact that neurol-
ogy does not posit the natural kinds that psychology requires” (Fodor 1974:
113).
Special sciences exist autonomously, because other taxonomies are required
alongside the taxonomywhich suits the purpose of formulating exceptionless ba-
sic physical laws. The other taxonomies are necessary for the formulation of im-
portant generalizations in areas of knowledge such as psychology or economics.
5 Similarities and differences
The last two sections show two scholars struggling for a plausible philosophical
reconstruction of science in general and its division into separate disciplines in
11This is a very brief and simplified presentation of a complex argument, presented in Fodor
(1974: 109).
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particular. Independently from each other and separated by nearly six decades,
they devised a nearly identical theory.12 According to this theory, boundaries be-
tween disciplines are not merely determined by the kind of stuff they investigate.
Although some (“conceptual” or “basic”) sciences can be demarcated along these
lines, other (“historical” or “special”) sciences are demarcated in a different way.
Their object of investigation consists of heterogeneous stuff, but is homogeneous
by its relevance to the purposes of the area of knowledge to which they belong.
For Sapir, the theory was a welcome alternative to Kroeber’s ontological way
of rescuing the autonomy of sociology and anthropology through the assump-
tion of a superorganic force. For Fodor, the theory was a welcome alternative to
reductive physicalism, with its problematic methodological requirements, espe-
cially for psychology.
Due to these different backgrounds, the theories have a different “appearance”.
In Fodor’s discourse, subtle logical properties of scientific theories are taken into
account, as was (and is) usual in positivistic-oriented philosophy of science. In
Sapir’s and Kroeber’s discourse, this approach is entirely absent, also in confor-
mity with what was (and is) usual in philosophy of non-exact sciences.
In the following sections, Sapir’s and Fodor’s theories will be compared in
more detail. Their common basic idea is elaborated in partially different ways
by both scholars. Part of these differences can be shown to be related to the
intellectual context in which the theories were developed.
In the rest of this article, I will use Fodor’s term “token physicalism” to refer
to the common view of Sapir and Fodor.13 In the same vein, I will adopt Fodor’s
terms “basic science” and “special science” for the similar types of sciences dis-
tinguished by both scholars.
My comparison is almost entirely based upon the articles just discussed. Nei-
ther Sapir nor Fodor elaborated their theory further in later publications. Fodor,
however, returned to the subject in his article “Special sciences: still autonomous
after all these years”, published in 1997. This article consists of a defence of his
view against the criticism of Kim (1992). In the course of this defence, some as-
pects of token physicalism are presented in more detail than before. An addi-
tion, which is relevant to our comparison with Sapir, is that special sciences are
now explicitly described in functionalistic terms.Their physically heterogeneous
natural kinds are functionally homogeneous, in the same way as physically het-
12Of course, Fodor could have read Sapir’s article, but I regard this as improbable. As far as
I know, Fodor never refers to Sapir. Moreover, Sapir’s intellectual activities and viewpoints
were unrelated to Fodor’s area of interest, or even repugnant to him (cf. Pullum 2017).
13The literal meaning of the term has to be bracketed in Sapir’s case, because of his trialistic
ontology.
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erogeneous types of artefacts (can openers, mousetraps) are functionally homo-
geneous (Fodor 1997: 160). This characterization was lacking in the 1974 article,
although “psychological functions” are mentioned. The term “functional” must
be interpreted in a very broad sense, because it is equally applied to biology,
psychology and geology. The last mentioned example of a special science is a
new one, and identical to Sapir’s example. Like Sapir, Fodor (1997: 160) claims
that mountains are made “of all sorts of stuff”, but that “generalizations about
mountains-as-such […] serve geology in good stead”.
Taking into account the 1997 additions to Fodor’s theory, the views of Sapir
and Fodor, as presented in §3 and §4 can be schematically juxtaposed as in Table 1.
Table 1: Comparison of the views of Sapir and Fodor
Basic sciences Special sciences
Sapir Fodor Sapir Fodor
Physics, Physics Sociology, Psychology,
Chemistry, Anthropology, Linguistics,
Sciences Geology, Linguistics, Biology,
Biology, Geology, Geology
Psychology (Cultural) His-
tory
Demarcation Ontological Ontological Experiential Functional
Exceptions
of laws?
No No Yes Yes
Table 1 shows that Sapir’s and Fodor’s varieties of token physicalism are differ-
ent at two points: (i) their selection of basic and special sciences, (ii) their charac-
terization of special sciences. As to (i), we may ask how far the differences can be
related to contemporary ontological assumptions. As to (ii), we may ask how far
apart the standpoints actually are, given the similarity of both scholars’ general
view of the special sciences. Likewise, wemay ask how far their agreement about
the issue of exceptions to laws actually goes, given the different motivations of
these ideas, observed earlier. I will discuss these three issues in separate sections.
6 Which basic and special sciences?
Fodor recognizes one basic science, physics, which is in conformity with the pos-
itivistic discourse he connects with. In the same vein, he also mentions chemistry
as a science that has been successfully reduced to physics.
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His most important example of a special science is psychology.The anti-reduc-
tionist defence of the autonomy of this science is his central aim, and directly rel-
evant to his work as a cognitive psychologist. In his seminal bookThe language of
thought (1975), the text of “Special sciences” is included in the introductory chap-
ter, which presents the foundations of the psychological and linguistic approach
described and applied in the rest of the book.14
Linguistics is not explicitly discussed in the 1974 article.15 However, Fodor has
always incorporated linguistics in psychology, following Chomsky’s views and
elaborating this connectedness in more detail than Chomsky did (cf., e.g., Fodor
1985: 149, quoted in footnote 26; and Loewer & Rey 1991: 278). The language of
thought bears clear witness to this approach. So there can be no doubt that, for
Fodor, linguistics is a special science. Other special sciences, such as economics
and geology, are dealt with as instructive examples.
Sapir distinguishes three irreducible ontological categories: inorganic, organic
and psychic. Inorganic sciences are physics, chemistry, and, partially, geology;
psychology is the basic science of the psychic. Sapir does not mention examples
of organic sciences, but we may assume that biology is the main, or even only,
example of this category.
Sapir does not present arguments in favour of his trialistic ontology. He sim-
ply claims that “the organic can be demonstrated to consist objectively of the
inorganic plus an increment of obscure origin and nature”. There is “a chasm be-
tween the organic and the inorganic which only the rigid mechanists pretend to
be able to bridge. There seems to be a unbridgeable chasm […] between the or-
ganic and the psychic, despite the undeniable correlations between the two. Dr.
Kroeber denies this en passant […]” (Sapir 1917: 444).
These quotations show that Sapir is aware of the existence of divergent onto-
logical ideas, but he does not feel obliged to supply arguments for his own view.
This is not surprising when we take contemporary ontological thought into ac-
count. Vitalism, the idea that organic nature is created from chemical elements
plus the action of a “vital force” had been waning over several decades, but was
not at all extinct (cf. Beckner 1967). Psychology was, despite some reductionistic
attempts, still largely regarded as studying purely mental entities. This applies,
for example, to Gestalt psychology, an approach Sapir found appealing (cf. Sapir
2002 [1928-1937]: xvi).
14There are some minor differences between the article and the book section. The book section
contains more notes and is extended by some final paragraphs.
15There is, however a note reference to Chomsky’s (1965) statements about natural language
predicates, to support Fodor’s claim that natural kind predicates of the special sciences cross-
classify the physical natural kinds.
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An example of a special science is, for Sapir, in the first place, social science,
including anthropology, the common discipline of Kroeber and himself. Other ex-
amples are history – cf. Sapir’s term “historical sciences” – and, partially, geology.
Given the above examples of “chunks of reality” studied by historical sciences,
we can add linguistics (cf. “the French language”) and literary history (cf. “the
romantic movement in literature”).
In summary, Sapir’s and Fodor’s examples as well as ideas about the position
of separate disciplines in their dichotomy are partially different. This is mainly
due to their different basic ontologies and their implications, especially for psy-
chology. A remarkable conclusion about linguistics is that its status of special
science has a different meaning for Sapir and Fodor. For Sapir, a language is an
ontologically heterogeneous entity. So linguistics is not reducible to psychology,
nor to any other basic science. Fodor includes linguistics in psychology, but for
him, psychology is itself a special science, due to ontological irreducibility. In §12
I will return to this issue.
7 Characterizing special sciences
The categories/types/natural kinds of special sciences are ontologically hetero-
geneous, but they are “experientially” (Sapir) or “functionally” (Fodor) homoge-
neous. At first sight, these characterizations are dissimilar. Experiences are di-
rect and unique, functions are conceptualized regularities. Therefore, when both
scholars conclude that a certain discipline belongs to the special sciences, their
reasons for the classification appear to be different. On the other hand, their
common focus on areas consisting of human institutions (clans, economics) or
“interesting” phenomena (mountains) suggests that they may share the same ba-
sic insight, but reconstruct it in different terms.
The shared example of geology may serve to clarify this point. For Sapir, ge-
ology is a special science, because it “depends, for its raison d’être, on a series
of unique experiences, directly sensed or inferred, clustering about an entity
(the earth, a mountain chain)” (Sapir 1917: 445). For Fodor, it is essential that
mountains, however ontologically heterogeneous, enter into generalizations that
“serve geology in good stead. […] Unimaginably complicated to-ings and fro-ings
of bits and pieces at the extrememicro-levelmanage somehow to converge on sta-
blemacro-level properties” (Fodor 1997: 160). On the next page, these macro-level
properties are equated with functional properties, as in psychology and biology.
My hypothesis is that these different characterizations are connected to the
different discourses in which both scholars are operating. Sapir conceives of
“historical sciences” as comparable to Geisteswissenschaften, referring to Rickert
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(1913 [1896]). This class of sciences is often characterized as “idiographic”, and is
contrasted with the “nomothetic” Naturwissenschaften. Hence Sapir’s emphasis
on particular, directly experienced events and on “the unique or individual, not
the universal” (Sapir 1917: 446). At the same time, the above citation also refers
to “inferred” experiences and later on, “such concepts as a clan, a language, a
priesthood” are denied individual connotation and supposed to be involved in
the same operations as natural science concepts: “observation, classification, in-
ference, generalization, and so on” (Sapir 1917: 446), exactly the operations Fodor
frequently refers to with respect to all sciences.
Fodor’s suggestion that, in special sciences, the generalizations are all of the
functional type has, in turn, to be taken with a grain of salt. When applied to
geology, the term “functional” is almost meaningless. Sapir’s appeal to “a certain
philosophically arbitrary but humanly immensely significant selection out of the
total mass of phenomena”, quoted above, seems to be a more adequate, but for
Fodor undoubtedly too subjective, characterization of what special sciences are
about, although he does not eschew the term “interesting”.16 So Sapir and Fodor
appear to appeal to the same insight, worded differently.
There is another difference between Sapir’s and Fodor’s ideas about special
sciences. In Sapir’s examples, ontologically heterogeneous features are simul-
taneously realized, for example in the earth, or a mountain chain. In Fodor’s
special sciences, they are realized in different events (the “tokens”) at different
moments, for example in various monetary transactions.17 This difference is not
entirely watertight, however. Sapir refers to events too (cf. the quotation on p.
95). His incorporation of history in the special sciences and examples such as
“the French Republic, the romantic movement in literature, Victor Hugo” also
suggest that the heterogeneous counterparts of special science entities may be
events. Fodor’s extension of the class of special sciences to geology and his com-
parison with artefacts, in turn, implies that he also recognizes the possibility of
simultaneous presence of heterogeneous features.
Certainly Sapir and Fodor did not have exactly the same idea of special sciences
in mind. But their ideas were more similar than their formulations suggest at first
sight.
16In Fodor’s “Special sciences”, there are some references to the alleged “interestingness” or “im-
portance” of the natural kinds of a special science. Compare the following passage about mon-
etary exchange: “The point is that monetary exchanges have interesting things in common.
But what is interesting about monetary exchanges is surely not their commonalities under
physical description” (Fodor 1974: 103–104).
17Consequently, Fodor’s presentation of the physical counterparts of a special science predicate
as a disjunction does not apply to the physical counterparts in Sapir’s examples. In these cases,
they constitute a conjunction.
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8 Laws and exceptions
Sapir and Fodor are both convinced that special science laws have exceptions.
For both scholars, scientific practice is an important argument. Sapir describes
this practice and contrasts it with natural science practice: “If, out of one hun-
dred clans, ninety-nine obeyed a certain sociological ‘law’, we would justly flat-
ter ourselves with having made a particularly neat and sweeping generalization;
our ‘law’ would have validity, even if we never succeeded in ‘explaining the one
exception”’ (Sapir 1917: 447). According to Fodor, the idea that laws of special
science are exceptionless has to be rejected because it “flies in the face of fact.
There is just no chance at all that all the true, counter-factual supporting gen-
eralizations of, say, psychology, will turn out to hold in strictly each and every
condition where the antecedents are satisfied” (Fodor 1974: 111).
Both Sapir and Fodor thus take the requirement of historical adequacy (con-
formity to clear cases of scientific practice) for philosophy of science seriously
and derive a strong argument for exceptions to special science laws from actual
scientific practice. When it comes to philosophical adequacy, however, their ar-
guments differ widely. Sapir appeals to his above-mentioned claim that special
sciences are about particular events. “Laws” are actually abbreviations for a fi-
nite number of phenomena. Sapir admits that this is a complicated issue and
adds here a footnote about Rickert for further reading.
Fodor’s argument is entirely based upon the disjunctive character of the an-
tecedent and the consequent of the physical counterpart of special science laws.
The resulting physical “law” is not a genuine law (cf. §3 above) and this explains
why special science laws have exceptions.
With respect to philosophical adequacy, Sapir’s as well as Fodor’s explanations
appeal to the pseudo-lawlike character of special science “laws”. However, the
ways in which pseudo-lawlikeness is argued for are different.
Summarizing the last three sections, we may conclude that some aspects of
token physicalism are elaborated in different ways by both scholars. These dif-
ferences can be shown to be related to the temporal and intellectual context in
which the theories were developed.
9 Getting involved
In the following three sections, Sapir’s and Fodor’s token physicalism will be
embedded in a wider context. The rise and development of their theories can be
further clarified in this way. There is, firstly, the preliminary question of how
104
4 Linguistics as a “special science”: A comparison of Sapir and Fodor
they got involved in the problem of relations between disciplines and, secondly,
whether their similar solutions were based on any clues in their intellectual en-
vironments. Finally, we may ask what, in general, became of Sapir’s and Fodor’s
token physicalism. Neither Sapir nor Fodor was a specialist in general philoso-
phy of science. During his student years, Sapir did not follow a philosophy pro-
gramme, but his education in Germanic philology certainly yielded some knowl-
edge of German philosophy, the breeding ground for the distinction between
Naturwissenchaften and Geisteswissenschaften. Fodor was educated in philoso-
phy. He was a pupil of Hilary Putnam and acquired a thorough knowledge of
philosophy of science, but philosophy of mind became his specialization. Like
many scientists, especially in the humanities and the social sciences, both schol-
ars became involved in the broader issue of relations between disciplines through
problems in their scientific work or through reflection on this work.
In Sapir’s case, his master thesis on Herder’s Ursprung der Sprache (Sapir 1907)
bears witness to an early interest in the foundations of linguistics, but he did not
become involved in foundational issues again until 1917. Kroeber’s article seems
to have been the direct incentive for Sapir’s development of token-physicalistic
ideas. He must have been dissatisfied with Kroeber’s ontological answer to the
question of what social sciences are about. Sapir’s title “Do we need a ‘superor-
ganic?’ ” reveals an Ockhamian approach: we must, if possible, avoid an unnec-
essary appeal to unknown and questionable entities such as Kroeber’s superor-
ganic force. Token physicalism supplied a promising alternative.
In Fodor’s case, there is not, as far as I know, such a direct “external” occasion
for his development of token physicalism. My hypothesis is that there was an “in-
ternal” occasion. As well as Putnam, Noam Chomsky, his mit colleague, became
very influential to Fodor’s intellectual development. Fodor adopted Chomsky’s
mentalistic approach of claiming psychological reality for linguistic categories,
rules etc. When Fodor wrote “Special sciences”, he was probably simultaneously
writing The language of thought, a book which went further than Chomsky in
postulating mental, and even innate, entities, structures and operations in the
cognitive systems of thinking and communicating humans. Token physicalism
could furnish a foundation for this approach by emphasizing the autonomy of
psychology. The fact that the text of “Special sciences” constitutes the second
section of the introduction toThe language of thought is an indication that Fodor
saw it that way.18 The final paragraphs of the introduction, absent in “Special sci-
18The introduction is titled “Two kinds of reductionism”. Its two sections are named after views
Fodor argues against: “Logical behaviorism” (about Wittgenstein’s and Ryle’s views of psy-
chology) and “Physiological reductionism”.
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ences”, confirm this suggestion. Compare the concluding sentences: “It has […]
been the burden of these introductory remarks that the arguments for […] the
physical reduction of psychological theories are not, after all, very persuasive.
The results of taking psychological theories literally and seeing what they sug-
gest that mental processes are like might, in fact, prove interesting. I propose, in
what follows to do just that” (Fodor 1975: 26).
10 Clues to token physicalism
Both Sapir and Fodor present their varieties of token physicalism as new ideas.
Indeed, there were no earlier theories with this content. But there certainly were
ideas of others which functioned as substantive building blocks or as sources of
inspiration for their views.
Both scholars refer only briefly to fellow scholars in their texts. Apart from
Kroeber, Sapir only refers to Rickert, in the footnote reference mentioned above
(the only footnote in the article). Sapir characterizes Rickert’s Die Grenzen der
naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung as “difficult but masterly” and continues:
“I have been greatly indebted to it.” This is understandable: Rickert’s way of dis-
tinguishing Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften, not in terms of their
subject matter, as other philosophers would have it, but in terms of their ways
of concept formation, appears to have inspired Sapir directly (cf. Anchor 1967).
Therefore, I do not share Silverstein’s doubts about this indebtedness to Rickert:
“While Sapir, in his paper, expresses his debt to Rickert […], it is clearly Boas’
discussion of 1887, the very phraseology and terms of which he repeats, that un-
derlies his discourse” (Silverstein 1986: 70, fn.5).
In any case, neither Rickert nor Boas developed anything comparable to token
physicalism. Both scholars adopted the distinction between Geisteswissenschaf-
ten and Naturwissenschaften. But both assumed a much deeper chasm between
the two types of science than Sapir did, by restricting Geisteswissenschaften to
a “value-laden” (Rickert) or “affective” (Boas) focus on individual entities and
regarding all generalizing thought as proper to natural sciences only.19 We ob-
served above that Sapir was also inclined to take into account the individuality of
the phenomena described by special sciences. But he also recognized their clus-
tering into abstract, generalized entities, which are subjected to operations such
as “classification, inference, generalization, and so on” in these sciences. This
view strongly deviates from Rickert’s and Boas’ views and is similar to Fodor’s
19See Anchor (1967) and Silverstein (1986) for Rickert’s and Boas’ views, respectively.
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view. Both Sapir and Fodor claim that special sciences share their generalmethod-
ology with basic sciences.
Fodor does not mention any indebtedness. Nevertheless, token physicalism is
often regarded as similar to Putnam’s idea of “multiple realizability”, presented
in several publications in the nineteen sixties (cf. Putnam 1960, Loewer & Rey
1991: xiii). Multiple realizability is the thesis that the same mental property can
be implemented by different physical properties. Actually, without mentioning
the term, Fodor (1974: 105–106) refers to this idea. He explicitly mentions Put-
nam’s reference to computers as possible providers of physical counterparts of
psychical events. Connections are also observed with Davidson’s “anomalous
monism”, which, like Fodor’s theory, restricts the links of the physical and the
psychical to the level of events (cf. Davidson 1970, Loewer & Rey 1991: xxxi).
Fodor does not refer to Davidson’s theory, but a reference to Davidson (1970) in
The language of thought (p. 200) proves that he knew about it. So Fodor’s idea of
how psychology reduces to physics was clearly prepared by other philosophers
he knew about. Fodor, however, extended Putnam’s and Davidson’s solutions to
the mind-body problem to a thesis about sciences in general, their typology and
their characteristics as intellectual enterprises.
11 What became of token physicalism?
Neither Sapir’s nor Fodor’s version of token physicalism was elaborated further
by their authors after the publications discussed above. Two additional questions
will be explored now:
a. Did token physicalism, as presented in these publications, play a role in
their later work?
b. Did token physicalism play a role in the work of later scholars?
Answering these questions exhaustively is far beyondmy limited state of know-
ledge, but this does not prevent me from making some tentative suggestions.
As to the first question, token physicalism, not surprisingly, “sets the stage”
for Sapir’s and Fodor’s further research in their respective “special sciences”.
Sapir presents and practises linguistics and anthropology as autonomous sci-
ences; Fodor’s “psychosemantics” is also practised autonomously, without any
appeal to specific brain states.20 But in their writings, token physicalism is not
20Psychosemantics is the title of a 1987 book by Fodor. I apply the term here to the totality of
Fodor’s work on cognitive psychology and its relations to semantics.
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at all prominent; it is a background framework rather than a major discussion
theme.
For example, Sapir does not refer at all to his typology of sciences in his 1929
article “Linguistics as a science”, although the main theme of this article is the
relation between linguistics and other sciences.21 The conclusions drawn – e.g.
that linguistics is not “a mere adjunct of either biology or psychology” (Sapir
1929: 214) – are in line with those drawn in 1917, but they are attainedwithout any
appeal to the distinction between conceptual sciences and historical sciences.The
same is true of the passage about the definition of language in the first chapter of
Sapir’s seminal book Language (1921). There, Sapir claims that language cannot
be defined “as an entity in psycho-physical terms alone” and that language can
be discussed “precisely as we discuss the nature of any other phase of human
culture – say art or religion – as an institutional or cultural entity, leaving the
organic and psychological mechanism back of it as something to be taken for
granted” (Sapir 1921: 10–11).
A clear echo of Sapir’s discussion with Kroeber can be found in Irvine’s recon-
struction of Sapir’s lectures on the psychology of culture, presented in the 1930s
(Sapir 2002 [1928-1937]). In a lecture on “difficulties of the social sciences”, Sapir
mentions the problem that “the culturalist […] cannot be absolutely sure of the
limits or bounds of what he is dealing with”, unlike physicists, who “know what
particular corner of the universe they are dealing with”. Another difficulty is the
essential uniqueness of cultural phenomena. Referring to Rickert, Sapir contrasts
the physicist, who deals with a conceptual universe covering all possible phe-
nomena in an abstract way allowing for one hundred percent accuracy, with the
social scientist, who studies all actual and unique phenomena, without this same
level of accuracy (Sapir 2002 [1928-1937]: 56–57). In another lecture, Sapir explic-
itly refers to his discussion with Kroeber. A sentence literally repeated from Sapir
(1917: 444) concludes the passage: “Social science is not psychology, not because
it studies the resultants of superpsychic or superorganic forces, but because its
terms are differently demarcated” (Sapir 2002 [1928-1937]: 245). But again, none
of these claims is argued for in terms of an explicit and general typology of sci-
ences, as presented in Sapir (1917).
Fodor now and then refers to token physicalism after 1975. Like Sapir, he wrote
an article which surprisingly omits the subject (“Some notes on what linguistics
is about”, 1985). In an article about the mind-body problem in Scientific American
21In Sapir (1929), linguistics is emphatically presented as a science aiming at generalization, ex-
planation, laws etc., which is at odds with Silverstein’s (1986) idea that the views presented in
Sapir (1917), as he interprets them in Boasian terms (cf. p. 106), permeate Sapir’s entire oeuvre.
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(Fodor 1981), one paragraph is devoted to a brief explanation and defence of token
physicalism as part of the solution to this problem. In his books Psychosemantics
(Fodor 1987: 5–6) andThe elm and the expert (Fodor 1994: 39), the “special science”
status of psychology is mentioned but, as in Sapir’s case, without a reference to
the broader context of token physicalism and the issue of typology of sciences.
The inconspicuous role of token physicalism in Fodor’s work cannot be better
illustrated than by the obituaries that appeared after his death on 29 November
2017. Of the eight obituaries I read, all paying ample attention to the content of
Fodor’s scientific work, only one, Rey (2017), mentions token physicalism.
Our second question about the role of token physicalism in the work of later
scholars receives a negative answer in Sapir’s case. As far as I know, Sapir’s token
physicalism avant la lettre was not discussed by other scholars. His distinction
between conceptual and historical sciences was neither adopted nor criticized by
his linguistic or anthropological colleagues. Autonomy versus reducibility was
an important and controversial issue for all humanities and social sciences, be-
fore and after 1917, but Sapir’s solution does not seem to play any role in this
multi-faceted discussion.22
Fodor’s token physicalism, on the other hand, became a rather popular issue in
philosophical discussions, and remains so up to the present day.23 Many philoso-
phers of science have analysed and commented on Fodor’s views. A considerable
portion of their reactions are critical and try to vindicate some variety of reduc-
tive physicalism. As an example of the broad impact of Fodor’s token physical-
ism, I would mention The Electric Agora (“a modern symposium for the digital
age”), which devoted a Special to “Jerry Fodor’s ‘Special sciences”’ in 2015. After
a brief introduction about “one of the most influential essays in the philosophy
of science since the Second World War” (Kaufman 2015: 1–2), thirty comments
follow.
In areas outside philosophy, I found very few reactions to Fodor’s token-phys-
icalistic ideas.24 It is sometimes suggested that all practising cognitive scientists
now adopt Fodor’s line of thought and proceed without any appeal to neurol-
ogy. For example, Jones (2004) claims that “this [token physicalism] has been
the consensus view among cognitive scientists since at least the mid-seventies”,
due to Fodor’s 1974 article. This is, however, an overstatement. In the same arti-
cle, when talking about belief states, Jones claims that their reduction to physical
22This tentative conclusion is based on a search in Google and Google Scholar for “conceptual
science”. No items were found containing this expression in the Sapirean sense.
23The most recent article devoted to token physicalism I found is DiFrisco (2017).
24I found only six non-philosophical items via a Google Scholar search for “token physicalism”.
109
Els Elffers
neurological states “has been at the centre of numerous research projects in the
behavioural and brain sciences for decades” (Jones 2004: 423). This recent obser-
vation shows the lasting validity of an earlier claim by Fodor himself that many
psychologists are type physicalists who believe that every psychological kind
predicate is lawfully related to a neurological kind predicate and that “there are
departments of psycho-biology or psychology and brain science in universities
throughout the world whose very existence is an institutionalized gamble that
such lawful coextensions can be found” (Fodor 1974: 105, cf. footnote 10).
In summary, Sapir’s token physicalism seems not to have left traces in the
work of later scholars.25 Fodor’s token physicalism was only partially influential
as a programme for research in cognitive science. But it did become the subject
of a lively philosophical debate that is still ongoing.
12 Linguistics as a “special science”
Recently, a newly appointed professor of Dutch Linguistics at Leiden University
claimed, in his inaugural lecture, that linguistics is in crisis because it is thought
it may become superfluous fairly soon. Language, as a cognitive phenomenon,
can now be investigated through brain research, so why should there be a sepa-
rate discipline of linguistics alongside neurology? The answer is that the role of
linguistics has not yet become entirely irrelevant because the help of linguists is
still necessary for the correct interpretation of the neurocognitive data (Barbiers
2017).
This line of argument, which presupposes correspondences between linguistic
and neurological natural kinds, is a clear example of reductive, type-physicalistic
thought. Such a radically reductive view of linguistics is not new, but recent de-
velopments in neurolinguistics have made it much more prominent and much
more applicable (and actually applied) in research practice. But it is not, and
never was, the only view. On the contrary, there are many linguistic approaches
that do not make any appeal to neurology, either because of a more autonomous
psychologistic conception of cognitive-linguistic research, or because of a more
radically autonomous, non-psychologistic view of linguistics (cf. Botha 1992; Elf-
fers 2014).
Thus far, token physicalism does not play a role in discussions about these
approaches. This might be due to the context in which it was introduced – an-
25There might be traces in work I did not consult: later publications by Kroeber, or his corre-
spondence with Sapir, which lasted for several decades. On p. 106, Silverstein (1986) was men-
tioned for drawing attention to Sapir’s token physicalism from the perspective of the history
of linguistics.
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thropology in Sapir’s case, philosophy of science in Fodor’s case. Neither Sapir
(1917) nor Fodor (1974) explicitly refer to linguistics but, as was argued in §6, both
scholars certainly incorporated linguistics in the category of special sciences, al-
though this incorporation has a different meaning for Sapir’s and Fodor’s vari-
eties of token physicalism. For Sapir, psychology is a basic science. Linguistics,
as a special science, has a non-psychological status. Language belongs, with art
and culture, to the category of “human institutions” (cf. the quotation on p. 108).
For Fodor, only physics is a basic science; psychology is a special science. Given
Fodor’s psychologistic view of linguistics, linguistics is also a special science.26
Can token physicalism, if plausible at all, play a relevant role in the discussions
of linguistic approaches examined above? A positive answer seems possible. The
conception of linguistics as a “special science” can play a supportive role in the
argumentation of both psychologists and non-psychologists. For psychologists,
token physicalism can help to justify the fact that they do not appeal to neu-
rology. Thus far this justification is often lacking or unconvincing. For example,
many cognitive linguists (cf., e.g., Langacker 1999) make strong statements about
mental architecture and processes, without discussing questions of neurological
reality. Chomsky (1987: 5–6) claims that such discussions are unnecessary, be-
cause chemists, too, “have not stopped to discuss ‘abstractly construed’ molecule
elements, the periodic system and so on”. The analogy fails, because chemists
could apply the vocabulary of atomic physics instead, whereas linguists are far
from knowing what corresponds neurologically to their psychological-linguistic
categories. Token physicalism provides a better justification for not discussing
neurological equivalents of linguistic natural kinds.
For non-psychologists, the autonomy of linguistics often implies a rather prob-
lematic ontological status of language. Like Kroeber, they look for an ontological
answer to questions of non-reducibility. For example, according to Cooper (1975),
language belongs to a separate “linguistic reality”, Itkonen (1978) assumes a non-
empirical “social reality” which incorporates language, Katz (1981) localizes lan-
guage in an abstract “Platonist” realm. In all cases, there is, apart fromOckhamian
considerations, the problem of explaining the interaction of these separate realms
with the psychological realm of actual use and knowledge of language. Without
suggesting that token physicalism offers ready-made solutions, I feel that it has
certain advantages: language use consists of (psycho-)physical events (tokens)
26Fodor (1985: 149) claims that “it is nomologically necessary that the grammar of a language is
internally represented by speaker/hearers of that language”. In itself, Fodor’s token physicalism
allows for an “institutional” interpretation of language as well (cf. his discussion of economics).
Jones (2004: 422–423) regards multiple realizability as a typical feature of institutional facts in
general.
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and the linguist’s constructs they instantiate (types, natural kinds) are epistemo-
logically but not ontologically autonomous.27
Of course, this extension of the topic in the final paragraphs of this chapter is
too fragmentary. But it may give an impression of how the idea of linguistics as
a “special science” can play a role in discussions of linguistic approaches.
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Chapter 5
The impact of Russian formalism on
linguistic structuralism
Bart Karstens
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Theaim of this chapter is to clarify the relation between Russian formalism, amove-
ment in literary studies, and structuralism. Because leading structuralists such as
Mukarovsky (linguistics) and Lévi-Strauss (anthropology) defined their approach
in opposition to formalism, we may have the impression that structuralism and
formalism are fundamentally different. However, on closer inspection, it turns
out that Mukarovsky and Lévi-Strauss targeted specific articulations of formalism.
There is a third major variant, namely systemic formalism, which escapes their
criticism and can be shown to have influenced structuralism in its earliest phase.
First, Tynjanov and Jakobson worked together and co-authored an important short
programmatic paper. Second, the genesis of Prague School structuralism should be
considered a merger of elements stemming from a multitude of directions. If we
do so, we can see how ideas derived from systemic formalism fitted in with other
constituents of linguistic structuralism, and hence how formalism influenced the
latter to a significant degree.
1 Introduction
Since the very beginning of structuralism, its relation to Russian formalism has
been a matter of dispute. Leading structuralists, such as Jan Mukarovsky (1891–
1975) and Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009), emphasized the differences between
formalism and structuralism, and members of the Prague Circle even claimed
that formalism was passé and in need of replacement, as it was marked too much
by its mechanistic heritage. In this chapter, I will review the dismissive attitude
of structuralists towards formalism. My conclusion is that this attitude applied
to a number of articulations of formalism, but not to the so-called systemic vari-
ant, which itself was formulated in response to problems experienced within the
Bart Karstens. 2019. The impact of Russian formalism on linguistic struc-
turalism. In James McElvenny (ed.), Form and formalism in linguistics, 115–
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formalist programme. From this it follows that a number of key notions of formal-
ism must be considered as constitutive of the structuralist analysis of linguistic
phenomena. In my interpretation these key notions include the application of
the function concept, the recognition of the systematic recurrence of forms in
language, the perspective on language as a system, as well as a system within
systems, and the analysis of actual manifestations of language in speech and
writing with reference to a deeper, underlying system.
I begin by discussing the reasons proponents of structuralism, such as Muka-
rovsky and Lévi-Strauss, had for their opposition to formalism. Mukarovsky is
interesting because he put forward his critique of formalism during the formative
days of structuralism in Prague and, according to Toman, Mukarovsky was the
second most important representative of Czech structuralism after Roman Jakob-
son (1896–1982) (Toman 1995: 128). Lévi-Strauss carried structuralism into the so-
cial sciences. I focus on his infamous 1960 critique of Vladimir Propp (1895–1970)
and his 1928 bookMorphology of the Folktale, which met with a late reception in
Europe and the United States. Despite the fact that more than 30 years elapsed,
both scholars delivered similar forms of critique on formalism, which gives the
impression of a clear-cut and deep rift between formalism and structuralism.
But it is essential to see that formalism was not a unitary movement at all. Fol-
lowing Steiner (1984), three main types of formalism can be identified, namely
mechanical, organic and systemic formalism.1 This classification probably does
not even exhaust all possible varieties of formalism that have existed, but it is
very useful for the present purposes. As will be made clear in what follows,
Mukarovsky dismissed mechanical formalism while Lévi-Strauss targeted organ-
ic formalism. In my view, however, systemic formalism possessed a number of
properties that escaped both these attacks.
The main proponent of systemic formalism was Yuri Tynjanov (1894–1943).
Tynjanov co-authored a highly influential programmatic paper with Roman Ja-
kobson, which was published in 1928. The nine theses defended in this paper
are often referred to as crucial to the genesis of linguistic structuralism. This
document thus forms a clear point of contact between systemic formalism and
structuralism.2 In addition, the work of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) served
as an inspiration to both Tynjanov and Jakobson. It is true that formalism was
1These labels are based on Steiner’s analytical terms. They were not actor’s categories. Sig-
nificantly, however, what is identified as systemic formalism was sometimes referred to as
“neo-formalism” by contemporaries.
2In historiography, claims of influence always need to be made concrete either by pointing at
references in texts or through an investigation of direct personal relations between historical
actors. Still relevant in this respect is Koerner (1989).
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an approach in literary studies and structuralism mainly applied to linguistics.
However, the study of literature and the study of language were seen by Tyn-
janov and Jakobson as complementary parts of the same endeavour. Indeed, the
formalism that inspired Jakobson must be embedded in the broader Russian revo-
lutionary cultural climate of the 1910s which includedmodernist art and futurism
(see Holenstein 1975: 32–33; see also Karstens 2017a).
It is in this context that scholars claimed a place for literary studies as a new
independent science. They wanted to base this new science of literature on a
set of facts that had to be established without presuppositions. Formalists were
in constant debate amongst themselves on how best to pursue this aim. In do-
ing so, different approaches came about, but what they shared was an eschewal
of philosophical and psychological speculation. Instead they started to “borrow”
models from natural sciences, such as biology and chemistry, and made use of
technological metaphors to bolster their research programme. Thus, somewhat
paradoxically, autonomy for literary studies was claimed through an alignment
with science and technology.
A similar story applies to linguistics. Structuralism can be seen as a further
step in the realization of Saussure’s quest to establish an autonomous science of
language, centred around the idea of treating languages as value systems of signs.
In my view, the formation of structuralism is best studied as a merger of elements
stemming from multiple directions.3 The “merger” perspective allows us to see
how systemic formalism provided constituents of early structuralism. Both for-
malism and structuralism may not have many adherents anymore; however, the
systemic way of thinking continues to exert a strong influence on linguistics to
this day. Hence it is important to clarify the historical ties between formalism
and structuralism in its earliest phase.
2 Mukarovsky’s definition of structuralism as opposed to
formalism
Born in Pisek, Bohemia in 1891, Jan Mukarovsky was among the founders of the
Prague Linguistic Circle in 1926. Mukarovsky developed an approach towards
literary analysis in which the concepts of structure and structuralism played a
3For a hybridization perspective on discipline formation, see Karstens (2012). For the study of
interdisciplinarity in terms of a merger of constitutive elements, see Graff (2015) and Bod et
al. (In Press). For a contextual study of Jakobson as part of an age of synthesis, see Karstens
(2017a).
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central role.4 He conceived of a structure as a set of elements, organized in a
complex hierarchy in which one element dominated over the other elements.
This dominant determined how other elements of the structure functioned. For
example, in Charlie Chaplin’s 1931 silent film City Lights, Mukarovsky identified
“expressive gestures” as the dominant. Other bodily movements and auditory ele-
ments (like music) he interpreted as subordinate to the expressive gestures in the
film. A literary work or film could thus be interpreted as a relational structure
and the main task of the literary critic was to locate the dominant, and the rela-
tionships between the dominant and all other elements occurring in the structure.
For Mukarovsky, this form of relationalism was holistic: “Structure is dynamic,
containing both the tendencies of convergence and divergence, and its artistic
phenomenon which cannot be taken apart since each of its elements gains value
only in relationship to the whole” (Mukarovsky, quoted in Galan 1985: 30). Struc-
ture could thus also be defined as a whole “whose nature is determined by the
parts and their reciprocal relationships, and which in turn determines the nature
and the relationships of the parts” (Mukarovsky, quoted in Galan 1985: 35).
In an interview given to Prague Weekly in 1932, Mukarovsky appears to have
used the term structuralism for the first time to refer to the new school of lit-
erary criticism.5 In the interview he explicitly mentioned that this new school
should be distinguished from formalism. In a 1934 review of the Czech edition
of Viktor Shklovsky’s (1893–1984) Theory of Prose (original edition 1925), it be-
comes clear how Mukarovsky viewed the opposition between structuralism and
formalism. Mukarovsky gave the formalists credit for their polemical extremism
and for their rejection of all extrinsic approaches to art that included all kinds of
(contextual) interpretation and psychologizing.6 According to Mukarovsky, this
unqualified emphasis on content had to provoke a radical antithesis emphasizing
the form of literary products.
This shift to form had, however, gone too far. For example, when in Shklovsky’s
analysis a change in form directly led to a change in content (such as in a passage
inTheory of Prose on Cervantes’s Don Quixote), this was accidental according to
Mukarovsky. Shklovsky’s research programme would not normally lead to such
an analysis because form and content had to be strictly separated. The example
demonstrates, however, that even Shklovsky could not avoid accidental identifi-
cations of form with meaning. From such examples Mukarovsky drew the con-
4What follows in the paragraphs below is by and large based on Galan (1985: 22–44).
5The first time structuralism was mentioned in print in relation to the study of language is in
Jakobson (1929). I will give this citation below.
6If one thing united all formalists, it was their rejection of both psychologism and subjectivism
in literary studies.
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clusion that a synthesis was required between the intrinsic, formalist approach
and the extrinsic, interpretative approach, and Mukarovsky explicitly claimed
that structuralism provided this synthesis.
The difference between structuralism and its direct predecessor is nicely illus-
trated in the way Mukarovsky elaborated on one of the industrial metaphors for
which Shklovsky is so well known. Shklovsky had pointed out that the literary
critic should be interested in the “yarn and weaving techniques” that produce
literariness and not in the “textile” that is produced and subsequently reaches
consumers on the economic market. According to Mukarovsky, however, it is im-
possible to separate the “external” market from production techniques because
the market mechanism of supply and demand conditions the very development
of weaving techniques.While in structuralism the internal relations, and the laws
that govern these relations, are still at the centre of investigation, external factors,
which influence the course of literary evolution, are included too.
In Mukarovsky’s interpretation, a structure has a dynamic, instead of a static,
nature. Structures are not unique and unchangeable.The stability of the relations
between the elements that make up the structure is temporary and represents a
fragile equilibrium. The continuous regrouping of elements and permutations of
functions is given by an evolutionary dynamic that involves interplay between
the literary tradition and external factors. A literary work may thus reflect the
tradition to which it belongs but diverge from it at the same time. This applies
especially when the dominant shifts, owing to external changes. In the Chaplin
case, this would, for example, be the change from silent films to films with audi-
ble dialogue; the literary work may assume a completely new appearance. The
nature of the structure is therefore not univocally given by the work, as it must
be perceived against the background of an external context. A form of empiri-
cism that is too narrow, which does not move much beyond the literary facts as
given by the work itself, as Mukarovsky found in Shklovsky, entirely misses this
dynamic side of literature.
It is important to note that changes in Mukarovsky’s view did not occur ran-
domly. Quite the contrary, Mukarovsky thought that it was possible to uncover
laws of modifications, and other alterations, of literary structures. If change were
chaotic and not orderly, it would probably be unintelligible. We find the same
consideration in the work of Russian futurists, who were aiming at language re-
form, often with the help of poetry.7 They argued that it made no sense to create
a new language from scratch. Instead, linguistic innovations should respect or-
7A clear example in this respect is Velimir Khlebnikov (1885–1922); see below.
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derly codes and norms that a community of speakers of a language has built up
during its history. It was only through a deeper understanding of the systematic-
ity of a language that purposeful innovations could be won.
Clearly Mukarovsky was a dialectic thinker. Formalism had been a necessary
stage in the development of literary criticism because without its theory of imma-
nence the later synthesis with extrinsic approaches would not have been possible.
With their theory of immanence, the formalists had created a realm of autonomy
for literary works and for their study, yielding an independent science of litera-
ture. However, in order to mature, the science of literature had to acknowledge
that this independence was a matter of degree. Poetics does not live in a vacuum;
it should not be cut-off from social reality. Hence some of the intrinsic formalism
remains in structuralism but it must be wed to extrinsic (i.e. sociological, cultural,
historical) considerations. According to Galan (1985: 38), structuralists were for-
malists “only to the extent of holding that the primary causes for literary changes
have to be sought within the literary series, and social scientists to the extent of
recognizing that literature properly belongs to the wider realm of culture and
society”.
Given the synthetic position that structuralists sought to occupy, they had to
strongly oppose any identification of structuralism with either the sociological
or the formalist pole. This explains the repeated effort of structuralists, such as
Mukarovsky, to draw boundaries between formalism and structuralism. How-
ever, because he was attacking a formalism that erected a strict barrier between
art and social reality, his criticism applied only to the earliest expression of for-
malism, namely mechanical formalism.
Mechanical formalism had its starting point with Shklovsky’s 1914 book The
Resurrection of the Word and the subsequent creation of the opojaz group in
St. Petersburg in 1916. opojaz is an acronym that translates to “Society of the
Study of Poetic Language”. The aim of the group was to put the study of poetics,
metrics and folklore on a new scientific footing. The focus of literary criticism
had to be on the “machines” or “devices” (rhythmic, stylistic, literary genre, etc.)
with which the form or the medium of expression was created. Through such
devices linguistic material could be transformed into a work of art. Devices thus
essentially determine whether a work is literary or not, hence the emphasis of
the early formalists on technology, craftsmanship and construction.
The opojaz programme was of a positivistic nature. The guiding idea was that
a basic set of literary devices could be uncovered. Art (poetry, fiction, belles-
lettres) was separated from everyday language because the form of art works
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had to have no relation to the external world. opojaz members thought this was
essential to safeguard a realm of independent facts from which an autonomous
science (and we might perhaps also say “technology”) of literature could be built,
fitting to the demands of the modern industrial world.
In this type of formalism, a work of art is not considered in holistic terms. In-
stead, it is viewed as an aggregate of loose parts. When these loose parts form
a set of facts that can be discovered through empirical research, it becomes im-
material who in the end puts the aggregate together. As Osip Brik (1888–1945)
once said: “Evgeny Oneginwould have beenwritten, also without Pushkin, just as
America would have been discovered, even without Columbus” (Brik 1923: 213).
This attitude is of course in tune with the view of science as a process of uncov-
ering the world “as it is”. The achievements of individual scientists in the process
can be marvelled at, but in the end each individual is in principle interchange-
able with someone else. The specific use of literary devices determines whether
a work like Evgeny Onegin is a sign of the time in which it was written. In this
sense, Shklovsky defended the view that a single man does not write and that
it is instead the time, the school-collective, that writes. Change occurs through
changes in the application of literary devices and this was seen as a completely
immanent process.
This conception of immanent change was felt to be problematic by others. Can
we really sufficiently explain the history of art if art at all times has to be discon-
nected from the rest of the world? And how do we capture the experience of the
totality of an artwork if we can only consider it bottom-up, as an aggregate of ba-
sic elements? Such problems with mechanical formalism bothered contemporary
formalists and led to exploration in new directions, while aiming to retain the
basic premises of the formalist programme, namely to develop an autonomous
science of literature and to do so without the a priori assumption of analytical
schemes or modes of interpretation. If we take this into account, Mukarovsky’s
dialectical analysis, in which structuralism is the synthesis of intrinsic and ex-
trinsic approaches, comes across as overly schematic. Even before Mukarovsky
published his critique of Shklovsky, other types of formalism had been put for-
ward in which form and content were connected and in which external factors
were integrated in explanations of historical change. One example is Propp’s or-
ganicist formalism. It is this articulation of formalism that was, however, severely
criticized by Lévi-Strauss in 1960 – interestingly enough, on roughly the same
grounds as those invoked by Mukarovsky in his earlier attack on mechanical
formalism.
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3 Lévi-Strauss’s voicing of structuralism contra Propp’s
organicist formalism
Although Propp was also from St. Petersburg, he was not a member of the opo-
jaz group. In reaction to the problems experienced with mechanical formalism,
he developed his own variant: organicist formalism. What this entailed is best
illustrated by considering his main work, Morphology of the Folktale (1928). This
book was based on an empirical investigation of a collection of Russian fairy
tales compiled by Alexander Afanasyev (1826–1871) in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, of which Propp selected 100 tales. In comparing this material Propp found
that 31 functions (for example, “trickery”, “mediation”, “departure” and “return”)
and seven character types (for example, “hero”, “villain”, “princess”) were con-
stantly recurring. He labelled these the basic elements of all folk tales.
Contrary to his expectations, Propp also found that the order in which the
functions occur in the tales was always the same. Thus, a tale always starts with
an injury of a victim or a lack of an important object, which immediately gives
the end result of the story, retribution for the injury or the recovery of the lost ob-
ject. The hero is then introduced, who must accomplish the main task. He meets
a donor who supplies him with a magical agent (ring, horse, lion, etc.), which
enables him to achieve his goal. Then they meet the villain, who will engage him
at some point in a decisive battle, and so on. This led Propp to the conclusion
that all fairytales are of one type in regard to their structure (Propp 1968 [1928]:
23). He provided an algebraic representation of this general structure, shown in
Figure 1.
Figure 1: Propp’s generalized fairytale with the set of functions ordered
in a compositional scheme. Copied from Propp (1968 [1928]: 105).
In Figure 1 we see that a fairytale starts at A on the left and proceeds to G
on the right. It can then either go up first, then down, and then proceed from
Q to the end; or it can go up first and then directly to the end part; or down
first then to the end part; or skip the middle part and move to the end part right
away. Hence, not all functional elements have to be present in every story but,
when they are, they always occur in the order given by the general type. It is
also immaterial how and by whom the functions are performed. What matters is
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that these functions are performed in the story, and that this happens in a fixed
order. Sequencing the functional elements is thus like establishing word order in
a sentence and so it is possible to arrive at a grammar of stories.
Propp created a new method of description, which he clearly hoped would
raise the prestige of literary studies: “What matters is not the amount of material,
but the methods of investigation. At a time when the physical and mathemati-
cal sciences possess well-ordered classification, a unified terminology adopted by
special conferences, and amethodology improved upon by the transmission from
teachers to students, we have nothing comparable” (Propp 1968 [1928]: 4). The
morphological method of classification Propp introduced was inspired by the bi-
ological writings of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832). This involved the
notion that we can identify fundamental ideas or archetypes (Urtypen) under-
lying natural phenomena. The study of common patterns of development and
modifications of the archetype was called “morphology” by Goethe.8
The generalized fairytale of Figure 1 can be considered the Urtyp of all fairy-
tales. Moreover, the word “morphology” in the title of Propp’s book is a direct
reference to Goethe; every chapter in the original publication is in fact preceded
by an epigraph from Goethe’s work. Following Goethe, Propp had an organicist
understanding of functions: a function is an activity seen from the perspective
of the relevance of this activity for the total course of action; that is, the story
that is being told (Steiner 1984: 84). With Propp, functions can never be studied
in relation to an isolated task or goal. Each tale is thus perceived as a functionally
integrated whole, and this distingishes him from members of the opojaz group,
who saw works of art as mere aggregates of constituting elements.
Propp was very much focused on the description of the structure of the stories
available in the present: “We shall not speak at present about the historical study
of the tale, but shall speak only about the description of it, for to discuss genetics,
without special elucidation of the problem of description as it is usually treated,
is completely useless. Before throwing light upon the question of the tale’s origin,
one must first answer the question as to what the tale itself represents” (Propp
1968 [1928]: 5). But the analytical result that all folktales were basically of the
same structure made Propp speculate about their origin. Could they all come
8According to Steiner (1984: 257–258), the return to Goethe was more widespread and stemmed
from a growing dissatisfaction with positivism, which led scholars to explore scientific models
that had existed before positivism became dominant. Oppel (1947: 13) argues that the appear-
ance of the Russian translation of Wilhelm Troll’s (1897–1978) book Goethes morphologische
Schriften in 1926 paved the way for the acceptance of morphology as a respectable method.
Alongside Propp, Petrovskij (1927) also adopted the term. For the long-lasting influence of
Goethe on the study of language and literature, see also Cassirer (1945).
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from the same source? Moreover, he was well aware that Morphology of the Folk
Tale left open the crucial issue of how to get from the general type to the actual
tales that occur in reality.What kind of transformations exist? Andwhat explains
their occurrence?
Pressed by these issues, Propp devoted a separate essay to the subject, “Fairy
Tale Transformations”, which was first published separately and then as an ap-
pendix to the book (the original publication is Propp 1928). He argued that syn-
chronic comparative analysis and diachronic genealogical analysis could be un-
dertaken separately, but in the end complemented each other. In the comple-
mentary paper, Propp discussed affinities that exist between the fairy tale and
religion (myth and ritual) and various social institutions at different stages of
their evolution. According to his analysis, the basic forms of fairy tales are re-
ligious. Changes into derived forms occur through ethnological and social pro-
cesses. Hence, in order to understand the transformations (of which Propp spec-
ified 20 kinds) we must include external factors. But Propp did not make clear if
a similar analysis can apply to all literary products. In his view, folk narratives
were the products of collective creativity and came about through long-term so-
cial processes. They may thus differ in crucial respects from other literary works,
such as novels and poems. The morphological approach was, however, tried on
other literary genres as well, for example by Michael Petrovsky (1887–1940) and
Aleksandr Skaftymov (1890–1968).
Morphology of the Folktale met with a late and peculiar reception in the West.
Initially the work was not noticed internationally. This was probably an effect of
the rise of Stalinism, which cut off intellectual exchange.The first translation into
English, and to my knowledge into anyWestern language, appeared in 1958 with
Indiana University Press.9 This translation was however full of deficiencies. It
also did not include the “Fairy Tale Transformations” appendix, and the Goethian
epigraphs that preceded chapters in the original edition were conspicuously left
out.10
Since structuralism was in full swing in 1958, the publication ofMorphology of
the Folktale prompted a reaction from Lévi-Strauss in the form of a long review,
which was published in French in 1960. Lévi-Strauss praised Propp for seeing
through the rich semantic variety of fairy tales and for penetrating into the for-
9Such delayed reception due to the political turmoil of the 1930s and 1940s occurred often. Em-
igrant scholars could make a “second” career in the United Kingdom or the United States. A
well-known example is the sociologist Norbert Elias (1897–1990). In this context, it must be
noted that the first translation of Propp’s work into English is accompanied by an introduc-
tion written by Svatava Pirkova-Jakobson, the wife of Roman Jakobson.
10The 1968 second edition was of much better quality but still without the Goethian epigraphs,
which were considered to be “non-essential” (preface by Louis A. Wagner).
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mal regularity of the stories. But he called it an error of formalism to disconnect
syntax from the vocabulary (or lexicon). According to Lévi-Strauss, it is not pos-
sible to do formal analysis and content analysis separately:
For formalism, the two areas must be absolutely separate, as form alone
is intelligible, and content is only a residual deprived of any significant
value. For structuralism, this opposition does not exist; structuralism does
not treat one as abstract and the other as concrete. Form and content are of
the same nature, amenable to the same type of analysis. Content receives
its reality from its structure, and what is called form is a way of organizing
the local structures that make up this content. (Lévi-Strauss 1984: 179)
As an illustration, he provided the example of bird names to stand for for-
mal oppositions. According to Lévi-Strauss, the morphological approach cannot
deal with the fact that the same bird names can be used to stand for multiple
formal oppositions. This becomes especially problematic when in one case two
bird names are in opposition, but in another case they together form one pole
to oppose something else. As an example Lévi-Strauss gave “day” vs. “night”, as
expressed by an “eagle” vs. an “owl”, and “predators” vs. “scavengers”, which can
be expressed by “eagle + owl” vs. “crow” or even “sky-land” vs. “sky-water”; that
is, “eagle + owl + crow” vs. “duck”. Structural oppositions framed in this way in-
volve the use of lexical meaning. For this reason, the formal opposition can only
be understood when content is taken into account. In my view, the point Lévi-
Strauss makes here resembles Mukarovsky’s point that structuralism involves a
synthesis between formal text analysis and meaningful interpretation through
relating the text to the external context.
In addition to this, Lévi-Strauss also declared structuralism superior to for-
malism in that it did not have to stick to a linear basic structure but could shift
from a syntagmatic (or temporal) order to a paradigmatic general structure. This
paradigmatic structure is based on the recognition of a number of fundamen-
tal oppositional patterns and abstracts away from the temporal ordering of the
story. In my view, the idea of making a distinction between a surface level and
deeper levels of linguistic structure, with corresponding rules of transformation
between them, is crucial to the structuralist approach to the study of language.11
But even this does not yield a fundamental distinction between structuralism
11Deep structure, surface structure and transformation are of course Chomskyan terms, and
used here somewhat anachronistically. But they are not far off the mark: according to Joseph
(2001: 1899–1900), Chomsky’s transformational grammar must be interpreted as a direct con-
tinuation of European structuralism (to contrast it with the significantly different American,
Bloomfieldian structuralism which was challenged by Chomsky).
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and formalism. Lévi-Strauss may have been correct in his assessment that or-
ganicist formalism lacked the means to abstract away from temporal order, but
in the next section I will argue that the assumption of multiple levels of analy-
sis in structuralism was inspired by another formalist variant, namely systemic
formalism.
Propp reacted to Lévi-Strauss’ critical reception. This reaction was translated
into Italian in 1966 and published together with an Italian version ofMorphology
of the Folk Tale, accompanied by Lévi-Strauss’ critical review of it. In his rebuttal
Propp blamed the American translator:
Professor Lévi-Strauss knows my book only in the English translation. But
its translator allowed himself an impermissible liberty. Not understanding
the function of the epigraphs which at first glance do not seem to be ex-
plicitly connected to the text, he considered them useless ornaments and
barbarously omitted them […] all these epigraphs […] had the purpose of
expressing what was left unsaid in the text of my book. (As translated in
Steiner 1984: 81)
Propp also lamented that Lévi-Strauss had completely missed the importance
of the plot for the understanding of a text as a functionally integrated whole. In
this respect it is perhaps even more significant that the “Fairy Tale Transforma-
tions” complementary paper was not translated at all and only became available
in English in 1971. The complementary paper demonstrates even more clearly
that Propp had a profound interest in historical and ethnographic investigation
and that he was willing to include “content” as an explanation for changes in the
structure of fairy tales. It could even have become clear that Propp viewed this
type of research as complementary to formalist analysis.
The aim of Propp’s two-way publishing strategy was to optimize clarity of
presentation, but the reception of Lévi-Strauss shows that this strategy may
have had the opposite effect. Still, had the references to Goethe and “Fairy Tale
Transformations” been known to Lévi-Strauss, I think that he would have main-
tained the two main points of his critique. For a structuralist to assume that for-
mal and contextual analysis are complementary is insufficient; the two must be
integrated, since form and content simultaneously inform and determine each
other. Mukarovsky charged mechanical formalism with neglect of external fac-
tors. While organic formalism in Propp’s approach no longer did this, it still did
not achieve the synthesis structuralists were seeking. Hence Lévi-Strauss could
deliver a similar critique on Propp, even though the latter represented a differ-
ent kind of formalism. Systemic formalism could, however, not be targeted in
this way. This I will show in the next section.
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4 Systemic formalism and its points of contact with
structuralism
According to Steiner (1984: 112), systemic formalism represented the most ad-
vanced stage of the formalist movement. Significantly, it was called “neo-formal-
ism” by contemporaries. Steiner connects the label systemic formalism for the
most part to the work of Tynjanov, who put forward a dynamic, relationist un-
derstanding of literary structures. The literary theorist – or, as the case may be,
linguist – had to account for the fact that linguistic structures are continuously
unfolding, but at the same time that the recurrent systematic appearance of forms
is what makes a language intelligible and understandable. In order to capture this
double aspect of language, Tynjanov argued that a focus on experience alone is
insufficient. Shklovsky counted as a formalist anyone whose analyses did not
move beyond the sensory stratum, with a rather static theory as a result. Accord-
ing to Tynjanov, good science had to proceed both from taking direct experience
into account and from the assumption of a system, or deeper structure, that gov-
erns the way experiences come about.
In this respect he was clearly inspired by Saussure’s langue-parole distinction.
The actual appearance of utterances (parole) is a manifestation of the underlying
linguistic system (langue). For a number of reasons, Tynjanov very much liked
the analogy between language and chess that Saussure had drawn.The positions
we see on the chessboard depend on an unchangeable set of rules that exist be-
fore the game even begins. The analogy supports the relationist stance, because
each piece receives its identity due to the system of rules and its value is relative
with respect to the other pieces on the board. The system of rules is strict, but it
allows for a great degree of freedom of choice in the actual execution of moves.
Finally, the social aspect of the analogy was attractive to Tynjanov: the system
of rules has to be shared by players of the game, otherwise they cannot play. As
written in Chapter 4 of the Cours, the socially shared linguistic code “is neces-
sary if speaking is to be intelligible and produce all its effects” (Saussure 1922
[1916]: 37). The analogy thus showed that both creative expression and human
communication rest on a governing system.
Yet, as Steiner explains, there was a “deep-seated difference” between Saus-
sure’s and Tynjanov’s thought about the autonomy of the langue (Steiner 1984:
112). While both wanted to establish an autonomous science of language (Saus-
sure) and literature (Tynjanov, very much like all the formalists), Saussure had
insisted on absolute autonomy, but for Tynjanov autonomywas a relative notion.
127
Bart Karstens
Tynjanov argued that any literary system was always part of an overall cultural
system. This stance “effected a gradual relativization of the original formalist po-
sition on the autonomy of the literary system” (Steiner 1984: 111). Where other
formalists had made a sharp distinction between what was immanent to litera-
ture and what was not, Tynjanov started to blur this distinction and replaced it
with a multi-layered conception of systems within systems.
A theory of relative autonomy was put forward in a 1928 paper co-written by
Tynjanov and Jakobson titled “Problems in the Study of Literature and Language”
(Tynjanov& Jakobson 1928).12 In this ground-breaking paper they presented nine
theses on the historical development of language and literature and the relation
between them. The eighth thesis reads:
The discovery of the immanent laws of literature (language) permits us to
characterize every concrete change in literary (linguistic) systems but does
not permit us either to explain the tempo of evolution or to determine the
actual selection among several theoretically possible evolutionary paths.
This is because the immanent laws of literary (linguistic) evolution are in-
definite equations which, while limiting the number of solutions, do not
necessarily leave only a single one. Which pathway, or at least which dom-
inant, is chosen can be determined only through an analysis of the corre-
lation among the literary and other historical series. This correlation (the
system of systems) has its own structural laws which should be studied.
(Quotation given in English in Steiner 1984: 128)
Tynjanov and Jakobson saw the entire culture as a complex system of systems.
Each subsystem has its own immanent set of rules but is also determined by
the larger system of which it is part, which can lead to a change in rules in the
subsystem itself.
The authors perceived a deep relation between language and literature, and
hence also between the science of language and the science of literature. These
two formed more than just a continuum: both disciplines had to be based on the
same principles. The literary genre of poetry provides a good illustration of this
commutativity (see Jakobson 1981b,a). Poetry is made of language; therefore lin-
guistics directly informs thewriting of poems. But structuralists also investigated
poetry as a special function of language. Because in poetry it is possible to break
the natural ties between signifier and signified, it is also possible to experiment
12For the importance of this text in the genesis of structuralism, see Holenstein (1975: 17).
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in poetry and self-reflexively develop the language that is being used.13 The 1928
paper established a connection between formalism, which pertained to literary
studies, and structuralism, which mostly pertained to linguistics. From this it be-
comes understandable that Jakobson, the linguist, and Mukarovsky, the literary
scholar, could collaborate in the development of structuralism in the context of
the Prague Linguistic Circle.
Systemic formalism differed from mechanical formalism in that it no longer
searched for an unchanging literary essence. It also did not explain the history of
literature as an immanent process. Systemic formalists analyzed both the struc-
tural relations within a single literary product and the relations of this work with
the rest of literature and with the whole culture of the time in which the work
was written and published. All of these realms were conceived as systems con-
taining sets of interdependent variables. In this way, a literary work was itself
seen as a variable in a system of higher order.
The difference between organic formalism and systemic formalismwas subtler,
yet very significant. Like the systemic approach, themorphological approachwas
also anti-positivistic and had a functional understanding of the role elements
play in relation to the purpose (artistic goal) of the whole. The whole is a system
because of the interplay of functional elements that work together to achieve the
common goal. But in systemic formalism the notions of system and function got
a different definition. A function in systemic formalism is seen as a relation of
two interdependent variables and a system was conceived as a hierarchical set of
interdependent variables. To call literature a system in this sense was extremism
or radicalism to adherents of the morphological approach.
In my view, a highly important difference is at stake here. In historiography of
linguistic structuralism, we often confront the “standard” interpretation that the
organic way of thinking of 19th century historical and comparative linguistics,
with August Schleicher’s (1821–1868) morphology perhaps as the most distinc-
tive representative, paved the way for the systematic/structural way of thinking
of the 20th century.14 To conceive of languages as structures is then simply the
continuation of the application of the organism metaphor; that is, to conceive
of a language as a living organism. What matters in both structuralist and com-
parative linguistics is to unravel the (reciprocal) relations between parts and the
whole of the linguistic structure/organism. Fitting to this account would be a ref-
13On the redefinition of the notion of function in semiotic terms and the use of functions in
Jakobson’s structuralism, see the next section.
14A clear example of this interpretation, which even reached the major handbook of the history
of the language sciences, is Kohrt & Kucharczik (2001).
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erence to organic formalism as a source of inspiration for linguistic structuralism.
But, as we have seen above, it is systemic formalism that mostly influenced lin-
guistic structuralism and not the morphological approach. In my view, it follows
that the “standard” continuity interpretation must be seriously questioned.
Notwithstanding the similarity between organic formalism and structuralism
with respect to holistic analysis, the morphological approach does not dig to a
deep level of systematic analysis. It remains quite closely tied to the empirical
“sensory stratum”; if we were to think, for example, of the skeleton as a structure
of bones. In this sense organic formalism was still relatively close to mechanical
formalism. Systemic formalism, on the other hand, involved a fundamental shift
in thinking. The approach rested on the recognition of multiple systems, hierar-
chically ordered in levels. This conception did not only apply to a view of the
system of language within broader cultural systems, but also to the study of lan-
guage itself. I believe this helped to pave the way for the distinction structuralists
made between a surface, or manifest, level of actual occurring written or spoken
speech, and a deeper level of structural relations that underlie occurrences at the
manifest level.
This of course had to be accompanied by a theory of the transformations from
one level to another. Such theories became customary in postwar linguistics,
even if not always under the banner of structuralism, and sometimes even op-
posed to it. Given this long-lasting impact, the final section of this chapter ex-
plores how the ideas of systemic formalism were incorporated as elements of a
larger merger of constituents of structuralism.
5 Structuralism as a merger of multiple constituents
Thehistoriography of structuralism has been dominated by the so-called “French
model” (cf. Flack 2016). In this model, structuralism starts with the Swiss, but
French-speaking, Saussure and after a brief intermediary phase is further devel-
oped by Lévi-Strauss and via him disseminated in many fields of study. I agree
with two recent papers that this model is at best incomplete and should be re-
placed by a model that involves a much wider circulation perspective and that
makes the figure of Roman Jakobson occupy centre stage (see Percival 2011; Flack
2016). This central position is justified because Jakobson was part of both the
Moscow formalism and futurism of the 1910s and the Prague Circle in the 1920s
and 1930s. He was the first to use the very term structuralism in linguistics and
contributed significantly to developing it, in the early years first and foremost in
the area of phonology. Due to his exile in the United States, he directly influenced
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Lévi-Strauss, who was also exiled for a while in New York, and after the war his
thought had an impact on important linguists such as Morris Halle (1923–2018)
and Noam Chomsky (b. 1928).
The study of the circulation of knowledge should investigate the crossing of
temporal, geographical as well as disciplinary boundaries. The latter is espe-
cially relevant when it comes to providing an account of the genesis of struc-
turalism. Jakobson was an extremely versatile scholar who fused together con-
stituents of structuralism from a variety of sources.15 Among these are the con-
cepts of Gestalt from psychology, “invariance” from mathematics, “limited varia-
tion” from biology, “periodicity” from chemistry, and from phenomenology the
central role of “expression”, the importance of the notion of “opposition” and
the anti-positivist stance.16 Members of the Prague School were therefore not
as hostile to philosophical “speculation” as the Russian formalists had been, as
they aligned their core anti-positivist stance to phenomenology and to the philo-
sophically informed Gestalt psychology.17 However, as in formalism, we find
the inclusion of ideas from the natural sciences, which the practitioners of struc-
turalism could use to claim a respectable place in the disciplinary landscape. But,
significantly, Jakobson, took this alliance a step further. The very first time he
mentioned the term structuralism he did not connect it to linguistics only, but
immediately raised it to the status of a science générale:
Were we to comprise the leading idea of present-day science in its most
various manifestations, we could hardly find a more appropriate designa-
tion than structuralism. Any set of phenomena examined by contemporary
science is treated not as a mechanical agglomeration but as a structural
whole, and the basic task is to reveal the inner, whether static or devel-
opmental, laws of this system. What appears to be the focus of scientific
preoccupations is no longer the outer stimulus, but the internal premises
of development; now the mechanical conception of processes yields to the
question of their functions. (Jakobson 1929: 11)
15“Das Werk [of Jakobson, like that of Leibniz] ist gekennzeichnet durch eine breitgefächerte
Forschungstätigkeit, die ans Unglaubliche grenzt” (Holenstein 1975: 17). In Karstens (2017a), I
argue that the pursuit of a number of key virtues helped Jakobson to fuse together a variety
of elements to a more or less coherent approach to the study of language. In this respect, see
also Karstens (2017b).
16For the influence of phenomenology on structuralism, the main point of reference has for quite
some time been Holenstein (1975), but see also Flack (2016).
17Thewidespread anti-psychologism of the time did not involve a complete rejection of psychol-
ogy, but a rejection of “bad” psychology and of an ill-founded connection between linguistics
and psychology that members of the Prague circle, for example, found in the work of Wilhelm
Wundt (1832–1920). See Toman (1995: 139).
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Two things are striking in this citation. The first of these is the distinction that
is drawn between two levels, namely “the outer stimulus” and an inner system,
seen as a structural whole. The second is the importance that Jakobson attached
to the investigation of functions of this structural whole. As was discussed above,
both the concepts of system and function played a central role in systemic for-
malism. Here I want to investigate how to place these concepts in the broader
amalgam of structuralism.
An important idea that structuralists took over from systemic formalism is
that, in order to be intelligible, language has to have recurrent properties. That
is, the regular appearance of linguistic forms is whatmakes language understand-
able and hence apt as a medium of communication. Russian futurists had made
a similar point in their call for cultural and linguistic reform in the 1910s and
1920s.18 Their approach must be contrasted with Italian futurism. The difference
became apparent when Filippo Marinetti (1876–1944), the author of the “Mani-
festo del Futurismo” (1909), paid a visit to Moscow in 1914.19 In a lecture he gave
there, Marinetti proposed to liberate speech by freeing words from the bonds
of grammatical rules and by using onomatopoetic and emotive interjections to
create expressions that appeal directly to the senses (Gasparov 2014: 87–88).20
The Russians found this approach extremely shallow.They argued that meaning-
ful variation is only possible given the structure of a language and the existing
tradition of language use in a community of speakers. Successful reform could
only be achieved by gaining a deeper understanding of the systematic aspects of
the language and by effecting meaningful and lasting reform from such knowl-
edge. Hence the advancement of the investigation of a deeper-level system be-
hind surface-level occurrences of linguistic expressions.
The Russian avant-garde explored relations between constituents of music,
painting and poetry. They wanted to know which constituents were basic or
“invariant”, and explored the limits set on combinations of constituents. Their
goal was to create a basis for free creativity, without any utilitarian purpose. It
was generally thought that elementary forms that appealed to everyone would
provide such a basis (Toman 1995: 238–239). When Jakobson said, “we learned
from the poets”, he was referring in particular to Khlebnikov, the futurist poet
who was influential in the Moscow Linguistic Circle, the Moscow counterpart
18There were many connections between futurism and formalism; this is one of the main themes
of Toman (1995).
19Interestingly, the young Jakobson acted as an interpreter at this event. See Toman (1995: 17).
20Such ideas about language reformwere not uncommon at the time. Both in Dada and other sur-
realist movements, spontaneous language use, freed from rules and “formulas”, was promoted.
See, for example, van Spaendonck (1977).
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of the Petersburg opojaz group (see Jakobson 1979).21 Khlebnikov thought that
knowledge of basic structural relations could show unused realms for the ex-
pressions of meaning and help to determine the scope of meaningful variation.
But this knowledge still had to be won. He drew inspiration from chemistry in
this respect: “The entire language is to be divided into its fundamental elemen-
tary truths, whereafter it would be possible to build for sounds something sim-
ilar to Mendeleev’s law, that last pinnacle of chemical thought” (Khlebnikov as
translated in Gasparov 2014: 95). This “law” states that chemical and physical
properties of the elements recur periodically. By analogy, Khlebnikov expected
that periodicity could also be found when the basic elements of language were
arranged in systematic order.
Jakobson and his fellow structuralists took up Khlebnikov’s challenge. Since
phonemes are the smallest units of sound capable of distinguishing units ofmean-
ing in language, a basic set of phonemes could be the basic elements of language
that Khlebnikov was looking for.22 It is therefore not a coincidence that Prague
structuralists focused on phonology, the area that studies the systematic organi-
zation of sounds in languages; that is, the system of phonemes. Phonology was
simply seen as the most basic science of language. Jakobson’s research yielded
an integral system of sets of minimal oppositions between the phonemes of a
language. The system of minimal pairs sets limits on the possible sound combi-
nations out of which words can be created and which eventually occur on the
surface level in language use.
We can therefore see how ideas about systematic organization from formalism
connected to Russian futurism and found their way into structuralist phonology.
The mathematical concept of “invariance” and the somewhat offbeat biological
concept of “limited variation” fitted in here too. The concept of invariance al-
lowed structuralists to express linguistic relations in mathematical terms. In Leo
Berg’s (1876–1950) evolutionary theory limits are set on variation, as variation
was thought to be strongly contained by morphological forms. This theory thus
differs from Charles Darwin’s (1809–1882) idea of random variation and selec-
tion through environmental pressures. Jakobson was attracted to Berg’s theory
because it corresponded to limits set on word formation through a system of
basic forms of language.
21Toman (1995: 10–11) mentions an early interest by Jakobson in the formal aspects of folkore,
Russian dialects and poetry. One of the first major papers hewrotewas an essay on Khlebnikov.
22In fact, the great breakthrough was to go one layer deeper and consider phonemes as bundles
of constitutive features. These features then are the real basic elements of language.
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The idea of distinguishing between a surface level and a deeper system was
most probably drawn directly from the work of Saussure.23 According to Joseph
(2010: 237), Saussure achieved the conceptual leap to consider phonemes not as
sound as such, but as units within a system: “Saussure’s impact on 20th century
linguistics would include the simplification brought about by the reorientation
away from sound as such, and toward systems and the units that compose them.
This would be the basis for the movement known as structuralism.” It is not en-
tirely clear where the conceptual leap of Saussure came from. Some have sug-
gested that he was inspired by an analogy with economics, others see an impact
of the periodic system of Mendeleev (1834–1907) on Saussure too.24 But in the
absence of concrete references the case is hard to make.
The distinction between surface structures and a deeper governing system Ja-
kobson most likely took over from Tynjanov’s systemic formalism, Khlebnikov’s
futurism and directly from Saussure. Moreover, Jakobson liked to draw analo-
gies between linguistic structures and biological or physical structures which in-
cluded those found in geology (earth layers) or meteorology (isolines) (see Holen-
stein 1975: 74, 188–194). For him all these links could only confirm the hypothesis
that structuralism was the appropriate designation for science “in its most vari-
ous manifestations”.25
Likewise, the concept of function could be applied in more than one scientific
discipline. Turning to Prague structuralism, Steiner (1976) has argued that the
three basic theoretical concepts – structure, function and sign – were comple-
mentary notions interwoven into a cohesive approach.This is because structures
have to be differentiated according to their dominant functions, and the semiotic
function has the capacity to turn every object it dominates into a sign. Elsewhere
Steiner explains how the formalist primary concept of function was redefined in
semiotic terms (Steiner 1984: 264–266). He argues that structuralists needed the
notion of function because they considered all of reality, from sensory percep-
tion to the most abstract mental construction, as a vast and complex realm of
signs. There was therefore a need for some criterion to differentiate individual
semiotic structures from each other. In structuralism the guiding thought is that
every element in language exists because it has a function to fulfil. A function is
23Toman (1995: 88–94) mentions that Jakobson ordered a number of French books in 1921 when
he was studying in Prague which included the Cours. Also his first investigations into phono-
logical systems were accompanied by references to Albert Sechehaye (1870–1946).
24The economic theory is discussed in Joseph (2014). For the chemistry case, see Culler (1976),
Clark (2008) and Silverstein (2016).
25A position that was fully vindicated through Cassirer’s wide-ranging philosophical discussion
of structuralism in Cassirer (1945).
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defined as an active relation between an object and the goal for which the object
is used.26 In this way we can distinguish between the communicative, practical
(or social) function of language and poetic, or artistic/aesthetic function. Func-
tion in this sense thus does not apply to the function of an element in a liter-
ary text, but rather to the dominant function of a particular semiotic structure.
On my estimation, this does not exclude functional interpretation in the former
sense. The semiotic understanding of functions just adds another dimension to
the application of the function concept of systemic formalism.
Structuralism, like formalism and Saussure before, aimed to establish an inde-
pendent science of language.The claim for independence prompted an alignment
with models and theories stemming from a great variety of directions, including
the natural sciences. I hope to have shown that systemic formalism provided a
number of key elements of structuralism. If these elements partially overlapped
with other sources of inspiration, this would only provide an extra assurance that
they were rightly elected as being part of the structuralist programme.
6 Conclusion
Steiner (1984) wittily presents the formalist movement as a polemos. Formalists
shared the common goal of changing the scholarly practice of literary studies and
establishing a new autonomous realm for the discipline, but disagreed about how
to achieve that goal. The formalists themselves were each other’s fiercest critics.
Boris Ejchenbaum (1886–1959) embraced this state of affairs in 1922, exclaiming:
“Enough of monism! We are pluralists. Life is diverse and cannot be reduced to
a single principle” (quoted in English in Steiner 1984: 259).
In general, three main types of formalism can be distinguished. Two of these,
mechanical and organic formalism, differed at crucial points from structuralism,
but with a third variant, systemic formalism, such a clear distinction cannot be
drawn. In structuralism we can therefore find a number of key aspects of sys-
temic formalism, such as the application of the notion of function, the impor-
tance of the systematic recurrence of forms in language, the idea of analysing
manifestations of language use with reference to a deeper system, and placing
the linguistic system within broader social and cultural systems; that is, think-
ing in terms of systems within systems. These points of continuity came about
in part through a direct collaboration between Tynjanov, the leading systemic
formalist, and Jakobson, the leading linguistic structuralist.
26Note that this teleology is anathema to a mechanistic worldview.
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Systemic formalism was constitutive of the new direction in which general
linguistics headed, as it helped to define object, aim and task of linguistic study.
In structuralism, formalist ideas merged with constituents stemming from other
directions, including phenomenology, biology, mathematics and Saussurian lin-
guistics. Mukarovsky tended to consider structuralism as an attitude instead of
a distinct linguistic theory. This attitude was synthetic rather than pluralistic.
Structuralists wanted to overcome oppositions between form and content, data
and interpretation, synchrony and diachrony, langue and parole, etc. It was there-
fore natural to combine ideas from all kinds of directions to achieve the sought-
after synthesis.27 We find this attitude most clearly in Roman Jakobson, who was
an extremely versatile scholar and who was instrumental in carrying structural-
ist ideas to theWestern world. I agree with Steiner (1984) that Russian formalism
is best considered a transitory phase in the history of literary studies and linguis-
tics. While the formalist programme as a whole came to an end, components of
it did not, and this was in no small part due to the rise of structuralism as a major
approach in linguistics.
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Chapter 6
The resistant embrace of formalism in
the work of Émile Benveniste and
Aurélien Sauvageot
John E. Joseph
University of Edinburgh
Rarely claimed by linguists as labels for their own work, “structuralist” and “struc-
turalism” have been more often hurled at others as criticisms. Yet those doing the
hurlingwere themselves often pursuing a similarly formalist analysis, andwere not
averse to claiming their share of the academic capital that structuralism brought to
linguistics. Work by Émile Benveniste (1902–1976) and Aurélien Sauvageot (1897–
1988) shows different modes of a “resistant embrace” to structuralist formalism,
with their resistance centred on a perceived abandonment of attention to phono-
logical and philological detail; and to the role of speakers, a concern that culmi-
nates with Benveniste’s concept of enunciation. Their reactions are examined here
within the framework of two different ways in which structuralism was conceived,
one based on holism, the other on universalism.
1 Introduction
Quentin Skinner (1969) expressed concern about the growing use in the history
of ideas of the notion of paradigm, which had emerged in the history of art (Gom-
brich 1960) and of science (Kuhn 1962). Skinner argued that it fosters a mythol-
ogy that how people thought at any given period was more unified than has ever
historically been the case. Insofar as we buy into this “mythology of doctrines”,
Skinner writes, quoting Voltaire, “History then indeed becomes a pack of tricks
we play on the dead” (Skinner 1969: 7, 13–14).1
1The quote is from Voltaire’s letter to Pierre-Robert Le Cornier de Cideville, 9 Feb. 1757:
“l’histoire […] n’est, après tout, qu’un ramas de tracasseries qu’on fait aux morts”.
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We are ninety years on from the first uses of the term “structuralism” by lin-
guists,2 first to manifest, then to identify a paradigm, to which some subscribed
wholeheartedly, while others resisted no less strongly, and others still, a majority
perhaps, were ambivalent. This is not always easy to determine, making it all the
more tempting to use the mythology of doctrines to unify the middle decades of
the twentieth century into a structuralist period.
Not only do linguists no longer apply “structuralist” to our work, we even
struggle to remember what exactly it represented, and why it had the power it
did.3 Actually, “structuralist” and “structuralism” were more often hurled at oth-
ers as criticisms than claimed as methodological labels. Yet those doing the hurl-
ing were themselves often pursuing a recognizably structuralist form of analysis,
and were not averse to taking their share of the academic capital that structural-
ism brought to linguistics. This paper examines some of the modes of resistance
to the formalist commitments of structural linguistics in mid-twentieth-century
France — before the onset of a “post-structuralist” period — and explores what
drove it.
2Joseph (2001) gives details on these early uses, and later ones, as well as on the “structuralism”
proclaimed in psychology starting in 1907.
3Having detected recently that younger colleagues in my department were using the term “gen-
erative” in a way that struck me as different from my own use of it, I went around to some
of them and asked, “Are you a generativist?” This included phoneticians and phonologists as
well as people who work in pragmatics and syntax, none of them committed Chomskyans
like the people with whom I worked at the University of Maryland in the 1980s. Each of my
present colleagues whom I queried hesitated for a few seconds, then answered “yes”. I then
asked what “generativist” means to them. None of them mentioned innateness, or universal
grammar, or rules and representations, or principles and parameters, or infinite creativity or
any other of the ideas which I associate with generativism. Rather, all said that they are gener-
ativists because they believe in the existence of a language system which speakers know, and
which is the basis of language production and comprehension. This, to me, does not a gener-
ativist make. It is structuralism, part of the considerable structuralist heritage that continued
into generativism. But to make it the criterion for being a generativist is like being asked to
define Episcopalianism, and answering that it means believing in God. I have argued for a long
time now (since Joseph 1999, and most fully in Joseph 2002) that “American structuralism” ac-
tually begins not with Bloomfield and Sapir but with Chomsky, or else perhaps the day in 1942
when Jakobson landed in New York. Yet one now meets linguists who think that the idea of
a mental language system originated with Chomsky. When it comes to meaning in language,
my colleagues often prove to be pre-Saussurean, conceiving of a language as an encoding of a
pre-existing external reality — what Saussure rejected as “nomenclaturism”. They are divided
over whether the sound side is essentially mental or acoustic. In these respects they are not
yet structuralists, let alone generativists. But they value the label.
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2 Benveniste and structuralism
Émile Benveniste (1902–1976) was the most important French linguist of the
“structuralist period”. When asked about structuralism in interviews, he did not
keep his distance, but answered the question as though he embraced the term
and what it stood for (Benveniste 1974 [1968](a), Benveniste 1974 [1968](b)). His
linguistic work became progressively less structural in some senses of that term,
starting from when he resumed it after his Swiss exile during the war. Starting
in the 1950s and culminating in 1969, he introduced his concept of “enunciation”,
which is the direct opposite to the structuralist approach in key respects. As
discussed in section §6 below, his stated aim was not to replace structuralism,
but to supplement it — to provide a parallel mode of enquiry in which the fo-
cus is not on the structure of the langue, nor on parole, but on speakers; on the
“semantic” rather than the “semiotic”, in his terms, which seems to make him
pre-Saussurean, as does his placing of writing at the centre of language.
He continued to publish prolifically on ancient Indo-European languages, as
he had done since the 1920s, and also undertook fieldwork on American Indian
languages in Alaska and the Yukon, though he published little of this research.
He also produced a small but steady number of papers offering radical revisions
to key concepts of linguistic analysis such as person, deixis and performatives,
the sort of thing that his teacher Antoine Meillet (1866–1936) had often done. A
number of these papers were republished in 1966 in a volume entitled Problems in
General Linguistics, of which a second volume appeared in 1974.The 1966 volume
(henceforth referred to as plg 1, and the 1974 follow-up as plg 2) appeared just
at the time when “structuralism” as a generalized mode of enquiry was getting
established as dominant across the fields that comprise what in France are called
the “human sciences”, and indeed beyond.
The focus of Benveniste (1969) on words, rather than sounds and forms (al-
though they come into the picture in a secondary role), gives it a precarious place
within linguistics tout court, let alone structural linguistics, which treated words
as a pre-scientific concept, necessary to refer to when communicating with the
general public and specialists in other academic fields, but kept at bay in their
formal analyses. This despite two of the core figures of structural linguistics, Ro-
man Jakobson (1896–1982) and André Martinet (1908–1999), giving the titleWord
to the journal which they co-founded in New York in 1945. The 1969 book is
his attempt at the sort of structuralism that had spread beyond linguistics. He
read the work of his contemporaries such as Georges Dumézil (1898–1986) and
Georges Canguilhem (1904–1995) with admiration mixed with an awareness that
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the philological knowledge they brought to bear in their enquiries was shallow
in comparison with his own. Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009) could not see any-
where near so deeply into the cultures he studied as Benveniste could into the
remote Indo-European past.
Yet Benveniste, in spite of all his work aimed directly or indirectly at subvert-
ing structuralism, never rejected it. In contemplating why, I have been inclined to
attribute it to practical concerns: his awareness that structuralism, in promoting
linguistics to master science, had brought considerable advantages to the French
linguistics establishment and to him as its leader. That may sound like a cyni-
cal motive, except that Benveniste was not a Jakobson or a Martinet, men with
flamboyant personalities who strove to attract followers and worried about their
place in the academic pecking order. Benveniste’s place at the top was assured
institutionally, from Meillet’s death until his own forty years later, even during
the last seven years when he was paralysed by a stroke and could not speak or
write. The advantages which the wide attention to structuralism brought were
ones that he personally did not need, but they offered benefits to his students
and the other French linguists of whom he was the acknowledged leader.
There was still more to his ongoing semi-commitment to structuralism than
the pragmatic benefits for others. Even his late work contains signs that he was
drawn to what structuralism promised, in an almost religious way — like an ag-
nostic who never misses church, drawn to the vision and promise he aches to
believe in.4
It is striking how in a 1968 address (Benveniste 1974 [1970][b]: 95), and again
in a lecture the following January (Benveniste 2012: 79), Benveniste insists that
“the language contains the society”.5 Meillet (1905–1906) had been the first to
state in print, more than sixty years earlier, that “a language is a social fact”. But
Benveniste is asserting much more than that. To understand why, we can look
for example at the brief chapter headed thémis in his Vocabulaire des institutions
indo-européennes:
The general structure of society, defined in its broad divisions by a certain
number of concepts, rests on an assemblage of norms which add up to
4No links to traditional religious thinking are apparent in Benveniste’s work, but see Dosse (1997
[1991]: 245–247) on Christian interpretations of the semiology of Jacques Lacan (1901–1981), to
whom Benveniste was sufficiently close to have contributed an article to the first issue of his
journal La Psychanalyse (Benveniste 1966 [1956][b]), and on displaced Christianity in the work
of Louis Althusser (1918–1990), Lacan’s ally in the École Normale Supérieure (pp. 294–295).
5“[…] la langue contient la société.” He adds that “la langue inclut la société, mais elle n’est pas
incluse par elle” (the language includes the society, but is not included by it) (Benveniste 1974
[1970][b]: 96). Translations are mine unless otherwise indicated.
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“law”. All societies, even the most primitive […] are governed by principles
of law relating both to persons and to goods. The rules and these norms
are traceable in the vocabulary.
[…]We can in the first place posit for common Indo-European an extremely
important concept, that of “order”. It is represented by Vedic r̥ta, Iranian
arta (Armenian aša, by a special phonetic development). We have here one
of the cardinal notions of the legal world of the Indo-European to say noth-
ing of their religious and moral ideas: this is the concept of “Order” which
governs also the orderliness of the universe, the movement of the stars,
the regularity of the seasons and the years; and further the relations of
gods and men, and finally the relations of men to one another. Nothing
which concerns man or the world falls outside the realm of “Order”. It is
thus the foundation, both religious and moral, of every society. Without
this principle everything would revert to chaos. (Benveniste 2016 [1973]:
379–380)6
Benveniste is attuned to the differences among Indo-European societies.Words
that are not shared across the languages are interpreted as representing later his-
torical developments. Through close study of texts in which the words occur,
Benveniste works to establish their precise meanings, and in so doing to recon-
struct the societies themselves. In the case of words shared across all or the great
bulk of the family, he is reconstructing the earliest recoverable Indo-European
social stratum. The language contains the society.
His remarks about the nature of law are grounded in the findings of this lin-
guistic method, but also apply to the method itself, particularly to the guiding
principle of Benveniste’s training, which he embraces even as he resists it. Struc-
turalism is the search for the system that is “an assemblage of norms which add
6“La structure générale de la société, définie dans ses grandes divisions par un certain nombre
de concepts, repose sur un ensemble de normes qui constituent un droit. Toutes les sociétés,
mêmes les plus primitives, […] sont régies par des principes de droit quant aux personnes et aux
biens. Ces règles et ces normes se marquent dans le vocabulaire. […] On peut poser, dès l’état
indo-européen, un concept extrêmement important : celui de l’‘ordre’. Il est représenté par le
védique r̥ta, iranien arta (avestique aša, par une évolution phonétique particulière). C’est là une
des notions cardinales de l’univers juridique et aussi religieux et moral des Indo-Européens :
c’est l’‘Ordre’ qui règle aussi bien l’ordonnance de l’univers, le mouvement des astres, la péri-
odicité des saisons et des années que les rapports des hommes et des dieux, enfin des hommes
entre eux. Rien de ce qui touche à l’homme, au monde, n’échappe à l’empire de l’‘Ordre’. C’est
donc le fondement tant religieux que moral de toute société; sans ce principe, tout retournerait
au chaos” (Benveniste 1969: vol. 2, 99–100).
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up to ‘law’ ”. No wonder its draw was so strong: it “is the concept of ‘Order’
which governs also the orderliness of the universe, the movement of the stars,
[…] the relations of men to one another”. It is as true of structure in language as
of order in law and society that “Without this principle everything would revert
to chaos”.
Who knows whether Benveniste saw, let alone intended, the reflexivity of his
comments? But a few paragraphs on, after going through various Indo-Iranian,
Greek and Latin reflexes of this root ar–, including Latin ars “art” and ritus “rite”,
Latin artus “joint” and Greek árthon “joint, limb”, he remarks: “Everywhere the
same notion is still perceptible: order, arrangement, the close mutual adaptation
of the parts of a whole to one another […]” (Benveniste 1969: 101).7 If you seek a
definition of the structuralist view of the language system, look no further.8
So why did Benveniste not seek unambivalently to be the Galileo of language,
reducing the vast chaos of diversity to Order? The clue is in the word ‘reducing’.
Reduction is the genius of structuralism. Its ancient and deep-seated appeal in
our languages and cultures is evident in Benveniste’s analysis of thémis. The one
small minority to which it might not appeal are those who actually love the
vast diversity of languages, who enjoy nothing more than reading ancient texts
in barely-known languages and working through their minute details. In other
words, linguists, particularly the sort who entered the field in the nineteenth
and the first two-thirds of the twentieth centuries, and who still exist, in reduced
numbers.
I am suggesting that the founding tension in structuralism was that it was
driven by a reductionist search for order, carried out by people who varied con-
siderably in how fast and how far they thought such reduction could legitimately
be taken. Indeed, some of them believed that legitimate knowledge required an
7“Partout, la même notion est encore sensible : l’ordonnance, l’ordre, l’adaptation étroite entre
les parties d’un tout […]”. ar– is also the root of French ordre and English order.
8The desire to find order in language, with the promise it held out of keeping everything from
reverting to chaos, was by no means exclusive to linguists. It was extremely widespread, lying
behind movements for language standardization, and for what linguists disparage as prescrip-
tivism. In my view, the descriptivist-prescriptivist dichotomy is ultimately rhetorical, a veneer
which masks a shared desire for order — law and order, given how fond linguists have always
been of discovering laws comparable to those by which the movement of the stars is explained.
One might expect linguists to regard prescriptivism as a phenomenon of language understand-
ing and use, as worthy of study and analysis as their supposedly prescription-free data, but
such an outlook is rare. We claim the unique right to define what order is and how it is to be
sought, and see it as our duty to stamp out other conceptions of order in language, exposing
their ignorance and error and treating them as an even greater threat to order because they
decline to acknowledge our unique authority.
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accumulation of ever greater data and detail, in direct contrast to the genius of
structuralism, and they would form the hard resistance. But my interest here is
in the soft resistance of those who embraced the programme even while holding
it at bay. Who smoked, but didn’t inhale.
3 The issue of discontinuity
I shall start from the end of the structuralist period, and the critique of struc-
turalist linguistics mounted from the 1970s onward by Henri Meschonnic (1932–
2000), who belonged to the generation of Benveniste’s students.9 This is well
into the period which, outside France, was being labelled as “post-structuralist”,
characterized by resistance to key aspects of structuralist work being mounted
by academics from fields other than linguistics. Such was the din from without
that Meschonnic’s resistance from within did not have the full impact one might
have expected. Like the integrationist critique of linguistics mounted by RoyHar-
ris (1931–2015) at Oxford, it produced a clique of devoted followers, along with
rejection and enmity from the linguistics mainstream — which however had by
now cut itself off from any commitments to a structuralism henceforth associ-
ated with the past. This masked its enduring heritage, and made it inevitable
that by the late 2010s linguists would no longer distinguish structuralism from
generativism.
For Meschonnic, the tragedy of structuralism lay in what he called its “tri-
umphalism of scientizing the discontinuous” (triomphalisme d’un scientisme du
discontinu) (Meschonnic 2009: 20). It is true that, if you ask a linguist what lin-
guistics is, the answer you are likely to get is, first, something about the scientific
study of language, and then a litany of the sub-specializations, phonology, syn-
tax, semantics, historical linguistics, sociolinguistics etc. and what they are con-
cerned with.10 The existence of those sub-fields, with their division of the labour
of analysing sound, order, meaning and the rest each allotted to specialists, is
taken to signify the field’s progress to a mature state. Specialists tend to avoid
treading on each other’s turf; yet no one would deny that the ultimate goal is an
understanding of language as a whole. The institutionalizing of discontinuity is
seen as a means to that end, yet, as Meschonnic shows, it has tended to become
an end in itself.
9His magnum opus, Meschonnic (1982), sits within a massive output that branches across the
disciplinary boundaries which he rejected.
10For an example, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7HOsQDD1Res.
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Taking inspiration from Benveniste’s (1974 [1970](a)) conception of utterance,
the perspective which starts from the speaker or writer rather than from the
linguistic system, Meschonnic devoted his mature career to exposing the struc-
turalist fetishization of the discontinuous and shifting the focus to the continu
(“continuous”) in language. It is not always clear who did and did not count as
a structuralist for him, though Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) definitely did
not. In fact, when Meschonnic reads out his charge sheet against structuralism,
each of the nine crimes is described in its opposition to Saussure. Here are the
first three:
1. when Saussure says “system”, a dynamic notion, structuralism says “struc-
ture”, a formal and ahistorical notion;
2. when Saussure proposes that with language all we have are points of view
— a crucial notion: representations — structuralism with the sign presents
itself as describing the nature of language;
3. and Saussure constructs the notion of point of view according to an en-
tirely deductive (rational-logical) internal systematicity, but structuralism
created descriptive (empirical) sciences of language […].
(Meschonnic 2009: 20)11
Again, he is right about the discontinuous — though it is complicated. Starting
in the 1920s, those who got called structuralists, or more rarely, called themselves
that, were torn between two urges. One was to reject the methods of an earlier
generation who wanted to decompose phenomena into elements. That can be
construed as a desire for continuousness. The other was to seek out what con-
nects phenomena to each other, and doing that demanded the decomposition
into discontinuous elements that their first urge was to reject.
Early structuralists invoked Gestalt psychology as continuous with what they
were trying to achieve. By 1945, the first volume of Word contains two articles
laying out visions of structuralism that superficially overlap, but in fact embody
these complexly opposed urges. For the older writer, Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945),
11“1. quand Saussure dit système, notion dynamique, le structuralisme dit structure, notion
formelle et ahistorique ; 2. quand Saussure pose que sur le langage on n’a que des points de
vue, notion capitale : des représentations, le structuralisme avec le signe se présente comme
décrivant la nature du langage ; 3. et Saussure construit la notion de point de vue selon une
systématicité interne toute déductive, mais le structuralisme a fait des sciences du langage de-
scriptives […]”. Saussure’s theory of language was famously laid out in the posthumous Cours
de linguistique générale (Saussure 1922 [1916]).
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systems such as language need to be approached holistically. Language for Cas-
sirer (1945: 110) is organic, “in the sense that it does not consist of detached, iso-
lated, segregated facts. It forms a coherent whole in which all parts are interde-
pendent upon each other”.
The younger Lévi-Strauss seems at first to be singing from the same hymn
sheet when he rejects the analysis of kinship by W. H. R. Rivers (1864–1922)
on the grounds that it is concerned merely with an atomistic charting of the de-
tails of relationships in some particular society: “Each terminological detail, each
special marriage rule, is attached to a different custom, like a consequence or a
vestige: we descend into an orgy of discontinuity” (Lévi-Strauss 1945: 37).12
But a careful reading shows Lévi-Strauss singing in a different key from Cas-
sirer. His concern is not with organicity, but with the failure to take a univer-
salist point of view, one that looks past superficial differences to find how kin-
ship systems are fundamentally the same from culture to culture. They must be
so, Lévi-Strauss assumes, because the human relationships they encode are the
same. Taking maternal uncles as an example, he writes:
We see that the avunculate, to be understood, must be treated as a rela-
tionship interior to a system, and that it is the system itself which must be
considered in its totality, in order to perceive its structure. (Lévi-Strauss
1945: 47)13
If this sounds like Cassirer’s holism, the resemblance is deceptive because of
what Lévi-Strauss understands by “system”. It is not like Saussure’s language
system, which is specific to each particular language. Lévi-Strauss is not talking
about the Yoruba kinship system, as distinct from the Inuit one. He means the
human kinship system, regarded as a product of evolutionary forces.
There is a double continuity-discontinuity tension at work in this defining
structuralist moment: on the one hand, holism versus atomism, Cassirer’s ten-
sion; on the other hand, the universal versus the language-culture-particular,
Lévi-Strauss’s tension.Meschonnic’s discontentwith the discontinuous falls with-
in the first type. When he takes up arms against the structuralist dissociation of
language from the body, he cites language-culture-particular examples (notably
12“Chaque détail de terminologie, chaque règle spéciale du mariage, est rattachée à une coutume
différente, comme une conséquence ou comme un vestige : on tombe dans une débauche de
discontinuité.”
13“Nous voyons donc que l’avunculat, pour être compris, doit être traité comme une relation
intérieure à un système, et que c’est le système lui-même qui doit être considéré dans son
ensemble, pour en apercevoir la structure.”
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from the Hebrew of the Old Testament, but also from modern languages) as evi-
dence for a universal language-body continuity. Any language-culture-particular
versus universal tension is left aside, or at least pushed into the background.14
Lévi-Strauss sees the development of phonology, as opposed to the merely
physical, empirical study of phonetics, as “playing for the social sciences the
same renewing role as nuclear physics, for example, has played for the exact
sciences” (Lévi-Strauss 1945: 35).15 He locates the renewal in four fundamental
points of method identified in 1933 by Nicolai S. Trubetzkoy (1890–1938):
[F]irst, phonology passes from the study of conscious linguistic phenomena
to the study of their unconscious linguistic infrastructure; it refuses to treat
terms as independent entities, instead taking as the basis of its analysis
the relations between terms; it introduces the notion of system […]; and
finally it aims at discovering general laws either by induction or by logical
deduction, […] which gives them an absolute character. (Lévi-Strauss 1945:
35)16
The second and third points, concerning relations and system, are ones Cas-
sirer would have endorsed. But the unconscious is not a concept Cassirer deals
with. Although he recognises that consciousness “grows” in the child, the dyad
suggested by Lévi-Strauss would have been too simplistic for his liking.
When Cassirer talks about atomism and holism, it is on the level of a particu-
lar system. Lévi-Strauss talks about atomism and totality of the general system,
for example the avunculate, considered universally. The two approaches are not
always at cross purposes, only sometimes, but enough to generate an enduring
tension within structuralism. A defining moment came in 1955, when the suc-
cès fou of Lévi-Strauss’s Tristes Tropiques defined structuralism for the public at
large and for the next generation of scholars. Cassirer’s worries about internal
discontinuity were shunted aside, not to vanish but to fester.
For Meschonnic and his contemporaries who took up academic posts with the
expansion of the Parisian university system after May 1968, structuralism stood
14The tensions we repress can come back to haunt us, and this, I argue in Joseph (2018b), is
potentially the case with Meschonnic’s approach to the Hebrew-language body.
15“[…] vis-à-vis des sciences sociales, le même rôle rénovateur que la physique nucléaire, par
exemple, a joué pour l’ensemble des sciences exactes.”
16“[E]n premier lieu, la phonologie passe de l’étude des phénomènes linguistiques conscients à
celle de leur infrastructure inconsciente ; elle refuse de traiter les termes comme des entités
indépendantes, prenant au contraire comme base de son analyse les relations entres les termes
; elle introduit la notion de système […] ; enfin elle vise à la découverte de lois générales soit
trouvées par induction, soit déduites logiquement, […] ce qui leur donne un caractère absolu.”
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for discontinuity. In linguistics, that meant treating phonology, prosody, mor-
phology, syntax, semantics, semiology and so on as separate levels of language
and distinct areas of specialization; and divorcing linguistics from poetics or ap-
plied areas such as translation, and ultimately even semiology, though linguistics
continued to focus on the sign and combinations of signs as the essence of lan-
guage.This never sat well withMeschonnic, but since hewas teaching linguistics,
he could only go so far in opposing it in these early years of his career, though
later he would attack it relentlessly.
The greatest damage wrought by this discontinuity, as Meschonnic saw it, was
that it resulted in the unifying core of language — rhythm — being relegated to a
minor corner, when it should be at the very centre of an investigative enterprise
where everything connects to everything else. Meschonnic’s rejection of struc-
turalist linguistics can be read as an assertion that structuralism itself was not
structuralist enough.
4 Benveniste’s early work: in what sense is it
structuralist?
Can Benveniste’s earlier work really be called structuralist? It is, after all, di-
achronic rather than synchronic in orientation, where structuralism is usually
characterized as having replaced diachronic with synchronic enquiry. But that
characterization is flawed — it is based on a misunderstanding of “diachronic” as
a synonym of “historical”, when Saussure’s intention in calling for a diachronic
linguistics was for it to replace the historical tracing of sound and forms through
time with, instead, the comparison of états de langue at different points in time,
each analysed synchronically. Saussure’s 1879 Mémoire on the primitive vowel
system of the Indo-European languages is really a synchronic study, a reconstruc-
tion of the system at some indeterminate point in the past. Benveniste’s doctoral
thesis and first published book (1935) follows the model of Saussure’sMémoire to
the extent possible, given that it is a morphological rather than a phonological
system that he is reconstructing.
The first three-quarters of Benveniste’s book consists of focussed surveys of
forms and alternations that appear to have been written as separate studies. Not
until Chapter 9 does Benveniste explain how they fit together.
All the lines of facts we have traced have led us progressively and by ul-
timately converging paths to recognize in neuters and adjectives a coher-
ent structure and rule-governed alternations. In turn, these nominal forms
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posited in their most ancient state reveal principles which, once defined,
confronted and grouped, constitute a theory of the Indo-European root.
(Benveniste 1935: 147)17
Before explaining what that theory is, however, Benveniste sets out his struc-
turalist stall, with a sweeping attack on everything written on the subject hereto-
fore:
What has been taught up to now about the nature and modalities of the
root is, in truth, a heteroclite assemblage of empirical notions, provisional
recipes, archaic and recent forms, all with an irregularity and complexity
which defy ordering. (Benveniste 1935: 147)18
He illustrates this with a catalogue of reconstructed roots varying from one
to five phonemes in length, monosyllabic or disyllabic, with either a vowel or a
diphthong as their nucleus,
with an initial vowel (*ar–) or a final vowel (*po–); in long degree (*sēd–) or
zero degree (*dhək–); with a long diphthong (*srēig–) or a short diphthong
(*bheudh–), with a suffix or a lengthening, etc. It would be difficult to justify
or even to enumerate completely all the types of roots that are attributed
to Indo-European. (Benveniste 1935: 147)19
This is akin to what Lévi-Strauss a decade later will disparage as “an orgy of
discontinuity” in Rivers’ ethnography, which he wants to replace with a struc-
tural analysis (see section §3). One might expect Benveniste to argue that no
language could be this complicated, but he does not. His critique extends only to
the analysis:
17“Toutes les lignes de faits que nous avons suivies nous ont acheminé [sic] progressivement et
par des voies finalement convergentes à reconnaître aux neutres et aux adjectifs une structure
cohérente et des alternances réglées. A leur tour, ces formes nominales posées en leur état le
plus ancien révèlent des principes qui, une fois définis, confrontés et groupés, constituent une
théorie de la racine indo-européenne.”
18“Ce qu’on a enseigné jusqu’ici de la nature et des modalités de la racine est, au vrai, un as-
semblage hétéroclite de notions empiriques, de recettes provisoires, de formes archaïques et
récentes, le tout d’une irrégularité et d’une complication qui défient l’ordonnance.”
19“[…] à voyelle initiale (*ar–) ou à voyelle finale (*po–) ; à degré long (*sēd–) ou à degré zéro
(*dhək–) ; à diphthongue longue (*srēig–) ou brève (*bheudh–), à suffixe ou à élargissement, etc.
On serait en peine de justifier et même d’énumerer complètement tous les types de racines qui
sont attribués à l’indo-européen.” It is interesting that *ar–, the root of order and its congeners
in other Indo-European languages as discussed in section §2 above, should figure among the
examples here.
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There is here an abuse of words that betrays an indecisive doctrine. The
way to arrive at Indo-European is not by piling up the various Indo-Eu-
ropean forms with a verbal theme, nor by projecting into prehistory the
particularities of an attested language state. It is necessary to try, through
broad comparisons, to find the initial system in its simplest form, then to
see what principles modify its economy. It is this mechanism that we are
attempting to define here. (Benveniste 1935: 147–148)20
Anumber ofwords are striking: Saussure’s système, and alsomécanisme, which
occurs repeatedly in the Cours; but also économie, in a sense more reminiscent of
Martinet, Benveniste’s younger contemporary and, in Martinet’s mind at least,
his rival. As Benveniste pursues this theme, the word structure, absent from the
Cours, comes to dominate:
The essential thing being the problem of structure, we shall neglect on
principle questions of “value”, “aspect” etc. If the definition of the root we
arrive at is judged to be valid, these notions of value and aspect will have
the morphological basis which they now lack. It will then be the right time
to re-examine them. (Benveniste 1935: 147–148)21
“Value” does not refer here to Saussurean valeur, but to amore particular use of
the term byMeillet whenwriting in his proto-sociolinguistic vein, where he talks
about the “abstract” and “concrete” value of words, linking the abstract to the
aristocratic, and to the oldest, most enduring strain of the Indo-European lexicon,
whereas the concrete belongs to the peasantry, is imbued with “affective” value
and is historically unstable. As for “aspect”, it figures in Meillet’s work mainly
in its familiar form, referring for instance to perfective versus imperfective in
verbs, but more extensively. For example, “verbs bearing preverbs offer a nuance
of ‘aspect’ different from that of the simple verb: they indicate a process, the
20“Il y a ici un abus de mots qui trahit une doctrine indécise. On n’obtient pas de l’indo-européen
en additionnant les diverses formes indo-européennes d’un thème verbal ni en projetant dans
la préhistoire les particularités d’un état de langue historique. Il faut essayer, par de larges
comparaisons, de retrouver le système initial sous sa forme la plus simple, puis de voir quels
principes en modifient l’économie. C’est ce mécanisme que nous cherchons à définir ici.”
21“L’essentiel étant le problème de la structure, nous négligerons en principe les questions de
‘valeur’, d’‘aspect’, etc. Si la définition de la racine à laquelle nous aboutirons est jugée valable,
ces notions de valeur et d’aspect auront le fondementmorphologique qui leur fait encore défaut.
Il sera temps alors d’en reprendre l’étude.”
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end of which is envisaged” (Meillet 1931: 263–264).22 Although Benveniste has
dismissed, or rather postponed, investigation of aspect in the same breath with
that of value, aspect in the more usual, limited sense is actually central to his
theory of the Indo-European root. What he is doing here is distancing himself
from Meillet’s extension of the concept, where Meillet tends to link it with the
“mentality” of speakers — this despite the fact that Meillet repeatedly places his
analyses in opposition to that of “Mr Vossler and his school” on the grounds that
they have recourse to mentality. Meillet’s accounts are not as different from Karl
Vossler’s (1872–1949) as his rhetoric would make it appear. Regarding tense and
aspect in the development from early Latin to Classical Latin, Meillet writes of
how
with the development of a civilization of intellectual character, in which
the thinking of the upper echelon takes an exact philosophical turn, and in
which children and youths are educated in schools, the notion of “tense”
takes precedence over the notion of “aspect”. (Meillet 1931: 270–271)23
Again, a matter of sociolinguistics: the thinking of the upper echelon, edu-
cation in schools being invoked to explain the rise of rational, which is to say
abstract, tense – not entirely replacing concrete aspect, but taking precedence
over it, quite as the upper echelon, the aristocracy, take precedence over the
peasantry.
The development of structural linguistics is then a story of difference, of dif-
ferentiating oneself from someone else who is perceived as too psychological,
insufficiently concerned with establishing the facts of language structure before
offering explanations of them, rendering dubious the sustainability of those ex-
planations. Meillet sees Vossler’s “idealism” as too, well, idealist, whereas his
own approach is better grounded in “concrete” facts. In historical terms Meil-
let believes that the move from the concrete to the abstract represents progress;
and so too in methodological terms, in that his own method proceeds in this
22“[…] les verbes munis de préverbes offrent une nuance d’‘aspect’ différente de celle du verbe
simple : ils indiquent un procès dont le terme est envisagé.” He gives the contrasting examples
of Nec tacui demens “I was mad enough not to keep silent” (Aeneid II, 94) and Conticuere
omnes “All fell silent” (Aeneid II, 1), where, since the highlighted verbs have the same root and
are both in the perfect tense, the preverb con– is analysed as conveying the perfective aspect.
23“[…] avec le développement d’une civilisation de caractère intellectuel, où la pensée des
hommes dirigeants prend un tour philosophique exact, où les enfants et les jeunes gens se
forment dans les écoles, la notion de ‘temps’ prenne le pas sur la notion d’‘aspect’ ”. In his
review of Vossler (1932), Firth (1933: 234) contrasts Vossler’s conception of “inner language
form” with Saussure’s “‘bloodless system of signs’ (langue)”.
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way, deducing higher-level explanations from detailed examination of phenom-
ena. Whereas abstraction that is not so deduced, but simply asserted, risks being
fantasy, and so is not progress at all; not a nobility destined to rule over the
concrete-minded, but a tyranny that the true nobles must resist.
Meillet is polite when rejecting Vossler, keeping his remarks to a minimum.
When it comes Benveniste’s turn to make a similar move vis-à-vis Meillet, he is
more than polite towards his cher maître, not even naming him, just two features
of his analysis of Latin, value and aspect in its extended sense, which he says he
wants not to eliminate, but to postpone, until the structure of Indo-European
is better established. This is not even a criticism of Meillet’s analysis of Latin,
a language the structure of which is well established — at least, not an overt
criticism. But perhaps he is undertaking some distancing fromwhat is said in the
Preface to Meillet (1931), which, after underscoring the role of value and aspect
as key features of the analysis, ends with a paragraph thanking Benveniste for
helping to revise the text and compiling its index.
One of the curious aspects of Benveniste (1935) is the sizeable gap between
the title, “origins of the formation of nouns”, and the contents, which are not
restricted to nouns, but culminate in a “unitary and constant definition of the
Indo-European root and its aspects” (une définition unitaire et constante de la
racine indo-européenne et de ses aspects) (Benveniste 1935: 170). This definition
says that the “Indo-European root is monosyllabic, triliterate, composed of the
fundamental vowel ĕ between two different consonants”, then gives four further
specifications about how it may be constituted (Benveniste 1935: 170–171).24 Ben-
veniste’s theory of the Indo-European root was received by Indo-Europeanists
somewhat as Saussure’s Mémoire had been received: with astonishment at its
daring brilliance and respect for its command of linguistic data, mixed with a
wait-and-see dubiety that is appropriate with any stunningly simple model, to
which scholars are bound to respond with examples that do not appear to fit it.
In the longer term, Benveniste’s approach to Indo-European reconstruction
has not held up,25 and has even been rejected as “brutally reductionist” (Dunkel
1981: 560).That does at least furnish himwith strong credentials as a structuralist
— but one determined to supplement the formalist approach with serious consid-
eration of what speakers do with language, redeeming his 1935 promissory note
to re-examine notions of value and aspect if his morphological analysis proves
valid. This is what he began to do after the war.
24“La racine indo-européenne est monosyllabique, trilitère, composée de la voyelle fondamentale
ĕ entre deux consonnes différentes.”
25I am grateful to the eminent Indo-Europeanist and Benveniste scholar Georges-Jean Pinault
for confirming to me that this is the case.
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5 The spirit of philology in Sauvageot
Another French linguist of the “structuralist period”, Aurélien Sauvageot (1897–
1988) was born in Constantinople, to a Belgian mother and a French father work-
ing as an architect for the Sultan. As a student at the British School of Pera the
boy, a natural polyglot, learned English and German, and also picked up Greek
and Turkish (see Jean-Robert Armogathe’s Preface to Sauvageot 2013: 9). In 1911
his family returned to Paris, where, preparing for the competitive examination
for entry into the École Normale Supérieure, he came toMeillet’s attention.Many
years later Sauvageot would recall his first summons to a private meeting at Meil-
let’s home, in September 1914. The seventeen-year-old made a confession:
“Look, Professor, I should tell you straightaway that I have no visual mem-
ory”.
“What?”
“No, with me everything happens only with phonic memory, or acoustic if
you prefer. I have only auditory images. So I’m really bad at linking what
I hear with what’s written, and I can only work on a language insofar as I
know how it’s pronounced”.
“Oh, how extraordinary,” he said to me, “because I, you see, never hear any
auditory image”.
And I said to him: “But, then, how do you think?”.
And he said to me: “Well, by sequences of written signs”.
With that a lot of things made sense to me. It was one of the first discoveries
I made about Meillet. (Sauvageot 1992: 193)26
Both are rather extreme cases. Sauvageot’s mind worked as one might expect
a blind lad’s to, Meillet’s a deaf man’s. There are deep differences in how people
think, differences we tend to erase, or sort into normal and pathological cases. I
shall come back round to Sauvageot’s acute acoustic sensitivity and memory.
26“Je lui dis : ‘Ecoutez, Monsieur le Professeur, je vous dis tout de suite que je n’ai pas de mémoire
visuelle.’ ‘Comment?’ ‘Non, chez moi tout se passe uniquement avec la mémoire phonique ou
si vous voulez acoustique. Je n’ai que des images auditives. Alors, je suis très malheureux pour
lier ce que j’entends à ce qui s’écrit et que je ne peux travailler sur une langue que dans la
mesure où je sais comment elle se prononce.’ ‘Oh, c’est extraordinaire, me dit-il, parce que moi,
alors, voyez-vous, je n’entends jamais une image auditive.’ Et je lui dis : ‘Mais, alors, comment
pensez-vous?’ Et il me dit : ‘Eh bien, par séquences de signes écrits.’ Alors là, j’ai compris bien
des choses. Cela a été une des premières découvertes que j’ai faites de Meillet.”
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In April 1917 Sauvageot received another summons, this time toMeillet’s office.
The only French linguist covering Finno-Ugric, Robert Gauthiot (1876–1916), had
been killed in the war, and it was decided that Sauvageot would have to replace
him, even though he knew no Finno-Ugric language at the time. He askedwhy he
had been chosen, andMeillet replied, “Why, that’s simple, because youwere born
in Constantinople, you spoke Turkish and you still know a fair bit of Turkish,
that’s why, and because Turkish is a language whose mechanism is very similar
to that of the Finno-Ugric languages” (Sauvageot 1992: 194).27
Meillet sensed the young Sauvageot’s lack of enthusiasm at the prospect, but
assured him that it would come. And come it did, verymuch so, fromhis arrival in
Finland in the summer of 1919 (the date is from Perrot 2007: 296), where he began
studying FinnishwithMeillet’s friend Emil Nestor Setälä (1864–1935). For the rest
of Sauvageot’s long life, Setälä would remain one of his principal touchstones
not just for Finnish but for the understanding of language generally, rivalled
only by Setälä’s Hungarian friend Zoltán Gombocz (1877–1935), along with, of
course, Meillet, and the linguist Meillet revered above all others, his own teacher
Saussure.These four were not a foursome, but a pair of twosomes; and we can see
throughout Sauvageot’s career a tension between what “structural” linguistics
came to represent, versus the sometimes diametrically opposed concerns of the
Finnish and Hungarian philologists.
Jump ahead now thirty years. Meillet had died in 1936. Benveniste, who suc-
ceeded him in his chair in the Collège de France, that last surviving royal in-
stitution, was king of the nation’s linguists. The dauphin, Martinet, had exiled
himself to New York after being hounded from the Sorbonne under suspicion
of having been a collaborator (see Joseph 2016). Beneath Benveniste were the
barons, including Sauvageot. He had occupied the first chair of Finno-Ugric lan-
guages in France, in the École Nationale des Langues Orientales Vivantes, Paris,
since it was established in 1931, with an interruption from 1941–43 at the insis-
tence of the Vichy government (Perrot 2007: 296), probably because for years
he had been a prominent and outspoken member of the Communist Party (see
Chevalier 2006: 158).
Sauvageot was also active in the Institut de Linguistique, which held monthly
lectures by the linguistic aristocracy, many of them aimed at surveying the struc-
tures of non-Indo-European languages. In 1946 Sauvageot published his Esquisse
de la langue finnoise (Sketch of the Finnish language) in a series called “L’Homme
27“‘Mais c’est simple, parce que vous êtes né à Constantinople, que vous avez parlé le turc et que
vous savez encore pas mal de turc, voilà, et que le turc est une langue dont le mécanisme est
très semblable à celui des langues finno-ougriennes’.”
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et Son Langage” (Man and his language) put out by La Nouvelle Édition in Paris.
Three years later, the same book was published by Klincksieck, as the first vol-
ume in a new series that Sauvageot started called “Les langues et leurs structures”
(Languages and their structures).28 The 1949 Avertissement (Preface) announces
three other volumes as forthcoming in the series, on Modern Greek, Tamil and
Berber, and explains that the aim is to create “a series of descriptive studies bear-
ing on idioms as diverse as possible, each envisaged in isolation, taken in itself”
(Sauvageot 1946: 7).29 Each book will “extricate through an appropriate analysis
the characteristics inherent to a given language, grasped at a given moment of
its evolution, and reveal the mechanism of the system of functions of which it is
constituted” (Sauvageot 1946: 7).30
That sounds quite structural — but “mechanism” is a loose concept. Used as
a metaphor in linguistic work since the nineteenth century (see Joseph 2018a),
it seems to have meant something rather specific to Sauvageot, and perhaps id-
iosyncratic to him. Sauvageot’s life’s work had been determined because, as Meil-
let said, “Turkish is a language whose mechanism is very similar to that of the
Finno-Ugric languages”. The Preface continues:
Up to now it has often been affirmed that a language is an ensemble in
which all the parts fit together and the categories that supposedly form
the foundation of the structure of a language have beenmuch evoked. Only
there has been a negligence in adding to the debate the concrete testimony
that must be brought in by the descriptive study of a given state of lan-
guage. (Sauvageot 1946: 7)31
What has been affirmed “up to now” is the Saussurean conception of the lan-
guage system.The toutes les parties se tiennent is a slight rewording of the famous
28Not only were the title and text unchanged, but they bear the copyright and printing date
1946, so apparently the unsold copies were simply given a new cover with the fresher date
of 1949. Curiously, the cover and copyright page both give the year 1949, and yet the legally
required final page gives the date of printing 24 August 1946, and the legal deposition as the
third trimester of 1946 (“Achevé d’imprimer […] le 24 août 1946. Dépôt légal: 3e trimestre 1946”).
The book must therefore have been completed by mid-1946.
29“[…] une série d’études descriptives portant sur des idiomes aussi divers que possible, envisagés
chacun isolément, pris en soi.”
30“Il s’agit de dégager par une analyse appropriée les caractères inhérents à une langue donnée,
saisie à un moment donné de son évolution et d’exposer le mécanisme du système de fonctions
dont elle est constitutée.”
31“Jusqu’à présent il a été souvent affirmé qu’une langue est un ensemble où toutes les parties
se tiennent et l’on a beaucoup évoqué les catégories qui formeraient le fondement de la struc-
ture d’une langue. Seulement on a négligé de verser au débat le témoignage concret que doit
apporter l’étude descriptive d’un état de langue donné.”
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motto tout se tient (everything supports everything else), attributed to Saussure
though first used in print by Meillet (1903: 407). It is probably fair to say that
structural linguistics does indeed make “categories” the foundation of the struc-
ture of a language, if categories are put into a binary contrast with “concrete tes-
timony”, and if that testimony means actual sounds and utterances: phonetics as
opposed to phonology, and parole as opposed to langue. By taking up Saussure’s
état de langue, state of language, as the place where this concrete testimony is
to be found, Sauvageot hints that it is not against Saussure that he is position-
ing himself, but against later structuralists who claim to be following Saussure’s
programme but are perhaps instead betraying it.
Sauvageot specifies that by “descriptive study” he does not mean simply enu-
merating grammatical processes or inventorying the most used paradigms, but
rather “a prospecting effort to penetrate beyond simple grammatical analysis into
the domain of expression of which grammar is so to speak only the more or less
schematic skeleton” (Sauvageot 1946: 7).32 This domain of expression includes
“syntax, semantics and vocabulary”, all of which are, he rightly notes, neglected
in structural grammars. He wants to get to them through “sufficiently detailed
analytic descriptions of concrete examples of the behaviour of a certain number
of linguistic structures” (Sauvageot 1946: 7).33 Here nearly every word is charged
with potentially polemical meaning: Sauvageot is implicitly accusing structural
linguistics of being insufficiently detailed in its analysis of individual linguistic
structures, of failing to use concrete examples, of taking a broad-brush approach
rather than focussing on “a certain number” of structures in depth, and of ne-
glecting the “behaviour” of the structures, in favour of simple inventories. What
he means by behaviour is expanded upon at the start of the book proper:
What makes the originality of an idiom is not the presence of this or that
particular structural feature but how the structure as a whole is arranged,
the use that is made of it and the performance that is obtained from it for
the needs of the expression of thought. (Sauvageot 1946: 13)34
The concern with “arrangement” is an embrace of the core principle of Saus-
surean linguistics, which Sauvageot thought however had not been adequately
32“[…] un effort de prospection pour pénétrer par delà la simple analyse grammaticale dans le
domaine de l’expression dont la grammaire n’est pour ainsi dire que le squelette plus ou moins
schématique.”
33“[…] des descriptions analytiques suffisamment poussées, des exemples concrets du comporte-
ment d’un certain nombre de structures linguistiques.”
34“Ce qui fait l’originalité d’un idiome, ce n’est pas la présence de tel ou tel trait particulier de
structure mais la façon dont l’ensemble de cette structure est agencée, l’usage qui en est fait et
le rendement qui en est obtenu pour les besoins de l’expression de la pensée.”
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buttressed with attention to particular features. The concern with “performance”
may again be his embrace of Saussure’s all-but-forgotten call for a linguistics
of parole. The concern with expression of thought reveals a tension within Sau-
vageot himself, in that he will often insist that language must be understood
as a tool of communication, the traditional alternative to representation or self-
expression as the primal and formative purpose of language.
The strongest evidence that Sauvageot is taking a polemical stance comes
when he claims to be “observation” personified: “In doing this, we have not the
least intention of diffusing the theories of a school. We are focussed above all on
describing the facts as they present themselves to observation, by disregarding
any preconceptions” (Sauvageot 1946: 7–8).35 But the language he has used up to
this point already belongs to a school, that of structural linguistics, and its un-
derlying theory is not immediately dissociable from that language, even when he
is positioning himself against aspects of that theory. That positioning is itself a
theory, and since this Preface is for a whole series of books by different authors,
it looks as though Sauvageot is trying to form a school and to diffuse its theories.
How his treatment of Finnish is distinct from a structural one can be seen from
the opening sentence.
To the ear, Finnish seems “loud”, a bit hoarse and abrupt, the whole spouted
rapidly in a rhythm with rather close beats, modulated according to a mu-
sical phrasing with rather sharp but descending notes that appear to follow
an almost unvarying curve. Finnish discourse knows only a few melodic
deviations between the peaks and troughs of modulation. The monotonous
repetition of these modulations makes one think right away that the lan-
guage modulates not in order to express, but only to mark out the elements
of the flow.
The vowels “mark”; they burst joyfully on speakers’ lips, whereas the con-
sonants are muffled sometimes to the point of being whispered. (Sauvageot
1946: 15)36
35“Ce faisant, nous n’avons aucunement l’intention de diffuser les théories d’une école. Nous
nous attachons avant tout à décrire les faits tels qu’ils se présentent à l’observation, en faisant
abstraction de toute idée préconçue.”
36“A l’oreille, le finnois fait ‘sonore’, un peu rauque et saccadé, le tout débité rapidement sur
un rythme aux alternances assez rapprochées, modulées selon une phrase musicale aux notes
plutôt aiguës mais descendantes, qui semble suivre une courbe à peu près invariable. Le dis-
cours finnois ne connaît que peu d’écarts mélodiques entre les sommets et les creux de mod-
ulation. La répétition monotone de ces modulations fait tout de suite penser que la langue
ne module pas pour exprimer, mais seulement, pour démarquer les éléments du débit. Les
voyelles ‘marquent’ ; elles éclatent joyeusement sur les lèvres des sujets parlants, tandis que
les consonnes sont assourdies parfois jusqu’au chuintement.”
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To his French colleagues this impressionism would have sounded like a throw-
back to the nineteenth century, maybe even to Rousseau (1782 [written 1755–
1761]). In some respects it is — one way to resist the mainstream is to hark back
to an earlier age and represent its discourse as a lost truth, as Chomsky would do
with his “Cartesian linguistics” (2009 [1966]). Sauvageot is rescuing a musicality
in linguistic analysis that in fact had not been absent in twentieth-century French
linguistics, but was always a minority concern and was marginalized with the
rise of structural linguistics, until its re-emergence with Meschonnic.37
But by the late 1940s, Sauvageot found himself unable actually to get the prom-
ised books on Tamil and Berber out of their signed-up authors, let alone sign up
any further authors.38 In his Klincksieck series there finally appeared only his
own “Sketches” of Finnish and Hungarian (1951). Given the eccentricity of Sau-
vageot’s vision, one can imagine that other authors may have felt themselves
caught between maintaining their standing among more conventional linguists
and producing what he wanted from them, which perhaps could only be man-
aged by someone with his rare “auditory memory”, plus his double saturation
in structuralism and the Finnish and Hungarian philological traditions of Setälä
and Gombocz.
The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (2016) contrasts what he terms the
H-L-C and the H-H-H, where the H-L-C is the Enlightenment outlook inher-
ited by analytic philosphers from Hobbes, Locke and Condillac. The H-H-H is
the Counter-Enlightenment “Romantic” outlook of Hamann, Herder and Hum-
boldt to which Taylor strives to draw philosophers’ attention.These two perspec-
tives are present in modern linguistics, mainly as a result of Saussure’s inclusion
in his lectures of both semiology, an Enlightenment inheritance from the gram-
maire générale tradition, and the self-contained language system impervious to
change by any individual, an inheritance from German linguists, most directly
the Neogrammarians.Their conception of sound laws that followed an exception-
less path “insofar as they are mechanical”, which is to say physical, represented a
neo-Romantic Counter-Enlightenment tradition in which language is something
extra-rational, that follows its own organic path, even though the Neogrammar-
ians and Saussure did not go the full naturalist route of Max Müller and others.
They however also opened up a breach to allow in some Enlightenment through
the role that they allotted to analogy as the only admissible explanation for ap-
37Saussy (2016) revives the history of this alternative tradition, inwhichMeillet figures as, among
other things, supervisor of the doctoral thesis of Milman Parry (1902–1935), whose studies of
contemporary oral recitation in the Balkanswould revolutionize the understanding of Homeric
epic.
38The books announced were Esquisse de la langue tamoule by Pierre Meile (1911–1963) and Es-
quisse de la langue berbère by André Basset (1895–1956).
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parent exceptions to the sound laws. Analogy is a mental rather than a physical
process, and rational in nature.
On the theoretical level, Meillet’s structuralism was universalist. He argued
that small European languages such as Finnish and Hungarian were doomed by
a sort of natural selection that would limit the number of “languages of civiliza-
tion” in Europe (Meillet 1918: 279; see also Sauvageot 2013: 209–210). That was an
Enlightenment position. But unlike Meillet, Sauvageot was H-H-H to the bone.
His personal experiences in Finland and Hungary had proved to him that what
really determined the present and future vitality of a language was its expressive
power. In a book manuscript published posthumously in 1992, he wrote, “If a
language succumbs, it is because it failed in its expressive task” (Si une langue
succombe, c’est qu’elle faillit à sa tâche expressive) (Sauvageot 1992: 160). Sauva-
geot was torn between loyalty to the man to whom he owed everything in career
terms, and the Finnish and Hungarian philologists whose view of their language
was so much more in accord with his own.
Hence his embracing and resisting of a structural linguistics that, in France,
saw Meillet as its head. But outside France, it was developing in various direc-
tions, above all in Prague, where the terms “structural” and “structuralism” were
being explicitly proclaimed by the start of the 1930s. In the English and French
speaking worlds, 1940 is the year when “structural linguistics” starts to appear
regularly (see Joseph 2015). Martinet was the one French linguist in regular con-
tact with the Prague Linguistic Circle, as well as with Copenhagen, where Louis
Hjelmslev (1899–1965) and Viggo Brøndal (1887–1942) were laying the ground for
glossematics. Perhaps it was Meillet’s death in 1936 that licensed French linguists
to be more directly critical of, even hostile to structuralism, particularly as it was
being developed in Prague. Meillet’s successor, Benveniste, was himself ambiva-
lent towards it, as became apparent with the article on the arbitrariness of the
sign that he contributed to the first issue of Hjelmslev’s Acta Linguistica in 1939.
What exactly about structuralism was repellent to Sauvageot? We got some
clues earlier in the Avertissement to the Esquisse de la langue finnoise, when
he wrote about “a negligence in adding to the debate the concrete testimony
that must be brought in by the descriptive study of a given state of language”,
and the neglect of syntax, semantics and vocabulary in favour of inventories of
phonemes and morphemes. More generally, he objected to the “dogmatism” of
the structuralists, as his student and later colleague Jean Perrot would report that
Sauvageot was not indulgent towards his colleagues and his hostility to
dogmatism led him to severe judgements about these dogmatic theoreti-
cians whom he readily called “these gentlemen”, and whom he readily mal-
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treated with irony, for example denouncing a manifest error as “a simple
blunder”. In particular he was rather hard with regard to the “phonolo-
gists”, for instance reproaching Lazicius for behaving as a “disciple of Tru-
betzkoy and the Prague phonologists, whose excesses and dogmatism he
espoused”. (Perrot 2009: 16)39
French linguists from 1925 to 1950 seem on the one hand to want to claim that
they are, along with the Geneva School, the keepers of the Saussurean structural-
ist flame,while on the other hand acting as if structuralism is a foreign perversion.
This aspect of linguistic history has to be read in the context of how nationalist
feeling was developing in the inter-war period, and again with the anti-imperial
wars in Indochina and Algeria in the 1950s, when the Cold War is also central
to the plot; as is the ambivalence of linguists to the massive increase in atten-
tion and status they gained starting with the success of Lévi-Strauss’s Tristes
tropiques in 1955, and the continuing rise of structuralism as the master science
informing thework of Lacan,Merleau-Ponty, Barthes, Greimas and soon the next
generation of French intellectuals who became prominent in the 1960s. Among
the linguists themselves new tensions arose whenMartinet returned in 1955 from
his self-imposed exile, distancing himself from structuralism in favour of a “func-
tionalism” that combined an ultra-structuralist analytical method with genuine
challenges to the how structuralists dealt with dialects, bilingualism and social
differentiation, challenges that were being pushed further by Martinet’s Amer-
ican student Uriel Weinreich (1926–1967) (see, e.g., Weinreich 1954 and Joseph
2016).
But Weinreich also had strong allegiances to Jakobson, who had been the first
to use the word structuralism in print in the 1920s, and had gone on to redefine
it, in conjunction with Trubetzkoy and the Prague School, in ways that directly
contradicted some of Saussure’s core principles. This is what made French lin-
guists resistant to structuralism as redefined by Prague — partly on intellectual
grounds, partly on nationalist ones, in which some degree of jealousy at the suc-
cess of Jakobson and the Prague School in other parts of Europe and America
cannot be ruled out. Sauvageot, and to a lesser degree Benveniste, were more
39“Sauvageot n’était pas indulgent à l’égard de ses confrères et son hostilité au dogmatisme lui
inspirait des jugements sévères sur ces théoriciens dogmatiques qu’il appelait volontiers ‘ces
messieurs’, et qu’il malmenait volontiers ironiquement, dénonçant par exemple comme ‘une
simple bévue’ une erreur manifeste. Il était en particulier assez dur à l’égard des ‘phonolo-
gistes’, reprochant par exemple à Lazicius son comportement de ‘disciple de Troubetzkoï et
des phonologistes de Prague, dont il a épousé les outrances et le dogmatisme’.” Perrot does
not indicate sources for the citations which he indicates. On the Hungarian phonologist Gyula
Lazicius (1896–1957), see Voigt (1986: 288).
163
John E. Joseph
forthright about their resistance to structuralism than others of their contempo-
raries in France, who may have feared being even more marginalized interna-
tionally if they overtly challenged Prague, Jakobson, Trubetzkoy, Hjelmslev et
al.
But it was not just the formalism, the “structural” part of structural linguistics,
that Sauvageot resisted. It was also “linguistics”, insofar as it had pushed philol-
ogy out from the forefront of academic enquiry, to become yesterday’s dusty,
antiquarian pursuit. With it went attention to the fine details of a language, in-
cluding how individual writers discovered and exploited its potential resources.
Philology — the love of language. Linguistics — its cold, clinical study.
It was a loss that Sauvageot, with his heritage from the philologists who taught
him Finnish and Hungarian, sought to rectify — above all in his last major work
(Sauvageot 1973), by which time he no longer needed to be concerned with his
position within the French linguistic establishment. Even so, he had the reputa-
tion of his students to think of; and that may explain why he never published the
book manuscript he entitled La structure du langage (The structure of language)
that appeared in 1992, four years after his death. This book seems determined
to subvert some of the basic principles of Saussurean structuralism, let alone its
later variants, and offer in their place a vision of language grounded in his long
experience of Finnish and Hungarian language and culture, including the ideas
of Setälä and Gombocz and the other great linguists and literary figures whose
individual impact on the languages he had witnessed. Yet Sauvageot can never
escape the shadow of his first linguistics teacher, Meillet, nor does he want to. In
this book he aims at a reconciliation in which we find a rare trace of his appar-
ently avowed Marxism. He distinguishes the “invariants” of a language, which
are its “structure”, from the “variants” which he calls its “superstructure” (Sauva-
geot 1992: 18).
Sauvageot’s encounter with Finno-Ugric philology would limit his embrace
of structuralism — a doctrine whose historical nuances we, starting with me,
have glossed over. We assume that embracing and resisting are either/or options.
History is more complicated than that, which is what makes it interesting. The
resisting embrace can have strategic force: someone who only embraces will not
push the science forward; someonewho only resists will struggle to get a hearing.
The resisting embrace can give one an audience for resistant innovations that
are heard as progress within the status quo, even if, in his heart, the innovator is
committed to overturning it.
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6 Benveniste’s later work: enunciation
Normand (1986) traces the development of “enunciation” in Benveniste’s work
back to papers he published in 1946 and 1949, and notes in particular that his 1954
paper on current trends in linguistics defines a linguist’s three principal tasks as
being to identify what is described using the word language (langue), how to de-
scribe this object (linguistic methodology), and thirdly, to confront “the problem
of signification”. Quoting Benveniste, “Language (langage) has as its function to
say something. What exactly is this something in view of which language is ar-
ticulated and how do we delimit it in relation to language itself? The problem of
signification is posed” (Benveniste 1966 [1954]: 7).40
Signification — essentially, meaning — is implicitly conceived here as lying
outside the language system (langue), while being its raison d’être. Signification
and enunciation occupy a “semantic” realm, distinct from the “semiotic” one of
the language (see the Editors’ Introduction to Benveniste 2012: 49–51). Under-
standing the semantic is the linguist’s third task. The wording makes clear that
signification lies outside language not just as a langue but as the more general
langage as well, being the something that it is the “function” of language and
languages to say. The challenge is to identify and delimit meaning with relation
to language, which is made difficult because language is itself articulated with
this function in view.
Benveniste’s initial presentation of his approach incorporates a questionwhich
it provoked in the minds of other structural linguists, as to whether enunciation,
as use, was not what Saussure meant by parole, speech. He does not directly
answer the question, but indicates how his focus is a different one.
Enunciation is putting the language to work through an individual act of use.
But isn’t this manifestation of enunciation simply parole, the discourse which
is produced each time one speaks? — We must take care to focus on the spe-
cific condition of enunciation: it is the act itself of producing an utterance,
and not the text of the utterance, that is our object. This act is the fact of the
40“Le langage a pour fonction de dire quelque chose.Qu’est exactement ce quelque chose en vue
de quoi le langage est articulé et comment le délimiter par rapport au langage lui-même? Le
problème de la signification est posé.” Ono (2007: 27–57) has shown how in Benveniste’s writ-
ings from 1945 until the definitive formulations in 1974 [1969] and 1974 [1970](a), the meaning
of énonciation is often ambiguous, or even indicates quite clearly what he will eventually refer
to as énoncé. See also Coquet (1987) and Joseph (In Press).
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speaker who mobilizes the language on his or her own behalf. The relation-
ship of the speaker to the language determines the linguistic features of the
enunciation. (Benveniste 1974 [1970][a]: 80)41
The speaker is not “speaker” before the act of enunciation. With enunciation,
speaker becomes both speaker and subject; the enunciation positions him or her
vis-à-vis the language, while at the same time that relationship shapes the enun-
ciation.
In presenting enunciation not as an alternative to structuralist analysis, but as
a parallel track, Benveniste can be said to fulfil a wish expressed by the Neogram-
marians Hermann Osthoff (1847–1909) and Karl Brugmann (1849–1919), when
they remarked that, in the past, “Languages were indeed investigated most ea-
gerly, but people speaking, much too little” (Man erforschte zwar eifrigst die spra-
chen, aber viel zu wenig den sprechenden menschen.) (Osthoff & Brugmann 1878:
iii). But more striking is how far forward looking the approach is, anticipating
ideas of decades later on stance, voice, identity, indexicality, in addition to the
direct continuations of enunciation in the work of Antoine Culioli and others
in France. Pierre Bourdieu’s (1930–2002) conceptions of language and symbolic
power are also grounded in Benveniste, and in fact it was Bourdieu who in 1969
coordinated the assembling and publication of perhaps Benveniste’s most influ-
ential book, the Vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes. It provides the con-
text for understanding what Benveniste means when he says that “the language
contains the society” (see above, p. 144). When he traces the history of a social
institution such as “personal loyalty” back through each of the branches of the
Indo-European language family, adducing precise etymological evidence to show
the very different ways in which loyalty was conceived among Celtic, Germanic,
Baltic, Slavic, Italo-Roman, Greek and Persian tribes and peoples, the conclusion
seems inescapable that the institutional differences among them are historically
bound to the language of their enunciation, so deeply as to be “contained” not
just in the sense of residing within, but in the stronger sense of being prevented
from escaping.
Benveniste’s third task of 1966 [1954] can be read as an attempt at responding
to the problematizing of meaning that was at the heart of behaviourism, the same
41“L’énonciation est cette mise en fonction de la langue par un acte individuel d’utilisation. Le
discours, dira-t-on, qui est produit chaque fois qu’on parle, cettemanifestation de l’énonciation,
n’est-ce pas simplement la ‘parole’? — Il faut prendre garde à la condition spécifique de
l’énonciation : c’est l’acte même de produire un énoncé et non le texte de l’énoncé qui est
notre objet. Cet acte est le fait du locuteur qui mobilise la langue pour son compte. La relation
du locuteur à la langue détermine les caractères linguistiques de l’énonciation.”
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problem that motivated Bloomfield to de-psychologize his linguistics, though
Benveniste attacks the problemwith a different strategy.The insight particular to
Benveniste is that the language system and the speaking person occupy different
conceptual spheres that nevertheless intersect with one another. He explores this
initially, and in greatest detail, in his papers on person and deixis.42 Benveniste’s
semiology as laid out in the second half of his 1974 [1969] paper and the lectures
of late 1968 and early 1969 combines the systematicity of a langue as conceived by
Saussure with the intersystematicity assumed by Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–
1914). “There is no trans-systematic sign”, Benveniste (1974 [1969]: 53) writes;43
the value of each sign “is defined solely within the system which integrates it”,
which is perfectly Saussurean. Nevertheless, every signifying system other than
a language must be interpreted through a language. “Every semiology of a non-
linguistic system must make use of a language to translate it; thus it can exist
only through and in the semiology of a language, […] which is the interpretant
of all other systems, linguistic and non-linguistic” (Benveniste 1974 [1969]: 60).44
And from his last lectures: “It is the language as system of expression that is the
interpretant of all institutions and of all culture” (Benveniste 2012: 83).45 One
could argue that this core Benvenistean axiom is implicit in both Saussure and
Peirce, but Peirce in particular might have resisted it. It reflects the way a linguist
thinks, rather than a psychologist.
The turn the lectures then take, which the article did not, is one that Saussure
would certainly have resisted. To say as I have done that Benveniste’s semiology
combines the systematicity of a langue as conceived by Saussure with the inter-
systematicity assumed by Peirce is potentially deceptive, because systematicity
must be understood in a strong sense for Saussure, and in a weaker sense for
Peirce, who places the stress on the “inter-”. Benveniste criticizes Peirce for “mis-
42These include, following on from the 1966 [1946] and 1966 [1949] papers cited above, Ben-
veniste (1966 [1956][a]) and Benveniste (1966 [1958]). It is surprising that, in his review of
Benveniste (1966), Winfred P. Lehmann (1916–2007) categorized these papers as “psycholin-
guistics” (Lehmann 1968). Equally surprising is Lehmann’s view that “If in any of his essays
Benveniste discusses linguistic theory as such, it is in the first three, which treat the develop-
ment of linguistics”. In other words, for Lehmann, what Benveniste is doing is not linguistic
theory at all, which was a compliment from the pen of a non-Chomskyan American linguist
like Lehmann in 1968.
43“Il n’y a pas de signe trans-systématique.”
44“Toute sémiologie d’un système non-linguistique doit emprunter le truchement de la langue,
ne peut donc exister que par et dans la sémiologie de la langue […] ; la langue est l’interprétant
de tous les autres systèmes, linguistiques et non-linguistiques.”
45“C’est la langue comme système d’expression qui est l’interprétant de toutes les institutions et
de toute la culture.”
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taking” words for being the whole of language. It is not words, not lexicon, not se-
mantics or even syntax that is the foundation of structural linguistics, but phonol-
ogy and morphology. And yet, when Saussure is teaching semiology, words are
what he uses to exemplify the sign; he brings in morphology in his discussion of
the associative axis and relative motivation, but sounds hardly figure. Phonemes
do not appear to be signs, just constituents of signifiers, even though the differ-
ences between phonemes are the ultimate source of signification, and that poses
a puzzle: what differentiates a phoneme from a non-speech sound is some sort
of signification that this is a signifying sound.
Here Peirce’s idea of “interpretance” offers a valuable insight: that the very
first meaning of every sign is: “I am a sign. Interpret me”. And even if Benveniste
is right that Peirce only thinks about signification at the level of words, nothing
in principle prevents us from extending this insight to the level of phonemes.
Regarding his critique of Peirce for reducing languages to words, it is worth
noting how widely known Benveniste’s revered teacher Meillet was for his Latin
etymological work, and that Benveniste himself had his broadest impact through
his 1969 Vocabulaire, which is word-based. Its focus is on the semantic, and it can
be seen as his major practical achievement in the linguistics of enunciation. Yet
it shows on every page how understanding the semantic at a deep level requires
detailed examination of the semiotic, and how such semantic understanding is
in turn what allows us to weigh up alternative analyses of phonological and
morphological facts in the semiotic system. Benveniste underscores in his lec-
ture notes “the impossibility of reaching the semantic in language without passing
through the semiotic plus the grammar” (Benveniste 1969: 114).46 Peirce tried to
reach the semantic through words alone, without signs, without the language
system. Saussure did not deny the self-evident link between the semiotic and the
semantic, but observed methodological scruples whereby he, as a grammarian
(the term he usually applied to himself), could only pronounce on the semiotic,
the semantic being the realm of expertise of psychologists and philosophers.
Saussure and Peirce are for Benveniste the key innovative thinkers of two
orders of language and signification. With Peirce, Benveniste folds in the later
phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) and of the Husserlian linguist
Hendrik Joseph Pos (1898–1955). Saussure stands at the head of the tradition of
modern linguistics in which Benveniste himself was trained. For Benveniste,
46“l’impossibilité d’atteindre le sémantique en langue sans passer par le sémiotique plus la gram-
maire.”
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Peirce and phenomenology Saussure and structural linguistics
represent the order represent the order
semantic semiotic
intention/intended signifier/signified
enunciation language system
utterance speech
words and things in the world signs and social structure
Structural linguistics is based on the Saussurean order, which excludes consid-
eration of writing. The new linguistics of enunciation envisioned by Benveniste
would combine the two orders, and one of the main aims of his last lectures is to
understand how they are bridged by writing.
Insofar as the marginalization of writing is an aspect of structuralism, Ben-
veniste’s last lectures pass unhesitatingly beyond it. The fundamentally philo-
logical nature of his etymological work makes it pre-structuralist, though in his
explanations of the history of individual words the spirit and basic approach of
structural method come through. And if the central roles he accords to writing
and enunciation make him a post-structuralist, that is certainly not a flag he
wanted to wave. Benveniste strove to reconcile his vision of the future path of
linguistics with its present and past. Or, more precisely, its pasts.
7 Conclusion
This study has focused on a small set of linguists whom histories of linguistics
place in the structuralist period, and who embraced formalist principles to a
greater or lesser extent while also resisting them. It has examined some of the
motives for their resistance, which include a perceived abandonment of attention
to phonological and philological detail (Benveniste and Sauvageot), as well as to
speakers (the same two, plus Martinet), along with a proclivity towards atomism
and discontinuity (Meschonnic). Interpersonal relations, political affiliations and
national identity have also come into the picture.
There are other chapters to be added to this story, including the polemic be-
tween Bloomfield and Leo Spitzer (1887–1960), with Spitzer (1944) calling out
Bloomfield’s mechanism for the reductionism it entailed; C. K. Ogden and the as-
sociated figures studied by McElvenny (2018); Hjelmslev, who never renounced
his early Saussurean commitments but moved progressively away from what he
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saw as the prioritizing of form over function and meaning (Joseph 2018a); and
of course Chomsky, who did battle with the methodological and epistemologi-
cal commitments of the older generation of linguists who are generally classed
as “American structuralists”, but where Chomsky attacked from a more deeply
structuralist position.
My aim may seem counter-structuralist in trying to undo the paradigm. Yet,
deep down, what is this enterprise if not a search for the Order which governs
the movement of the stars of the modern science of language, and which is the
foundation of our society as its practitioners? Without this principle, everything
would revert to chaos.
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Chapter 7
Linguistics as a science of structure
Ryan M. Nefdt
University of the Western Cape
Generative linguistics has rapidly changed during the course of a relatively short
period. This has caused many to question its scientific status as a realist scientific
theory (Stokhof & van Lambalgen 2011; Lappin et al. 2000). In this chapter, I argue
against this conclusion. Specifically, I claim that the mathematical foundations of
the science present a different story below the surface. I agree with critics that due
to the major shifts in theory over the past 80 years, linguistics is indeed opened up
to the problem of pessimistic meta-induction or radical theory change. However, I
further argue that a structural realist approach (Ladyman 1998; French 2006) can
save the field from this problem and at the same time capture its structural nature.
I discuss particular historical instances of theory change in generative grammar as
evidence for this interpretation and finally attempt to extend it beyond the gener-
ative tradition to encompass previous frameworks in linguistics.
1 Introduction
The generativist revolution in linguistics started in the mid-1950s, inspired in
large part by insights from mathematical logic and in particular proof theory.
Since then, generative linguistics has become a dominant paradigm, with many
connections to both the formal and natural sciences. At the centre of the newly
established discipline was the syntactic or formal engine, the structures of which
were revealed through modelling grammatical form. The generativist paradigm
in linguistics initially relied heavily upon the proof-theoretic techniques intro-
duced by Emil Post and other formal logicians to model the form language takes
(Tomalin 2006; Pullum 2011; 2013).1 Yet despite these aforementioned formal be-
ginnings, the generative theory of linguistics has changed its commitments quite
1Here my focus will largely be on the formal history of generative syntax but I will make some
comments on other aspects of linguistics along the way.
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drastically over the intervening years, eschewing among other things formaliza-
tion, cognitive science for evolutionary biology, derivations for constraints, rules
for schemata, phrase structure for cyclic phases of the merge operation and other
theoretical choices.
Given significant theory change, the fecundity of the enterprise and its so-
called discoveries are inevitably called into question (Stokhof & van Lambalgen
2011; Lappin et al. 2000; Jackendoff 2002). A related, more ontological, question
is, if the grammars of linguistics are scientific theories (as Chomsky and others
have insisted over the years), then what are the objects being explained by these
grammars? The former question has received little attention as compared to the
latter.2 I will not directly add to the ontological debate here, but I do hope to draw
some needed attention to the question of theory change in linguistics.
Thus, in this chapter, I argue that linguistics as a science faces the problem
of pessimistic meta-induction, more generally discussed in the philosophy of the
hard science such as physics. In addition, I claim that the focus on the ontology of
linguistic objects, such as words, phrases, sentences etc. belies the formal nature
of the field, which is at base a structural undertaking. Both of these claims, I
argue, lead to the interpretation of linguistics in terms of ontic structural realism
in the philosophy of science (Ladyman 1998; French 2006). Thus, to be realist in
this sense is to accept the existence of linguistic structures (not their content)
defined internally through the operations of the grammars, and what remains
relatively stable across various theoretical shifts in the generative paradigm, from
Standard Theory (1957–1980) to the Minimalist Program (1995–present), are the
formal structures so defined.
The chapter is separated into three parts. In the first part, I discuss the various
theoretical changeswhich the generative linguistic tradition has undergone since
its inception in the late 1950s. For instance, themove from rewriting systemswith
transformations to X-bar representation (Chomsky 1970) with theta roles to the
current single movement operator Merge contained only by constraints. Despite
appearances, I hope to show that the structure of these representations has re-
mained relatively constant. In the second part, I discuss structural realism in the
philosophy of science more generally and why it might serve as an illuminating
foundation for linguistics. Linguistics here is interpreted structurally without
recourse to the independent existence of individual objects or contents in that
2See Chomsky (1986) for the received psychological view on the ontology of linguistics, Katz
& Postal (1991) for a Platonist interpretation, Devitt (2006) for a non-psychological physicalist
view, and Stainton (2014) for a mixture of all the above. See Nefdt (2018) for an alternative
mixture of these views.
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structure (along the lines of Shapiro 1997 for mathematics). In other words, there
are no phrases, clauses or sentences outside the overarching linguistic structure
described by the grammar. Lastly, I briefly show that once a structural realist
framework is adopted for the study of language, connections and continuity be-
yond current generative paradigms become apparent.
2 Theory change in generative linguistics
The history of science has seen a number of radical theory changes, from Newto-
nian to Relativistic physics, from Euclidean to Riemannian geometry as a charac-
terization of physical space, from phlogiston theory to Lavoiser’s oxygen theory,
among many others. In the course of such changes, one might easily dismiss
the old theory as simply false. However, as Laudan (1981) convincingly showed,
there is a deeper issue looming in the passage of time, namely what has become
known as pessimistic meta-induction (pmi). pmi can be defined as follows for
present purposes.
pmi : If all (most) previous scientific theories have been shown to be false, then
what reason do we have to believe in the truth of current theories?
The problem with radical theory change is that it causes serious tension for
any realist theory of science, which aims to hold to the truth or approximate
truth of current theories. Of course, false theories can be responsible for true
ones through some sort of trial-and-error process. But the idea that our best
current theories are of mere instrumental value for later truth is hard to accept.3
Furthermore, at no point will certainty naturally force itself upon us, especially
since success is not a guarantee of truth (e.g. classical mechanics is still a useful
tool for modelling physical phenomena). pmi has an ontological component as
well. When theories do change, they often propose distinct and incompatible
entities in their respective ontologies. Consider the move from phlogiston theory
to oxygen theory. In fact, the term “phlogiston” has become synonymous with
a theoretical term which does not refer to anything. Essentially, the ontological
status of the objects of the theories are rendered problematic when radical theory
change occurs, which prompts a challenge again to the realist. “[I]f she can’t
establish the metaphysical status of the objects at the heart of her ontology, how
can she adopt a realist attitude towards them?” (French 2011: 165).
3There are such instrumentalist theories on the market. Van Fraassen’s (1980) constructive em-
piricism is one prominent example. A general problem for such views is that they tend to make
miraculous the explanatory and predictive successes of scientific theory.
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Linguistics, too, has seen its fair share of radical shifts in theory and perspec-
tive over the past few decades. In fact, the early generative tradition of Chomsky
(1957) had a more formal mathematical outlook. Drawing inspiration from the
work of Emil Post on canonical production systems, which are distinctively proof-
theoretic devices in which symbols are manipulated via rules of inference in or-
der to arrive at particular formulas (not unlike natural deduction systems), lin-
guistics approached language from a more syntactic perspective.4 This was due
in part to two assumptions, namely (1) that syntax is autonomous from semantics,
phonology etc. and (2) that syntax or the form of language ismore amenable, than
say semantic meaning, to precise mathematical elucidation. However, it must be
added that as early as Syntactic Structures (1) had often been advanced as a nec-
essary condition for progress in semantics.5 Mathematical models of this sort
would be a key tool in early generative linguistic analysis. Chomsky states the
formal position in the following way at the time:6
Precisely constructed models for linguistic structure can play an important
role, both positive and negative, in the process of discovery itself. By push-
ing a precise but inadequate formulation to an unacceptable conclusion, we
can often expose the exact source of this inadequacy and, consequently, gain
a deeper understanding of the linguistic data. More positively, a formalized
theory may automatically provide solutions for many problems other than
those for which it was explicitly designed. (Chomsky 1957: 5)
He goes on to chastise linguists who are sceptical of formal methods. However,
as we shall see, the course of linguistic theory saw a decrease in formalization
and an increased resistance to it (partly inspired by Chomsky’s later views). In
fact, a generative grammar in the early stages was expressly noncommittal on
ontological questions: “Each such grammar is simply a description of a certain
set of utterances, namely, those which it generates” (Chomsky 1957: 48). By the
1960s, grammarswere reconceived as tools for revealing linguistic competence or
the idealized mental states of language users. With mentalism, linguistics looked
4For a thorough discussion of the influence of Post on generative grammar, see Pullum (2011)
and Lobina (2017).
5I thank Michael Kac for emphasizing this point to me.
6I attempt to follow Pullum & Scholz (2007) throughout in slaloming my way through the mine-
field of the distinctions between “formalization”, “formal”, and “Formalism”. The senses ex-
pressed here are related to “formal” as a term used for systems which abstract over meaning
and “formalization” as a tool for converting statements of theory into precise mathematical
representations. Early generative grammar can be seen as a theory which aimed to achieve
both distinct goals.
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towards sciences such as psychology, physics, and biology for methodological
guidance as opposed to logic and mathematics as it did before. As Cowie (1999:
167) states of the time after Aspects, Chomsky “seemed also to have found a new
methodology for the psychological study of language and created a new job de-
scription for linguists”. The psychological interpretation of linguistic theory held
sway until the 1990s, when the biolinguistic program emerged as yet another new
way of theorizing about language. The Minimalist Program (1995b) pushed the
field towards understanding language as a “natural object”, in which questions
of its optimal design and evolution take centre-stage.7
Each new foundation distanced itself from the methodology of its predecessor,
postulated different objects and advocated different ends. Thus, pmi takes on spe-
cial significance for linguistics and an answer to the puzzles it presents become
especially peremptory in this light. In the following sections, I will focus on some
specific cases of the methodological changes which underlie the picture sketched
above.
3 From phrases to phases
In this section, I aim to provide a story of the mathematical formalisms employed
in the service of an ever-changing landscape of theory in linguistics. I will not,
however, directly discuss theoretical postulates such as Universal Grammar or
modularity etc., which lie outside the scope of the present purview.
The early generative approach had a particular notion of a language and ac-
companying grammar at its core. On this view, a language 𝐿 is modelled on a
formal language which is a set of strings characterizable in terms of a grammar
𝐺 or a rule-bound device responsible for generating well-formed formulas (i.e.
grammatical expressions). In lslt, Chomsky (1975: 5) writes of a language that
it is “a set (in general infinite) of finite strings of symbols drawn from a finite
‘alphabet’ ”. In formal language theory (flt) (which took inspiration from this
period), assuming a start symbol 𝑆, set of terminals (words) 𝑇 , nonterminals 𝑁𝑇
(syntactic categories) and production rules 𝑅, we can define a grammar in the
following way:
𝐺 will be said to generate a string𝑤 consisting of symbols from Σ if and only
if it is possible to start with 𝑆 and produce 𝑤 through some finite sequence
7Of course, matters are rarely this simple or clear. For instance, Bickerton (2014) stresses that
the peculiarity of the situation in linguistics is that the field at present still contains scholars
working in various versions of the generative programme concurrently.
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of rule applications. The sequence of modified strings that proceeds from 𝑆
to 𝑤 is called a derivation of 𝑤 . The set of all strings that 𝐺 can generate is
called the language of 𝐺, and is notatedℒ(𝐺) (Jäger & Rogers 2012: 1957).
In Chomsky (1956), natural languages were shown to be beyond the scope
of languages with production rules such as 𝐴 → 𝑎, 𝐴 → 𝑎𝐵 or 𝐴 → 𝜀 (𝜀
is the empty string) such that 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝑁𝑇 and 𝑎 ∈ 𝑇 (i.e. regular languages).8
This result lead to the advent of phrase-structure or context-free grammars with
production rules of the following sort: either 𝑆 → 𝑎𝑏 or 𝑆 → 𝑎𝑆𝑏 (read the arrow
as “replace with” or rewrite). These grammars can handle recursive structures
and contain the regular languages as a proper subset. For many years, phrase-
structure grammars were the standard way of describing linguistic phenomena.
Essentially, phrase structure grammars are rewriting systems in which symbols
are replaced with others such as 𝑆 → 𝑁𝑃, 𝑉𝑃 or 𝑁𝑃 → 𝑑𝑒𝑡, 𝑁 ′. As Freidin
(2012: 897) notes, “phrase structure rules are based on a top-down analysis where
a sentence is divided into its major constituent parts and then these parts are
further divided into constituents, and so on until we reach lexical items”. There
are a number of equivalent means of representing the structure of sentences in
this way. The most common is via hierarchical diagrams, shown below.
(1) S
NP
det 𝑁 ′
VP
Alternatively one can capture the same information as:
(2) [S[NP[det][N′]][VP]]
This basic structure, however, proved inadequate as a means of capturing the
structure of passives and certain verbal auxiliary constructions as shown origi-
nally in Postal (1964).9 Transformations were meant to buttress the phrase struc-
8One issue is that regular grammars cannot capture centre embeddings such asThe boy the girl
loved left.
9This picture of the trajectory of the grammatical formalization is necessarily sketchy. A fuller
story would include formal results such as Shieber (1985), which showed from the cross serial
dependencies of Swiss-German that natural language syntax cannot be captured by a context-
free grammar.
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ture system in order to bridge this gap in explanation. Transformation rules op-
erate on the output of the phrase structure rules and create a derived structure,
as in (3) below for passivization.
(3) NP1 V NP2 → NP2 be-en (aux) V NP1
The combined expressive power of phrase structure and transformations pro-
ved very productive in characterizing myriad linguistic structures. This produc-
tivity, with its increased complexity, however, came at a cost to learnability. “[I]f
a linguistic theory is to be explanatorily adequate it must not merely describe
the facts, but must do so in a way that explains how humans are able to learn
languages” (Ludlow 2011: 15). The move to more generality led in part to the Ex-
tended Standard Theory and the X-bar schema.
Since the continued proliferation of transformations and phrase structure rules
was considered to be cognitively unrealistic, linguistic structures needed more
sparse mathematical representation. Although, as Bickerton (2014: 24) states,
“rule proliferation and ‘ordering paradoxes’ were only two of a number of prob-
lems that led to the eventual replacement of the Standard Theory”.10
There was also a theoretical push for more general structure from the Univer-
sal Grammar (ug) postulate assumed to be the natural linguistic endowment of
every language user. ug needed to contain more general rule schemata in or-
der to account for the diversity of constructions across the world’s languages.
This structural agenda dovetailed well with the Principles and Parameters (p&p)
framework, which posited that the architecture of the language faculty consti-
tuted a limited number of universal principles constrained by individual para-
metric settings, where “parameters” were roughly the set of possible variations
of a given structure. For instance, some languages, such as English, require a
mandatory np/dp in the subject position of sentences, whereas in pro-drop lan-
guages, such as Spanish, empty categories can do the job.
(4) It is raining.
(5) Llueve.
These kinds of differences could be expressed in the language of parametric set-
tings.The so-called Extended Projection Principle might be universal, but certain
languages can contain distinct parameters with relation to it (such as fulfilling it
with a null determiner). In other words, a child in the process of acquiring her
10“Ordering paradoxes” here refer to the situation in which there are equally valid reasons for
orderings from X to Y and Y to X despite the grammar requiring a particular order to pertain.
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first language can “set” the parameter based on the available linguistic environ-
ment in which she finds herself, like the flicking of a switch. Furthermore, this
kind of structural picture is represented well in the X-bar schema (Jackendoff
1977), which contains only three basic rules. There is (1) a specifier, (2) an ad-
junct, and (3) a complement rule. The specifier rule is given below (where 𝑋 ′ is
a head-variable and 𝑋𝑃 and 𝑌𝑃 are arbitrary phrasal categories determined by
that head).
(6) Specifier rule: XP→ (Spec)X′ or XP→ X′(YP)
Or equivalently:
(6′) XP
specifier X’
X complement
A vast amount of linguistic structure can be modelled by means of this formal-
ism. In fact, X-bar theory overgenerates structural descriptions (which need to be
reined in by various constraints). But the underlying idea is that our mental com-
petence is more likely to contain generalized rule schemata such as those above
than individual phrase structure rules and countless transformations for each nat-
ural language. In a sense, X-bar merely smooths over the individual hierarchical
structures of before and homes in on a more abstract structural representation
for language. As Poole mentions:
[W]e discovered that your language faculty appears to structure phrases
into three levels: the maximal projections or 𝑋𝑃 level, the intermediate 𝑋 ′
level, and the head or 𝑋 ∘. (Poole 2002: 50)
These rules subsume the previous ad hoc phrase structure rules. Importantly,
however, the representation only allows for binary rules (unlike the possible n-
ary branches of phrase structure trees). Freidin (2012) further claims that X-bar
theory represented a shift from top-down to bottom-up analysis, despite being
formulated in a top-down manner a decade after its inception. Here, the idea is
that the rules stated above are projections from lexical items to syntactic category
labels, not the other way around.
Unfortunately, history has a way of repeating itself. Where in the previous in-
stantiation of generative grammar, the proliferation of transformations became
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unwieldy, parameters would soon see a similar fate befall its fecundity. Briefly,
ug was assumed to be extremely rich during this period: “the available devices
must be rich and diverse enough to deal with the phenomena exhibited in the
possible human languages” (Chomsky 1986: 55). However, what was innate and
what was learned or set by experience relied in part on a distinction between
“core” grammar and “periphery”, which was never explicitly provided by the the-
ory (see Pullum 1983 and Culicover 2011 for discussion). Although formally all
previous transformations were reduced to the “move alpha” operation, the mul-
tiplication of parameters took similar shape to its transformational predecessor.
Newmeyer describes this period as one of instability and confusion:
In the worst-case scenario, an investigation of the properties of hundreds
of languages around the world deepens the amount of parametric variation
postulated among languages, and the number of possible settings for each
parameter could grow so large that the term ‘parameter’ could end up being
nothingmore than jargon for language-particular rule. (Newmeyer 1996: 64)
In addition, these parameters seemed to force the violation of the binary re-
quirement set by the X-bar formalism and with it the cognitive plausibility tran-
siently acquired after the Standard Theory. There needed to be a better way of
capturing the movement toward simplifying the grammatical representation and
theory of natural language syntax. This and other theoretical motivations led to
the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1995b), which pushed the new biolinguistic
agenda and a call for further simplicity.
As mentioned in §2, the question of the evolution of language reset the agenda
in theoretical linguistics at this time. The grammatical formalisms assumed to
underlie the cognitive aspects of linguistic competence were forced to change
with this new perspective, with the result that many of the advances made by
the p&p and Government and Binding (Chomsky 1981) theories needed to be
abandoned. The rationale was something of the following sort:
Evolutionarily speaking, it is hard to explain the appearance of highly de-
tailed, highly language-specific mental mechanisms. Conversely, it would
be much easier to explain language’s evolution in humans if it were com-
posed of just a few very simple mechanisms (Johnson 2015: 175).
The Merge operation represented the goal of reducing structure to these sim-
ple mechanisms. In the Standard and Extended theories, grammars followed the
structures set by the proof theory of the early twentieth century (see above),
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which often resulted in grammars “of roughly the order of complexity of what is
to be explained” (Chomsky 1995a: 233). In the Minimalist programme, this appa-
ratus was reduced to a simple set-theoretic operation which takes two syntactic
objects and creates a labelled output of their composition (the label to be deter-
mined by the features of the objects thereby replacing the projection from heads
of X-bar theory).11 The formulation is given below:
(7) Merge(𝛼, 𝛽) = {𝛾 , {𝛼, 𝛽}}
Or again, equivalently:
(7′) 𝛾
𝛼 𝛽
The above is an example of external set merge (where 𝛾 is a label projected
from one of the elements). Internal merge accounts for recursive structures since
it applies to its own output (as in if 𝛽 is already contained in 𝛼). Consider the
following sentence.
(8) The driver will speed recklessly.
In a bottom-up fashion, speed and recklessly will merge to form a vp, and there-
after this union will merge with the auxiliary will to form a tp or Tense Phrase.
Merge will independently take the and driver and create an np which will merge
to form the final tp to deliver (8) above (the T is the label projected for the en-
tire syntactic object). Importantly for the proposal I will present, “[t]his last step
merges two independent phrases in essentially the same way that generalized
transformations operated in the earliest transformational grammars” (Freidin
2012: 911).12 Thus, although the phrase structure rules had been replaced by the
less complexmerge operationwith phases, which are cyclic stages applying to the
11Technically, as Langendoen (2003: 307) notes, “Merge is not a single operation, but a family
of operations. To belong to the merge family, an operation must be able to yield an infinite
set of objects from a finite basis”. However, by this definition, the phrase structure rules with
recursive components would be invited to Thanksgiving dinner. The structural similarities of
various versions of this infinity requirement on grammars will be discussed in the next section.
12Of course, the practice of taking ideas or insights in disguised form from early frameworks
was not uncommon. For instance, the binding theory of Government and Binding is very close
(if not identical) to principles governing anaphora (like the Ross-Langacker constraints) that
were first articulated in the 1960s. Similarly, the trace theory of movement is closely tied to the
earlier idea of global derivational constraints. I thank Michael Kac for drawing my attention
to these cases.
184
7 Linguistics as a science of structure
innermost constituents of the entire process (Chomsky 2008), there is a similar
structure to the derivation.
Of course, unlike the top-down analysis of early generative grammar, Merge
operates from lexical items in the opposite direction (Merge and the “lexical ar-
ray” constituting “narrow syntax”, see Langendoen 2003). However, as Lobina
(2017: 84) cautions, “talk of top-down and bottom-up derivations is clearly met-
aphorical”.13 It might add something in appreciating the flavour of the computa-
tional process at hand, but often the overall structural picture is unchanged by
such parlance.
Let this serve as an account, albeit incomplete, of some of the formal and theo-
retical changes of generative grammar over the 60-year period since its inception.
Below, I will draw on the picture developed here to argue for the structural con-
tinuity of linguistics despite the theoretical shifts the overarching theory might
have taken during this time.
4 Structural realism and linguistics
The previous two sections showed a theoretical landscape in flux with each new
stage abandoning the commitments of its predecessor. In such a scenario, pmi
takes on a strong force. Not only this, but as mentioned before, the situation
in linguistics is unique, since practitioners of each epoch of the theory can still
be found working within the remit of their chosen formalism. In §2, I described
some of the theoretical shifts in the generative paradigm since the 1950s. In §3,
I described the underlying mathematical formalisms utilized in service of the
changing theory at each junction. In this section, I want to use a structural realist
analysis of linguistics to show that despite the former, the structures of the latter
remained relatively constant or at least commensurable.
What is structural realism? One way of thinking of it is as the “best of both
worlds” strategy for dealing with pmi. Realists, as we have seen, have trouble
holding on to the objects of their theories once better theories come along. Anti-
realists, on the other hand, have trouble accounting for the unparalleled predic-
tive and explanatory success of theories (whose objects do not refer to objects in
reality). Structural realism offers a conciliatory intermediary position between
these choices. Ladyman describes the position as follows:
13Compare this metaphorical language to a similar caution in Pullum (2013: 496), “[t]he fact
that derivational steps come in a sequence has encouraged the practice of talking about them
in procedural terms. Although this is merely a metaphor, it has come to have a firm grip on
linguists thinking about syntax”.
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Rather we should adopt the structural realist emphasis on the mathematical
or structural content of our theories. Since there is (says Worrall) retention
of structure across theory change, structural realism both (a) avoids the
force of the pessimistic meta-induction (by not committing us to belief in
the theory’s description of the furniture of the world), and (b) does not make
the success of science […] seem miraculous (by committing us to the claim
that the theory’s structure, over and above its empirical content, describes
the world). (Ladyman 1998: 410)
There are two versions of structural realism in the philosophy of science. The
first, initially proposed byWorall (1989), is epistemic in nature.The second, cham-
pioned by French & Ladyman (2003), is an ontological proposal. The former in-
volves the idea that all we can know is structure, while the latter is a claim about
all there is. In other words, what is preserved across theory change is a kind
of structure posited by the underlying equations, laws, models or other mathe-
matical representations of the theories. Part of the reason I opt here for ontic
structural realism is that there is an ontological component to pmi, as mentioned
before. Thus, we are not only interested in what is communicated or epistemi-
cally accessible between different theories over time but what these theories say
exists as well. The ontological answer to pmi is therefore that if we cannot be
realists about the objects of our scientific theories, we can be realists about the
structures that they posit.14
From here, it is not hard to see what the argument of the present section is
going to be, namely that different generations of generative grammar display
structural continuity notwithstanding variation in theoretical commitment. The
means by which we can appreciate this continuity is by considering features of
the mathematical representations employed during the course of history which
could affect my proposed analysis. Moss has a similar idea when he discusses the
contribution made by mathematical models to linguistic theory.
[L]anguage comes to us without any evident structure. It is up to theoreti-
cians to propose whatever structures they think are useful […] Mathemati-
cal models are the primary way that scientists in any field get at structure.
(Moss 2012: 534)
14At this point, one can glean how such a picture might enter into the debate concerning the
ontological foundations of linguistics mentioned earlier. Unlike Platonists, who claim among
other things that languages are individual abstract objects like sets, or mentalists, who claim
they are psychological or internal states of the brain, a structuralist could argue that languages
are complex structures in part identified by abstract rules and physical properties. See Nefdt
(2018) for precisely such a view.
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In the previous section, I told a story about how the proof-theoretic gram-
mars of the StandardTheorywere transformed into X-bar representations, which
eventually led to the Merge operation in Minimalism. However, a remarkable
fact about the structural descriptions generated by these various formalisms is
that they share a number of essential features: (1) they generate the same sets
of sentences (also called “weak generative capacity”),15 (2) they take a finite in-
put and generate an infinite output, and (3) they can be represented hierarchi-
cally through tree structures (not to mention actual structural similarities such
as the way in which Merge joins two independent clauses and the way it was
proposed in early transformational grammar). None of these latter properties are
trivial. For instance, dependency grammars can be shown to be weakly equiva-
lent to phrase structure grammars but are represented bymeans of flat structures.
Model-theoretic grammars, such as Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar, are
usually hierarchically represented and can generate the same sets of sentences
but do not have any cardinality commitments.
It is important to note that there were a number of formal shifts present in
the transitions from transformational grammars to Merge which might chal-
lenge the framework put forward here. I have already mentioned the top-down
to bottom-up change and argued that, from a structural point of view, this is
largely a metaphorical distinction. There is, however, another property of for-
mal representations of syntax which also shifted from early to later generative
grammar, namely from derivational approaches to representational or constraint-
based ones. Simply put, derivational approaches follow the proof-theoreticmodel
discussed earlier, where given a certain finite input and a certain set of rules, a
particular structured output is generated. Constraint-based formalisms operate
differently. Rather than ‘deriving’ an expression as output from a rule-bound
grammar, these formalisms define certain conditions upon expression-hood or
what counts as a grammatical sentence of the language. Chomsky discusses this
shift in thought in the following way:
If the question is real, and subject to inquiry, then the [strong minimalist
thesis] might turn out to be an even more radical break from the tradition
than [the principles-and-parameters model] seemed to be. Not only does
it abandon traditional conceptions of “rule of grammar” and “grammatical
construction” that were carried over in some form into generative grammar,
15In fact, these equivalences go beyond the generative grammars. Minimalist Syntax (or the
Stabler 1997 version), Phrase-Structure grammars, Tree-substitution grammars, Head-Driven
Phrase Structure grammars (hpsg), andDependency grammars have been shown to shareweak
generative capacity. See Mönnich (2007).
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but it may also set the stage for asking novel questions that have no real
counterpart in the earlier study of language. (Chomsky 2000: 92)
Indeed, with the Minimalist agenda and the Merge operation, more constraint-
based grammar formalisms were embraced and adopted. This latter approach in-
volves a different idea of “rule of grammar” and indeed “grammar construction”.
The formal difference can be understood in terms of how each type of formal-
ism answers the so-called “membership problem”. Decidability is an important
aspect of formal language theory. Given a string 𝑤 and a formal languageℒ(𝐺),
there is a finite procedure for deciding whether 𝑤 ∈ ℒ(𝐺), i.e. a Turing machine
which outputs “yes” or “no” in finite time. In other words, a languageℒ(𝐺) is de-
cidable if𝐺 is a decidable grammar.This is called the membership problem.What
determines membership in a traditional proof-theoretic grammar is whether or
not that string can be generated from the start symbol 𝑆 and the production rules
𝑅. In other words, whether that string is recursively enumerable in that language
(set of strings). What determines membership in a constraint-based grammar is
whether the expression fulfils the constraints set by the grammar (which are like
axioms of the system). “An mts [model-theoretic syntax] grammar does not re-
cursively define a set of expressions; it merely states necessary conditions on
the syntactic structures of individual expressions” (Pullum & Scholz 2001: 19).
As mentioned above, Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar and Head-Driven
Phrase Structure Grammar are formalisms of the latter variety. While phrase
structure grammars can be found in the average syntax textbook, tree-adjoining
grammars fall within the former camp.
The interesting fact for our purposes is that Merge and Minimalism represent
the fruition of the gradual shift from derivational grammars to constraint-based
ones. However, Chomsky (2000) does not initially put much stock in this for-
mal transition, despite the strong statement quoted above. He considers the old
derivational or “step-by-step procedure for constructing Exps” approach and the
“direct definition […] where E is an expression of L iff …E…, where …-… is some
condition on E” approach to be “mostly intertranslatable” (Chomsky 2000: 99).16
Here he holds these formalism types to have few empirical differences.
From a mathematical point of view, the same formal languages and the struc-
tures of which they are composed are definable through both generative enu-
merative and model-theoretic means. Traditionally, the formal languages of the
16He goes on to “suspect” that the adoption of the derivational approach is more than expository
and might indeed be “correct”.
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Chomsky Hierarchy were defined in terms of the kinds of grammars specified
at the beginning of the previous section. However, there are other ways of de-
marcating the formal languages without recourse to generative grammars. For
instance, they can be defined according to monadic second-order logic in the
model-theoretic way. Büchi (1960) showed that a set of strings forms a regular
language if and only if it can be defined in theweakmonadic second-order theory
of the natural numbers with a successor. Thatcher & Wright (1968) then showed
that context-free languages “were all and only the sets of strings forming the
yield of sets of finite trees definable in the weak monadic second-order theory of
multiple successors” (Rogers 1998: 1117).
The point is that the same structures can be characterized by means of either
proof-theoretic or model-theoretic techniques. Thus, the move from the former
to the latter should not be seen as a hazard to the structural realist account of
linguistic theory I am proffering here.17
5 In search of lost paradigms
Thepicture painted above is perhaps rather parochial. I consider theoretical shifts
within the generative paradigm exclusively as a means of demonstrating the ad-
vantages of a structural realist interpretation of the science.There were a number
of reasons for this narrow focus. One reason was that, with the centrality of syn-
tax in the early generative tradition, the idea of form over content naturally led
to a structural picture. Another reason was related to various criticisms levelled
against the theoretical changes and the threat of pmi specific to contemporary
generative grammar.
Nevertheless, despite this focus, the structural realist analysis offered here al-
lows the possibility of a broader perspective on the history and development
of linguistics, one that goes beyond the inception of generative grammar in the
1950s. The advent of generative linguistics is often characterized as a sharp par-
adigm shift eschewing the tenets of what was known as “structural linguistics”
(or “American structuralism”) which came before. Some of these alleged tenets
include (1) the limitation to classificatory or taxonomic methods of study, (2) the
17In terms of the nature of structural properties themselves, there are at least two possible ways
in which to identify a structural property in the literature, one in terms of direct definability
and another via a particular notion of invariance across structures. See Korbmacher & Schiemer
(2017) for a formal comparison between these two options and Johnson (2015) for an application
of the latter to linguistic theory.
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restriction of data to language corpora (producing only so-called “observation-
ally adequate grammars”), and (3) a local limit on language-specific rules and
generalizations (i.e. no Universal Grammar).18
However, there is strong evidence to suggest that pre-generative linguists were
thinking along similar mathematical lines. As early as Bloomfield (1926), a meth-
odological shift towards the axiomatic method of Hilbert in the sciences is advo-
cated. It is this move towards mathematical (proof-theoretic) structure that took
shape in the generative paradigm, but also connects the latter to early work in
American structuralism (again despite some theoretical shifts).
In addition (and more specifically), Bloomfield was an early proponent (pos-
sibly the earliest?) of the use of the axiomatic-deductive method in linguis-
tics, an approach that was revived first by Bloch in the 1940s, and then by
Bar-Hillel, Harwood, and others in the 1950s, and which gradually became
the dominant method of syntactic analysis after the appearance of [Syntac-
tic Structures]. (Tomalin 2006: 184)
Bar-Hillel (1953) took this idea even further in providing the first attempt at
incorporating recursion theory in mathematics into linguistics (and with it the
first generative grammar of sorts). As Tomalin notes:
Bar-Hillel’s use of recursive definitions to analyse the structure of sentences
in natural language can be viewed as one manifestation of this pervasive
desire for the mathematisation of syntactic analysis, which became such
a characteristic feature of certain kinds of linguistic research in the mid-
twentieth century. (Tomalin 2006: 67)
Thus, in terms of structural realism, there is ample evidence of continuity
across paradigms. In terms of individual structures, Chomsky’s mentor Zellig
Harris (1951) advocated adoption of what he called “transformations” within his
structuralist linguistic theory.
A different linguistic analysis can be obtained if we try to characterize each
sentence as derived, in accordance with a set of transformational rules, from
one or more (generally simpler) sentences […]. Such an analysis produces a
more compact yet more detailed description of language and brings out the
18One might also add scepticism of meaning to the list. Interestingly, meaning-scepticism per-
sisted long into the generative movement and in part resulted in the so-called “Linguistics
Wars” (see Newmeyer 1996 for discussion).
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more subtle formal and semantic relations among sentences. (Harris 1951:
iv).
According to Matthews (2001) structural linguistics is still present within con-
temporary research on language, depending on how one defines “structuralism”.
Specifically, the interpretations that involve claims that languages are distinct
systems of relations, sets of sentences, and linguistics is the science of such struc-
tures (over and above the elements of the systems) show continuity between the
past and the present. For Firth (1957: 181), commenting on Saussure, one of the
forefathers of structuralism, “true Saussureans, like true Durkheimians, regard
the structures formulated by linguistics or sociology as in rebus […]. The struc-
ture is existent and is treated as a thing”. This idea of being realist about struc-
ture and the formalist mathematics of this early paradigm carried through into
Chomskyan generative linguistics. In fact, for Joseph (1999: 26), it was Chomsky
himself who “introduced structuralism into American linguistics, more fully than
any of his predecessors”. Nevertheless, the idea of linguistics treating structure
as an object of theory directly is also very close in spirit (and word) to the mo-
tivations behind structural realism in the philosophy of science which takes the
underlying mathematical structures of theories to be transmitted across frame-
works and paradigms. For instance, as Pullum (Forthcoming) observes of one of
the core mathematical notions of generative grammar,
[t]he idea that a linguistic description can be viewed as providing instruc-
tions for “generating” sentences had been advanced by both Hockett (1954)
(“principles by which one can generate any number of utterances in the
language,” 1954, 390) and Harris (1954) (“A grammar may be viewed as a
set of instructions which generates the sentences of a language,” 1954, 260).
(Pullum Forthcoming)
With Bar-Hillel’s recursive grammars, Bloomfield’s axiomatic method, and the
transformations and generativework of Hockett andHarris, the structures which
would find fruition in the generative paradigm were present in its predecessors
somuch so that, again despite significant theory change, mathematical and there-
fore structural continuity can be appreciated across paradigms.
6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that understanding generative linguistics in struc-
tural realist terms brings a number of philosophical advantages. Not only does
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it offer an answer to worries concerning the radical theoretical shifts which the
programme has undergone, but it also provides a more sound philosophical un-
derstanding of the scientific nature of linguistics and its history. I further ex-
tended this analysis beyond the paradigm to include insights from the erstwhile
American structural linguistics tradition.
Abbreviations
aux Auxiliary category
gpsg Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar
hpsg Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar
lslt Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory
sbcg Sign-based Construction Grammar
ug Universal Grammar postulate
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Chapter 8
Formalism, grammatical rules, and
normativity
Geoffrey K. Pullum
University of Edinburgh
Formalism within logic and mathematics has indirect connections to modern for-
mal linguistics in that the earliest attempt at realizing the formalist program for
logic had the side effect of leading to the development of what today we call gener-
ative grammars. Syntactic theory has been dominated by the generative conception
for six decades. Despite reference in the literature to “rules”, generative grammars
do not contain rules in the usual sense (under which a rule can be followed or
disobeyed). It is not clear how work on generative grammars could make sense
of the idea of normative principles of grammar. But the subject matter of gram-
mar is indeed best taken to be normative: a grammar expresses statements about
what is correct or incorrect, not claims directly about phenomena in the empiri-
cal world. Grammatical rules with normative force can nonetheless be rendered
mathematically precise through a type of formalization that does not involve gen-
erative grammars, and normativity can be understood in a way that does not imply
anything about obligations or duties. Thus there is some hope of reconciling the
normativity of grammar with the enterprise of formalizing grammars for human
languages and the view that linguistics is an empirical science.
1 Introduction
The school of thought known as “formalism” in logic and mathematics takes
these disciplines to be concerned solely with procedures for manipulating strings
over a finite inventory of meaningless symbols. Put like that, it sounds pointless:
logic and mathematics were surely supposed to be about something, not just
meaningless games. But formalism has a point: its aim is to ensure that proofs
of theoremhood are constructed in a way that is scoured clean of any question-
begging hint of meaning or truth. Then, if what is provable turns out to coincide
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with what is semantically tautologous, it can be shown that proof in the syntactic
sense truly accomplishes something.
That is, ideally we want everything logically provable from true premises to
turn out to be true given those premises, and everything that is logically true to
be provable. To show that this has been achieved, without circularity, we need
first a method of proof that pays no regard to meaning or truth, and second a
way of demonstrating that it proves all and only the logical truths. In technical
terms, we want a consistent and complete method of proof.
A crucial contribution to the formalist program in logic, just over a century
old, was presented in an important book by Clarence Irving Lewis (1883–1964):
A Survey of Symbolic Logic.1 Lewis clearly saw that the crucially important work
on reducing mathematics to logic, Principia Mathematica (1910–1913, henceforth
pm) by Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970),
had failed to separate syntax from semantics in the logical system it assumed.
The distinction between axioms and inference rules had not yet emerged: White-
head and Russell subsumed them both under “primitive propositions”. In conse-
quence Modus Ponens was framed in a way that, from the formalist viewpoint, is
shockingly confused, because it is semantically contaminated. It says: “Anything
implied by a true elementary proposition is true” and, where 𝑥 is a real variable,
“When 𝜑𝑥 can be asserted […] and 𝜑𝑥 ⊃ 𝜓𝑥 can be asserted […] then 𝜓𝑥 can be
asserted”.
This precludes making legitimate use of the claim that 𝑝 implies 𝑞, unless we
take 𝑝 to be true. But 𝑝 might of course be a proposition we are by no means
sure of. Using logic to see what follows from a false assumption is an important
technique of discovery that Whitehead and Russell’s statement of Modus Po-
nens appears to disallow. Lewis understood that, if we want to be sure that our
symbolic reasoning is trustworthy, we must have a purely syntactical method
of deriving strings, one that does not in any way depend on meaning, and we
must then show that the strings it derives are the right ones – the ones that are
true if and only if the initially adopted premises are true. Lewis sketched in ordi-
nary English a statement of Modus Ponens that ruthlessly excluded any talk of
meaning or truth, referring solely to positions of symbols in strings.
The program for making logic truly formal that Lewis urged was taken up in
earnest by a PhD student in the Department of Mathematics at Columbia Uni-
1See section iii of Chapter 6 in the first edition, 1918; the edition is crucial, because when the
second edition by Dover was authorized, Lewis stipulated that Chapters 5 and 6 of his book
were to be omitted; he felt that whatever value the book had did not depend on those two
somewhat more speculative and heterodox chapters.
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versity. Emil Leon Post (1897–1954) graduated with a mathematics BA from the
City College of New York in 1917, and went on to do a PhD at Columbia under
the philosopher andmathematician Cassius JacksonKeyser (1862–1947).2 Lewis’s
book appeared during Post’s first year as a graduate student, and appears to have
influenced him considerably. The plan for a doctoral dissertation that he con-
ceived involved turning Lewis’s informally presented “heterodox” approach into
a program within pure mathematics. Post aimed to construct:
(I) a way of testing a formula of the propositional calculus used in pm to de-
termine (via truth tables for connectives) whether it was a tautology (i.e.,
a logical truth);
(II) a system for deriving new formulæ (intuitively, the theorems) from given
formulæ (pm’s axioms) that was totally independent of semantic or logical
categories like “constant” or “variable” or “connective”, working on strings
of symbols without reference to their potential meaning; and
(III) a proof that the set of tautologies as determined by (I) coincided with the
set of derivable strings defined by (II).
For the limited portion of Whitehead and Russell’s logic that he tackled, the
propositional part, Post actually achieved that goal (see the abridged version of
his PhD dissertation published as Post 1921). He planned to go on and complete
the job of dealing with the whole of pm’s logic, including its quantificational
reasoning, in a postdoctoral year at Princeton, where he had obtained a Procter
fellowship. In pursuit of that goal, he generalized his syntactical proof system
further, and created a type of formal system that would revolutionize theoretical
linguistics nearly 40 years later.
The system Post worked out in 1921 was not described in a publication until
1943, but there were reasons for that. The reasons had to do with a long battle
against severe manic-depressive mental illness (now usually called bipolar disor-
der). Suffice it to say that the system was general enough that it could express
any imaginable set of rules for deriving strings from other strings. Indeed, Post
rapidly came to regard it as fully capturing the intuitive notion “set for which
it is possible to envisage a way of systematically enumerating the membership”.
Today such a set is usually referred to as recursively enumerable (r.e.).
2Post’s intellectual and personal biography is well documented in broad outline. Sources that
I have consulted include Davis (1994a), Stillwell (2004), De Mol (2006), Urquhart (2009), and
Jackson (2018).
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Formalizing the inference rule Modus Ponens is a very simple application of
Post’s system. Assume a symbol inventory containing “⊃”, “)”, “(”, and letters
like 𝑝 and 𝑞, and 𝑃𝑖 are to be interpreted as indexed variables over unbounded
strings. Assume that we have already been given some strings that do not need
to be proved (intuitively, those correspond to axioms), and we are trying to build
a list of other strings using them (those are the theorems). Then Modus Ponens
says that if we can find a string on our list that has a “(” followed by some other
stuff which we will call 𝑃1, followed by the symbol “⊃”, followed by some further
stuff which we will call 𝑃2, followed by a “)”, and the stuff that we called 𝑃1, on
its own, is also on the list, then the stuff that we called 𝑃2 can be added to the
list.
The way Post put it was that a string of the form “( 𝑃1 ⊃ 𝑃2 )” together with a
string of the form “𝑃1” produce a string of the form “𝑃2”.
Modus Ponens is an extremely simple application of the idea of building strings
systematically on the basis of already obtained strings (though it was crucial for
Post’s PhD dissertation project). But in 1920–1921 as a Procter fellow at Princeton,
Post started working on doing the rest of Whitehead and Russell’s logic – the
reasoning that involved quantifiers – and in connection with that he worked out
a radical generalization of the notion of a rule of inference. There could be any
finite number of “premise” lines, and both the premises and the conclusion could
be of any finite length and contain any number of specified symbol strings and/or
the variables over strings (𝑃1, 𝑃2, etc.). He presented his generalized metaschema
in a truly bewildering tableau. I give it here in a slightly modified form due to
Davis (1982), which (believe it or not) makes things slightly clearer:
𝑔1,0 𝑃1,1 𝑔1,1 𝑃1,2 ... 𝑃1,𝑛1 𝑔1,𝑛1𝑔2,0 𝑃2,1 𝑔2,1 𝑃2,2 ... 𝑃2,𝑛2 𝑔2,𝑛2⋮ ... ⋮
𝑔𝑘,0 𝑃𝑘,1 𝑔𝑘,1 𝑃𝑘,2 ... 𝑃𝑘,𝑛𝑘 𝑔𝑘,𝑛𝑘
⇓
ℎ1 𝑃𝑟1,𝑠1 ℎ2 𝑃𝑟2,𝑠2 ... ℎ𝑗 𝑃𝑟𝑗 ,𝑠𝑗 ℎ𝑗+1
Each of the 𝑔𝑖 and ℎ𝑖 stand for specific strings of symbols that would be given
in the production. The down arrow “⇓” means “produce” in Post’s sense. The
𝑟𝑖 variables tell us which premise line a variable comes from, and the 𝑠𝑖 tell us
which variable we are talking about (counting from the left), so requiring the 𝑟𝑖
to be between 1 and 𝑘 (where 𝑘 is the total number of premises) and requiring
the 𝑠𝑖 to be between 0 and 𝑛𝑟𝑖 (where 𝑛𝑟𝑖 is the total number of variables in the
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relevant line) guarantees that the last line will call only 𝑃𝑖 variables that are
present somewhere in the earlier lines. Thus everything in the conclusion must
be either an explicitly specified string or something drawn from the material
covered by the 𝑃 variables of the premises. Hence the conclusion can say things
like “put the content of the 𝑥 th variable in premise number 𝑦 into the conclusion
at this point”, while not allowing it to say “put in some random stuff at this point”,
which would make nonsense of the idea of representing logical reasoning.
I exhibit the above tableaumerely tomake the point that it represents a schema
fully general enough to express arbitrary string edits. It is more than general
enough to state anything from simple phrase structure rules (immediate con-
stituent analysis), or categorial grammar rules, or Chomsky’s most elaborate gen-
eralized transformations.
Thus a chapter of the history of formalism in mathematical logic turns out
to relate to a crucial part of the prehistory of generative linguistics. For Post’s
specific design of a formalist proof system with axioms as inputs was to emerge
later in Noam Chomsky’s work under a new name: generative grammar.
Chomsky hit upon the idea of rewriting systems as a mathematical technique
for giving syntactic descriptions of human languages some thirty years after Post
developed his production systems. Late in 1951, in the revised version of his MA
thesis,3 Chomsky (1951: 3) used the verb “generate” for the relation between a
grammar and a string of symbols – for the first time in linguistics, as far as I
have been able to determine. By 1954 both Zellig Harris (1909–1992) and Charles
Hockett (1916–2000) had used “generate” in the same way (see Harris 1954: 260
and Hockett 1954: 390). It is not clear whether they were influenced by Chom-
sky’s usage, for although Chomsky had close contacts with Harris up to summer
1951, his December 1951 revision of the MA thesis was done during his first six
months at the Society of Junior Fellows at Harvard (see Chomsky 1975: 26), and
was little known before its publication by Garland in 1979 (Chomsky 1975: 30 says
it met with an “almost total lack of interest”). By 1955 Chomsky had completed a
first draft of The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory, which proposed a theory
of “generative grammars” in detail (though it was very little read at that time,
and did not appear in print until twenty years later, as Chomsky 1975).
There is no citation or mention of Emil Post in Chomsky (1955–1956), but
from 1959 onward Chomsky has occasionally mentioned Post’s name as an ear-
lier source for the prior use of “generate” in the mathematical literature. Chom-
sky (1959: 137n) notes that he is “following a familiar technical use of the term
3On the two versions of Chomsky’s MA thesisTheMorphophonemics of Modern Hebrew, see the
very careful comparative study by Daniels (2010).
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‘generate’ ”, citing Post (1944), a paper that says almost nothing about how pro-
duction systems work. The locus classicus on production systems is Post (1943),
a paper which Chomsky has never cited, probably because (as conjectured by
Urquhart 2009: 471), he learned about Post’s work mainly or entirely from sec-
ondary sources like the 1950 mathematical logic text by Paul C. Rosenbloom
(1920–2005), which is cited in Chomsky (1975). In Chomsky’s hands over the fol-
lowing six decades, production systems, under the new name “generative gram-
mars”, became the overwhelmingly dominant type of framework for the study
of syntax.
2 Rules
With generative grammars firmly established as mainstream in linguistics, both
linguists and philosophers commonly speak as if generative grammars of the
sort that Chomsky advocates contain something like rules of grammar of the
traditional kind – “The verb agrees with the subject” and so on. Chomsky even
had an early paper called “On the notion ‘rule of grammar’ ”, which might tempt
anyone to think that he was dealing with rules in some antecedently understood
sense. I am not aware of anyone who has pointed out that it is simply not true.
Linguists have completely overlooked a key fact about generative grammars: that
they do not consist of rules in any sense that would be recognized by traditional
grammarians or non-linguists like philosophers.
The ordinary intuitive understanding of a rule is something that we can follow
(that is, behave in a way that complies with it) or break (that is, violate or dis-
obey it). It defines a regular pattern or practice, a way of “going on in the same
way”. But nothing of the content of a generative grammar has anything like this
character. Chomsky actually recognizes this when he comes to respond to the
discussion of rule-following in Kripke (1982) and observes that “we would not
say, as scientists, that a person follows the rule of phrase structure” formulated
as “vp → v np Clause” (Chomsky 1986: 243). A rule of this sort (a context-free
phrase structure rule, to be technical about it) is often thought of as saying “a
verb phrase may consist of a verb followed by a noun phrase followed by a com-
plement clause”, but in fact it means nothing of the kind. The presence of such a
“rule” in a generative grammar neither says nor implies that a vp always contains
a v followed by a np and a Clause in that order. It does not even say that this
is possible. It does not entail that a vp always contains a v, or even that it may
contain a v. These things may be true in a grammar with such a “rule”, or they
may not. Everything depends on what the rest of the grammar says.
202
8 Formalism, grammatical rules, and normativity
There could be a transformational “rule” that always shifts v to the end of vp
(as with the “universal base” analyses of the early 1970s that derived even sov
languages from vso underlying structures), or the v could be shifted out of the
vp altogether (as in much more recent transformational analyses). In either case
there would never be a vp containing a v with an np following it. Nothing is fixed
by any individual statement in the grammar. Only the entire grammar, taken
holistically, does anything at all; and what it does is to provide an instantaneous
description of the entire set of well-formed sentences. No part of the grammar
expresses any generalization about the shape of expressions in the language.
Through all of the last 60 years of linguistics, and especially the discussion of
linguistics among philosophers, there has been talk of Chomsky-style generative
grammars containing “rules” that is completely counter to the way generative
grammars actually work. If we take a rule to be a statement that expresses some
generalization about the form of linguistic expressions, then no proper subpart
of a generative grammar, of any scope or size, is a rule or contains a rule.4
What I have said about phrase structure rules holds also for transformations.
Wh-movement cannot be followed or complied with. A transformation saying
“move a wh-marked phrase to the beginning of the clause” does not say that the
language has clause-initial wh-words. The language might or might not exhibit
them: there could be another transformation that moves them back again (the
device known as “reconstruction” in post-1980 transformational grammar does
exactly that whenmapping s-structures to logical form), or a transformation that
moves them to the very end of the sentence, or a rule that simply expunges them
completely (which is actually what happens in bare relatives like the one I want).
Everything depends on the rest of the grammar and how all of its components
interact.
It is very important, therefore, not to assume when we talk about people fol-
lowing particular rules, or languages having particular rules, that “rule” refers to
anything found in a generative grammar. The non-technical and informal notion
4We can see a partial exception in the case of Chomsky (1981), Lectures on Government and
Binding (lgb), but that is precisely because it is not fully generative (in the narrow sense of that
term I assume here). In lgb, modules of grammar of a completely different sort are introduced.
When the “binding theory” says that anaphors (like reflexive pronouns) must be bound in their
governing category, it actually is talking about something that has to hold within the structure
of any expression. It says that an np node with a reflexive pronoun as its lexical realization
always has a coindexed node that c-commands it in the tree (roughly, is closer to the root,
and dominated by a node that also dominates the reflexive pronoun). This use in lgb of what
linguists often call “constraints” is a departure that Chomsky made from his earlier theoretical
work. It disappeared again after 1990 with the appearance of his “minimalist program”.
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of a rule is valuable (indeed, in my view it is essential), but it simply cannot be
equated with any pieces or elements of generative grammars.
3 Normativity
What I have just said entails that we are in a certain amount of difficulty when
we come to consider the issue of whether the claims made by a grammar are (or
are not) normative. A normative statement is one that deals not with how things
are but how they ought to be, or how it is appropriate for them to be given some
set of values. Nothing in a generative grammar has that property.
Some philosophers in effect question whether normativity can arise in a phys-
ical universe. How could any physical distribution of elementary particles con-
stitute a situation in which some things (drawn from an indefinitely large range)
are objectively “good”, or “beautiful”, or “right”? Such reflections lead to moral
antirealist views under which ethical statements like “That is morally wrong” or
“You should apologize” are regarded as having more in common with grunts or
cries of pain than truth-evaluable statements like “This is made of gold”.
My own views in metaethics incline towards moral realism. But at least one
philosophically inclined linguist assumes we have to accept antirealist error the-
ories of ethics. Replying to an article in which I mentioned that I think claims
about grammaticality are normative (Pullum 2007), Geoffrey Sampson remarked:
I was at least assuming that grammatical description consists of statements
that are correct or incorrect: but correctness is not a concept applicable to
the domains of ethics or aesthetics. (As it is often put in the case of ethics,
“you cannot derive an ought from an is”.) (Sampson 2007: 112)
Sampson is assuming that claims like “Torturing children is wrong” or “Bach’s
music is beautiful” are not even truth-apt, and he thinks that my passingmention
of ethics and aesthetics has committedme to the view that claims about grammat-
icality are likewise not statements of objective fact. This is of course nothing like
what I believe. But it is instructive to read Sampson’s views (restated in Samp-
son and Babarczy 2014: 96–99), because they are a reminder of how difficult the
philosophical clarification of descriptive linguistics is going to be. While extreme
prescriptivists seem to think that a construction can be held to be grammatically
incorrect no matter how much natural usage conflicts with that claim, Sampson
represents the opposite pole, apparently holding that the only objective claims
about language concern what has occurred in a corpus, and statements about
what is grammatical or ungrammatical do not even have truth conditions.
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Let me start by attempting to be clear about what I think normativity is. Nor-
mativity is generally taken primarily as a property of statements, and then deriva-
tively as a property of domains or subject matters in which normative statements
are the appropriate mode of discourse (see Millar 2004: 93–96 for a careful dis-
cussion of how the two are related).
The claims of geology are not normative; the system of table manners is. Num-
ber theory is not a normative discipline; ethics is. Aeronautical engineering is
not normative; aesthetics is.5
Millar (2004: 92–99) points out that all the classic cases of normativity involve
normative statements providing reasons for doing, feeling, believing, desiring, or
intending something. I believe grammatical normativity falls together with the
classic cases. “It is not good table manners to lick your knife” offers a reason for
not licking your knife; “Torturing children is wrong” implies a reason for not
torturing children; “Bach’s music is beautiful” suggests a reason for planning to
attend a Bach concert; “Attributive adjectives expressing colour always follow
the noun in French” provides a reason for positioning colour adjectives after the
noun when seeking to be regarded as using normal French.
4 Prescriptivism
Touching on a rule of grammar that defines how to a speaker ought to position
French adjectives brings us inevitably to a consideration of prescriptive gram-
mars. Some discussion cannot be avoided, though in fact I will not have much
truck with prescriptivism here. I make a terminological distinction that is not
standard: althoughmany have referred to old-fashioned “don’t-do-this” grammar
and usage books as “normative grammar”, and many have said that normative
statements are prescriptive rather than descriptive, I am going to use “normative”
and “prescriptive” quite differently.
With respect to the grammatical rules for a human language (especially one
with a high-prestige standard variety), there is a crucial distinction between two
stances or attitudes:
– descriptive grammar involves the identification and statement of the rules
or constraints that define the linguistic system (rules and constraints that
I am going to argue are normative);
5Logic is a rather interesting case, since on the one hand we want to say that it is a plain and
undeniable fact that 𝑃 → 𝑄 is logically equivalent to𝑄∨¬𝑃 , but on the other hand it also seems
right and proper to reason logically rather than illogically. There is a philosophical literature
on this but, regrettably, exploring it is beyond the scope of this chapter.
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– prescriptive grammar involves the issuing of injunctions or opinions or
exhortations about what system ought to be used, or judging how well or
poorly some use of language complies with a given system.
Prescriptivist grammarians certainly see language as a normative domain, but
not in the way I am interested in.What primarily marks out prescriptivists is that
they see their role as advising or instructing or cajoling other language users to
alter their linguistic behaviour.They want to change the way we speak and write,
to lead us out of error and towards the correct path.
We can set aside here the fact that prescriptivists often have the rules wrongly
conceived or wrongly formulated. They often doggedly maintain the validity of
rules that do notmatchwhat they profess to regard as excellent usage, such as the
usage of people they explicitly admire (Orwell, Strunk, White, whoever). Often
it can be shown that they defend a rule which they unknowingly and constantly
violate in their own writing, which one might have thought was a knock-down
drag-out argument that the rule cannot be right, at least for their own English.
They never accept such arguments, preferring to insist, irrationally, that even
their own usage is to be condemned if it does not comply with the fictive rule.
And they invariably ignore grammatical differences between dialects, treating
non-standard English He don’t never come here no more as simply incorrect stan-
dard English, as if it were a poorly executed attempt at saying He does not ever
come here any more, when in truth languages or dialects that have negative con-
cord working-class and low-prestige dialects of English around the world fall
together with standard Italian, standard Polish, and other languages in which re-
peated morphological expressions of negation reinforce each other rather than
cancelling out.
But all of this is basically a side issue, because even if the prescriptivists had all
the rules exactly right, their enterprise would still be quite distinct from that of
descriptive linguistics.They are in the critical and advisory business of evaluating
language use as good or bad. I am not.
John Searle draws a relevant distinction (in his book SpeechActs, 1969) between
constitutive and regulative rules. Constitutive rules define or set up the activities
to which they apply; regulative rules are established to govern an activity that
can proceed independently of them and in defiance of them. Knocking other
marathon runners down in order to get ahead of them is still clearly running in a
marathon, because the rule thatwe should not use physical violence against other
runners in a marathon is regulative. But moving a knight six squares directly
towards the other end of the board is not playing chess: the rule that a knight
moves to a second-nearest square of opposite colour is constitutive.
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Prescriptivists take grammatical rules to be regulative. Criticizing other peo-
ple’s linguistic behaviour and attempting to get them to modify it is the goal.
That has nothing to do with my topic here, so I want to simply set the prescrip-
tive stance aside.
The question I am concerned with is whether the descriptive view of grammar
also involves a normative perspective of what the subject matter is.
What suggests normativity in the subject matter of grammar, more specifically
syntax, is the fact that there is (or at least, linguists assume there is) a distinction
betweenwell-formed and ill-formed expressions, and it holds over an indefinitely
large range, certainly far too large for it to be a matter of list membership.
What a grammar has to do is not to summarize some finite set of observations
or facts, but to use all available evidence to discover a definition, over an indef-
initely large class of candidate objects (potential expressions), of the difference
between those that are good or properly structured in the language under study
and those that are bad or improperly structured.
This does not mean that linguistics fails to be empirical (contrary to Sampson’s
assumption). Its task is to find out what the right constraints are, and that is not
an a priori matter. It can only be done empirically, ultimately by reference to the
usual behaviours and reactions of the native users of the language when distrac-
tions and irrelevant extraneous factors do not intrude.This is true despite the fact
that both intuitions and corpus attestations are fallible sources of evidence. The
epistemology is therefore subtle. I have suggested elsewhere (see Pullum 2017)
that it should be seen as based on the method of reflective equilibrium.
The way generative linguists usually view it, the grammar has to cover all the
expressions of the language, and only those expressions, and it must do it in a
way that tells us the status of novel expressions – expressions we have never
encountered before. That means making a description that is fully explicit about
how the expressions of the language – all of them, however many there may
be – are structured. And that calls for some kind of formalization of both the
representation mode and the grammatical rule system.
5 Formalization
What I mean when I refer to formalization in syntax is simply the use of mathe-
matical and logical tools to make theoretical claims more explicit. Talk about for-
malization is therefore not essentially connected to the “formalist” progamme.
It has nothing to do with de-emphasizing the semantic, pragmatic, rhetorical,
or aesthetic aspects of human languages, or with assigning more importance to
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form than to function, or with Carnap’s project of eliminating meaning from the
language of science, or with Hilbert’s doomed project of reducing all of mathe-
matics to questions of logical truth in some decidable formal logic.
The tools that formally inclined linguists have borrowed from logic for use
in framing syntactic theories over the last few decades have included rewriting
systems, automata, graphs (most importantly trees), and model theory. More re-
cently, 21st-century linguistics has been increasingly employing tools from statis-
tics and probability theory.
But there is truth in the familiar remark about how to a three-year-old with a
hammer everything looks like a nail. Syntacticians have become so completely
engrossed in working with generative grammars that they see everything in
terms of derivations, and cannot conceive of what life would be like in any other
terms.
They have paid very little attention to the fact that a generative grammar of 𝐿
says absolutely nothing about the structural properties of any non-sentence of
𝐿. They have ignored the fact that the sharp boundaries of any set defined by a
generative grammar fly in the face of the widely accepted intuitive view of ill-
formedness as gradient – the fact that one ungrammatical sentence can be more
ungrammatical than another.
They have also paid little or no attention to the fact that a generative grammar
makes syntactic properties depend crucially on the contents of a finite lexicon: a
derivation that does not terminate in a string of items belonging to the relevant
lexicon is not a derivation at all, so there is no way for a generative grammar
to represent an example like Carnap’s Pirots karulize elatically as grammatical
unless the lexicon contains a noun pirot, a verb karulize, and an adverb elatically
– which for standard English it does not.
These are not problems for formalized syntax in general. For one thing, when
we are talking about the invented languages of logic and computer program-
ming, the worries I just expressed about generative grammars turn into virtues.
For proving theorems about logical systems – completeness, consistency, com-
pactness – it is absolutely crucial that the formulæ of the logic should be sharply
defined to form a specific set with a known cardinality. And for proving correct-
ness of a computer program, the same is true. There can be no gradient levels of
ill-formedness, or potential tolerance of minor deviance, or uncertainty about the
finite list of allowable symbols, whenwe are talking about logics or programming
languages. This is the grain of truth in Michael Tomasello’s capsule summary of
“Chomskian generative grammar” (2003: 5), which he says is “a ‘formal’ theory,
meaning that it is based on the supposition that natural languages are like formal
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languages”. In a way, though I suspect not in the way he intended, he is correct.6
The sense inwhich generative grammars do treat natural languages like formal
languages has to do with the origins of their formal machinery, as already out-
lined. It was developed for a specific purposewithinmathematical logic (formaliz-
ing formation rules and inference rules in a fully general way), and it is perfectly
suited to the description of the invented languages for logic, metalogic, and com-
puter programming. But it is important that there are ways of making grammars
mathematically explicit that are quite distinct from the generative one. Chom-
sky has sometimes confusingly denied this point, claiming (as in, e.g., Chomsky
1966: 12) that for him the term “generative grammar” means nothing more than
“explicit account of sound/meaning correspondences”, but this does not square at
all with his actual usage (Ney 1993 argues this point at length). Pullum & Scholz
(2001) use the term “generative-enumerative syntax” to stress that the referent is
syntax formalized in terms of nondeterministic random enumerators; their paper
discusses certain types of explicit grammar that are not generative in this sense.
The non-generative mode of formalizing grammars that Pullum and Scholz
discuss uses model theory rather than rewriting systems to formalize syntac-
tic description. Grammatical rules are taken to be constraints on the structure
sentences, in a straightforward and informally comprehensible sense: the con-
straints in a model-theoretic grammar for English would say things that for con-
venience we can readily paraphrase in English. A few examples:
– A preposition phrase has a preposition as head.
– A lexical head is the initial subconstituent of its parent.
– A pronoun subject of a finite clause takes its nominative case form.
Such constraints can be stated more precisely as formulæ of a logic; a grammar
can be defined as a finite set of such formulæ; structures of sentences can be
taken to be the models for the interpretation of that logic; and grammaticality
can be reconstructed as satisfaction of the constraints in the grammar, in the
model-theoretic sense.
6The rest of his summary is inaccurate and confused. He says generative grammar uses “a uni-
fied set of abstract algebraic rules” (they are actually of diverse types, not at all unified); and
they “are both meaningless themselves and insensitive to the meanings of the elements they
algorithmically combine” (but algebraic operations always need interpretations, as McCawley
1968 carefully shows, and grammar rules can be written to build semantic representations si-
multaneously with syntactic ones, as in Montague 1973, Montague 1974 or Gazdar et al. 1985).
Finally he says the rules come with “a lexicon containing meaningful linguistic elements that
serve as variables in the rules” (but I see no sense in which lexical items serve as variables).
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For additional concreteness, we can look very briefly at the syntax of preposi-
tion phrases (pps) in English. A typical old-fashioned generative grammar would
include a phrase structure rule like this:
(1) pp → p np
Under its standard interpretation this licenses derivational steps in which the
symbol “pp” is replaced by the sequence “p np”, and derivatively licenses the
building of (part of) a tree diagram that looks like this:
(2) PP
P NP
We might easily think that the rule entails that prepositions always have np
complements. It does not. There could be (and in fact for English there will need
to be) other rules in the grammar saying things like this:
(3) a. pp → p pp
b. pp → p Clause
So some pps will not have np right branches. And we might easily think that
the rule at least says that those prepositions that do take np complements precede
their np complements. But it does not entail that either. There could be another
rule in the grammar saying this (where 𝜀 is a symbol representing the null string):
(4) pp → 𝜀
In that case there might be no prepositions appearing in the language at all.
Or there could be a transformational rule like this:
(5) x - p - np - y
1 - 2 - 3 - 4 ⇒ 1 - 3 + 2 - 4
In that case prepositions would always be suffixed to their NP complements –
unless some other rule in the grammar tamperedwith things further.This is what
I am referring to when I say that the grammar provides its definition holistically:
in the same way that we are told that in the Brexit negotiations nothing is agreed
until everything is agreed, with a generative grammar we do not know anything
about what any part of the grammar determines about any part of a sentence
until we know what the entire grammar yields.
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We might easily fall into the error of thinking that the rule “pp→ p np” does
say that a pp always contains a p. But it does not do that either. It does not guaran-
tee anything about the interior of pps.There could be another rule in the grammar
saying “pp→ a b c”.
Under the view I favour, the conditions on pps would be stated directly as
constraints – and for concreteness we can take them to be constraints on the
structure of trees.
Assume a predicate logic in which we quantify over nodes with variables
𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 … and have a vocabulary of monadic predicates for category labels and
binary relations for grammatical functions. We write “B(𝑥)” to mean “node 𝑥 is
labelled with category label b” and “F(𝑥, 𝑦)” to mean “the f of node 𝑥 is node 𝑦”
(i.e., “node 𝑦 bears the grammatical function f to its parent node 𝑥”). Then the
constraint saying that pps have p heads would be expressed precisely in this way:
(6) ∀𝑥[PP(𝑥) → ∃𝑦[Head(𝑥, 𝑦) ∧ 𝑃(𝑦)]]
And if we write Lexical(𝑥) to mean “node 𝑥 bears a lexical category label”,
“Parent(𝑦, 𝑥)” to mean “𝑥 immediately dominates 𝑦”, and “𝑥 ≺ 𝑦” to mean “node
𝑥 is to the left of node 𝑦”, then the second constraint above, stating that lexical
category nodes are initial in their phrases, can be stated like this:
(7) ∀𝑥, 𝑦[Head(𝑥, 𝑦) ∧ Lexical(𝑦) → ∀𝑧[Parent(𝑧, 𝑥) → 𝑥 ≺ 𝑧]]
Any set of trees characterized by a set of first-order logic formulæ in this sort
of waywill be a regular set of trees (recognizable by a finite-state tree automaton)
and its string yield will be a context-free stringset (these results are corollaries
of theorems now found in textbooks of finite model theory like Ebbinghaus &
Flum 1999 and Libkin 2004). By giving a finite set of first-order logic statements
interpreted on tree models in this way, we explicitly characterize a set of trees
and thereby a context-free set of strings. We are in effect giving a formally ex-
plicit model for a context-free language without using a context-free generative
grammar. I argue elsewhere (Pullum 2013) that this yields significant advantages.
I point all this out merely in order to establish the point that normative prin-
ciples like those stated informally in English above can be made fully precise
and become, without change, a formalized grammar with precise consequences,
known parsability results, etc. I am in no doubt that it is worth pursuing the goal
of making the syntactic structural principles for human languages fully explicit
– formalizing them using the tools of logic and mathematics.
On the other hand, I do not believe that by formalizing some version of the
grammar rules for a language we are thereby defining a hypothesis about the
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mind – ultimately the brain structure – of an idealized native speaker of that
language. Kripke (1982) believes there are profound difficulties for this basically
Chomskyan view, because there seems to be no way to identify the unique set
of rules that guides a given speaker’s grasp of their native language: indefinitely
many grammars would account for all of the utterances they have produced (or
judged acceptable) in the past, and nothing identifiable about the speaker in ques-
tion can be said to fix the structure that will be revealed in further utterances as
the speaker goes on.
I think Scholz (1990) was right to elaborate on Kripke’s worry, and argue that
we do not obtain an explanation of 𝑆’s linguistic capabilities simply by saying
“𝑆 has a mentally inscribed representation of the generative grammar 𝐺 in his
brain”. And I think Chomsky is wrong in responding to Kripke by denying that
there is any normative aspect to grammar (see Chomsky 1986: chap. 4).
What I am suggesting is that we are better placed to see how there can be a nor-
mative conception of grammar that is not prey to Kripke’s metphysical worries if
we conceptualize grammar in model-theoretic terms, as approximate compliance
with certain structural constraints on the form of sentences.
It might also assuage the worries expressed by Riemer (Chapter 9, this volume)
concerning a kind of authoritarianism that he sees as stemming from the ideas
of generative grammar. Imagining that there is some unique generative mecha-
nism that is the mental and ultimately neurophysiological reality underlying the
capacity to use English, and teaching students about it as if it were unique, he
feels, is inimical to the idea that this complex world can be viewed from many
divergent perspectives. It might even militate against our students feeling that
they have the intellectual freedom to explore alternatives, and to encourage be-
lief in an authority that could be “argued to replicate and so to normalize, in
the domain of education, the kinds of relations of social domination on which
contemporary political orders rest” (this volume, p. 225).
The relevance of the model-theoretic approach to Riemer’s problem is that it
is by no means necessary that to adopt the “unique form hypothesis” that he
sees as implicit in standard generativism. Indeed, I see absolutely no reason to
believe that one unique, correct set of constraints defines English (or any other
language), or that there is one correct way of formally expressing the content
of such a set. What is needed for someone to be a competent user of English is
not that they have some ideal and perfect constraint set (or generative system)
neurochemically implanted in their brain, but merely that they have developed
a set of constraints on grammatical form that, to a good approximation, leads
them to structure their utterances in ways much like the way other speakers of
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English structure theirs. There will be indefinitely many ways to do this, and in-
definitely many ways to represent formally what has been done. Let a hundred
flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend. I regard it as emi-
nently plausible that among the vast population of native speakers of English,
millions of slightly different systems of constraints contend. The reason this is
not problematic is that all we need for linguistically expressed communication
to be possible is substantial overlap in the consequences of the different systems.
And the slight differences between the ways the constraints are defined and re-
alized will of course be the seeds of future linguistic change.
One further thing I should say about normativity concerns the notion of uni-
versal grammar. Here the issue of normativity may not be relevant at all. Modern
linguistics since Chomsky (1965) has stressed the goal of formulating a theory of
universal grammar (ug). This theory has been taken to be not just a systematiza-
tion of the facts that have been discovered to hold for all human languages, but
a kind of ideal model of the human infant’s capacity for learning languages. And
it is important that ug could in principle be an entirely non-normative domain:
it could be a description of a set of neurophysiologically instantiated devices or
of a psychological organization.
I do not regard this as plausible or well supported, because of the lack of any
account of mechanisms. How does ug constrain the growth of grammars? We
know how the curved horns of a ram grow (faster-growing cells on one side and
slower-growing on the other), but nothing at all about how ugworks or develops
in the brain. And more recent work tells us nothing that helps (the literature on
what some have been calling “biolinguistics” over the past decade seems to me
increasingly to be parodying itself).
But we can set aside the issue of whether there might be a serious theory of the
biological aspects of the human language acquisition capacity. I am concerned
here simply with understanding grammars of individual languages. This will be
necessary regardless of whether the human capacity to form and use them is
constrained by a built-in ug. It is by nomeans clear tome that any non-normative,
naturalistic, neurophysiological account of the parochial grammars of specific
languages makes sense.
It is uncontroversial that the mentally inscribed grammar that Chomsky posits
does not (i) describe all the utterances that have occurred in the past, or (ii) pre-
dict what utterances will occur in the future, or (iii) identify the probabilities of
occurrence for future utterances, or (iv) make us do whatever it is we do when
we produce an utterance or understand one. Assuming that *Fetch quickly it is
ungrammatical, for example, the correct statement of the grammatical rules of
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English does not imply (i) that no one has ever said it, or (ii) that no one will ever
say it, or (iii) that the probability of its being uttered is low, or (iv) that we ought
not to utter it.
The implication of a grammar defining something as ungrammatical is closer
to being that no one should say it if they want to be taken as speaking English
as it is usually spoken. What kind of “should” is that? Well, it should be clear
enough that we are not talking about anything closely analogous to the moral
sense of “should”. Moral philosophers standardly take morality to be universal.
Certainly for a moral realist (and moral realism is the metaethical view that I
would subscribe to), torturing a child is not immoral just for certain people in
certain circumstances though possibly moral in other cultures or under other
circumstances; it is morally wrong for everyone. Someone who disagrees is sim-
ply mistaken. Societies and cultures can evolve, and come to see that moral views
they held earlier were mistaken,
But essentially none of the rules in the grammar of a particular language can be
taken to hold universally. There are some 7,000 extant languages, differing quite
radically in grammar as well as lexicon. No one of them is more grammatically
correct in its structures than any of the others. In matters of grammar we have
to be radically relativist.
Morality also relates to behaviour in a way that has consequences for human
actions. From the fact that torturing a child is immoral it follows that we ought
not to torture a child. But from the fact that *Fetch quickly it is ungrammatical
in English nothing at all follows concerning what anyone ought to do or not do.
Whether we ought to utter it will depend entirely on the circumstances. During
a minute of silence at a funeral, we ought not to utter it, or anything else. But
if we are playing a foreign character in a play and the script has your character
saying *Fetch quickly it, then at the relevant point we ought to utter it.
This issue has sometimes been discussed in the philosophy literature, in the
context of the normativity of meaning. Philosophers of language are in fact mad-
deningly uniform in their habit of talking only about reference of words – as if
all we ever do with our language were pronounce the word “cat” and success-
fully achieve reference thereby to a creature of the species Felis silvestris catus,
and as if that were the deepest and most interesting thing about language. But
even there, saying that cat refers to a certain animal species in the Felidae family
does not mean that we ought to describe cats by using that word. Even if we
do want to refer to the creatures, we might want to use moggy or pussy or foul
razor-clawed mewing beast from hell. And we have no obligation to talk about
cats or refer to them at all if we do not choose to.
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My concern here is not with elementary lexical meaning but with syntax. How-
ever, it just as clear that no syntactic rule or constraint or principle conveys any
obligation or presumption about how we should act.
For one thing, the constraints of syntax mostly involve categories and restric-
tions and classifications of which we have no conscious knowledge whatsoever,
so typically we could never know whether we had violated them or not. And
almost everyone agrees that “ought” implies “can”, of course: it is generally not
taken as coherent to assert that we have a duty to do something that we are
totally incapable of doing.
This point offers a clue to some understanding of what the prescriptivists are
up to. They peddle rules that, while not a correct reflection of the actual syn-
tax of the language, are fairly easy for even linguistically unsophisticated people
to check: never place an adverb between infinitival to and a plain-form verb (to
boldly go), never end a sentence with a preposition (What are you looking at?),
never begin a sentence with however, avoid the passive, etc. Such rules are hope-
less as a guide to how to actually use the language like a normal person, but
they have become cultural markers of attention to grammar. Most people are
not aware of how inaccurate they are or how much they are ignored by truly
accomplished writers, and it is moderately easy to identify violations.
Prescriptivists fail in some of their identifications: they mistake particles for
prepositions, and mistake existentials or predicative adjective constructions for
passives, and so on; but they think they are correctly applying genuine rules,
and they see a kind of quasi-moral force to the rules: they see the people who do
not respect the rules as falling short of the standards of behaviour that society
ought to maintain and enforce. In other words, they see the rules of grammar as
regulative.
Domains involving obligations on agents to act (or not act) in certain ways are
not the only domain for normativity. Neither constitutive nor regulative rules of
a game have any connection to anything about obligations. We are not obliged to
play the game at all, for one thing, so the rule defining a knight’s move certainly
does not say we should or should not move any particular knight.
Moreover, making an illegal move is not something we “shouldn’t do” in abso-
lute terms; whether we should do it depends on the circumstances. We might be
playing against a sadistic jailer, with the life of a fellow prisoner forfeited if we
lose, in which case we should make the illegal move if we can get away with it
and it will ensure a win.
What we should do, if “should” has anything like the sense it has in connection
with morality or similar kinds of obligation, has nothing whatever to do with the
normative force of linguistic rules.
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I should also note that the rules of syntax do not have normative force in any
instrumental way: it is not that they should be obeyed because bad things will
happen if they are not obeyed, or because following them will enable one to get
things that one needs.There is sometimes hint of this in naive talk about language
and how we learn it: people talk about needing to make oneself understood in
order to interact satisfactorily with other people. But in fact there is very little
pressure to get things right grammatically. There are people who live most of
their lives speaking mostly in a language that is not their native language, and
speaking it very badly. They still find ways to get what they want.
And perhaps the starkest andmost obvious refutation of the instrumental view
comes from looking at the actual facts of human infants’ experience: while they
are incapable of speech they are constantly looked after, and all their needs are
met, but once they are four or five and can speak and understand they start being
expected to do things that other people want them to do. The idea that we speak
the way we do because we have to on instrumental grounds is nonsense.
6 Understanding
The normative rules of games and linguistic systems do not define anything as
unethical, or contemptible, or inadvisable, or evil. But I think what they do can be
elucidated in terms of the very interesting work of Alan Millar in Understanding
People (2004), cited above. Millar stresses the notion of a commitment to follow
rules: he separates the following of rules from the commitment to follow them.
It is important that there can be tacitly acknowledged rules that no one has
set down in detail. Management of phone calls is an example. Nowhere is it set
down that when a call is connected the recipient of the call is supposed to speak
first, or that normally the maker of the call is supposed to instigate the ending of
the call, or that the recipient speaks last (echoing the goodbye of the maker of the
call). The fact that a certain set of rules is tacit does not preclude the existence of
a practice based on them.
This is the potential answer to the problem with Crispin Wright’s observation
about effortless first-person authority: we do not appear to have that for syn-
tax, in the general case. We can have tacit command of a rule that one cannot
state, and the fact that we cannot state it does not mean we cannot recognize
departures from what it requires.
What the tacitly acknowledged rules of grammar do is to define certain ways
of structuring expressions and associating themwith meanings. Millar put it this
way in the handout for a talk at the University of Edinburgh in 2010:
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The commitments incurred by participation in a practice have a closely anal-
ogous structure to those incurred by beliefs and intentions. Participating in
a practice, G, incurs a commitment to following the rules of G. To a first
approximation that amounts to it being the case that one ought to avoid
continuing to participate in G while not following the rules of G. [… T]here
are twoways to discharge the commitment – bywithdrawing from the prac-
tice and by complying with the rules.
Rules of grammar that define expressions as being structured in certain ways
do not entail that we ought to structure our expressions in those ways.
We do incur a commitment to structure our expressions in the English way
when we decide to speak English. But incurring a commitment to do something
does not entail that we ought to do it. Sometimes the way to deal with a commit-
ment that we incur by engaging in a certain practice is to cease engaging in the
practice.
Millar uses the example of offensive ethnic terms to illustrate the point that
the existence of a practice says nothing about what we ought to do: Chink in
English is an offensive epithet meaning “Chinese person”. But the existence of a
practice of saying Chink to mean “Chinese person” does not imply that anyone
ought to use the term: most would say the opposite is true.
It is not by anymeans as easy to illustrate the same sort of thing in syntax, but I
think it is possible. Consider the fact that it is usual for the direct object to follow
the verb in what the Cambridge Grammar of the English Language (Huddleston
& Pullum 2002) calls canonical clauses:
(8) a. The old tree shades the house.
b. * The old tree the house shades.
That rule codifies a certain practice, applying the generalization to an indefi-
nitely large range of expressions, not just recording properties of previous utter-
ances. It has normative force in that it defines it as syntactically incorrect to put
the object before the verb. If we do not put the object before the verb, other things
being equal, we are not respecting the constraints of English syntax. But it does
not follow that anyone ought to place any direct object before any verb. A person
might have reason not to respect the constraints of English syntax. For example,
someone might be imitating the poetry of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries,
where the long-extinct order with object before verb was often employed.
One might well ask what point there could be to having rules that do not have
to be obeyed. This would be like having rules of the road that nobody has to
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follow. The rules of the road at least have instrumental motivation relating to
safety, but in the case of grammar we do not even have that. Millar (handout) in
effect answers that question when he says:
On the view I am promoting it is our participation in practices and our abil-
ity to recognize what these require in particular situations that enables us
both to make reasonable predictions about, and make sense of, what people
think and do. The basic idea is simple. Because we know how people are
supposed to act we can often make sense of how they do act and how they
are likely to act.
In talking about making sense Millar is not necessarily to be interpreted as refer-
ring to the understanding of meaning, either semantic or pragmatic. The point
has nothing inherently to do with the correct apprehension of literal meaning
or perceiving the utterer’s intended meaning, though it may apply to those ac-
complishments, and it may not even imply those abilities. I am breaking with the
usual practice among philosophers of language in wanting to talk about syntax.
The understanding I am alluding to is simply a matter of making sense of what
is going on linguistically: what sort of system the interlocutor is using, what to
expect, what to infer about the intent of a speaker or the likely form of further
utterances.
Understanding of meaning is neither necessary nor sufficient for the syntac-
tic ability I am talking about. It is not necessary because it is often possible to
grasp the structure of an uttered sentence without having the vaguest clue as
to its meaning. Faced with something like I doubt whether that is not necessarily
not untrue, most people are aware that they have heard something grammatical
but they cannot work out the truth conditions of a quadruple negation. And we
can immediately perceive the grammaticality of Appearances are not deceptive, it
only seems as if they are; working out from its meaning whether it is sensible or
contradictory is much harder. But it is also not sufficient: being able to extract
the meaning does not imply grasping the syntactic structure. We often correctly
identify intended meanings despite massive non-compliance with syntax: if a
worried stranger says “Me need you help! Me house go fire!” we would know what
was meant.
However, it remains true that if we follow the practice of ordering words and
structuring phrases and clauses in the English manner, and our interlocutor un-
derstands us to be following that practice, they can make sense of certain aspects
of our intentions that otherwise would be inscrutable to them, and they canmake
much better guesses at why our linguistic behaviour is the way it is, and what to
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expect in future utterances. They can assume that if we begin an utterance with
an auxiliary verb and continue with a nominative pronoun (Can we…; Is he…;
Will they…) we are beginning a closed interrogative, and thus that we will prob-
ably continue with a verb phrase, and are probably about to ask a question with
a yes/no answer, and are likely to have made the assumption that they know the
answer to the question, and so on.
If we depart from the usual practices, that does not necessarily mean that we
should not have, or that we have made a mistake. If our interlocutor detects
that we have departed from the usual grammatical practices, they can simply
regard us as having ceased to operate in accord with the usual rules, and they
can reason about why that might be and what they should assume from now on.
A normal context is one where we appear to be respecting the same constraints
on sentence structure as they would, and using words they have encountered
before, so they assume we are using the same language, and they turn out to
be right. But there are also anomalous contexts, such as one in which a native
speaker who is required to draft a forced confession by the agents of a foreign
dictatorship puts subtle syntactic mistakes into the text to signal that he is under
duress, intending people back home to spot that he is not complying with the
usual constraints.
There are any number of reasons why we might depart from normal syntax:
we might be half asleep, drunk, delirious, brain-damaged, interrupted, distracted,
foreign, playful, joking, impersonating someone. But if our interlocutor can see
why we have departed from the usual grammatical practices, they may be able
to understand what is going on with us. Otherwise, we become mysterious. But
it is of course our right to be mysterious if we want to: the fact that grammatical
constraints have normative force does not impose on us, even as a default, any
obligation to obey.
7 Conclusion
What I have tried to do in this rather wide-ranging survey is to make the follow-
ing points. I have stressed that the formalist movement in logic had an important
rationale: representing logical proof in a totally syntactic way so that the com-
pleteness and consistency of a logical language (the correspondence between its
resources for proof and its efficacy in preserving truth under inference) could
be mathematically verified. It was in pursuit of this goal that Emil Post invented
the systems we now call generative grammars, the systems that were repurposed
three decades later for use in linguistics.
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Though talk of “rules of grammar” persisted in linguistics, even in Chomsky’s
work, it did not really make sense within a generative perspective (as Chomsky
himself noticed): rewriting operations are not rules in the sense that we can fol-
low them, behave in accordance with them, be guided by them, or violate them.
Yet we do need a conception of rules with normative force in the ordinary sense
of rules that can be respected or violated, for the point of linguistic grammars
is not to compactly represent a corpus or to characterize a mental organ, but to
define well-formedness over an indefinitely large class of sentences.
The claim that rules of grammar have normative force should not be confused
with the bid to change people’s linguistic habits and practices represented by the
prescriptive grammar tradition. And it should also not be taken to be at odds with
the empirical character of linguistics (there is a fact of the matter about whether
English is a prepositional or a postpositional language), or to be in conflict with
the goal of making the predictions of grammars fully clear and explicit, with help
from tools from logic and mathematics.
I believe that generative grammars (the systems that Post invented) were the
wrong tool to pick, but there are alternatives. Repurposing model theory for syn-
tactic description, for example, is a better idea. Under that view grammars are
finite sets of constraints on structure, andwell-formedness is construed as model-
theoretic satisfaction. An early work advocating this view was Johnson & Postal
(1980). Rogers (1998) develops it in a much more technically sophisticated way,
and uses the model-theoretic perspective to derive some fascinating insights con-
cerning what generative grammars of early 1980s vintage actually claimed (they
were in fact strongly equivalent to context-free phrase structure grammars). A
small but growing minority of syntacticians have been further developing the
idea that formal grammars could be developed along model-theoretic lines (see
Pullum & Scholz 2001 and Pullum 2013 for discussion and references).
As to how formalized constraints on sentence structure can have normative
force without in any sense implying anything about what anyone should do, or
implying any judgment on a person that they have done something wrong (or
right), I think thework to turn to is that ofMillar (2004), who (as briefly recounted
above) relates the normativity of rules in certain kinds of systems not in what
we ought to do but in what can make our words or actions more predictable to
others. Weaving together the strands I have briefly surveyed here offers what I
believe might be a productive line of work in the steadily unifying disciplines of
philosophy, psychology, and linguistic science.
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Chapter 9
Linguistic form: A political epistemology
Nick Riemer
TheUniversity of Sydney & Laboratoire d’histoire des théories linguistiques, Uni-
versité Paris-Diderot
This chapter explores ideological dimensions of contemporary mainstream linguis-
tics, especially with reference to the “unique form hypothesis”: the assumption that
each language has a single form, which it is the role of linguistics to characterize.
The chapter surveys grounds for scepticism about the hypothesis, reviews some
recent ideological critiques of linguistics, and sketches the contours of a specula-
tive “political epistemology” of the unique form hypothesis, suggesting how well-
known critiques of the other social sciences might apply to structural linguistics
research. It pays special attention to the unique form hypothesis’ role as a vehicle
for the discretionary intellectual authority of the linguistic expert – in the pedagog-
ical context, the lecturer who serves as the origin and authority of the ideas about
language structure transmitted to the linguistics student. This authority is argued
to replicate and so to normalize, in the domain of education, the kinds of relations
of social domination on which contemporary political orders rest. As a result of
this discussion, the theoretical biases of contemporary linguistics are replaced in
the broader socio-ideological context to which they belong, and considered with
respect to some classic political critiques of “bourgeois” social science.
1 Introduction
What might it mean to assert that a language has a form, and what political and
ideological consequences, broadly conceived, might such an assertion currently
entail? If, with Konrad Koerner (1999), we accept that linguists in the past have
been “particularly prone to cater, consciously or not, to ideas and interests out-
side their discipline and, as history shows, allowed at times their findings to be
used for purposes they were not originally intended”, then the question arises
Nick Riemer. 2019. Linguistic form: A political epistemology. In James McEl-
venny (ed.), Form and formalism in linguistics, 225–264. Berlin: Language
Science Press. DOI:10.5281/zenodo.2654369
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as to whether, and if so how, this may also happen today.1 One of the functions
of the humanities and social sciences in general, it has often been argued, is to
supply an apologetics of the dominant political order and the ideologies that ac-
company it (Nizan 1971 [1932], Chomsky 1978 [1967], Ingleby 1972, Baudrillard
2001 [1972], Bourdieu 1991). What role in this apologetics might linguistics play?
What insights might the “critical” tradition in the reflexive social sciences bring
to our understanding of the nature of formalist linguistics as an intellectual, dis-
ciplinary and ideological project? In exploring these questions, this contribution
starts notwith the substantives language and form, butwith the indefinite articles
accompanying them, and the implications of singularity they introduce. Those
articles express central intellectual and ideological characteristics of contempo-
rary “structural” or “formal” linguistics – those varieties of the discipline, that is,
that posit a unique underlying “form” of language and set out to characterize it.2
In its mapping of grammatical form, this kind of linguistics deploys reductive, ob-
jectivizing and centripetal procedures in order to discern a single structural unity
underlying the diversity of observable manifestations of language.The rules, gen-
eralizations, and categorizations deployed in describing grammar tend in a single
direction: almost exclusively, intellectual effort is devoted to bringing complex
facts under the scope of general rules, and to deriving the diverse manifestations
of speech, sign and text from the operations of a unique and singular grammar
– the Platonic form that underlies the variety of human language, guarantor of
the “scientificity” of linguistics.
“There is a single French language, a single grammar, a single Republic”, the
French Education Minister, Jean-Michel Blanquer tweeted in November 2017 in
the context of calls for French spelling reform in the interests of gender inclusive-
ness.3 But while traditional grammar has always sought to discern – or, more
frequently, establish – forms (plural) in language, the “unique form hypothesis”
– the idea that each language has a single form, which linguists scientifically re-
1An earlier version of some of these ideas was published as Riemer (2016b).
2It is important for what follows to note that, as I use it here, “formal linguistics” has a far wider
extension than usual.Whereas in its typical use “formal” denotes a feature of linguistic method-
ology – the use of mathematizable techniques in grammatical analysis – here it is simply used
to refer to any theoretical endeavour that assumes that a language has a unique underlying
form. Approaches that avoid this hypothesis are, needless to say, in a distinct minority in the
discipline: the most obvious example, no doubt, is integrational linguistics, which rejects the
assumption of “a single vantage point fromwhich language presents itself as forming a unified
or homogeneous system”, along with “the idea of a scientific search for the single best model
or set of procedures for analyzing language and communication” (Pablé & Hutton 2015: 4, 15).
3“Il y a une seule langue française, une seule grammaire, une seule République.” See https://
twitter.com/jmblanquer/status/930813255211208707.
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veal – has not been a permanent feature of the discipline, and it is not a necessary
one. Its dominance in our period therefore deserves to be critically analysed. In
this chapter, I propose to explore the ideological dimensions of the unique form
hypothesis in linguistics, particularly with respect to its political and ideological
affordances in the era of contemporary “platform” capitalism (Srnicek 2017). Ko-
erner (2000: 19) observes that “linguistics, past and present, has never been ‘value
free’, but has often been subject to a variety of external influences and opinions,
not all of them beneficial to either the discipline itself or the society that sustains
it”. In the spirit of this remark, I will ask what might lend the unique form hypoth-
esis plausibility in the context of the overarching ideological climate in which
linguistics research and teaching currently unfold, understanding ideology in
Slavoj Žižek’s sense of ideas that are “functional with regard to some relation
of social domination (‘power’, ‘exploitation’) in an inherently non-transparent
way” (Žižek 1994: 8).
According to Christopher Hutton, “linguists […] generally associate their dis-
cipline and the practice of linguistic analysis with a vague form of liberal pro-
gressiveness” (Hutton 2001: 295). A corresponding progressivism of some kind
no doubt also characterizesmost linguists’ political orientation: right-wing politi-
cal views are probably distinctly in the minority in the profession. Yet ideological
critiques identifying political aspects of linguistics, whether progressive or anti-
progressive, are only rarely acknowledged in the discipline itself. Many linguists,
working under the assumption that they are doing “normal science”, often hes-
itate to take ideological analysis seriously, and linguistics’ scientific aspirations
regularly serve to inhibit any critical reflection on either the epistemological sta-
tus or political import of the discipline’s theoretical results.
Such reflection is nevertheless both important and interesting. As Talbot Tay-
lor notes,
if purportedly descriptive discourse on language is best reconceived as a
(covertly authoritarian mode of) normative discourse, then the assertion
of the political irrelevance and ideological neutrality of linguistic science
can no longer be maintained. (Taylor 1990: 25)
Examining the ideological dimensions of linguistics in order to propose a “polit-
ical epistemology” of the discipline – an account of the political and ideological
conditions that help secure acceptance of theoretical propositions – can only en-
rich the way in which linguistics understands itself. Linguists may often prefer
to maintain the illusion of a wholly independent and isolated discipline, but we
are ourselves well and truly members of the body politic. Understanding how
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linguistics works also means understanding its connections to society, illumi-
nating the ways in which external stakes can feed into linguistic research, and,
correspondingly, how linguistic theories themselves can act on the world outside
theory.4
I begin by briefly surveying a number of the ways in which the reductive and
formalizing energies embodied in the unique form hypothesis have been or could
be called into question, thereby establishing that the unique form hypothesis is,
precisely, just that. I then review a number of ideological critiques of linguis-
tics from the past several decades, before sketching the contours of a speculative
“political epistemology” of the unique form hypothesis, which shows how well-
known critiques of the other social sciences might apply to structural linguistics
research. In particular, I consider the unique form hypothesis from the point of
view of an aspect of the discipline often neglected by historians: its function in
undergraduate education. This pedagogical function is essential for an accurate
grasp of the ideological dimensions of linguistics as a discipline. I pay special
attention to the unique form hypothesis’ role as a vehicle for the discretionary
authority of the linguistic expert – in the pedagogical context, the lecturer who
serves as the origin and guarantor of the ideas about language structure transmit-
ted to the student. I consider an interpretation of this authority as prefiguring and
normalizing, in the symbolic register, the kinds of relations of social domination
on which contemporary political orders rest, and to which linguistics undergrad-
uates, like those in other disciplines, must learn, as one of the key functions of a
university education, to accommodate themselves. As a result of this discussion,
the theoretical biases of contemporary linguistics are replaced in the broader
socio-ideological context to which they belong, and considered with respect to
some classic political critiques of “bourgeois” social science.
2 Must language have a single form?
To raise the question is, of course, to bring linguistics’ very disciplinary identity
into question. In a striking example of the way in which the formal presuppo-
sitions of theories can be ignored by their own proponents, however, linguists
sometimes react negatively to the suggestion that they are involved in charac-
terizing the form of languages, and protest against the dogmatism and epistemo-
logical closure that such a claim might be taken to entail. So it is important, at
the outset, to register precisely that the very idea of the grammar, the structure,
4I have explored an aspect of this latter question in Riemer (2019).
228
9 Linguistic form: A political epistemology
or the form of a language, particularly when coupled with the empirical proce-
dures of modern linguistic “science”, carries exactly this implication of singular-
ity. To characterize the phonological structure of a language is to claim that the
language has – until, of course, improvements in phonological theory prompt
revisions – this phonology, and not some other. Equivalent remarks apply to the
other grammatical subfields. Regardless of the open-mindedness or tolerance for
different perspectives with which any particular researcher approaches the sub-
ject matter, it is intrinsic to the theoretical enterprise of formal linguistics in its
contemporary guise that any paradigm within it advances a claim of uniqueness
for its current best analysis of a particular grammatical phenomenon. This does
not mean formal linguists are epistemic zealots: like any empirical researchers,
they replace their current conception of what form is like when a better theory
presents itself, all things being equal. But it is only if the unique form hypoth-
esis is adopted that this process of theoretical replacement can be understood.
If the presumption was that a multitude of different analyses of a grammatical
phenomenon was possible, and that any number of different interpretations of
the grammar could be equally “correct”, or correct in different ways or for differ-
ent purposes, formal linguistics’ basic operational norms could not be sustained.
Without the premise that languages have a unique form,monopolistic theoretical
competition over the right way to characterize that form becomes meaningless.
The assumption that any language has a single form is, then, necessary to the
very practice of the discipline. But the history, and even just the recent history,
of reflection on language, within linguistics and outside it, offers ample grounds
for calling that assumption into question.
Doing so does not mean denying that languages have forms at all or denying
that they can be represented structurally; it just means denying that those forms
and representations are necessarily unique. In this section, I will briefly review
a handful of considerations which militate against the unique form hypothesis.
These considerations do not always contradict the hypothesis directly; but their
effect is to weaken its plausibility by calling into question many of the ideas
about language or its structure which accompany it. The aim of my review of
these considerations is therefore to illustrate that the unique form hypothesis is
not self-evidently correct: that it has a case to answer. And if the hypothesis can
at least be doubted, then we have good reason to enquire into the forces that
quarantine it from that doubt so thoroughly in the modern discipline.
Themost serious obstacle to the unique form hypothesis comes, no doubt, from
the failure of linguistic theory to reach consensus on what such a form might be.
This is more than the necessary “failure” intrinsic to ongoing empirical enquiry,
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in which the inadequacy of the previous best theory and its replacement by a
successor is the very mark of scientific progress. This continual renovation of
the best theory is not the case in linguistics, since even cursory inspection of the
major subfields shows that linguists do not agree even on the premises on which
the search for a unique form is to be conducted. Whatever its practitioners might
think, linguistics is not characterized in a Kuhnian fashion by a contrast between
periods of “normal science” in which the details of accepted paradigms are being
refined, and wholesale paradigm shifts which thoroughly change the field’s basic
apparatus. Instead, “formal” linguistics is the site of numerous jockeying para-
digms, none of which is the object of consensus, investigators not even sharing a
single set of metatheoretical criteria on which the relative adequacy of different
explanatory models could be judged (for example, only some researchers accept
that a theory of syntax should be “generative” in the Chomskyan sense). In a sit-
uation like this, the idea that language does, in fact, have a unique form available
for investigators to discover, seems incongruous.
For the purposes of linguistics, a language has a form if it can be reduced to
a series of rules (generalizations) which demarcate units which are fully part of
the language (“grammatical” ones) from ungrammatical or less grammatical ones.
The true “form” of the language (“grammar”, “competence”, “langue”), then, is
the one for which the grammatical theory accounts, the others (“usage”, “perfor-
mance”, “parole”) being understood as derivative of this. One does not have to be
a generativist to accept this elementary definition: it is implicit in essentially all
attempts to explain “surface” well-formedness by reference to “underlying” gram-
matical rules. The role of underlying rules in grammar allows us to recognize a
second obstacle to the unique form hypothesis. As acknowledged by Chomsky
(1986), among others, the second Wittgenstein’s (2001 [1953]: §§139, 40) sceptical
critique of the notion of rule-following, especially in the version popularized by
Saul Kripke (1982), poses a serious challenge to any attempt to ground grammar
in rules. There is not the space here to go into the detail needed to develop the
arguments that underlie the Wittgensteinian critique properly, or to address the
numerous difficult questions it raises.5 We will instead briefly sketch one aspect
of it.
Wittgenstein establishes that what constitutes following a rule or being in
conformity with a rule is indeterminate: for any given rule, there is any number
of different and indeed contradictory behaviours which might be described as
following, or as in conformity with it. Applied to language, this means that a
5For an attempt to do the question greater justice, see section 3.3 of Riemer (2005) and the
references there.
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grammatical rule cannot correspond to, mandate or “generate” any single surface
output; and, conversely, that the well-formedness of an utterance in a language
cannot be exhaustively explained by any single rule or set of rules. The reason
is the following: since, as Wittgenstein demonstrates, the way in which a rule is
to be followed is always ambiguous, and numerous different and contradictory
behaviours can all count as conforming to the rule, no rule or set of rules is
sufficient on its own to specify a unique output. Any grammatical rule requires
a set of further rules which governs the way in which it is to be applied – yet
this combination of first and second-order rules is itself powerless to specify any
determinate set of grammatical sentences as its output, since the second-order
rule is just as much in need of principles of interpretation setting how it is to be
applied, as was the original rule itself. Second-order rules need third-order ones
to set their application, third-order ones need fourth-order ones, and so on. An
infinite interpretative regress is set in train that has been argued to undermine
any attempt to conceive of rule systems such as grammars as anything other
than heuristically convenient representations of aspects of language.
The conclusion I have drawn elsewhere about the effect of the “rule-following
argument” in semantics generalizes to any domain of formal structure: the rule-
following argument renders all competing rule-based explanations of a linguistic
regularity equivalent (Riemer 2005: 52). In proposing rules as part of the analysis
of language structure, the linguist is relying on a tacit “background” of practices
which allows her to apply those rules with confidence and generate the output
in an apparently definite way, effectively ignoring the interpretative indetermi-
nacy that attaches to any given rule, and even though the rule itself radically
underdetermines the “correct” result.
The fact that any rule relies on an infinite number of interpretative meta-rules
radically levels the status of the theoretical metalanguages in which grammati-
cal rules are stated vis-à-vis the object languages which they supposedly explain:
rather than standing over our ordinary language practices in a relation of theo-
retical explanation to them, the metalinguistic enunciation of grammatical rules
emerges as simply a different kind of linguistic practice, equally reliant on an un-
explicated background as the object language practices for which it purports to
account, and to which no explanatory priority can therefore be attached.There is,
for the later Wittgenstein, simply no more fundamental level of simplicity in the
explanatory order than our everyday language use: to seek out some more basic
level of theoretical explanation underlying it is to substitute a deluded search for
unattainable “philosophical” certainty for the (confusingly named) “grammati-
cal” description of our everyday practices that is, he believes, the real, therapeu-
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tic task of reflection. If to have a form is to be characterized by rules exhaustively
explaining well-formedness, Wittgenstein offers a critique of the very possibility
of that explanatory project.
Another important line of objection to the unique form hypothesis takes its
inspiration from the broad phenomenological tradition, and can be constructed
through appeal to a range of thinkers such as Heidegger, Gadamer, Hubert Drey-
fus and –with a very different critical sociological twist – Bourdieu.6Thepremise
of this line of thought can be captured in the proposition that “philosophy [and
so linguistics] has from the start systematically ignored or distorted the everyday
context of human activity” and that the everyday world cannot be represented
by a “theory [that] formulates the relationships among objective, context-free
elements (simples, primitives, features, attributes, factors, data points, cues, etc.)
in terms of abstract principles (covering laws, rules, programs, etc.)” (Dreyfus
& Dreyfus 1988: 25, 28). Applied to linguistics, the essence of this critique can
be summed up in the proposition that the formal structure which linguistic sci-
ence sees as the basis of linguistic competence does not reflect any underlying
linguistic “essence”, but should be understood instead as a product of artificial sit-
uations of “breakdown” in which our ordinary relation to our linguistic practices
has been suspended. The formal rules and categories posited to underlie speech
do not, on this account, reflect anything deep about the nature of language: they
are, instead, theorists’ elaborations of the heuristics to which speakers appeal
post hoc in order to consciously and artificially rationalize aspects of their un-
reflective linguistic behaviour. For Gadamer, for instance, outside situations of
breakdown, speakers are not just unaware of language as form: they are even
unaware of language as language:
No individual has a real consciousness of his speaking when he speaks.
Only in exceptional situations does one become conscious of the language
in which he is speaking. It happens, for instance, when someone starts to
say something but hesitates because what he is about to say seems strange
or funny. He wonders, “Can one really say that?” Here for a moment the
language we speak becomes conscious because it does not do what is pe-
culiar to it. (Gadamer 1976 [1966]: 64)
Form is what is left when meaning has been emptied out. Many phenomenologi-
cally inspired thinkers like Gadamer, accordingly, maintain that speaker-hearers
6Christopher Lawn’s (2004) comparison of Gadamer andWittgenstein can usefully be consulted
here as an indication of the continuities between this and the previous line of critique.
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are simply not aware of language as form, in the sense of a dimension of speech
separated from meaning. InThe phenomenology of perception, Merleau-Ponty de-
nies that speech and thought (meaning) are “thematically given” to the speaker
independently of each other: in fact, he says, “they are intervolved, the sense be-
ing held within the word, and the word being the external existence of the sense”
(Merleau-Ponty 1962 [1945]: 182). The speaker is not aware of two things when
speaking, the form (the word) and its meanings (her thoughts); the very division
between the two only emerges when the speaker steps out of their unmonitored,
prereflective linguistic habitus and adopts an artificially external attitude to it –
Bourdieu’s (2003 [1997]: 12) “scholastic disposition”.
In this situation of what Gadamer calls the intrinsic “self-forgetfulness” of lan-
guage, the idea that structural form underlies linguistic action represents a seri-
ous misconstrual: language is, first and foremost, the activity of speaking, and
structure – “form” – is an artificial domain of constructed regularity carved out
from it a posteriori (for some interesting illustration, see Preston 1996). Language
is not, therefore, fundamentally semiotic: it should not be seen as a code uniting
(more or less) fixed forms with (more or less) fixed meanings:
Signs […] are a means to an end. They are put to use as one desires and
then laid aside just as are all other means to the ends of human activity.
[… A]ctual speaking is more than the choice of means to achieve some
purpose in communication. The language one masters is such that one
lives within it, that is “knows” what one wishes to communicate in no way
other than in linguistic form. “Choosing” one’s words is an appearance or
effect created in communication when speaking is inhibited. “Free” speak-
ing flows forward in forgetfulness of oneself and in self-surrender to the
subject-matter made present in the medium of language. (Gadamer 1976
[1972]: 87)
If language is not a system of signs, and if speech is not to be theoretically con-
ceptualized as the mere implementation of an antecedent grammatical structure,
then the interest of formal approaches to characterizing this structure is imme-
diately diminished. In terms largely compatible with Gadamer’s, Bourdieu (1991:
37, italics original) criticizes “the intellectualist philosophy which treats language
as an object of contemplation rather than as an instrument of action and power”,
a treatment he sees as perfectly instantiated in the word-plus-definition concep-
tion of the vocabulary embodied in dictionaries. The postulation of structure on
which formal linguistics depends can be criticized, that is, for a fundamental, in-
tellectualist misconstrual of the nature of our relationship to language, and hence
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of the nature of language itself. In Pascalian meditations, Bourdieu pursues a sim-
ilar line of thought:
Projecting his theoretical thinking into the heads of acting agents, the re-
searcher presents the world as he thinks it (that is, as an object of contem-
plation, a representation, a spectacle) as if it were the world as it presents
itself to those who do not have the leisure (or the desire) to withdraw from
it in order to think it. He sets at the origin of their practices, that is to say,
in their “consciousnesses”, his own spontaneous or elaborated representa-
tions, or, worse, the models he has had to construct (sometimes against
his own naive experience) to account for their practices. (Bourdieu 2003
[1997]: 51)
Bourdieu emphasises the intrinsic distortion that this kind of theoretical mod-
elling introduces:
simply because we pause in thought over our practice, because we turn
back to it to consider it, describe it, analyse it, we become in a sense ab-
sent from it; we tend to substitute for the active agent the reflecting “sub-
ject”, for practical knowledge the theoretical knowledge which selects sig-
nificant features, pertinent indices (as in autobiographical narratives) and
which, more profoundly, performs an essential alteration of experience.
(Bourdieu 2003 [1997]: 51–52)
He concludes that “it is very unlikely that anyonewho is immersed in the scholas-
tic ‘language game’ will be able to come and point out that the very fact of
thought and discourse about practice separates us from practice” (Bourdieu 2003
[1997]: 52). If, simply in virtue of their status as representation and explanation,
theoretical models must be understood as “distortions” of the reality they model,
there is even less justification for seeing any one particular theoretical model as
uniquely accurate. On Bourdieu’s account, theoretical knowledge of language,
with the forms it posits, is something intrinsically different from the practical
knowledge that speaking deploys; there is therefore even less reason to anoint a
single theoretical representation as the definitive unique body of forms underly-
ing linguistic practice.
The final source of doubt about the unique form hypothesis that I will briefly
mention comes from the work of researchers in the “translanguaging” move-
ment:
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The point is simple: a named national language is the same kind of thing
as a named national cuisine. Like a named national cuisine, a named lan-
guage is defined by the social, political or ethnic affiliation of its speakers.
Although the idea of the social construction of named languages is old in
the language fields, it is often not understood. The point that needs repeat-
ing is that a named language cannot be defined linguistically, cannot be
defined, that is, in grammatical (lexical or structural) terms. And because
a named language cannot be defined linguistically, it is not, strictly speak-
ing, a linguistic object; it is not something that a person speaks. (Otheguy
& Reid 2015: 286)
As is the case in generativism (see, e.g., Chomsky 2000), translanguaging schol-
ars only recognize the existence of idiolects, “the system that underlies what
a person actually speaks, … [consisting] of ordered and categorized lexical and
grammatical features” (Otheguy & Reid 2015: 289). Insofar as “linguistic form” is
understood as the form of a language, where the latter is defined pretheoretically
and exemplified by such things as “French”, “Turkish” or “Arabic”, translanguag-
ing scholars explicitly reject the proposition that such form exists.
3 Ideological critiques of linguistics: a sampler
There are, then, many reasons for which the unique form hypothesis might be
doubted. But it will be clear that the grounds for scepticism that we have just
surveyed are either highly marginal within linguistics, or come from disciplinary
traditions outside it. The analytical task that faces us, therefore, is to understand
why this is the case. Why is questioning of the unique form hypothesis so alien
to mainstream linguistics itself?
In looking to what I am calling a “political epistemology” of the discipline,
my presupposition is that the answer is, in part at least, ideological. Linguistics
occupies a highly independent – sometimes, indeed, isolated – position within
the contemporary humanities and social sciences. That intellectual autonomy,
however, does not entail social, political, or ideological innocence or neutrality.
Nor does it mean that linguistics has no effect on the world beyond its own in-
tellectual frontiers, still less that it is not influenced by the overall context in
which research is conducted (see Joseph 2002: 182 for some pertinent observa-
tions). So linguists must not, in Talbot Taylor’s (1990: 20) words, “continue to
mistake theories of the nature of languages and linguistic competence as cultur-
ally neutral and value-free, conceiving of ourselves as unbiased conveyors of sci-
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entific objectivity”. This is particularly the case given that acceptable ideological
objectives of grammatical and linguistic analysis are not infrequently avowed
perfectly openly. Linguistic description, especially, has often been framed as a
progressive intellectual project designed to loosen the arbitrary grammatical au-
thority of social elites.7
On the other side of the ledger, reactionary ideological consequences of mod-
ern models of grammar have also often been denounced, though mainly from
outside linguistics itself. To generalize massively, the main line of critique can be
summarized in the proposition that linguistics’ semiotic and cognitive premises
entail an instrumentalist, asocial vision of language and humanity, well suited
to the liberal ideology of capitalist exploitation. As far as I know, however, the
history – a fascinating one – of ideological critiques of linguistics remains to be
written. In order to situate the ideas that follow, in this section I will briefly men-
tion some more recent critiques, before considering their relation to the unique
form hypothesis in the next. Because these critiques are often not well known, I
will not hesitate to quote from them generously.
Arguably the most important ideological effects of linguistics are those which
it shares with the social sciences and humanities more generally. A common line
of critique targets the historical role of disciplines in this category, linguistics
included, in promoting norms of bourgeois liberalism, understood as the domi-
nant ideology of competitive capitalism. Applied to linguistics, the core of this
critique would focus on the discipline’s near-universal construal of language as a
sign system, along with the model of autonomous subjecthood that accompanies
it. The significance of the semiotic framing of language derives from the status
of signs as things which people autonomously and rationally use to further their
ends:
When you speak, you are using a form of telemetry, not so different from
the remote control of your television […] Just as we use the infrared device
to alter some electronic setting within a television so that it tunes to a
different channel that suits our mood, we use our language to alter the
settings inside someone else’s brain in a way that will serve our interests.
(Pagel 2012: 275–276, quoted by Enfield & Sidnell 2017: 75)
The semiotic view of language entails that speakers’ and hearers’ relation to lan-
guage is essentially instrumental, but not only in the way acknowledged in the
7This is by no means a uniquely modern framing. According to Talbot Taylor (1990: 11), the
18th century grammarian Horne “Tooke argued for a descriptive approach to language in part
because he felt it would help to free language from the control of political authorities andwould
thereby offer access to the use of that powerful instrument by the politically oppressed.”
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quotation: quite aside from any effect produced by signs on hearers (“alter[ing]
the settings inside someone else’s brain in a way that will serve our interests”),
the speaker uses signs in order to convey the coded meanings which correspond
to the conceptual or denotational content they wish to express, following the
rational determinations of an underlying code. This semiotic-instrumental con-
ception of language as code locates the source of speech uniquely in the indi-
vidual, and wholly obfuscates social determinants of linguistic acts.8 Structural
linguists, Bourdieu (1991: 44) says, “merely incorporate into their theory a pre-
constructed object, ignoring its social laws of construction and masking its so-
cial genesis”. This asocial vision elevates the individual’s means-end rationality
as the all-important parameter governing speech. It thereby promotes the fan-
tasy of a rational, sovereign, and unfettered subject with a uniform code at her
disposal, free of the constraints introduced by class, gender or ethnicity, either
in the speech situations in which she might participate, or in her access to the
code itself. This is the very ideology of autonomous rational agenthood that ac-
companied, for instance in Locke, the development of bourgeois liberalism and
the market economy, and that is essential to their justification (Losurdo 2014).
The ideological rationale for the “free” market rests on the fiction of the sub-
ject as homo economicus, a maximally informed, rational and independent agent
of commodity transactions in an individualized, competitive market – a fiction
obligingly affirmed not only by the semiotic conception of language and its var-
ious philosophical elaborations, but by the premises of much other work in the
humanities and social sciences.
The advent of the forms of heavily authoritarian capitalism characteristic of
the administered economies of the twentieth century elicited a famous ideologi-
cal critique frommembers of the Frankfurt School. This critique of “instrumental
reason” – the term is Horkheimer’s (1992 [1947]) – has clearly been of significant
influence on the more specific critiques of linguistics we will consider shortly.
ThemodernWest, Horkheimer and Adorno claimed, perverts reason, reifies dom-
ination as law and organization, and leads to a “nullification” of the individual
in the face of dominant economic powers (Horkheimer & Adorno 2002 [1944]:
xvii). “Bourgeois society,” they say
is ruled by equivalence. It makes dissimilar things comparable by reducing
them to abstract quantities. For the Enlightenment, anything which can-
not be resolved into numbers, and ultimately into one, is illusion; modern
8The individualist bias of theories in pragmatics has been a particular object of criticism by schol-
ars working on non-Western and postcolonial communities: see Anchimbe & Janney (2017) for
a summary.
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positivism consigns it to poetry. Unity remains the watchword from Par-
menides to Russell. All gods and qualities must be destroyed. (Horkheimer
& Adorno 2002 [1944]: 4–5)
The effect is that individuals, in all their particularity, contradictions and anomie,
“are tolerated only as far as their wholehearted identity with the universal is be-
yond question” (Horkheimer & Adorno 2002 [1944]: 124), where “the universal”
stands for the permanence of social compulsion, the form in which the inex-
orable power of the modern socioeconomic order confronts individuals, “who
must mold themselves to the technical apparatus [of the economy] body and
soul” (Horkheimer & Adorno 2002 [1944]: 23). The principle of universality or
identity, in this vision, “strives to suppress all contradiction”, a process which, as
Terry Eagleton (1991: 127) puts it, “has been brought to perfection in the reified,
bureaucratized, administered world of advanced capitalism”.
This process of universalization and suppression of difference is reflected in
linguistics’ construal of the activity of speech as selection from a shared, formal-
izable semiotic code: rather than intersubjective expressions of ourselves, mean-
ings are reified (commodified) components of a formal calculus which we freely
exchange to accomplish certain goals, and from which we are therefore essen-
tially alienated. By installing the same formal code in the head of every speaker,
grammatical theory accomplishes a wholesale cognitive uniformization, offering
a striking illustration of Horkheimer and Adorno’s (2002 [1944]: 3) claim that for
the modern sensibility “anything which does not conform to the standard of cal-
culability and utility must be viewed with suspicion”. Rationality is domination’s
nom de guerre: “the impartiality of scientific language,” Horkheimer & Adorno
(2002 [1944]: 17) say, “[…] merely provide[s] the existing order with a neutral
sign for itself”. Christopher Hutton’s (1999) demonstration of the links between
German “mother tongue” linguistics and National Socialism provides sobering
empirical illustration of Horkheimer and Adorno’s ideas, in a mode inflected by
vitalistic and mystical sensibilities.
The structuralist emphasis on the unique form underlying speech forces the
contingency of linguistic convention into the background and thereby displaces
attention from its changeable character. This displacement is, indeed, intrinsic to
the very project of writing a grammar of a language, where both are thought of
as inherently singular. The totalizing and singularizing picture of language that
emerges contributes to what has sometimes been identified as the wider ideo-
logical purpose of the social sciences in general: to distract attention from the
alterability of human social arrangements, thereby affirming the inevitability of
the status quo, reflecting “a world of objects frozen in their monotonously self-
same being, […] thus binding us to what is, to the purely ‘given’ ” (Eagleton 1991:
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126, on Adorno). Linguistics’ structural universalizing, on this vision, has the ef-
fect of dematerializing the conception of humanity by abstracting it from local
circumstances. By stressing what is supposedly necessary to an undifferentiated
human nature, it forces the contingency of the social order into the background
and displaces attention from their volatile and hence politically modifiable char-
acter. In a similar vein, Blommaert and Verschueren (1991, 1992) have character-
ized the assumptions lying behind much work in linguistics as “the dogma of
homogeneism”: “a view of society in which differences are seen as dangerous
and centrifugal, and in which the ‘best’ society is suggested to be one without
intergroup differences” (Blommaert & Verschueren 1992: 362). In enforcing a sin-
gular vision of linguistic structure, theoretically suppressing linguistic variation,
and tacitly canonizing the standard (often, national) language, the unique form
hypothesis contributes centrally to the homogeneist dogma.
Critiques along these lines have a long pedigree. Almost forty years ago, De-
leuze and Guattari highlighted what they took to be the political implications
of the modern linguistic project. “Since,” they asked, “everybody knows that lan-
guage is a heterogeneous, variable reality, what is the meaning of the linguists’
insistence on carving out a homogeneous system in order to make a scientific
study possible?” Their answer deserves to be quoted in full:
It is a question of extracting a set of constants from the variables, or of
determining constant relations between variables (this is already evident
in the phonologists’ concept of commutativity). But the scientific model
taking language as an object of study is one with the political model by
which language is homogenized, centralized, standardized, becoming a lan-
guage of power, a major or dominant language. Linguistics can claim all
it wants to be science, nothing but pure science – it wouldn’t be the first
time that the order of pure science was used to secure the requirements
of another order. What is grammaticality, and the sign S, the categorical
symbol that dominates statements? It is a power marker before it is a syn-
tactical marker, and Chomsky’s trees establish constant relations between
power variables. Forming grammatically correct sentences is for the nor-
mal individual the prerequisite for any submission to social laws. No one
is supposed to be ignorant of grammaticality; those who are belong in spe-
cial institutions.The unity of language is fundamentally political. (Deleuze
& Guattari 1987 [1980]: 100–101)
“Linguistics,” Deleuze (1977: 21) comments elsewhere, “has triumphed at the
same time that information has been developing as power, and imposed its own
image of language and thought, suitable for the transmission of slogans and the
organisation of redundancies”.
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Recognition of an underside of theoretical analysis – its ideological links with
socio-political domination – is a constant in modern analysis of instrumental rea-
son. Deleuze and Guattari’s remarks recall Althusser’s (2015 [1976]) discussion
of the ideological import of idealist philosophy. For Althusser, the very project
of “philosophical languages” à la Descartes or Leibniz – a tradition well and truly
alive in contemporary linguistics – unwittingly serves an inherently authoritar-
ian and conformist political stance. The “vertiginous exercises” of philosophical
analysis, Althusser tells us, “are not neutral”, but intrinsically beholden to the
power of the status quo:
Even if they have no object, they have well known objectives, or, at least,
stakes. Since they speak of order, they speak of authority and thus of power,
and since there is no power other than the established one, that of the
dominant class, its power is the one they serve, even if they don’t know it,
and especially if they believe they are combatting it. (Althusser 2015 [1976]:
107)9
Sandrine Sorlin follows a similar line in criticizing the totalizing and reductive
vision of linguistic theory:
The common denominator of philosophical and universal language, stan-
dard languages, and […] the Saussurean concept of “langue” could be a
single attempt at reduction and autonomization. […] Like the universal lan-
guages which linguistically take account of the world in a single “glance”,
grammatical and linguistic activity is motivated by the same “aim of lin-
guistic unity” consisting in making language “single and visible”. (Sorlin
2012: 103)10
– for her, a highly ideological result:
9Original: “S’ils n’ont pas d’objet, ils ont des objectifs, ou, à tout lemoins, des enjeux bien connus.
Comme ils parlent d’ordre, c’est qu’ils parlent d’autorité, donc de pouvoir, et comme il n’est
de pouvoir qu’établi, celui de la classe dominante, c’est le sien qu’ils servent, même s’ils ne le
savent pas, et surtout s’ils pensent le combattre.” In all cases where no translation is cited in
the bibliography, translations are my own.
10“Ce qui pourrait être le dénominateur commun des diverses entreprises linguistiques étudiées,
à savoir les langues philosophiques et universelles, les langues standard, et, ici, le concept saus-
surien de ‘langue’, c’est une même tentative de réduction et d’autonomisation. […] À l’image
des langues universelles qui rendent linguistiquement compte du monde d’un seul ‘coup d’œil’,
l’activité grammaticale et linguistique est animée par la même ‘visée d’unité langagière’ con-
sistant à rendre la langue ‘une et visible’.”
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While “pure” linguistics believes itself to be neutral from the political and
social point of view, without being conscious of it, it is at base eminently
ideological. Its implicit acceptance of pre-established political categories is
masked by its methodological rigour. (Sorlin 2012: 113)11
Even more recently, Philippe Blanchet (2016: 73) has drawn attention to lin-
guistics’ disciplinary role in maintaining “glottophobia” – “the directly human,
social, political and ethical dimensions of linguistic discrimination” – by promot-
ing “a dissociation […] between language and society, between linguistic prac-
tices and speakers, between linguistic forms and individual and collective forms
of existence”. The debt of this analysis to the Frankfurt School is clear:
This dissociation has been effected by a long western intellectual – includ-
ing philosophical and scientific – tradition, which has conceptualized “lan-
guage” [la langue] as a cognitive tool: as a tool, it is therefore supposedly
exterior to the human and able to be evaluated, changed, validated or in-
validated from a strictly technical point of view; as a set of cognitive op-
erations, it is supposedly exterior to the social and able to be evaluated,
developed, implemented or corrected from a strict neurological and math-
ematical point of view. (Blanchet 2016: 73–73)12
Finally, it is necessary to mention critiques of the well-known links between
linguistics and colonialism. Christopher Hutton has emphasized that “the history
of modern linguistics […] is coextensive with that of high colonialism and inex-
tricably tied to it.” “The practices of descriptive linguistics,” Hutton (2001: 291)
writes, “require forms of privileged social access, and the attempt to set up a ty-
pology in which the relationships between the world’s languages are laid out is
an expression of a universal ‘panoptic vision’ ”. This theme will be taken up in
the following sections.
11“[…] alors même que la linguistique ‘pure et dure’ se croit neutre du point de vue politique
et social, sans en être consciente, elle est au fond éminemment idéologique. Son acceptation
implicite des catégories politiques préétablies est masquée par sa rigueur méthodologique.”
12“Au-delà de l’adhésion cynique à un projet de société inique, ce qui rend possible le
masquage de la glottophobie, c’est-à-dire des dimensions directement humaines, sociales, poli-
tiques, éthiques, des discriminations linguistiques, c’est une dissociation opérée entre langue
et société, entre pratiques linguistiques et locuteurs, entre formes linguistiques et formes
d’existence individuelle et collective. Cette dissociation a été réalisée par une longue tradi-
tion intellectuelle occidentale, y compris philosophique et scientifique, qui a conceptualisé ‘la
langue’ comme un outil cognitif: comme outil, elle serait extérieure à l’humain et pourrait être
évaluée, modifiée, validée ou invalidée d’un point de vue strictement technique; comme ensem-
ble d’opérations cognitives, elle serait extérieure au social et pourrait être évaluée, élaborée,
implémentée ou corrigée d’un strict point de vue neurologique et mathématique.”
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4 Ideology as process or as magic
The critiques of orthodox linguistics we have now surveyed should be taken seri-
ously. Yet, when they are not simply ignored, most of them are likely to be char-
acterized as arbitrary or unbalanced. Penelope Brown (2017: 391), for instance,
summarily dismisses Bourdieu-inspired objections to the Brown and Levinson
politeness framework as “postmodern posturing” which, she thinks, conveys the
ultimatum “study a phenomenon my way or not at all”. By no means all linguists
would assent to Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory. By contrast, the un-
willingness to entertain foundational challenge evident in Brown’s reaction is,
unfortunately, far more characteristic of the discipline.
It is nevertheless true, in so far as it is possible to judge, that most linguists
would explicitly oppose the universalizing and dominating politics which the
critiques we have surveyed associate with the discipline. That is only to be ex-
pected: ideology would not exist if consciously held intentions and beliefs were
transparently reflected in their holders’ intellectual and discursive practices.
In any case, the totalizing, hegemonic dimensions of linguistic theory that crit-
ics have identified are certainly not the only ones which students will retain from
their undergraduate training. The intellectual climate of linguistics is, as I have
already noted, surely mostly progressive, opposed to discrimination and, above
all, antiracist. As one American textbook expresses it, “looking more closely at
languages, and in particular at languages that might seem exotic to us, can make
us more tolerant” (Gasser 2012). Opposition to “prescriptivism”, which is ham-
mered into students from the first moments of their linguistic study, is the most
concrete manifestation of this kind of “tolerance”. As for another core aspect
of linguistics pedagogy, structural analysis of unfamiliar languages, there is no
doubt that this can offer powerful lessons in human diversity. Linguistics also
fosters values like curiosity, logical rigour, and appreciation of difference, along
with other mental capacities which can be harnessed for anti-reactionary and
critical ends. It is surely not among linguistics graduates that one should seek
virulent racists.
These considerations are certainly relevant, but they do not disprove the ex-
istence of the ideological effects discussed in the previous section. Instead, they
suggest that linguistics is not ideologically uniform, and that those effects are
not the only ones which need to be taken into account. In its intellectual and
educational practices, linguistics is, like any complex intellectual institution, het-
erogeneous: on the one hand, its practitioners are mostly characterized by an
open, liberal, vaguely left-leaning political ethos which the discipline’s content
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cannot but reflect in some ways; on the other, linguists’ theoretical assumptions
are inherited from longstanding, often more conservative, intellectual traditions
which should not be expected to be in phase with this encompassing political
culture, and which allow the discipline to be valued precisely as an autonomous
field with its own traditional modes of internal validation.
However, for the purposes of the ideological critique of a discipline, it is not
enough to reason solely from the content taught to students. Doing so would
leave us open to Baudrillard’s important objection against what he calls a “mag-
ical” conception of ideology. In standard ideological critique, Baudrillard (2001
[1972]: 79, italics original) says, “ideology […] always appears as the overblown
discourse of some great theme, content, or value […] whose allegorical power
somehow insinuates itself into consciousness (this has never been explained) in
order to integrate them.These become, in turn, the contents of thought that come
into play in real situations”. But critique of this kind of ideological effect, he says,
feeds off a magical conception of its object. It does not unravel ideology
as form, but as content, as given, transcendent value – a sort of mana that
attaches itself to several global representations that magically impregnate
those floating and mystified subjectivities called “consciousnesses.” (Bau-
drillard 2001 [1972]: 79)13
As we have seen, “instrumental reason”, “rationalism”, “individualism”, “homo-
geneism”, “ethnocentrism” or “colonialism”, are among the “great themes, con-
tents or values” that have been argued to be conveyed by linguistics or the social
sciences in general. Baudrillard’s critique would consist in asking exactly how
these themes come to actually affect linguistics students’ beliefs and practices, as
well as their consciousness: the failure to address this point no doubt accounts
for the tenuous, far-fetched, or arbitrary impression that the critiques discussed
in the last section may have left on some readers.
In order to develop a non-magical, non-allegorical account of the effect of ide-
ological content, Baudrillard insists that attention must be paid to the forms and
processes of that content’s transmission. Ideology, Baudrillard (2001 [1972]: 80)
claims, is nothing less than “the process of reducing and abstracting symbolic
material into a form” (italics added). This means that the analytical challenge is
to account for ideological effects in a way that explains how abstract doctrines
influence practice and consciousness not by simply positing a black box, but by
taking into account the processes involved in the generation of ideological effects
13See Larrain (1994) for a discussion of Baudrillard on ideology.
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at their point of production. If we want to critique linguistics effectively, we have
to do better than solely discerning abstract analogies or “allegories” between lin-
guistic and political ideas. Neither bourgeois individualism, nor colonialism, nor
any of the other ideological values purportedly conveyed by linguistic theorizing
can be claimed to be automatically induced in students simply because linguis-
tic theory can be described as “individualist” or “colonialist” in certain respects.
If they could, it would be possible to detect harmful ideological effects under
any disciplinary bed, justifying the impression of arbitrariness that ideological
critiques risk giving.
To properly establish an argument about the ideological tenor of a discipline,
analysis of content must be linked to analysis of the discursive and other material
forms in which that content is transmitted (cf. Debray 1996 [1994]). Attention to
linguistics as a set of educational forms, processes or practices therefore calls for
analysis, since it is through exposure to those forms and participation in those
practices in the course of disciplinary socialization that new audiences of stu-
dents are brought to take on the attitudes and practices of ideological interest.
The different effects that linguistics might have on students constitute the most
significant concrete influence that the discipline has, but they are almost never
discussed seriously. When it comes to analysis of the real effects of education
in linguistics, the discipline typically does not come closer than conventional
rhapsodic claims of linguistics’ ability to equip students for the needs of the in-
formation economy:
Students who major in linguistics acquire valuable intellectual skills, such as
analytical reasoning, critical thinking, argumentation, and clarity of expres-
sion. This means making insightful observations, formulating clear, testable
hypotheses, generating predictions, making arguments and drawing conclu-
sions, and communicating findings to a wider community. Linguistics majors
are therefore well equipped for a variety of graduate-level and professional
programs and careers. (Linguistic Society of America, “Why major in Lin-
guistics?”
https://www.linguisticsociety.org/content/why-major-linguistics, 10 April 2018)
How, then, might a more serious, non-“magical” account of the ideological
effects of linguistics pedagogy advance beyond the kind of marketing discourse
evident in this claim?
To answer, we can start with the epistemic or justificatory status which stu-
dents are encouraged to attribute to linguistic knowledge. As I have emphasized,
this knowledge does not command a similar level of disciplinary consensus to
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the results taught to students in the “hard” sciences – far from it. Nevertheless,
linguistic theory, particularly those parts of it constituting the core of the disci-
pline – those, in other words, in which the unique form hypothesis is asserted
most categorically – are regularly presented to students as “scientific”, and there-
fore as enjoying an epistemic authority qualitatively similar to that of the natural
sciences – not as great, certainly, but nevertheless of the same basic kind. Some
linguists would no doubt hesitate to make that claim openly, substituting for “sci-
entific” expressions like “empirical” or “systematic”, but the idea is always there
in the background, as can be easily confirmed by an inspection of Linguistics
websites, including that of my own department, with their explicit references to
“science”, or to unmistakably “scientific” methodologies (“discovering the com-
mon properties” of languages or of “the human language capacity”; italics below
are added):
Linguistics is the scientific study of language, aimed at finding out what lan-
guage is like, and why. Each of the world’s 6000 languages is a rich and
textured system, with its own sounds, its own grammar, and its own identity
and style. From the Amazon to Africa, from Southeast Asia to Aboriginal
Australia, we use language to think with, to persuade others, to gather infor-
mation, to organize our activities, to gossip, and ultimately to structure our
societies. (http://sydney.edu.au/arts/linguistics/, 25 July 2018)
Sciences of language degree. Linguistics sets itself the task of discovering the
common properties of languages by studying their formal properties, their
history, their diversity, their acquisition, and their pathologies.
(http://www.linguist.univ-paris-diderot.fr/_media/plaquette_licence_sciences_du_langage_nov_2016.pdf,
25 July 2018)14
Yes, linguistics is a science! […] Linguists develop and test scientific hypotheses.
Many linguists appeal to statistical analysis, mathematics, and logical formal-
ism to account for the patterns they observe.
(http://www.linguisticsociety.org/content/why-major-linguistics, 24 July 2018)
It is impossible to overstate the fundamental importance of language to in-
dividuals and society. Linguistics—the scientific study of language structure—
explores this complex relationship by asking questions about acquisition, pro-
duction, comprehension and evolution.
(https://arts-sciences.buffalo.edu/linguistics.html, 24 July 2018)
14“Licence Sciences du langage sdl. La linguistique s’efforce de dégager les propriétés communes
des langues en étudiant leurs propriétés formelles, leur histoire, leur diversité, leur apprentis-
sage, leurs pathologies.”
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Linguistics is the science of language. It is not about learning a new language;
rather, we study everything about language itself, ranging from how speech
is produced to the relationship between language and the human mind /
brain, and the role language plays in society.
(http://www.humanities.uct.ac.za/hum/departments/linguistics, 24 July 2018)
Linguistics is the scientific study of human language, from the sounds and
gestures of speech up to the organization of words, sentences, and meaning.
Linguistics is also concerned with the relationship between language and
cognition, society, and history.
(https://www.ling.upenn.edu/, 24 July 2018)
General Linguistics cross-linguistically explores the structures of the sound
systems, morphology, phrase construction, meaning and use of linguistic ex-
pressions and attempts to derive these from general laws of communication
and the human capacity for language
(https://www.linguistik.hu-berlin.de/de/institut/professuren/allgemeine-sprachwissenschaft/allgemeine-
sprachwissenschaft-s-prof/, 25 July 2018)15
The ideology of scientificity reflected here is not just a matter of academic mar-
keting: it remains embedded in linguistics education throughout undergraduate
studies in the subject and, in generativism, is strongly asserted in the form of
opposition to “methodological dualism” (Chomsky 1995; see Johnson 2007: 367
for a defence of the claim that there is “a remarkably tight point-by-point agree-
ment between the relevant aspects of linguistic methods and the underlying logic
of the other sciences”). Whatever the paradigm in question, approaching lan-
guages “scientifically” means discovering a unique form underlying the diversity
of speech.
In the context of their “scientific” study of language, students are explicitly or
implicitly encouraged to accept the following broad presuppositions:
Totalizing objectivity. The language practices of human communities should be
approached from the point of view of their formal and structural coherence, with
the aim of reducing them to the single (ideational) reality of linguistic structure
(grammar). The structural reality thereby discovered is factual and objective on
every level of linguistic analysis: every language has a unique, precise and discov-
erable level of semantic content, a unique representation of morphosyntax and
15“Die Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft untersucht einzelsprachübergreifend die Strukturen der
Lautsysteme, derWortbildung, des Satzbaus, der Bedeutung und der Verwendung sprachlicher
Ausdrücke und versucht diese aus allgemeinen Gesetzmäßigkeiten der Kommunikation und
der menschlichen Sprachfähigkeit abzuleiten.”
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phonology; a unique information structure, etc. It is the job of linguistic theory
to reveal all these levels, with the overall aim of bringing to light the grammar
of the language.
Reducibility. Actually observed utterances are therefore the imperfect realiza-
tions of a level of underlying, more regular structure. The flux of “performance”,
replete with non-normative structures, is mined to extract fixed categories, on
the hypothesis that variation is not essential to language, but the cloak in which
an invariant structure is concealed. Actual utterances, with their numerous “un-
grammatical” phrases, “sentence fragments” and “production errors”, are thus de-
graded in comparison to the underlying representations which they imperfectly
realize, and which can be captured in a unique and stable metalanguage in a way
which reconciles cultural and cognitive diversity. The recognition of variation is
not consistent throughout the discipline: as is often admitted by variationists, the
study of linguistic variation is principally concerned with dominant languages.16
In one’s own language, variation can therefore be studied, but in someone else’s,
uniformity is assumed.
Formalizibility. Languages lend themselves to a formal or quasi-formal descrip-
tion through rule-systems.
Transparency. This formalization is, most often, transparent (intuitive, shal-
low), in the sense that the rules believed to underlie the object-language can be
expressed in the theorist’s native language without any need for this to be en-
riched with an extended apparatus of technical concepts. For instance, “thematic
roles” (agent, patient, recipient, etc.), a core component of descriptive and the-
oretical grammar, are defined through ordinary language expressions (“move”,
“action”, “place”, “possession”, etc.), and definitions of Vendlerian aspectual cat-
egories make reference to commonsense notions like “limited”, “instantaneous”,
and so on. Wierzbicka and Goddard’s well known Natural Semantic Metalan-
guage (nsm) framework is a striking example: in this theory, all possible word
meanings are reduced to intuitive definitions in “natural” language, supposedly
without the least technical accretions (see Wierzbicka 1996). To analyse seman-
tics in nsm, there is therefore no need to develop a sophisticated technical ap-
paratus: ordinary language suffices. Not all semantic theories, of course, are as
16Cf. the “Widening horizons: cross-cultural approaches to linguistic variation” workshop at
nwav 45 in 2016, whose abstract starts with the words: “Despite great advances in variationist
sociolinguistics in the last decades, a major limitation is the fact that the great majority of
studies are done on relatively few languages; existing work in our discipline also leaves non-
Western societies massively under-represented. Hence the accepted wisdom and prevailing
theories and models in sociolinguistics actually rest on a culturally narrow base” (conference
booklet, pp. 32–33, http://web.uvic.ca/~ddenis/NWAV%2045%20Booklet.pdf).
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reluctant as nsm to adopt a technical metalanguage. Neverthlesss, transparency
is characteristic of a large part of linguistics, especially as it is presented to stu-
dents.
The authority of linguistics. Thanks to the properties of objectivity, reducibility
and formalizability, linguistics is a science, and linguists hold an intellectual au-
thority which qualifies them to pronounce on human linguistic nature in their
own right, without mastering the technical competencies of the biological or
brain sciences.
None of the principles I have listed would be accepted without qualification by
all linguists. Nonetheless, they constitute a reasonably accurate summary of the
hypotheses that most students studying “mainstream” linguistics, especially in
the English-speaking world, are encouraged to embrace during the early years
of their linguistics study. These years are, of course, the operative period for
the purposes of analysing the discipline’s most important ideological effects, be-
cause most students never advance to a stage where the premises of linguistic
research are seriously challenged or complexified: in order to study the ideologi-
cal effects of linguistics, it is undergraduates, not doctoral students, who should
be observed.
From the beginning of their linguistic studies, students learn that language can
legitimately be approached in the highly systematizing and totalizing way that
is necessary if a unique form underlying the plurality of a speech community’s
linguistic practices is to be revealed. In thinking about language within their own
society or outside it, students are trained in an essentially reductive and classifi-
catory approach to human diversity. This framework defines a unique, idealized,
normative model of language and meaning (the “language faculty”, “linguistic
universals”, “grammatical structure”, “semantic/conceptual structure”), with ref-
erence to which linguistic variability is conceptualized. Almost always, intellec-
tual effort in linguistics is devoted to referring complex and multifaceted facts
to a framework of general rules, in order to reduce the motley variety of hu-
man languages to the operations of a unique and singular structure. The reduc-
tive, universalizing and classificatory mental habits formed during this training
constitute, I believe, the principal mechanisms by which the ideological effects
identified in the previous section are created.
In fostering their capacities of abstraction and idealization in the context of the
unique form hypothesis, students are trained and examined in formal techniques
of reduction and analysis much more than in hermeneutic ones of interpretation
or complexification. In line with this orientation, students are often taught that:
• Predicates belong to a small handful of semantic categories (those of Vend-
ler 1957);
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• A language’s vocabulary can be exhaustively categorized into a finite set
of lexical categories;
• Discourse has a basic unit — the phrase, utterance, or turn;
• Some phrases are grammatical, others ungrammatical;
• Propositions (truth-conditional statements) are at the base of meaning;
• Conversation is governed by a small number of conversational maxims or
similar principles;
• Speech acts can be taxonomized into a finite number of specific categories;
• Words’ diverse uses can be reduced to a meaning or definition, or a finite
set of these, reducible in turn to a set of conceptual primitives.
Behind the variety and complexity of human speech acts, a kind of underlying
force or power can therefore be identified: abstract linguistic reason, the essential
properties of the linguistic “system”, deriving from psychological, biological or
quite simply grammatical constants.
On the whole, the concepts I have just listed are not approached as partial
interpretative perspectives on linguistic facts, useful for certain specific purposes.
Instead, they are reified, and claimed to constitute the permanent essence of lin-
guistic structure. Linguistic diversity ends up being understood as what is left af-
ter the maximum number of cross-linguistic generalizations have been extracted.
Linguistic aspects of human life are presented as the rational products of under-
lying rule-systems. For this to be plausible, significant idealization is necessary:
what is studied are “grammar”, “vocabularies”, “language families” – imaginary,
idealized constructs remote from, and not easily de-idealized to, situated acts of
speech.
It is precisely because they have been idealized that languages admit the gen-
eralizations about them that students are encouraged to make. It goes without
saying that both generalization and idealization are necessary and unavoidable in
intellectual activity and there could be no question of studying language without
them. But they can be presented to students in different ways, and the universal-
izing and reductive manner in which they are currently understood in linguistics
is only one of them (cf. Stokhof & van Lambalgen 2011).
What ideological effect might this kind of training have? There are two as-
pects that are worth exploring: the implications of the fact that the universaliz-
ing and reductive theorization of unique form is conducted in a Western, usu-
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ally English, metalanguage; and the meaning of the universalizing and reduc-
tive energies themselves that students are trained to channel. We will deal with
these in turn in the next two sections. First, however, it is worth emphasizing
the modernity of this intellectual configuration. Experts on language have not
always claimed that grammatical knowledge encompassed human language in
an exhaustive, scientific way. Eighteenth-century English grammarians, for in-
stance, quite frequently acknowledged that at least some aspects of the grammat-
ical structure of English simply could not be summed up in neat rules. In such
cases it is not the “head” – the seat of rationally statable, rule-based grammati-
cal knowledge – which is the judge of what the correct construction is, but the
“ear”, which “will overrule judgement and theory”, as the English grammarian
Anselm Bayly put it in his 1772 Plain and complete grammar of the English Lan-
guage (Bayly 1772: 61).17 As well as the rational principles governing language
structure, then, Bayly recognized the influence of a whole domain of different
ones, connected with aesthetic or perhaps stylistic, rather than strictly rational,
principles, and reinforced by usage. These mark out a territory into which gram-
mar is represented as unable to venture, and which escapes from the possibility
of description by objective rules. Bayly’s vision is characteristic of the period:
language is hybrid in nature, largely constituted by rational, orderly principles
which can be described and submitted to conscious regulation, while at the same
time containing aspects which evade the grip of rule-based formalization, and
which are a matter of “taste and judgement”, as William Cobbett expressed the
point (Cobbett 1983 [1818]: 56).18 Far from a formal theory being able to account
for the entirety of discourse, grammarians acknowledged that there were some
regions into which their expertise could not penetrate.
Bayly and Cobbett’s present-day successors do not have the luxury of being
able simply to declare some aspects of grammatical organization off-limits. The
centralizing and universalizing intellectual dynamic of formal linguistics has
the goal of reducing all of a community’s language practices to a single struc-
17See Bayly (1772: 26, 44) for some illustrative passages.
18The ear, then, occasionally trumps the head. But this principle of the sovereignty of the ear
was applied only selectively, to those cases where the grammarian could not devise any rules
to neatly describe the particular aspect of grammar in question. Where such rules could be
invented, no amount of appeal to the “natural demand” of the ear would be countenanced. For
Lowth, for instance, even though ordinary language use is sanctioned by the ear, this in itself
gives it no grammatical warrant; as he explains (Lowth 1762: 9), English is very often spoken
inaccurately, no matter how good it sounds to the ear. The contradiction of allowing that some
aspects of language could be left to the discernment of the ear, but that in other apparently
similar cases the ear had to be ignored, seems not to have been noticed.
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ture, a grammar – and often then to claim that a single set of theoretical cat-
egories is capable of accounting for all languages (universal grammar, “the ba-
sic blueprint that all languages follow”, as it is put by a well-known linguistics
textbook, Fromkin et al. 2010: 18). This theoretical process frames the structure
of language and languages, including the “structure” of meaning, as a unique
and determinate object open to empirical methods of discovery, aspiring to the
imagined epistemology of the natural sciences (see Zwicky 1973 for a striking
example).19
5 Western ethnocentrism
The first of the two ideological effects of linguistics pedagogy that we will dis-
cuss lies in the implications of the metalanguage in which this kind of analysis is
conducted. It is no doubt in semantics – a domain presupposed by a great deal of
linguistic description and theory – that the relevant effects can bemost clearly ob-
served. Semantics depends on the proposition that the linguist’s native language
is an adequate medium for the representation of meaning cross-linguistically. If,
like most linguistic semanticists, I hold a mentalist theory of meaning, then I am
justified in using a minimally enriched version of my own native language to
reveal what others have in mind when they speak, regardless of what language
they happen to be using. Semantic theory, as expressed in English, reveals both
the content of others’ semantic representations, and the conceptual structures
on which this content rests.
The very tool of cross-linguistic semantic research – a Western metalanguage,
usually English – therefore participates in what Anchimbe & Janney (2017: 109)
have called “the ad hoc transformation of the West’s emic research perspectives
into the prescribed etic standards for the rest of the world”. This entails some
uncomfortable consequences: even if “exotic” languages are configured differ-
ently from the researcher’s metalanguage, they can nevertheless, at base, be “con-
tained” in the latter. The point is not limited to semantics: in all domains of gram-
mar, the mainly Western languages which serve as metalanguages for compar-
ative research do not assume the status of languages like any other, into which
“exotic” languages can be translated in necessarily approximate, rudimentary,
contextually variable ways: they are, on the contrary, master-codes in which
fixed, context-independent, explanatory representations of exotic meaning can
be definitively supplied. The universe of meaning in non-Western languages
turns out to be completely “legible” or “decipherable” in Western metalanguages.
19I am grateful to Geoff Pullum for this reference.
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In a discussion of informant-training in his once well-known 1967 handbook
on linguistic fieldwork, William Samarin (1967: 41) states that “the ultimate goal
is to get the informant to think about language as the investigator does [and to
answer questions in] the way he should respond”. Such a frank admission that
the goal of fieldwork is to substituteWesternmetalinguistic categories for indige-
nous ones, even in the consciousness of the informant, would not, of course, be
easily avowable today. Nevertheless, contemporary glossing practices have ex-
actly the same effect, as though Samarin’s instructions to field-workers – to aim
for the native informant to wholly assimilate the linguist’s metalinguistic cate-
gories – were still in full effect. The most visible semantic theories, such as cogni-
tive semantics or Wierzbicka’s Natural Semantic Metalanguage (see Wierzbicka
1996) give the impression that English, in which research in these frameworks is
mostly presented, is not just spoken in every airport and hotel in the world, but
in every head as well. The uncomfortable conclusion is that this arrangement is,
in short, a striking example of Christine Delphy’s (2008: 31) definition of racism:
the idea that “the characteristics of the dominant are not seen as specific char-
acteristics but as the […] normal way of being” — normal, in the sense that it
is the vocabulary of dominant languages which provides the universally valid
metalanguage in which the significations of any language can be represented.20
Charles Taylor observes that
We are always in danger of seeing our ways of acting and thinking as
the only conceivable ones. This is exactly what ethnocentrism consists in.
Understanding other societies ought to wrench us out of this; it ought to
alter our self-understanding. (Taylor 1985: 129)
However, current semantic theories are not meant to entail any alteration to
their users’ self-understanding. From the moment that one presents expressions
in English as markers of invariant semantic “primitives”, the possibility is ex-
cluded that their meanings could be changed by their analytical function. Seman-
tic analysis is not dialectical: an object-language expression is analysed through
a known, usually native-language expression, whose meaning is presumed to be
fixed and settled, and which can therefore serve as a point of reference for the
representation of exotic meanings.
It is one thing to state – incontestably – that different languages can be trans-
lated and understood for the purposes of a very wide range of practices and
20“Les caractéristiques des dominants ne sont pas vues comme des caractéristiques spécifiques
mais comme la façon d’être […] normale.”
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interactions. It is quite another to imagine that that reflects a cognitive identity
in meaning, and that a single language – most often, English – provides an all-
encompassing metalanguage capable of representing all other languages’ mean-
ings. John Lucy’s (1997: 333) critique of the Berlin and Kay colour typology, that
it “dictated in advance the possible meanings the terms could have since no other
meanings were embodied in the [Munsell colour] samples”, can be generalized
to all of semantics: the use of English as a metalanguage also dictates in advance
the possible meanings of object-language terms.
Descriptive linguists who engage in fieldwork know very well, and frequently
mention, how far their metalinguistic tools are provisional and inadequate to
theoretical expectations, unable to account definitively for languages’ structural
and semantic reality. Linguistic theory, by contrast, conveys an entirely different
idea. For the epistemology of theoretical linguistics, it is more or less inconceiv-
able that our own linguistic categories might be inappropriate for the representa-
tion of foreign meanings. Of course, it is freely admitted that certain parts of the
vocabulary –words for colours, for emotional states, etc. – wholly or partly resist
metalinguistic definition, but those very parts are problematic for the semantic
analysis of our own languages too. For everything which can be represented
metasemantically, English – the dominant language of metalinguistic analysis –
works. For metalinguistic purposes, there are no areas in which English turns
out to be less adequate than others. Difference is abolished, with the English-
speaking student in semantics being trained in an analytical technique that rests
on the presupposition that their language and their meanings are, in a sense,
the only ones that exist, since they can serve as a universal metalanguage for
the representation of foreign or exotic meanings. There is a significant symbolic
violence in this position: not only does the world speak English, it thinks in it
too.
6 Theoretical domination?
Anglophone ethnocentrism is not the only ideological value reinforced by under-
graduate linguistics education.The second ideological consequence of linguistics
pedagogy derives from the reductive intellectual dynamic of the unique form
hypothesis itself and the claims to scientificity that accompany it. The field of
theoretical competition over language in undergraduate linguistics education,
I suggest, inducts students into practices which will be reengaged when, after
graduation, they enter the labour market and come to participate fully in the
competition of differing social interests that that entails. This induction oper-
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ates on two levels. Fields of linguistics (phonology, morphology, syntax, histor-
ical linguistics, and much of semantics and pragmatics) in which instruction is
mainly based around problem sets and concrete analysis model the norms of or-
derly, rule-governed and dispassionate decision-making essential to the ideology
of contemporary technocratic administration. This much is more or less explic-
itly admitted in the marketing many linguistics departments regularly undertake.
The spirit of disciplined, hierarchical reasoning characteristic of formal linguis-
tics recalls Horkheimer’s (1992 [1947]: 22) critique of the reduction of language in
modernity “to just another tool in the gigantic apparatus of production inmodern
society”. It is, consistently, also strongly reminiscent of Max Weber’s principles
of bureaucracy (Weber 1947: 329–341), which I present here in a selective and
summarized form (Blackburn 1967: 177–178):
1. All official actions are bound by rules with the official subject to strict and
systematic control from above.
2. Each functionary has a limited and defined sphere of competence.
3. The organization of offices follows a principle of hierarchywith each lower
one subordinate to each higher one.
In drumming a procedural, rule-based approach to complexity into students, lin-
guistics education trains them in the habits of streamlined rational organisation
well suited to the demands of administrative work in many domains.
The second way in which the reductive training of scientific linguistics oper-
ates ideologically is through a tension created by the unique form hypothesis
itself: the clash between the search for a single, definitive representation of lan-
guage structure, and the fact that multiple analyses of any theoretical problem
can always be envisaged (this is, of course, just one instance of the more general
underdetermination of theory by evidence in empirical enquiry). Theoretical lin-
guistic analyses are perspectives on or interpretations of languages. Any gram-
matical analysis depends on a multitude of little decisions about how a chaos of
variable performance data is to be idealized and normalized in order to be turned
into the imaginary constructs of “language” and “grammar”. As acknowledged
by Hockett (1958: 147) in the passage quoted by Kaplan (this volume, p. 17), these
depend on creative decisions informed by a myriad of considerations on which
opinions can legitimately differ. In this situation, it demands significant intellec-
tual determination to elevate contingent and hermeneutic answers to these ques-
tions into unique, “scientific” and definitive analyses. In fields like semantics and
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pragmatics, where the role of the investigator’s subjective, discretionary judge-
ment is determinant in arriving at a definitive theoretical analysis, analytical
indeterminacy is overwhelming, though typically not fully acknowledged, with
claims of the empirical authority and uniqueness of the researcher’s preferred
analysis remaining largely unqualified by any recognition of theoretical plural-
ism.When the availability of more than one theoretical solution is acknowledged,
it is typically resolved by appeal to values of “parsimoniousness”, “elegance”, or
“explanatory” capacity.The claim of any one analysis to empirical or scientific au-
thority therefore depends on a hermeneutic – subjective, discretionary, aesthetic
– judgement par excellence, the judgement that solution x is “simpler”, more “ele-
gant”, “economic”, or “explanatory” than solution y.21 Althusser (2015 [1976]: 105)
refers to the formalist or taxonomic tradition in idealist philosophy as the “ma-
nia for domination through categorisation”. Exactly such a mania characterizes
linguistics in its pursuit of the unique form hypothesis. Students learn that the
manifest diversity of possible solutions to analytical problems cannot be main-
tained: despite appearances, only one of the many possible analyses of a phono-
logical, syntactic or semantic problem can be endorsed as accurate, and dominate
theoretically.
Hermeneutic considerations therefore underlie claims of empirical accuracy
in core linguistics subfields. The same hermeneutic foundation is evident on the
higher level of framework selection. Questions of choice between theoretical
frameworks (generativism versus “West Coast” functionalism in syntax, Rele-
vance Theory versus more classically Gricean approaches in pragmatics, Wierz-
bickian versus cognitive, or truth-functional versus definitional semantics) can-
not be resolved by objective considerations, and the role of essentially discre-
tionary and interpretative judgement in preferring one approach to another is
inescapable. Yet the proponents of different frameworks rarely find the need to
justify their theoretical choices in depth, and certainly do not engage in detailed
theory comparison, but still enjoy the full force of claims of empirical uniqueness.
The student of a Chomskyan will benefit from demonstrations of the “scientific”
or “empirical” accuracy of generativism and of the mistakenness of alternative
paradigms like Cognitive Linguistics. Cognitive linguists, in turn, claim a scien-
tific authority for their own, different analyses. And so on: despite the courtesy
and collegial respect evident in themajority of linguistics departments that I have
21From this perspective, it is striking to note that Ludlow (2011: 159) denies that “there is a genuine
notion of simplicity apart from the notion of ‘simple for us to use’ ”: simplicity, he says, “is in
the eye of the theorist” (Ludlow 2011: 161), and varies from one research community to the next,
and over time.
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observed, each “academic lobby” (Rastier 1993: 155) presents its own approach to
language as the correct, and most often, as the only really legitimate one, despite
the self-evident fact that it is only ever one among a number of theoretical alter-
natives, with choice between them being established on essentially discretionary
grounds.22 Bourdieu’s (2003 [1997]: 44) reference, in the context of philosophy,
to “the contradiction […] which arises from the existence of a plurality of philo-
sophical visions, each claiming exclusive access to a truth which they claim to
be single” carries over to linguistics perfectly.
Undergraduate textbooks, accordingly, most often shelter their preferred the-
ory and methodology from the threat of alternative perspectives through claims
of the disciplinary longevity, influence, or institutional entrenchment of the fa-
voured approach: “a longstanding and influential view about language”, states
Kearns (2008: 6) at the start of her introduction to truth-functional, formal se-
mantics, “is that the meaningfulness of language amounts to its ‘aboutness’ ”.
Adger’s (2003: 14) stipulation of theoretical assumptions at the start of Core Syn-
tax is similarly discretionary: “[t]he approach to syntax that we will take in this
book, and which is taken more generally in generative grammar, assumes that
certain aspects of human psychology are similar to phenomena of the natural
world, and that linguistic structure is one of those aspects”; challenges to this
assumption are not even mentioned. Frameworks are taught not so much be-
cause they and their assumptions are “right”, though this is certainly implied,
but because they are more “influential” or “general” than their competitors. No
greater accountability from teachers for their choices of theoretical perspective
is expected. Lawson (2001: 9) notes that “[t]he rhetoric of dismissing a theory
as ‘uninteresting’ […] seems to be one of the stock-in-trade notions of introduc-
tory, as well as advanced, texts in linguistics”. Twentieth-century textbooks of
linguistics, he notes, “present the historically most-highly contested elements of
their theories simply as fact”, and “the most tenuous and problematic premises
of a linguistic theory have tended to be presented to the reader of introductory
linguistics texts as a natural assumption, true by definition or out of common
sense” (Lawson 2001: 12).
Whether within frameworks or between them, it is the institutional authority
held by an academic in the classroom setting that allows the arbitrariness of these
theoretical choices to be obscured, the existence of analytical indeterminacy and
competing theoretical frameworks to be rejected in an essentially voluntaristic
22See McElvenny’s discussion (this volume, p. 42) of Boas’ “domineering role in the world of
Americanist anthropology, freely blocking the work of researchers who did not meet his fre-
quently quite arbitrary standards”.
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way, and the threat these pose to the academic’s own theoretical preferences
and hence authority to be obviated. Students quickly learn that linguistic experts
can claim authoritative “scientific” or “empirical” uniqueness for their preferred
theoretical framework, even in the absence of disciplinary consensus.23
This exercise of discretionary theoretical power, we might speculate, consti-
tutes the most important ideological consequence of the unique form hypothesis
as an educational practice in linguistics. The spectacle of theoretical justification
to which students are exposed in their linguistics training habituates them to
a certain acceptance of arbitrary symbolic authority – their lecturer’s – which
will be rapidly reactivated outside the university in the figure of their employer,
landlord or political “representative”. This authority is at its most obvious when
students sit examinations or submit work to be marked: here, the extent to which
academic success is a function of their lecturer’s discretionary judgement is clear.
In submitting to their lecturer’s theoretical authority over the thoroughly mate-
rial stakes of their academic results, students reinforce dispositions that will be
reengaged in the far more coercive world of labour-market exploitation which
they will soon fully (try to) join.
For academics, too, the stakes of theoretical competition are not just imma-
terial or intellectual, confined to a world immune from any extra-disciplinary
considerations. Theories are also the instruments of careers, and enable the ac-
quisition and exercise of institutional power and professional advancement. The-
oretical pluralism and the evaluative equivalence it suggests between different
frameworks sits uneasily in a rigidly hierarchical institutional context like that
of the university. In such a world, theoretical competition is natural. Only if the
unique form hypothesis is in place can intellectual competition for the best the-
ory of language be aligned with material competition for professional rewards.
I have suggested, then, that linguistics education ends up prefiguring the con-
flict of interests in society. It does not do this, however, by conveying any explicit
theoretical content: asserting that would be precisely the “magical” or “allegori-
cal” view of ideology criticized by Baudrillard. Rather, the ideological import of
linguistics education should be located in its pedagogical processes and forms of
23The discretionary authority detained by the academic is, perhaps, nowhere in greater evidence
than in the grammaticality assignments on which syntactic theorizing rests. There can be no
rules to determine whether a sentence is grammatical: the native speaker’s intuition is the only
judge, and one of the most commented-on features of syntax classes is the regularity of dis-
agreements.These inevitable disputes are a prime arena for the imposition of the linguist’s own
preferences: for the purposes of a syntax class, a sentence is grammatical if the lecturer says
it is. The discretionary authority exerted by the linguist in stipulations about grammaticality
is a microcosm of the authority they detain more generally.
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transmission. In studying linguistics students learn to submit to – and to assume
– a certain way of exercising arbitrary symbolic power in the domain of theory,
by gradually accepting the scientistic pretensions of a basically discretionary,
subjective institutional practice. Students studying linguistics are encouraged to
develop generalizations and theories about linguistic aspects of the humanworld
in a highly reductive and abstract way, subject to fairly lax empirical controls.
The verification procedures they are trained to employ rarely go beyond the ide-
alized and hence hypothetical representations under study, and are strongly con-
ditioned by their lecturer’s interpretative preferences. By validating their own
theoretical preferences in the context of the unique form hypothesis and by effec-
tively sheltering them from serious contestation, academics model for students
the way that claims of scientificity, reason and empirical responsibility can be
deployed to legitimate individual sovereign interests.
The arbitrariness of justification in the theoretical order, embodied in the re-
gimes of authority of the university, comes therefore to correspond to the arbi-
trariness of the material and political order outside it. In giving students, at an
important stage of their intellectual development, and at the very moment when
they are on the point of entering the full-time labour-market, the authorization
to claim scientific status, in the context of the unique form hypothesis, for what
remain essentially discretionary and unoperationalized interpretations, linguis-
tics education, whatever its other effects, normalizes the unjustifiable exercise of
power.
The fact that the ideological properties of linguistics are rooted in the wider
institutional context of higher education means that commonalities between lin-
guistics and other “human sciences” should exist. This is, indeed, the case: habit-
uation to the arbitrariness of intellectual power is arguably a hallmark of edu-
cation in the humanities in general (see Riemer 2016a for some preliminary dis-
cussion). It is commonplace to insist on the capacity of the humanities to foster
students’ critical capacities, but the complement of this process is a risk that is
often ignored – the possibility that humanities disciplines, linguistics included,
end up habituating students to different kinds of arbitrary symbolic domination,
forerunners of the very real forms of domination to which they will soon have
to reconcile themselves as job seekers amid the madness of capitalist labour mar-
kets, or that they will themselves exert as members of the comparatively privi-
leged Western middle classes (see Pinsker 2015).
258
9 Linguistic form: A political epistemology
7 Education and linguistic ‘science’ in a post-truth world
If linguistics was a natural or “hard” science – if, that is, theoretical activity was
governed by protocols generally accepted throughout the discipline, thereby pro-
ducing objective and agreed-on results – we would be wholly justified in accept-
ing every theoretical linguistic result, regardless of its apparent ideological tenor.
This is not, however, our situation. As we have noted, there is no single theory
accepted discipline-wide: linguists do not even agree on how to define the object
they study. Unlike the sciences of nature, linguistics, as a human “science”, con-
cerns the behaviour of autonomous creatures endowed with their own ways of
existing and understanding the world. Given this, it is not self-evident that the-
oretical understanding is obtained through an objectifying and reductive analyt-
ical procedure, assimilating grammar and meaning to a determinate object able
to be studied using the empirical techniques of the natural sciences, rather than
through a pluralistic process of interpretation, drawing the study of language
closer to that of other socio-cultural performances. Anthropology, literary his-
tory and sociology are all empirical disciplines which propose explanations, not
just descriptions, of the objects they study. But they do not have the ambition of
producing reductive and singular analyses of their objects. As far as linguistics
is concerned, it is no more obvious that it should advance unique analyses of
grammatical and semantic “structure” than it is that literary historians should
converge on a unique interpretation of a canonical text.
Linguistic analyses of grammar and meaning intrinsically entail conclusions
about the conceptual competencies of speakers and the cultural resources of com-
munities. Sidelining the entire interpretative dimension of linguistics, ignoring
the multiplicity of analyses that is always possible, claiming to discover a unique
conceptual form underlying speech – this is, as we have seen, what a large part
of linguistics education involves. At a time when racist and other identitarian
forms of discrimination are strongly on the rise, when many political actors seek
to caricature the psychology of entire civilizations and social categories in ways
whose reactionary intentions are only too clear, and in the “post-truth” era when
the results of scientific research are routinely threatened by pseudo-sciences in
the pockets of influential political lobbies, linguists have a responsibility not to
insist on the necessity or scientific credentials of their fundamentally wholly
hermeneutic analyses, if we do not wish to reinforce the abuses of science and
expertise characteristic of our age.
Just as it is important to validate “minor” languages, a challenge which lin-
guists often take up explicitly, minor linguistics should be validated too. To do
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so is natural, given a basically hermeneutic understanding of what the discipline
is. In this chapter, I have described some of the ideological factors that entrench
the unique form hypothesis in linguistics, especially in its ramifications in under-
graduate education, and which obscure the ample reasons to call it into question.
The purely speculative, strictly non-“scientific” nature of this “political epistemol-
ogy” of the unique form hypothesis might strike readers from the mainstream of
linguistics as problematic. Such a reaction would be mistaken. A discipline’s de-
velopment does not involve just the collection, analysis and theorization of data,
but should also consist in collective reflection on the various aims and effects of
those practices. This reflection must not allow itself to be diverted into a purely
“academic” and abstract investigation of the sociology of linguistic theory, valu-
able though that would be in its own right. Linguists are not sociologists, and we
do not have to be in order to undertake metatheoretical reflection on the possible
social meaning of our practices. In a world disfigured by the ecological, economic
and political violence of the neoliberal capitalist order, the value of theoretical
understanding and education derives from the contribution they make to har-
nessing reason for the progress of society. It is therefore incumbent on those of
us responsible for the creation and transmission of knowledge to interrogate our
own practices in order to assess how far they facilitate or obstruct this goal. As
participants in the education of the next generation of workers, unemployed, ex-
ploiters and voters, it is difficult to reflect too deeply on our discipline’s possible
social effects.
This vision entails no dogmatism, and certainly does not threaten, as onemight
be tempted to think, to coercively subordinate linguistics to any particular politi-
cal program. On the contrary, it allows us to conceive of the discipline as a site of
a pluralistic and reflexive exchange, and justifies a blossoming of different theo-
retical frameworks and approaches. As a disciplinary practice, that is, as a matter
of fact, what linguistics often already is. That the discipline’s conventional epis-
temology can only analyse this as theoretical competition is a fact that surely sits
uneasily with the solidarity that should be at the origin of intellectual progress,
whether in theory or education.
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